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CHAPTER 1: OVERVIEW OF RESEARCH 
 
1.1 INTRODUCTION 
Corporate social responsibility (CSR) has grown in prominence, following the greater 
awareness of stakeholders on the social and environmental implications of business 
activities. Such awareness has put firms under great pressure to be dynamically 
involved in CSR activities and report them (Halme & Huse, 1997; Zwetsloot & Van 
Marrewijk, 2004; Ingley, 2008). This is to exhibit greater accountability and 
transparency to the stakeholders (Gray, Owen & Adams, 1996; Hess, 2007), manage 
firms’ relationship with the stakeholders (Ullmann, 1985; Huang & Kung, 2010), 
demonstrate good corporate image or reputation (Hooghiemstra, 2000; Bebbington, 
Larrinaga & Moneva, 2008; Criado-Jimenez, Fernandez-Chulian, Larrinage-Gonzalez 
& Husillos-Carques, 2008), and to maintain firms’ legitimacy in the eyes of society 
(Deegan, 2002, 2007; Chen & Roberts, 2010).  
Corporate social responsibility reporting (CSRR1) has become an important agenda in 
firms; particularly post-Enron (Owen, 2005; Cooper & Owen, 2007; Aras & Crowther, 
2008). This period has witnessed the urge of firms to address issues such as ethics, 
accountability, transparency and disclosure. The body of literature in the field of CSR 
has increased in the past few decades; thus indicating to a certain extent the importance 
of CSRR (Bebbington, 1997; Mathews, 1997; Gray, 2002, 2010; Parker, 2005, 2011; 
Deegan & Soltys, 2007; Owen, 2008). While most of the extant literature offers 
insights, mainly from the perspective of developed countries, contributions from the 
                                                 
1 Throughout this  thesis, CSRR refers to corporate social responsibility reporting and CSR refers to corporate social responsibility. 
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perspective of developing countries still remain limited (Belal & Momin, 2009; Islam, 
2010).  
With the awareness that the developing countries are also confronted with widespread 
social and environmental challenges resulting from rapid economic development, 
explosive population growth and the urbanisation process2
 
(Hart, 1997; Campbell-
Lendrum & Corvalan, 2007), more research efforts are warranted in these countries. 
The CSR agendas set in the developing countries are quite different collectively from 
those faced by developed countries (Newell, 2005; Baughn, Bodie & McIntosh, 2007; 
CSR Asia, 2008; Visser, 2008; Saleh, Zulkifli & Muhamad, 2011); thereby requiring 
specific attention to be paid to CSR in developing countries.  
Malaysia, as a developing country, is not without its share of social and environmental 
problems. Continuous rapid economic growth, as well as globalisation and urbanisation, 
are often related to a number of environmental issues. These include climate change, 
environmental degradation and disruption of ecological diversity, depletion of non-
renewable natural resources and extinction of wildlife species (Abdullah, 1995; Hezri & 
Hasan, 2006; Muyibi, Ambali & Eissa, 2008; Jahi, Aiyub, Arifin & Awang, 2009).  
On the social aspect, several cases of corporate misconduct have been reported; for 
example, Transmile Group Berhad and Megan Media Holdings Berhad (Zaimee, 2007; 
Oh, 2010; Norwani, Mohamad & Chek, 2011), together with issues of corruption 
(Siddiquee, 2010; Harun & Hafizuddin, 2012). All of these raise the importance of 
extending firms’ accountability to all stakeholders and acting in a socially responsible 
manner in all areas of business activities (Brennan & Solomon, 2008; Carroll & 
Shabana, 2010; Solomon, 2010). To demonstrate commitments of firms towards these 
                                                 
2 The Star, October 26, 2011, ‘Asia, Africa megacities top climate change risk survey’. 
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broader responsibilities, there is the need to establish social and environmental reporting 
by firms, which this thesis terms as CSRR. 
Prior literature has documented an upward trend of CSRR, following the increase in 
public pressure and coverage in the mass media on various issues of CSR (Patten, 1991; 
Brown & Deegan, 1998; Hooghiemstra, 2000; Kent & Monem, 2008). In Malaysia, 
although a similar pattern of reporting is apparent (Association of Certified Chartered 
Accountants (ACCA), 2004, 2010), a number of researchers argue about the low level 
of CSRR among Malaysian firms, and claim that Malaysia is still in its infancy of 
CSRR (Thompson & Zakaria, 2004; Bursa Malaysia, 2007; Lu & Castka, 2009; 
Othman, Darus & Arshad, 2011). Perhaps, the current stage of CSRR in Malaysia can 
be improved through the development of appropriate governance mechanisms and 
reporting guidelines, as well as the enforcement of relevant reporting regulations to 
enable firms to discharge their broader responsibility to the society. 
Most of the available CSRR literature, particularly in the developing countries, 
examines the nature and extent of CSRR, and the motivation behind such reporting, 
from various perspectives; for example, legitimacy, stakeholder and institutional theory 
(Owen, 2008; Belal & Momin, 2009; Islam, 2010). Drawing upon stakeholder theory, 
the stakeholders of a firm play a significant role in driving CSRR (Ullmann, 1985). 
They are in a good position to exert pressure on firms to disclose CSRR, and to 
influence regulators or government authorities to regulate CSRR (Ullmann, 1985; 
Roberts, 1992; Epstein & Freedman, 1994; Tilt, 1994; Deegan & Rankin, 1997; 
O'Dwyer, Unerman & Hession, 2005; Islam & Deegan, 2008; Huang & Kung, 2010). 
This is due to the power of the stakeholders, together with their heightened interest, 
concern and awareness of the social and environmental implications of economic and 
business activities.  
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According to Ullmann (1985), the greater power possessed by the stakeholders, for 
examples when the stakeholders control resources critical to the firms, the greater 
influence they may exert on the firms’ CSRR decisions. Being a substantial or primary 
stakeholder that provides capital to firms, shareholders may possess greater power to 
influence firms’ decision on CSRR disclosed, compared with other stakeholders. The 
importance of CSRR to the shareholders has been documented in a number of studies, 
for example Patten (1990), Wilmshurst and Frost (2000), Holm and Rikhardsson (2008) 
and De Villiers and Van Staden (2010, 2012). Nevertheless, different types of 
shareholders, for instances foreign shareholders and government shareholders, may 
have different influence over the CSRR disclosed by firms. 
Beside shareholders, boards of directors are also expected to influence the levels of 
CSRR disclosed. The broader perspective of corporate governance that is focusing on 
the stakeholder approach has witnessed a shift in the role of boards of directors from 
merely defenders of shareholders’ interests to being able to address the needs of diverse 
stakeholders and commit to CSR (Cramer & Hirschland, 2006; Ingley, 2008; Ayuso & 
Argandona, 2009; Bear, Rahman & Post, 2010; Mallin, Michelon & Raggi, 2012; 
Michelon & Parbonetti, 2012). Boards of directors are expected to become more 
involved in assessing and shaping firms’ policies and practices on a wide range of social 
and environmental issues. Therefore, they should consist of more active, experienced, 
diverse, representative and independent directors who reflect accurately the broader 
range of stakeholders. Selected characteristics of the boards of directors, such as 
independence and diversity have been related to CSRR. Nevertheless, the impact of 
other important characteristics such as experience remains under-explored. 
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Overall, both corporate ownership structure and board of directors’ characteristics have 
been considered in a number of studies examining the association between corporate 
governance and CSR (Johnson & Greening, 1999; Arora & Dharwadkar, 2011) and 
CSRR (Halme & Huse, 1997; Adams, 2002; Haniffa & Cooke, 2005; Kent & Monem, 
2008; Kathyayini et al., 2012, Mallin et al., 2012). These two components of corporate 
governance have received increasing attention following the greater demand for ethical 
business, and increased corporate accountability and transparency to the stakeholders.  
In Malaysia, the importance of corporate governance and CSR has been apparent with a 
number of initiatives introduced by government through various corporate bodies, such 
as the Securities Commission Malaysia and the Bursa Malaysia3. Among these are the 
implementation of the Malaysia Code of Corporate Governance (MCCG) and the 
establishment of a CSR framework as guidelines for CSRR and mandatory reporting 
requirement obligating all public listed firms to report CSR activities in their annual 
reports (Bursa Malaysia, 2007; Lu & Castka, 2009; Lindsay, 2012).  
The imposition of the mandatory CSRR requirements may have an effect on the CSRR 
disclosed by firms (Lee & Hutchison, 2005). As documented in prior research 
examining CSRR in the UK, Spain and Norway, although the number of reporting firms 
and the quantity and quality of CSRR increase following the regulation, there remains a 
lack of reporting by several firms in the presence of such regulations (Adams, Coutts & 
Harte, 1995; Larrinaga, Carrasco, Correa, Llena & Moneva, 2002; Criado-Jimenez et 
al., 2008; Fallan & Fallan, 2009). Adams et al. (1995) focused on equal opportunity 
reporting in Britain, while others (see Larrinaga et al., 2002; Criado-Jimenez et al., 
2008; Fallan & Fallan, 2009) examined the environmental reporting in Spain and 
Norway, all of which represent part of the CSRR, as defined in this thesis. The effect of 
                                                 
3 Bursa Malaysia, formerly known as Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange (KLSE), is one of the largest bourses in Asia that mandated 
CSRR in member firms’ annual reports beginning in 2007.   
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CSRR regulation in Malaysia is yet to be observed, despite its implementation 
beginning from 2007. 
In summary, the continuous efforts to support corporate governance and CSR, together 
with the significant progress made in the development of corporate governance and 
CSR in Malaysia indicates the important link between these two concepts. It further 
implied that the need for reputable corporate governance arises not only to survive the 
financial crisis, but also to further develop and compete in the global market without 
neglecting the rights of society and the young generation with regards to sustainability 
issues.   
1.2 PROBLEM STATEMENTS 
Irresponsible business and economic activities create harmful threats to the environment 
and human lives. Both developed and developing countries are no exception to dealing 
with the social and environmental issues arising from irresponsible activities. 
Nevertheless, the developed countries were deemed to have a low level of pollution 
despite their intense use of resources. Hart (1997) claimed that the low level of 
pollution in developed countries was due to a number of factors, such as stringent 
environmental regulations, greening of industry and relocation of most polluting 
activities to developing countries.  
Stringent regulations have made it costly for global firms to operate in developed 
countries (Park, Hisanaga & Kim, 2009). Consequently, many of these firms move their 
manufacturing facilities from developed to developing countries. Furthermore, several 
economic factors, such as low operating costs, high unemployment rate and the lack of 
regulation or enforcement of any existing regulations in developing countries have also 
influenced the global firm’s decision for such relocations (Park et al., 2009). The 
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relocations of manufacturing facilities to developing countries have yielded a number of 
social and environmental problems; for example, poor employee welfare (Locke, Qin & 
Brause, 2007), climate change (Campbell-Lendrum & Corvalan, 2007) and transfer of 
occupational health problems (Park et al., 2009) from a developed to a developing 
country. These problems have called for more emphasis to be given on CSR in 
developing countries. 
A number of studies described the exploitative working conditions, such as unsafe or 
hazardous working conditions, child labour, low wages and excessive working hours; 
which are apparent in the global supply chain plants (see Welford, 2005; Locke et al., 
2007; Lim & Phillips, 2008; Visser, 2008). These have urged the global firms to 
embrace CSR to address these matters. The global firms seem to take advantage of 
developing countries’ low wages and weak social and environmental regulations to 
manufacture low-cost products at the expense of the local employees’ welfare (Locke et 
al., 2007; Park et al., 2009). This can be seen in a number of cases of sweatshop 
practices that captured public attention, including Nike, Reebok, GAP, Levi's and Wal-
Mart (Rock, 2003). 
For example Nike, a dominant player in the athletic footwear industry has been 
criticised for sourcing its products in factories and countries, where low wages, poor 
working conditions and human rights problems were rampant. Nike has been confronted 
with issues such as underpaid employees in Indonesia, child labour in Cambodia and 
Pakistan, and poor working conditions in China and Vietnam (Locke et al., 2007). To 
tackle these issues, Nike monitors its compliance with a corporate code of conduct and 
makes changes to supply chain governance from an arm-length market model to a 
collaborative partnership between the global firms and their suppliers (Lim & Phillips, 
2008). Nike also empowered their suppliers to better schedule their work in order to 
 
8 
 
improve quality and efficiency of operations (Locke et al., 2007). Engagement in 
various forms of public relation activities, including CSRR has also been undertaken to 
restore its public image (DeTienne & Lewis, 2005). 
In terms of environmental aspects, the deforestation crisis, which occurred as a result of 
rapid urbanisation and other development’s activities such as economic and 
infrastructure, has led to a number of environmental degradation threats, for instances 
climate change and pollution (Laurance, 1999; Mawle, 2010). Compared with the 
Americas and Africa, Asia was found to have the most immediate concerns with regards 
to the deforestation crisis, due to the low volume of surviving forest held and higher 
relative rates of deforestation and logging in the region (Laurance, 1999; Sodhi, Koh, 
Brook & Ng, 2004).  
The importance of addressing climate change issues, especially in Asia, lies in its 
growing threat to public well-being (Campbell-Lendrum & Corvalan, 2007; Cruz et al., 
2007; Mawle, 2010). The rising of climate temperature and extreme weather events 
such as drought, storm and typhoons in the region (Salleh, 2009; Yusuf & Francisco, 
2009) have caused numerous problems; for example, disturbance to or loss of 
ecosystem diversity (Sodhi, Koh, Brook & Ng, 2004), increased risk of flood, especially 
in vulnerable areas, and climate-related disease outbreaks, such as cholera, hepatitis, 
malaria and dengue (Cruz et al., 2007). 
Several pollution problems have also arisen following the inadequate planned 
urbanisation and development activities (Nash, 1993; Mawle, 2010). For example, the 
release of toxic gases as a result of industrial and transportation activities to the 
atmosphere has caused air pollution problems such as acid rain and haze. Improper 
waste treatment out of the economic development activities has also led to water and 
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land contamination problems. Therefore, careful attention is needed to manage these 
problems to avoid further exacerbation of existing environmental situations. This is to 
ensure the environmental sustainability for future generation consumption. 
As a developing country, Malaysia shares similar challenges with regards to social and 
environmental problems. For example, rapid economic development that occurs in the 
country accounts for high percentage of water pollution, even in the presence of 
effective technologies and policy measures (Muyibi et al., 2008). Researchers have 
detected the presence of microorganisms, suspended particles and chemical constituents 
such as ammonia, manganese and mercury in Malaysian rivers, especially in the 
industrialised states of Selangor, Johor, Penang and Perak (Muyibi et al., 2008; Sharaai, 
Mahmood & Sulaiman, 2009; Fulazzaky, Seong & Masirin, 2010; Hasan, Abdullah, 
Kamarudin & Kofli, 2011). All of these cases necessitate corrective action to ensure the 
supply of clean water for daily use and the minimisation of health problems related to 
contamination (Nash, 1993).  
Furthermore, aggressive deforestation activities for the purpose of agricultural, logging 
and urbanisation in Malaysia have impacted the growing number of environmental 
problems. Carbon dioxide emissions and energy consumption were found to be related 
positively to economic development in Malaysia (Ang, 2008; Murad, Molla, Mokhtar & 
Raquib, 2010). Malaysia has reported an increase in carbon emissions by 221 percent 
from 1990 to 2003, and the country is ranked among the world’s top 30 greenhouse gas 
emitters (United Nation Development Programme, 2007). Such growth is dictated 
despite Malaysia’s participation in the Kyoto protocol that aims to combat global 
warming; and initiatives to use renewable energy and minimise emissions. The release 
of greenhouse gas emissions into the atmosphere has caused the increase of climate 
temperature and led to changes in the overall climate in unpredictable ways. These 
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global warming and climate change phenomena have consequently triggered the 
occurrence of floods, hurricanes, heat waves and drought. 
Malaysia has experienced several episodes of floods; significantly, in Kuala Lumpur 
(Abdullah, 2004) and other states in 1971, 2003, 2006 and 20114. The incidents tend to 
occur more frequently in cities and towns, such as Kuala Lumpur, Penang and Johor 
Bahru, as a result of poor urbanisation management. The frequency of such incidents 
may disrupt the cities’ functions, threaten human lives and damage properties. Several 
flood mitigation projects have been introduced, particularly in Kuala Lumpur; for 
example, the Klang River Basin Flood Mitigation project and the Stormwater 
Management and Road Tunnel (SMART) project (Abdullah, 2004). However, the 
continuous episodes of flooding over the years, particularly in Klang Valley, have 
called for a re-evaluation of the existing flood prevention system (Ahmad, Samy, 
Chapman, Lee & Sipalan, 2012). 
A number of landslide cases have also been reported in Malaysia as a result of 
irresponsible development activities; including Genting Highland slip road near Karak 
Highway in 1995, which caused 48 deaths; Bukit Antarabangsa, Selangor in 1993, 
1999, 20025 and 20086 (Singh & Subramaniam, 2009); Hulu Langat in Selangor (May 
2011)7 and Kampung Sungai Ruil near Brinchang in Cameron Highlands (August 
2011)8 that reported 16 and 7 deaths respectively. As the number of landslide cases 
increases, serious attention should be placed on minimising the problems, requiring 
efforts from both firms and regulatory bodies.  
                                                 
4 The Star, January 31, 2011, ‘Floods in five states, three dead, more than 46,000 evacuated’. 
5 The Star, December 30, 2010, ‘Spotlight on natural disasters’. 
6 The Star, December 6, 2008, ‘Massive landslide at Bukit Antarabangsa’. 
7 The Star, July 11, 2011, ‘Human activities blamed for Hulu Langat landslide that killed 16’. 
8 The Star, August 8, 2011, ‘Cameron Highland’s landslide: Seven dead’. 
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Deforestation and climate change also contribute to habitat loss and extinction 
problems, which threaten the overall ecosystem diversity in Malaysia. The country, 
which was formerly known for its richness and uniqueness of biodiversity, is now under 
threat of extinction. Malaysia has been identified as a hotspot deserving the highest 
priorities for conservation investment (Myers, Mittermeier, Mittermeier, da Fonseca & 
Kent, 2000; Rahim, 2012).  
Aside from the climate change issue, air pollution is another environmental challenge in 
Malaysia requiring further monitoring, as it affects human health (Afroz, Hassan & 
Ibrahim, 2003). The high level of air pollution has turned several places in Malaysia 
into “poisonous towns”; for example, Putrajaya, Shah Alam in Selangor, Nilai in Negeri 
Sembilan and Tanjung Malim in Perak9. Air pollution derives mainly from 
transportation, industrial emissions and open burning sources. Citing an example, the 
recurrent haze episodes in the country have imposed threats to environmental 
management in Malaysia and increased awareness of the environment. The Malaysian 
government has established the Malaysian Air Quality Guidelines, the Air Pollution 
Index and the Haze Action Plan to improve air quality in the country (Afroz et al., 
2003).  
Malaysia is working towards achieving a balanced or sustainable development that aims 
to safeguard the environment for the use of the future generations. Nevertheless, the 
evolution of a sustainable management practices in Malaysia occurs at a slow pace 
(Hezri & Hasan, 2006). Given the infancy of sustainability objectives in the existing 
environmental policy, environmental issues will continue to be a marginal consideration 
in the overall pursuit of socio-economic advancement in Malaysia (Hezri & Hasan, 
                                                 
9 Utusan Malaysia, October 3, 2011, ‘Bandar beracun ancam penduduk’. Utusan Malaysia is one of the daily newspapers published 
in Malaysia. The phase ‘Bandar beracun ancam penduduk’ is translated into ‘Poisonous towns threaten people’. 
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2006). This has contributed partly to the overwhelming environmental issues in the 
country.  
On the social aspect, there have been several corporate mismanagement and misconduct 
cases reported in Malaysia; for example, Perwaja Steel, Malaysia Airlines and Renong 
Berhad during the 1990s. This was followed by a number of cases reported from 2000 
onwards; including Transmile Group Berhad and Megan Media Holdings Berhad 
(Zaimee, 2007; Oh, 2010; Norwani et al., 2011). For example, a special audit conducted 
on Transmile Group Berhad revealed an overstatement of the firm’s revenue for the 
financial years 2004 to 2006 by RM622 millions, relating to invoices issued to over 20 
firms and irregularities in the firm’s trade receivables, cash receipts, and property, plant 
and equipment accounts.  
Similarly, Megan Media Holdings Berhad is also being charged with substantial 
irregularities in its wholly-owned subsidiary’s financial statements, involving fictitious 
trade creditors and debtors, undisclosed related party transactions, and a bogus deposit 
payment of RM211 million for production lines. Other firms involved in corporate 
mismanagement and misconduct cases in Malaysia include Sime Darby Berhad, 
Kenmark Berhad, DIS Technology Holdings Bhd, Golden Plus Holdings Berhad and 
SCAN Associates Bhd (Oh, 2010).  
Findings from the Klynveld Peat Marwick Goerdeler (KPMG) Fraud Survey Report 
2005 also revealed that corporate fraud in Malaysia is on the rise (Shim, 2006). A 
majority of respondents to the survey agreed that fraud is a major problem for 
Malaysian businesses and acknowledged experiencing fraud in their organisations 
(Shim, 2006). These corporate cases of misconduct and fraud have been the 
consequences of corporate governance failure (Shim, 2006; Norwani et al., 2011).  
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Several issues related to the workplace, such as safety, employee welfare and industrial 
relations
10
 have also been highlighted in Malaysia, particularly in recent years. For 
example, a workplace accident, specifically a fire at gas processing plant was reported 
in one of the oil and gas firms in May 2012, causing death and injury to workers
11
. 
Malaysia has reported a rising trend of cases of workplace accidents (from 55,186 cases 
in 2009 to 57,639 cases in 2010) and occupational diseases and permanent disabilities 
resulting from workplace injuries
12
. Following that, firms are expected to be aware of 
the importance of safety measures in the workplace in order to safeguard the social 
welfare of employees
13
.  
The growing number of social and environmental issues in Malaysia has elevated CSR 
to become an important topic. As highlighted by Baskin (2006), Malaysia is recognised 
as among the most active emerging markets in relation to CSR. However, the lack of 
reporting has kept most of the public ignorant of the contributions (Teoh & Thong, 
1984). A survey conducted by the Bursa Malaysia in 2007 also reported a lack of 
knowledge and awareness of CSR among the selected public listed firms in Malaysia. 
Findings of the survey highlighted a need of firms to improve the level of CSRR 
disclosed as the majority of reported firms fell far behind the global best practice of 
CSRR (Bursa Malaysia, 2007).  
Improvement in the levels of CSRR could be achieved through the implementation of 
appropriate corporate governance structure (Adam & Zutshi, 2004). As suggested by 
Shahin and Zairi (2007), comprehensive corporate governance provides a solid 
foundation for sound practice in CSR. Mallin et al. (2012) added that corporate 
governance with stakeholders orientation bring changes to firms that can lead to 
                                                 
10 The New Strait Times, May 22, 2012, ‘Strengthen ties, trade unions and employers told’. 
11 The New Strait Times, May 10, 2012, ‘One dead, nine injured in explosion at Petronas plant in Paka’. 
12 The New Strait Times, April 29, 2012, ‘MTUC: Workplace accidents increasing’. 
13 The Sun, June 24, 2012, ‘Ensure workplace safety’. 
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improved social performance dan reporting. Two important elements of corporate 
governance, namely corporate ownership structures and boards of directors, are very 
influential in determining firms’ decision for corporate reporting (Fama & Jensen, 1983; 
Eisenhardt, 1989), including CSRR (Halme & Huse, 1997; Adams, 2002; Haniffa & 
Cooke, 2005; Kent & Monem, 2008; Kathyayini et al., 2012, Mallin et al., 2012).  
Governance structure at firm-level and country-level may influence the levels of CSRR; 
for example, the distinctive features of corporate ownership structure in Malaysia that is 
different from other developed countries, the variety of boards of directors’ 
characteristics, as well as the implementation of the mandatory CSRR in Malaysia. 
However, different governance structure may have different influence over the CSRR 
disclosed. In order to ensure the progressive development of CSRR, there is a need to 
identify the appropriate governance structure that drives towards the improvement in 
the quantity and quality of CSRR disclosed. Quantity of CSRR refers to the amount, 
volume or extent of CSRR, while quality of CSRR captures the variety of CSRR 
disclosed and indicates the importance given to a specific item of CSRR (Joseph & 
Taplin, 2011). 
Many firms in Malaysia are motivated to disclose their CSR activities after the 
reporting was made mandatory for all public listed firms with effect from 31 December 
2007. The mandatory CSRR requirement has been incorporated into the Listing 
Requirement of Bursa Malaysia (Appendix 9C, Part A, Paragraph 29). It obligates all 
public listed firms to include a description of CSR activities or practices undertaken by 
the listed firm and its subsidiaries or, if there are none, a statement to that effect. 
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Despite the mandatory reporting requirement, there has been lack of specific reporting 
requirement on the content and extent of CSRR. This is argued to lead to greater 
variability in terms of CSRR disclosed by firms. The absence of specific content or 
standards of CSRR permits firms to report their CSR activities in their own ways, which 
consequently put the stakeholders at a disadvantage. In this case, rather than fulfilling 
the accountability and transparency functions, CSRR is seen as a mechanism used by 
firms to legitimise their business activities (Deegan & Gordon, 1996; Hackston & 
Milne, 1996; Deegan, 2002; Cho & Patten, 2007; Deegan, 2007). 
The quantity and quality of CSRR disclosed by firms may be influenced by the 
distinctive features of corporate ownership structure in Malaysia. As an Asian country, 
Malaysia possesses several unique features of corporate ownership structure. Unlike the 
diffused ownership of firms in western and industrialised countries, such as the US, the 
UK and Eastern Europe, corporate ownership structures in Malaysia are characterised 
by concentrated ownership, associated pyramidal and cross-holding structures 
(Claessens, Djankov & Lang, 2000; Fan & Wong, 2002; Deesomsak, Paudyal & 
Pescetto, 2004; Tam & Tan, 2007). Many firms in Malaysia are closely held by a single 
large shareholder and controlled by state or government, and individual or family 
shareholders (Claessens et al., 2000; Zhuang, Edwards & Capulong, 2001; Ball, Robin 
& Wu, 2003; Shim, 2006).  
Consistent with the government’s effort to encourage shareholder activism, Malaysia 
has also witnessed the enhanced role of institutional shareholders; in particular, the five 
largest institutional funds in Malaysia, all of which are controlled by the government. 
They are Employee Provident Fund (EPF), Lembaga Tabung Angkatan Tentera 
(LTAT), Lembaga Tabung Haji (LTH), Permodalan Nasional Berhad (PNB) and Social 
Security Organisation (SOCSO) (Wahab, How & Verhoeven, 2008; Saleh, Zulkifli & 
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Muhamad, 2010). The different types of corporate ownership structure held in Malaysia 
may have a different impact on the levels of CSRR disclosed by firms.  
Moreover, there have been extensive debates over the characteristics of good 
governance and an effective board of directors (Van Der Walt & Ingley, 2003), 
especially the governance structure that could lead to better CSRR practice (Adams, 
2002; Webb, 2004; Haniffa & Cooke, 2005; Mallin et al., 2012). Good corporate 
governance does not focus simply on the needs of shareholders, but also incorporates 
the needs of diverse stakeholders, which may later help to promote the welfare of 
society. Board of directors in socially-responsible firms have characteristics associated 
with effective board structure, for example have more outsiders and women directors, 
less instances of Chief Executive Officer (CEO) or chairperson duality, and higher 
governance index (Webb, 2004). 
To date, several board of directors’ characteristics are seen to have effects on CSR 
performance and reporting (Haniffa & Cooke, 2005; Barako & Brown, 2008; 
Lattemann, Fetscherin, Alon, Li & Schneider, 2009; Bear et al., 2010; Khan, 2010; 
Post, Rahman & Rubow, 2011; Kathyayini, Tilt & Lester, 2012; Mallin et al., 2012; 
Michelon & Parbonetti, 2012). While most prior studies have focused on board 
independence, the issue of board diversity is also rising in prominence following the 
benefits it offers. For example, a diverse board provides new insights and perspectives 
(Coffey & Wang, 1998; Carter, Simkins & Simpson, 2003), and promotes the exchange 
of ideas and group performance (Milliken & Martins, 1996).  
However, the impact of other important characteristics, such as experience, particularly 
on CSRR, remains under-explored (Carpenter & Westphal, 2001; Kroll, Walters & 
Wright, 2008; McDonald, Westphal & Graebner, 2008; Kor & Sundaramurthy, 2009) 
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despite the potential benefits that experience could bring to the board of directors and 
firms. Evidence from several empirical studies has documented the benefits of 
directors’ existing and past experiences as managers and board members. For example, 
experiences direct the thinking and perceptions of directors, and allow them to develop 
specific skills and knowledge about how boards, firms and industries operate (Kor & 
Sundaramurthy, 2009). Directors with appropriate knowledge gained through 
experience will become more useful advisers (Kroll et al., 2008).  
Following the importance of board experience in directing directors’ decisions and 
influencing firm performance, more efforts are warranted to investigate the impact of 
boards’ CSR experience on CSRR disclosed by firms. Perhaps the appointment of board 
members with CSR experience could assist firms in implementing CSR activities and 
reporting them to stakeholders. Such appointments may also be used by firms to 
improve their strategic posture and be regarded as socially responsible. 
Overall, the implementation of different governance mechanisms, such as ownership 
structure, board of directors and regulation, may have different influence over the levels 
of CSRR disclosed. An investigation on the association between the different 
governance mechanisms and the levels of CSRR disclosed may highlight the important 
roles of these governance mechanisms in influencing the levels of CSRR disclosed. 
This is vital as to ensure the continuous development of CSRR, particularly in 
Malaysia. 
1.3 RESEARCH OBJECTIVES AND QUESTIONS 
In general, the current study investigates the link between corporate governance and 
CSR from a developing-country perspective; specifically, Malaysia. It suggests that the 
ways firms are governed influence the manner in which the firms behave, particularly in 
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CSRR. Therefore, this study aims to examine the influence of different governance 
mechanisms, namely ownership structure, board of directors and regulation, on the 
levels of CSRR disclosed by firms in Malaysia. Different governance mechanisms can 
be adopted to promote greater quantity and quality of CSRR. Hence, finding an 
appropriate combination of the mechanisms that suit a particular context is vital. This is 
to account for the difference in governance practised in different countries.  
While there have been studies that related ownership structure and board of directors 
with CSRR, this study includes regulation as a third governance mechanism that may 
influence CSRR. This is in line with the introduction of CSRR regulation in Malaysia 
beginning from 2007, whereby there is a need to evaluate the effectiveness of such 
regulation in promoting CSRR. Perhaps, the interrelationship between the various 
mechanisms of corporate governance may assist towards the improvement of corporate 
reporting quality, including in the aspect of CSRR.  
This has led to the construction of the following research objectives: 
1. To investigate the influence of different types of corporate ownership structure 
on the quantity and quality of CSRR disclosed by firms. 
2. To examine the impact of board of directors’ CSR experience on the quantity 
and quality of CSRR disclosed by firms. 
3. To observe the moderating effect of mandatory CSRR requirements on the 
association between corporate ownership structure and the quantity and quality 
of CSRR disclosed by firms. 
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Overall, the current study attempts to answer the following research questions: 
1. Do different types of corporate ownership structure influence the quantity and 
quality of CSRR disclosed by firms? 
2. Does board of directors’ CSR experience impact on the quantity and quality of 
CSRR disclosed by firms? 
3. Does mandatory CSRR requirement moderate the association between corporate 
ownership structure and the quantity and quality of CSRR disclosed by firms? 
A summary of the research objectives, research questions and theoretical framework 
used in the current study is provided below: 
 Research Objectives  Research Questions Theoretical 
Framework 
1. To investigate the 
influence of different types 
of corporate ownership 
structure on the quantity 
and quality of CSRR 
disclosed by firms. 
 Do different types of 
corporate ownership 
structure influence the 
quantity and quality of 
CSRR disclosed by firms? 
Stakeholder 
     
2. To examine the impact of 
board of directors’ CSR 
experience on the quantity 
and quality of CSRR 
disclosed by firms. 
 Does board of directors’ 
CSR experience impact on 
the quantity and quality of 
CSRR disclosed by firms? 
Stakeholder 
3. To observe the moderating 
effect of mandatory CSRR 
requirement on the 
association between 
corporate ownership 
structure and the quantity 
and quality of CSRR 
disclosed by firms. 
 Does mandatory CSRR 
requirement moderate the 
association between 
corporate ownership 
structure and the quantity 
and quality of CSRR 
disclosed by firms?       
Contingency 
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1.4 RESEARCH MOTIVATIONS AND CONTRIBUTIONS 
Social and environmental problems around the world are on the rise. Firms are blamed 
for causing social problems and environmental damage, which affect the quality of 
human lives. This has brought a growing research interest to look into CSRR, as a 
document used to demonstrate firms’ commitments to CSR. Historically, there has been 
a number of CSRR literature examining the nature and extent of CSRR, and 
determinants of CSRR, including the corporate governance’s components, such as 
ownership structure and board of directors’ characteristics.  
The link between corporate governance and CSRR has been evident following the 
greater demand for ethical business and increased corporate accountability and 
transparency to the wider stakeholders (Cooper & Owen, 2007; Aras & Crowther, 
2008). Adams & Zutshi (2004) highlighted the importance of corporate governance in 
promoting CSRR by emphasising the need of firms to put in place appropriate 
governance structures to ensure that social and environmental impacts, as well as the 
concerns of their key stakeholders, are addressed in corporate decision making. Owing 
to the greater importance of corporate governance in driving CSRR, more research 
efforts that relate these two concepts are required.  
Extant studies that relate board of directors’ characteristics to corporate reporting have 
focused largely on the association between board independence and corporate reporting, 
including CSRR. The importance of board diversity in influencing CSRR has also 
received considerable attention. Nevertheless, there is lack of research investigating the 
impact of other important characteristics of the board of directors, such as experience on 
CSRR. This is in spite of the importance of experiences of directors in mapping firms’ 
strategic directions and decisions (Milliken & Martins, 1996; Westphal, 1999; Kroll et 
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al., 2008; Kor & Sundaramurthy, 2009). Therefore, the current study examines the 
impact of boards’ CSR experience on the levels of CSRR disclosed by firms.  
Overall, the current study seeks to provide additional evidence on the link between 
corporate governance and CSRR in Malaysia, as one of the developing countries. 
Specifically, the current study dictates the importance of board CSR experience in 
shaping the quantity and quality of CSRR disclosed by firms. Findings from the current 
study may assist regulatory authorities to improve existing policies on corporate 
governance and CSRR. Drawing on the stakeholder theory, the current study also 
provides useful inputs for firms to consider board CSR experience as a strategic posture 
to sustain business in competitive markets.  
The uniqueness of corporate ownership structure in Malaysia, which is very much 
characterised by family and government-owned structures, has also offered an ideal 
setting to investigate the link between corporate ownership structure and corporate 
reporting (Chau & Gray, 2002). This is because it differs from the diffused ownership 
structure that is prevalent in the developed countries (Claessens et al., 2000; Fan & 
Wong, 2002; Deesomsak et al., 2004; Tam & Tan, 2007). Several studies that related 
shareholder power to CSRR based on Ullmann’s (1985) model (see Figure 4.4) relied 
on either diffused or concentrated ownership to represent the shareholder power. This 
type of corporate ownership structure is insufficient to represent the unique 
characteristics of corporate ownership structures in Asian countries; particularly in 
Malaysia.  
For example, the dominance of family-owned firms in Malaysia may result in less 
demand for corporate reporting since the majority of fund providers of the firms already 
have access to the required information. However, a significant proportion of 
 
22 
 
government shareholding in firms may motivate more reporting made by the firms to 
demonstrate transparency and accountability to the government, representing the public 
at large. In short, the variety of corporate ownership structure in Malaysia may have 
different impact on CSRR disclosed by firms. Therefore, further investigation of the 
impact of different types of corporate ownership structure on CSRR is required, 
particularly in Malaysia. This may inform stakeholders on the types of corporate 
ownership structure that provide greater levels of CSRR. Such information is useful in 
enabling stakeholders to evaluate the commitments of firms to CSR. 
While there have been several studies investigating the influence of corporate 
ownership structure on the CSRR disclosed by firms in Malaysia, for example, Ghazali 
(2007) from the perspective of agency theory and Amran and Devi (2008) from the 
perspective of institutional theory, the evidence was limited to that disclosed during the 
voluntary period of CSRR. Therefore, the current study examines the influence of 
different types of corporate ownership structures on the CSRR disclosed by firms from 
the perspective of stakeholder theory in both voluntary and mandatory period of CSRR. 
The current study also considers the effects of CSRR regulation, which was introduced 
by the Bursa Malaysia in 2007. The data set selected for the purpose of the current 
study includes both the voluntary (from 2005 to 2006) and mandatory periods of CSRR 
(from 2007 to 2009). This enables the researcher of the current study to explore the 
moderating effect of CSRR regulation on the association between corporate ownership 
structure and CSRR.  
As documented by Larrinaga et al. (2002), there has been lack of research examining 
CSRR in a regulatory regime, as most countries are still practising CSRR on a voluntary 
basis. Following the introduction of CSRR regulation in Malaysia from 2007, there has 
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been a need to further explore the effect of such reporting regulation on the quantity and 
quality of CSRR disclosed by firms. Such findings may provide valuable input for 
regulatory authorities on the effectiveness of the reporting regulation. They may also 
serve as benchmarks or references for the regulators to work on a better mechanism 
towards the improvement of CSR and CSRR practices in Malaysia. For instance, the 
regulators may consider including the appointment of board members with CSR 
experience as one of the criteria for the appointment of members of the board of 
directors of firms, in a way to help firms to improve their CSR practice and reporting.  
Findings of the study may also inform both firms and stakeholders on the influence of 
reporting regulation on CSRR. Overall, these findings offer a benchmark for CSRR 
development in Malaysia. The current study also suggests the application of 
contingency theory in explaining CSRR in Malaysia, following the implementation of 
regulation in the country. 
Furthermore, a number of firm-specific characteristics have been identified to explain 
the significant variation in the quantity and quality of CSRR disclosed by firms; 
including firm size, profitability, leverage and industry (Patten, 1991; Hackston & 
Milne, 1996; Branco & Rodrigues, 2008b). Adding to the list, researchers might be 
motivated to explore the influence of Shariah status of firms on CSRR. Shariah refers 
to the Islamic law of human conduct, which regulates all matters of the lives of Muslims 
(Maali, Casson & Napier, 2006), while Shariah-approved firm is a status granted on 
firms that conduct activities that are permitted by the Shariah.  
The motivation to investigate the influence of Shariah status on CSRR arises as a result 
of the rising importance of the Shariah-approved firms, particularly in Malaysia 
(Ousama & Fatima, 2010). Several researchers have documented the differences in 
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corporate reporting made between the Shariah and non-Shariah approved firms (see 
Ibrahim, Fatima & Htay, 2006; Aribi and Gao, 2010). By listed as Shariah-approved 
firms, the firms may be exposed to greater public visibility. Therefore, they are 
expected to commit and disclose more CSRR than its counterparts. Such proposition is 
based on the argument of the relatedness of many principles of Islamic teaching 
(Shariah) to the concept of CSR. The Islamic teaching itself promotes accountability to 
the environment and the community wellbeing (Baydoun & Willett, 2000; Lewis, 2001; 
Kamla, Gallhofer & Haslam, 2006; Dusuki, 2008). Following that, the current study 
introduces Shariah status of firms as one of the control variables, along with firm size, 
profitability, leverage and industry. 
Most of the CSRR research is derived from the developed countries and focused on the 
cross-sectional analysis of CSRR (Belal & Momin, 2009; Islam, 2010). The current 
study supplements the existing evidence by presenting a longitudinal descriptive 
analysis of CSRR to observe the trend of reporting over a five-year period from 2005 to 
2009. This covers both the voluntary and mandatory period of CSRR in Malaysia. 
CSRR investigation in developing nations is considered important, as these countries 
are also confronted by a number of social and environmental problems, and deal with 
different CSR agendas compared with developed countries (Visser, 2008).  
Moreover, differences in the cultural, political and institutional background of a country 
lead to national differences in the CSR system (Matten & Moon, 2008). The national 
socio-cultural environment and the level of national economic development were found 
to influence the CSR practice (Jones, 1999; Williams, 1999; Baughn et al., 2007). The 
cultural environment, in which a country operates, may also affect the corporate 
reporting orientation of that particular country.  
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Being an Asian country, Malaysia is categorised as having a relatively high level of 
secrecy and statutory control (Gray, 1988). Moreover, there is little incentive for firms 
in Malaysia to become transparent14 through greater voluntary CSRR due to the high 
level of secrecy. Nevertheless, they are more likely to comply with the CSRR regulation 
imposed on them, reflecting the high level of statutory control practiced by the firms. 
Based on this argument, there is a need to conduct CSRR research in the national 
context of Malaysia, in order to achieve a deeper understanding of the CSRR 
development that occurs in one specific country. 
Being a rapidly-developing economy in Asia, Malaysia has been facing a major 
transformation since the 1970s, from a producer of raw materials into an emerging 
multi-sector economy. The country’s GDP is worth 238 billion US dollars (representing 
0.38 percent of the world economy)15, and is ranked among the four largest economics 
in Southeast Asia16. The total market capitalisation of Malaysia’s capital market has 
increased threefold, from 116.9 to 410.5 billion US dollars between 2000 and 2010 (US 
Census Bureau, 2011).  
As Malaysia’s capital market rises in importance, more research on firms’ reporting 
behaviour should be undertaken. This is due to the significant role of corporate 
reporting as one of the valuable references used by the stakeholders to evaluate a firm; 
for example, in terms of sustainability and reputation. However, the current study 
focuses specifically on CSRR made by firms owing to its importance and relevance in 
today’s competitive business environments. The quest of Malaysia to become a 
developed country by the year 2020 and achieve Vision 2020 is supposed to be based 
                                                 
14 According to Ball et al. (2003), firms in Asian countries have less incentives for transparent disclosure that their counterparts (e.g. 
the US and the UK). 
15 Source: http://www.tradingeconomics.com/malaysia/gdp 
16 Source: http://www.tradingeconomics.com/gdp-list-by-country 
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on a well-balanced development between the economic, social and environmental 
aspects. 
In Malaysia, both CSR and CSRR have received increased attention from various 
parties, especially the government (Amran & Devi, 2007; Amran & Devi, 2008; Lu & 
Castka, 2009; Othman et al., 2011). This has driven more CSRR research to be 
undertaken in the country. While the extant research on CSRR focused on non-financial 
industry (Haniffa & Cooke, 2005; Ghazali, 2007) and sensitive industries only (Othman 
et al., 2011), the current study includes firms from both financial and non-financial 
industry17, and also sensitive and non-sensitive industries. This is based on the view that 
CSR provides the agenda for all firms, regardless of industry. Chung and Parker (2010) 
observed the extension of environmental concerns of the stakeholders to firms in service 
industry rather than firms in environmentally-sensitive industries only. In the case of 
Malaysia, even though different industries may be subject to different set of laws and 
regulations, they are subjected to the same reporting requirement or regulation in terms 
of CSRR in Malaysia. 
Different CSR agendas set in different countries (Newell, 2005; Matten & Moon, 2008; 
CSR Asia, 2008; Visser, 2008; Saleh et al., 2011) motivate the researcher to employ a 
self-constructed CSRR checklist based on both conventional and Islamic perspectives of 
CSR for the purpose of the current study. The idea to combine the two lies upon the 
importance of Shariah approved firms in Malaysia, alongside the non-Shariah approved 
firms (Ousama & Fatima, 2010). Many principles of Islamic teachings (Shariah) are 
also related to the concepts of CSR (Sulaiman, 2005; Kamla et al., 2006; Zulkifli, 
2012). The construction of the CSRR checklist takes into account several checklists 
used in prior CSRR literature. References were also made to several CSRR guidelines 
                                                 
17 Hamid (2004) highlighted a limited research that examined CSRR in finance industry. 
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and frameworks, such as the Global Reporting Initiatives (GRI) and recent CSR 
framework for Malaysian firms developed by Bursa Malaysia. This is to enable the 
capture of new CSR agenda in the context of Malaysia.  
1.5 RESEARCH PROCESS  
The outcome of this thesis is based upon a proper research process that involves 
identifying problems or issues of interests, reviewing prior related literature, 
constructing appropriate research design, then presenting analyses and discussions on 
the findings. The sample of the current study is drawn from the large firms listed on the 
main board of Bursa Malaysia from 2005 to 2009. In the current study, CSRR is 
represented by the quantity and quality of CSRR. While the quantity of CSRR is 
measured by the number of sentences, the quality of CSRR is based on a CSRR index. 
Data of the current study is gathered through content analysis procedure based on a self-
constructed CSRR checklist. Information pertaining to ownership structure, board of 
directors’ CSR experience, CSRR regulations and several firm-specific characteristics 
used in the current study, are captured from the manual search of the firms’ annual 
reports that are publicly available in the Bursa Malaysia’s website. To examine the 
associations between the variables of interest, several regression analyses are performed 
using Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS) software version 19.0. 
1.6 ORGANISATION OF THESIS 
This thesis is composed of eight chapters, which are arranged as follows: 
Chapter one outlines an overview of the research. In this chapter, the rising social and 
environmental issues in the context of developing countries, particularly Malaysia, are 
highlighted. Then, the relevant research objectives and questions are identified. The 
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chapter continues with an explanation about the research motivations and contributions 
as well as the research process involved. 
Chapter two reviews related CSRR literature, focusing on the research and development 
of CSRR, in terms of theoretical and practical aspects. Among the topics included in 
this review are the trends and determinants of CSRR. These topics are discussed from 
various theoretical perspectives such as legitimacy theory, stakeholder theory and 
political economy theory. 
Chapter three provides a review of the association between corporate ownership 
structure, board of directors’ characteristics, reporting regulation and corporate 
reporting. This chapter highlights the manner in which several components of corporate 
governance may influence CSRR, namely corporate ownership structure, board of 
directors’ characteristics and reporting regulation. 
Chapter four outlines the research framework and elaborates the relevant hypotheses 
developed for the purpose of the current study. Overall, the current study is based on 
stakeholder and contingency theories.  
Chapter five explains the methodology involved in conducting the research. 
Descriptions of research perspective, sampling procedures, measurements of research 
variables, data collection techniques, research instrument and regression models applied 
in the current study are presented in this chapter. 
Chapter six presents the empirical results of the current study. These include the 
descriptive analysis of CSRR over the five-year period from 2005 to 2009, and the 
results of the multiple regression analysis that examines the associations between 
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corporate ownership structure, board of directors’ CSR experience, CSRR regulation 
and CSRR. 
Chapter seven provides discussions of the results of the current study, as presented in 
Chapter six.  
Finally, Chapter eight concludes the thesis by summarising the key research findings 
and highlighting important points pertaining to the contributions and implications of 
study, limitations of study, recommendations for future research and conclusions of 
study. 
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CHAPTER 2: CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY REPORTING 
(CSRR): A REVIEW OF LITERATURE  
 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter reviews literature related to CSRR. First, a brief notion of CSR is 
described in Section 2.2, followed by a more detailed review from Section 2.3 onwards. 
Discussions of CSRR begin with a general overview, followed by the development of 
CSR and CSRR research in Section 2.4. Next, a specific discussion of CSRR in the 
annual report is presented in Section 2.5. The chapter continues with a review of the 
nature and extent of CSRR in the annual reports in Section 2.6. Under this heading, 
several CSRR categories/themes used in previous literature are highlighted in Section 
2.6.1 and the trends and patterns of CSRR in the annual reports are presented in Section 
2.6.2. The variation of CSRR disclosed in firms’ annual reports can be explained by a 
number of factors, some of which are elaborated in Section 2.7. Then, a review of 
several theories that have been used to explain CSRR is provided in Section 2.8, before 
a summary of the overall reviews concludes the chapter in Section 2.9. 
2.2 CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY (CSR) 
The fundamental idea of CSR relies upon the changing perception on the role of firms 
in society (Freeman, 1984). In contrast to Friedman (1970), who viewed profit 
maximisation as firms’ sole responsibility, Freeman (1984) cites the obligation of firms 
to act in a socially responsible manner, alongside maximising profits. To operate in a 
socially responsible manner, firms are expected to enhance economic growth while 
protecting the environment and promoting social responsibility (Carroll, 1991). Firms 
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need to fulfil their economic, legal, ethical and philanthropic responsibilities in order to 
become good corporate citizens (Carroll, 1991). They have the economic responsibility 
to be profitable, the legal responsibility to follow the laws that guide their ability to 
achieve their economic requirements, an ethical responsibility that include a range of 
societal norms or standards, and a philanthropic responsibility referring to the interest of 
doing well for society, regardless of its impact on profit. Figure 2.1 outlines the pyramid 
of CSR as suggested by Carroll (1991). 
 
Figure 2.1: The Pyramid of Corporate Social Responsibility 
(Source: Carroll, 1991, p. 42) 
A firm’s responsibility is not only limited to the shareholders, but also extended to the 
wide range of stakeholders (Clarkson, 1995). There have been numerous definitions of 
‘stakeholder’, as indicated in the extant literature (Clarkson, 1995; Laplume, Karan & 
Litz, 2008; Freeman, Harrison, Wicks, Parmar & De Colle, 2010). However, Freeman’s 
(1984) definition has been used widely in many studies, referring a stakeholder of a 
firm as any group or individual who can affect, or is affected by, the achievement of the 
firm’s objectives.  
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According to Clarkson (1995), there are two categories of stakeholders: (1) primary 
stakeholders: those whose continuing participation is necessary for the survival of the 
firm; and (2) secondary stakeholders: those who are not essential to the survival of the 
firm, although their actions can significantly damage or benefit the firm. Primary 
stakeholders include shareholders, employees, suppliers, customers, government and 
community, while secondary stakeholders include trade unions and environmentalists. 
Therefore, CSR can be referred to as the management of the various stakeholders’ 
interest in relation to the economic, environmental, social and ethical issues (Cheung, 
Tan, Ahn & Zhang, 2009).  
There have been a number of definitions given of CSR (Carroll, 1999; Dahlsrud, 2008). 
Carroll (1999) outlined the development of these definitions spanning from the early 
1950s to the 1990s. According to Carroll, the core concept of CSR focuses on the 
relationship between business and society. CSR describes firms’ responsibilities to their 
stakeholders as including society. It addresses and captures the most important concerns 
of the public regarding business and society relationship (Carroll, 1999).  
Out of 37 CSR’s definitions analysed in Dahlsrud (2008), the one provided by the 
Commission of the European Communities (2001) and the World Business Council for 
Sustainable Development (1999) is used frequently. The Commission of the European 
Communities (2001) defined CSR as ‘a concept whereby firms integrate social and 
environmental concerns in their business operations and in their interaction with their 
stakeholders on a voluntary basis’, while the World Business Council for Sustainable 
Development (1999) refers CSR as ‘the commitment of business to contribute to 
sustainable economic development, working with employees, their families, the local 
community and society at large to improve their quality of life’. Despite the variety of 
CSR definitions in different studies, Dahlsrud (2008) argued that most were looking at a 
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set of CSR dimensions that include the social and environmental dimensions. Other 
dimensions that are included in the CSR definitions are the economic, ethical and 
stakeholder dimensions (Moura-Leite & Padgett, 2011).  
According to Gibson and O’Donovan (2007), CSR can be demonstrated through an 
increase in its reporting in the annual reports. Detailed discussion on CSRR is provided 
in Section 2.3. It is not the intention of this thesis to discuss in a greater detail about 
CSR from the management perspective, as the focal subject of this thesis is on the 
reporting aspect of CSR, viewing CSRR from the accounting perspective, particularly 
in the national context of Malaysia. Therefore, more discussions are provided on the 
reporting aspect of CSR, as detailed in the next section.  
2.3 CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY REPORTING (CSRR) 
CSRR has received increased attention from both academic and corporate sectors 
following its importance in exhibiting firms’ accountability and transparency to 
stakeholders (Gray et al., 1996; Hess, 2007) and demonstrating good corporate 
reputation (Hooghiemstra, 2000; Bebbington et al., 2008; Criado-Jimenez et al., 2008). 
CSRR is defined as ‘the provision of information about a particular firm that may 
embrace any subject in any mediums to any parties with the aim of providing a solution 
for improved accountability to a wide array of stakeholders on environmental and 
societal issues’ (Gray, Kouhy & Lavers, 1995a). It involves extending firms’ 
accountability beyond the traditional role of providing a financial account (Gray et al., 
1996), and covers a variety of forms and appears under various labels; for example, 
social responsibility accounting, social audits, corporate social reporting, employee and 
employment reporting, stakeholder dialogue reporting and environmental accounting 
and reporting (Gray, 2002). It encompasses both the voluntary and mandatory reporting 
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made by firms regarding issues that are important to a wide range of stakeholders, 
covering more than solely economic concern (Gray et al., 1995a; Jenkins & Yakovleva, 
2006). 
Zulkifli (2012), who reviewed the definition of several new forms of accounting, also 
analysed that social and environmental accounting, social accounting, corporate social 
reporting and social responsibility accounting generally have the same definitions. 
These terms have been used interchangeably in many previous CSRR research to mean 
CSRR (Gray et al., 1995a; Gray et al., 1996; Branco & Rodrigues, 2008a). Despite the 
variety of terms used to describe the social and environmental reporting by firms, for 
example, ‘social (and environmental) accounting (disclosure)’ and ‘corporate social 
(and environmental) reporting (disclosure)’, this thesis uses the term ‘CSRR’ to 
describe the social and environmental reporting by firms.  
2.4 THE DEVELOPMENT OF CSRR AND CSRR RESEARCH 
The development of CSRR has been well-acknowledged in many literatures for more 
than two decades (Mathews, 1997; Gray, 2002, 2010; Parker, 2005, 2011; Deegan & 
Soltys, 2007; Owen, 2008). Despite the different perspectives used in reviewing CSRR 
research, generally, researchers are in agreement on a number of issues pertaining to the 
current state and future prospects of the field. For example, most researchers 
acknowledge the continuous development of CSRR research over time. Such 
development occurs not only in developed countries, but also in developing countries. 
However, researchers continue to wrestle with a multiplicity of theoretical approaches 
used to explain CSRR. The growing literature on CSRR reflects an increasing focus and 
concern of both the academic and corporate sectors on the social and environmental 
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issues that drive research efforts theoretically and empirically (Belal & Momin, 2009; 
Eugenio, Lourenco & Morais, 2010; Islam, 2010; Fifka, 2013).  
CSRR began its journey to become a substantial research discipline in the early 1970s, 
when most empirical works were mainly descriptive in nature and focused on social 
issues. Research during this period was theoretically under-developed with limited 
studies examining the motivations of CSRR (Mathews, 1997). CSRR continued to 
develop in the 1980s with more analytical works conducted, particularly on 
environmental issues, as these issues started to gain popularity. These analytical works 
involved the empirical testing of specific conceptual frameworks or proposals.  
Research was more theoretically informed with the introduction of various perspectives 
into CSRR research; for example, the decision-usefulness, economy, and social and 
political perspectives (Mathews, 1997). Gray et al. (1995a), who reviewed several 
perspectives to explain CSRR, argued the limited contribution of the decision-
usefulness and the economy perspectives. However, they acknowledged the continuous 
contributions made by the social and political perspective in driving more research 
efforts on CSRR from the 1990s onwards. 
While social reporting received so much attention in the 1970s and 1980s, it 
disappeared in the early 1990s due to a change in direction for the research of 
environmental reporting (Gray et al., 1995a; Mathews, 1997). However, a resurgence of 
interest in social reporting, in addition to environmental reporting, occurred from the 
mid-1990s (Gray et al., 1995a; Mathews, 1997), focusing on eco-justice and eco-
efficiency (Bebbington, 1997). CSRR has been further developed recently to include 
triple bottom line (TBL) reporting and sustainability reporting (Bebbington, 1997; Gray, 
2002; Owen, 2008; ACCA, 2010; Gray, 2010). TBL reporting encompasses economic, 
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social and environmental dimensions of corporate reporting. Sustainability reporting 
originated from the firms’ concern of sustainability. As emphasised in the Brundtland 
Report (1987), firms should aim to achieve sustainable development that is the 
development that meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of 
future generations to meet their own needs. 
The greater focus placed by government, professional accounting bodies and firms on 
the social and environmental issues led to the substantial growth of CSRR research 
from the mid-1990s (Deegan, 2002) with a predominance of environmental reporting 
research within the growth of CSRR research (Parker, 2011). Among the topics studied 
so far include, motivations, determinants, and methods of reporting; types of disclosure, 
and various parties’ reactions to, or perceptions of, disclosure or reporting practices.  
The majority of CSRR studies were investigated from the perspective of developed 
countries; for example, the US, the UK and Australia. Moreover, Spain, the Netherlands 
and Finland have also been identified by Parker (2011) as the leading non-Anglo-
Saxon18 contributors to CSRR literature. Despite the small amount made by the 
developing countries, the number of contributions continues to increase (Owen, 2008; 
Belal & Momin, 2009; Islam, 2010). 
Several studies claimed that the interest among researchers in CSRR research has 
tended to fluctuate for a number of decades (Gray et al., 1995a; Mathews, 1997; 
Deegan, 2002). This has been due to several reasons, such as lack of agreed theoretical 
perspectives to drive systematic research (Ullmann, 1985; Gray et al., 1995a), 
researchers entering and leaving the field (Mathews, 1997; Deegan & Soltys, 2007) and 
the relative popularity of CSRR topics over a particular time period (Gray et al., 1995a; 
                                                 
18 Anglo-Saxon countries refer to the English-speaking countries, such as the US, the UK, Canada, Australia and New Zealand. 
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Mathews, 1997; Deegan, 2002). Nevertheless, the importance of CSRR research 
remains as a result of the greater concerns of stakeholders on the social and 
environmental implication of firms’ activities and the corporate governance reform 
around the world. 
2.5 CSRR IN THE ANNUAL REPORT 
CSRR has demonstrated the acceptance of firms’ broader responsibility to the 
stakeholders and interests to report CSR information (Adams & Zutshi, 2004). CSRR 
has also received much attention in firms due to the potential it offers; for example, it 
promotes good reputation, minimises risks and influences or delays legislation (Adams, 
2002; Adams & Zutshi, 2004; ACCA, 2010; Dhaliwal, Li & Yang, 2011). In other 
words, the stakeholders may have better understanding of the firms’ activities through 
the CSRR disclosed. This may reduce stakeholders’ criticisms; hence, leading to 
improved reputations (Adams, 2002). CSRR may also minimise the risks of losing 
money in settling fines from breach of regulations and clean-up costs out of 
irresponsible business activities, thus leading to cost-saving (Adams, 2002; Adams & 
Zutshi, 2004). CSRR can also help improve firms’ performance (Adams & Zutshi, 
2004) and cost of capital (Dhaliwal et al., 2011). 
According to Dhaliwal et al. (2011), firms with a high cost of equity capital in the 
previous year tend to initiate CSRR, as the initiating firms with superior social 
responsibility performance enjoy a subsequent reduction in the cost of equity capital 
and attract dedicated institutional investors and analyst coverage. In response to the 
question of whether CSRR add any value to the pursuit of profit, Gray (2006) did not 
deny its possibility, yet emphasised the accountability role of the reporting on the 
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sustainability of human life and planet as a whole. CSRR may also represent a source of 
competitive advantage for firms (Ingley, 2008). 
A number of reporting media has been used by firms in communicating their CSRR 
(Jenkins & Yakovleva, 2006); for example, via annual reports (Gray, Javad, Power & 
Sinclair, 2001; Stanton & Stanton, 2002), websites (Adams & Frost, 2006; Branco & 
Rodrigues, 2008b; Guthrie, Cuganesan & Ward, 2008a; Wanderley, Lucian, Farache & 
Filho, 2008), stand-alone reports (ACCA, 2001; Tilt, 2001b; Chen & Bouvain, 2009), 
advertisements and brochures (Zeghal & Ahmed, 1990; Tilt, 2001b), media releases 
(Brown & Deegan, 1998; Deegan, Rankin & Tobin, 2002) and newsletters (Tilt, 
2001b).  
However, the importance of annual reports has made it being chosen as a more practical 
option in conducting research (Gray et al., 2001), especially in a large scale and 
longitudinal basis of study. This has been indicated in a number of CSRR literatures 
(Gray et al., 1995b; Neu, Warsame & Pedwell, 1998; Gray et al., 2001; Stanton & 
Stanton, 2002; Campbell, Moore & Shrives, 2006). For example, an annual report 
represents one of the major sources of information and reporting tools that provides 
useful information to a wide range of users, including shareholders and other 
stakeholders (Halme & Huse, 1997; Campbell et al., 2006).  
According to Stanton and Stanton (2002), annual reports are recognised as the most 
comprehensive communication channel with the potential of making information easily 
and regularly available to the public in a single document. The association of the annual 
reports with regulation and audit has made it a credible corporate document (De Villiers 
& Van Staden, 2011); hence, the annual reports can be an effective method of managing 
external impression (Neu et al., 1998). 
 
39 
 
The reporting role and credibility of the annual report as a focal corporate document has 
made it become the main choice of media in reporting corporate information, including 
CSR information. Annual reports have been used widely as the main source of CSR 
information in many of the CSRR research (Hackston & Milne, 1996; Deegan, Rankin 
& Voght, 2000; Haniffa & Cooke, 2005; Tilling & Tilt, 2010; De Villiers & Van 
Staden, 2011). Adams and Zutshi (2004) highlighted that Australian firms continue to 
use annual reports as a primary source of reporting on environmental information.  
Furthermore, De Villiers and Van Staden (2011) noted that firms report environmental 
information mostly in their annual reports and on their websites. Based on a sample of 
US firms, De Villiers and Van Staden (2011) found that varying levels of environmental 
reporting are provided in annual reports and on websites under different conditions. 
Firms report more environmental information on their websites when faced with an 
environmental crisis, and more in their annual reports when they have a bad 
environmental reputation (De Villiers & Van Staden, 2011). In other words, De Villiers 
and Van Staden (2011) suggested that different reporting media serve different purposes 
and have different audiences. For example, annual reports have been proposed as the 
most appropriate media used to communicate with the providers of capitals, especially 
shareholders and creditors. 
Despite the increasing popularity of stand-alone reports and Internet/website as CSRR 
media (Guthrie et al., 2008a; Chen & Bouvain, 2009), several researchers argued that 
such phenomena might be valid only in the context of Western developed economies 
(Williams & Pei, 1999; Chapple & Moon, 2005; Belal & Momin, 2009). Differences in 
the level of socio-economic (Xiao, Gao, Heravi & Cheung, 2005) and technological 
development (Williams & Pei, 1999) between developed and developing countries may 
contribute to the lower adoption levels of CSRR media other than annual reports. For 
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example, websites may not be used widely for business communication in Asia 
countries in comparison with Western countries (Williams & Pei, 1999; Chapple & 
Moon, 2005).  
Based on questionnaire surveys and structured interviews conducted within selected 
firms participating in the Malaysian Environmental and Social Reporting Awards 
(MESRA) 2007, Sawani, Zain and Darus (2010) revealed that CSRR was incorporated 
mostly in the firms’ annual reports. The use of stand-alone reports was very limited and 
the progress towards such practice was slow (Sawani et al., 2010). Overall, evidence 
from the extant CSRR studies documented the importance of annual reports as CSRR 
media, particularly in the context of developing or Asian countries. 
Regardless of the reporting media, much of the extant CSRR research has focused on 
developed countries, with evidence from developing countries remaining limited but 
increasing over time (Belal & Momin, 2009; Islam, 2010). This has invited more 
rigorous research to be undertaken in developing countries, in order to obtain some 
indication of the extent to which cultural, political and institutional differences between 
the developed and developing countries affect CSR activities and reporting (Jones, 
1999; Matten & Moon, 2008).  
2.6 THE NATURE AND EXTENT OF CSRR IN ANNUAL REPORT 
The nature and extent of CSRR in annual reports have been much investigated in both 
developed and developing countries (Belal & Momin, 2009; Eugenio et al., 2010). Most 
studies document a variation in CSRR disclosed in terms of the nature (e.g. positive or 
negative information, good or bad news), extent (e.g. volume of reporting for each 
theme included in the CSRR’s instrument employed) and location (e.g. chairman’s 
statement, separate section in the annual report, operations and reviews section) of 
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reporting. Past empirical research that examined the nature and extent of CSRR in the 
annual reports conducted either cross-sectional analysis or longitudinal analysis of 
CSRR disclosed, by either a single firm or multiple firms.  
Cross-sectional analysis of CSRR is very common in the literature. A number of 
evidence on the cross-sectional analysis of CSRR has been gathered from various 
countries; for example, European nations (Roberts, 1991; Adams, Hill & Roberts, 
1998), Arab nations (Abu-Baker & Naser, 2000; Kamla, 2007), Australia (Tilt, 2001a; 
Guthrie, Cuganesan & Ward, 2008b), New Zealand (Hackston & Milne, 1996), 
Malaysia (Thompson & Zakaria, 2004; Amran & Devi, 2008; Othman et al., 2011) and 
Bangladesh (Belal, 2001; Hossain, Islam & Andrew, 2006), to name a few. There have 
also been plenty of studies that analysed CSRR on a longitudinal basis. This range of 
studies presents the trends and patterns of CSRR over a specific period. Reviews of the 
longitudinal study of CSRR are provided in Section 2.6.2. 
2.6.1 CSRR Categories/Themes 
Different categories of CSRR have been used in different studies to reflect the different 
CSR orientation set in different countries (Newell, 2005; Welford, 2005; Visser, 2008) 
and changes in CSR focus over time (Gray et al., 1995a; Owen, 2008). Earlier CSRR 
research (Cowen, Ferreri & Parker, 1987; Zeghal & Ahmed, 1990; Patten, 1991) relied 
on the categories suggested initially by Ernst and Ernst (1978, cited in Patten, 1991); the 
US-based research. There are seven themes of CSRR included in Ernst and Ernst’s 
(1978) instrument: environment; energy; community involvement; human resources; 
fair business practices; products; and other disclosures. Several other studies employed 
the same instrument, yet excluded ‘fair business practices’ as a CSRR theme in their 
analysis (Trotman & Bradley, 1981; Guthrie & Parker, 1989; Guthrie & Parker, 1990). 
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Milne and Adler (1999) claimed that ‘fair business practices’ was included under the 
‘human resource’ theme in Guthrie’s CSRR instrument. 
Newson and Deegan (2002) added ‘diversity’ to the seven themes used by Ernst and 
Ernst (1978). Guided by Guthrie’s CSRR category, Gray et al. (1995a, b), who studied 
CSRR in the UK, suggested a list of themes that can be further classified into four 
broader themes; environment, community, employee and customer. These were 
employed by Pratten and Mashat (2009) in their study of CSRR in Libya. Ness & Mirza 
(1991), who examined the CSRR disclosed by the UK firms, also relied on these four 
broad themes, yet ‘product’ replaced the ‘customer’ theme. 
Hackton and Milne (1996) proposed environment, energy, community involvement, 
employee health and safety, employee others, products and others as CSRR themes in 
their study in New Zealand. They referred to the works of Ernst and Ernst, Guthrie and 
Gray et al. in constructing their CSRR category. Later, Deegan et al. (2002) modified 
Hackston and Milne’s (1996) work by excluding the ‘product’ theme and combining 
‘employee health and safety’ and ‘employee others’ into one theme, labelled as 
‘employee’.  
Williams (1999), Abu-Baker and Naser (2000), Thompson and Zakaria (2004), Gao, 
Heravi and Xiao (2005) and Hossain, Islam and Andrew (2006) shared four common 
themes of CSRR in their studies, namely environment, energy, community involvement 
and human resource. While the ‘products and customers’ theme was added in Williams 
(1999) and Thompson and Zakaria’s (2004) study, ‘products’ was added as a theme in 
Abu-Baker and Naser (2000) and Hossain et al.’s (2006) study. Gao et al. (2005) added 
‘health and safety’ and ‘fair business practices’ to their list of themes. Generally, the 
addition and exclusion of themes in a study reflects the different CSR focuses of 
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differing studies. It also denotes the changes in CSR focus over time and the relative 
importance of certain themes in different countries.  
Despite a list of themes used in prior CSRR research, there are three common themes 
that were used widely; ‘environment’, ‘community’ and ‘employee’ (Milne & Chan, 
1999). The emergence of these common themes corresponds with the changing 
demands of public interest that go beyond employees’ related matters, and include the 
environment and local community-related matters (Milne & Chan, 1999). It could also 
signify the importance of these three themes to CSR agendas in most of the countries 
around the world.  
Kuasirikun and Sherer (2004) adopted these three themes in examining CSRR in 
Thailand, while Tsang (1998) added ‘other’ theme that includes product quality as sub-
theme of CSRR exploration in Singapore. Additional themes such as consumer 
relations, product safety and shareholder rights were included to the existing common 
themes in Smith, Adhikari and Tondkar’s (2005) study of the Norwegian/Danish and 
the US firms in the electric power generation industry.  
Haniffa and Cooke (2005) added ‘product or service information’ and ‘value-added 
information’ themes to their CSRR categories investigated from the context of 
Malaysia, whereas Branco and Rodrigues (2008b) included ‘products and consumers’ in 
the examination of Portuguese firms. Othman et al. (2011) added a ‘marketplace’ theme 
to the existing themes and labelled ‘employee’ theme as ‘workplace’. The ‘marketplace’ 
and ‘workplace’ labels reflect the themes introduced to the CSRR framework by Bursa 
Malaysia in September 2006, which serves as voluntary guidelines for public listed 
firms in Malaysia in relation to their CSRR matters. 
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There have also been several studies that classified CSRR categories into broader areas 
of similar themes (Adams et al., 1998; Kamla, 2007). Adams et al. (1998), who 
investigated CSRR in Western Europe, employed three themes; environmental 
reporting, reporting on employee issues and ethical reporting. In their study, Adams et 
al. (1998) defined ethical reporting as ‘any information, except employee or 
environmental, that was concerned directly or indirectly with giving an impression of 
corporate ethical values’, which includes a wide range of specific topics; for example, 
customer relations, community involvement, equal opportunities, investment policies, 
charitable and political activities and product safety.  
In examining CSRR in the Arab countries of the Middle East, Kamla (2007) included 
‘economic’ and ‘other cultural characteristics of the annual reports’ as themes, in 
addition to ‘environmental’ and ‘general social’ themes. The ‘economic’ theme refers to 
supplier relations, customer relations, Islamic considerations in firm business decisions 
and activities, and linking corporate business activities and decision making to 
governmental and national considerations while ‘other cultural characteristics of the 
annual reports’ include other indications of Islamic and nationalistic influence on 
reporting (Kamla, 2007). Community and employee-related information are included 
under the ‘general social’ theme (Kamla, 2007).  
Several common themes or dimensions of CSRR have been identified following the 
growth of literature on the topic over the years; for example, environmental concerns, 
community involvement, employees’ welfare, products and others issues. These 
common themes of CSRR offer useful benchmarks and guidelines for researchers to 
drive future investigations. CSRR seems to be led by developed countries, as most of 
the earlier instruments were derived from developed countries.  
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However, more CSRR contributions emerged from the developing countries from 2000 
onwards, adapting instruments that originated from the Western perspective. Several 
studies have also attempted to discuss CSRR from an Islamic perspective (Sulaiman, 
2005; Maali et al., 2006; Kamla, 2007; Pratten & Mashat, 2009), as many principles of 
Islamic teachings (Shariah) are related to the concept of CSR. Perhaps a growing trend 
of CSRR research in developing countries could motivate researchers to build 
instruments that suit the needs of a specific country and time, since different countries 
have different focuses (Newell, 2005; Welford, 2005; CSR Asia, 2008; Visser, 2008) 
and that the CSR focus tends to be varied across different time (Gray et al., 1995a; 
Owen, 2008).  
2.6.2 Trends and Patterns of CSRR in the Annual Report  
Existing literature on the nature and extent of CSRR can be categorised in terms of the 
basis of study; for example, cross-sectional versus longitudinal, country-specific versus 
international comparative, and developed versus developing countries. The cross-
sectional nature of CSRR research that relies on single year data does not allow 
researchers to examine the trend of CSRR over a period of time. In order to overcome 
this weakness, a number of researchers have conducted CSRR analysis in a longitudinal 
basis. By examining the trend of CSRR, researchers may observe the manner in which 
firms respond to the rising social and environmental issues, any specific events that 
occur in a particular year or time-period, or any other reasons that may influence the 
changes in CSRR over a specified time-period. This is important in terms of measuring 
the level of commitments of CSRR demonstrated by firms. 
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As observed in several CSRR literatures, there is a variation of CSRR over time, even 
in a single-firm study. This variation resulted from a specific event that occurs at one 
specific time-period, emphasising the use of CSRR as an instrument to manage the 
demands of stakeholders (see Buhr, 1998; Deegan et al., 2002; Tilling & Tilt, 2010). 
For example, Campbell (2000), who conducted a longitudinal analysis of CSRR made 
by a British retailer, Marks and Spencer Plc, observed variability in the volume of 
CSRR over the period of 1969 to 1997, which can be explained by the varying 
perceptions of reality of the successive chairmen.  
In analysing environmental reporting made by Falconbridge, Buhr (1998) witnessed 
changes in reporting from 1964 to 1991, reflecting the importance of a specific agenda 
in each period, for example, pollution reduction and regulation compliance. 
Falconbridge is an international resource firm engaging primarily in mining and 
smelting of nickel activities in Sudbury, Ontario, Canada. The firm has struggled to 
manage sulphur dioxide emission in its operations (Buhr, 1998). An increasing focus on 
political matters can be observed with a movement of reporting trend from ‘fact’ to one 
based on ‘claims’ and ‘promise’ (Buhr, 1998).  
Tilling and Tilt (2010) examined the CSRR made by Rothmans Ltd over a 43-year 
period (1956 to 1999). Rothmans Ltd was one of the tripartite of firms that dominated 
the Australian tobacco market (Tilling & Tilt, 2010). Being in the tobacco industry, 
Rothmans Ltd, which faced a major threat to its legitimacy due to smoking and health 
issues, chose not to engage with those issues, focusing instead on community service 
and charitable work (Tilling & Tilt, 2010). However, when the industry became highly 
regulated, scrutinised and taxed, the firm surrendered its charitable community 
involvement and subsequent reporting, as it no longer seemed important in trying to 
defend its legitimacy (Tilling & Tilt, 2010). 
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A longitudinal CSRR analysis of Broken Hill Proprietary (BHP) Company Ltd was 
undertaken by Guthrie and Parker (1989) and Deegan et al. (2002). BHP is one of the 
Australian largest firms engaging in the steel industry. While Guthrie and Parker (1989) 
presented a 100-year analysis of CSRR (1885 to 1985), Deegan et al. (2002) covers a 
15-year period (1983 to 1997). Both studies reported a variable pattern of CSRR in 
BHP and attempted to relate specific CSRR to specific community concerns.  
Guthrie and Parker (1989) tested the application of legitimacy theory in explaining the 
CSRR of BHP. They compared the observed peaks of disclosure frequency over time 
with the relevant social, economic or political events of the firm in the same, or 
immediately preceding, time periods. Their analysis did not confirm the application of 
legitimacy theory as the primary explanatory theory for CSRR disclosed by the firm.  
Deegan et al. (2002) argued that the way Guthrie and Parker (1989) measured the 
community concern might have led to such findings. For example, Guthrie and Parker 
(1989) relied on the contents of a ‘data bank of all major events and issues relating to 
BHP’, which they acknowledged may exclude some important events or activities in 
BHP’s history, as a measure of community concern. In contrast, Deegan et al. (2002), 
who related the extent of media attention, as a measure of community concern, with 
CSRR disclosed by BHP on the same issues, found significant positive correlations with 
the general themes of environment and human resources, as well as for various sub-
issues within these, and other, themes. Deegan et al.’s (2002) findings suggested that 
management released positive social and environmental information as a response to 
unfavourable media attention. 
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Rather than focusing on single-firm study, a number of researchers have also analysed 
CSRR based on a sample of firms on a longitudinal basis (see Patten, 1992; Gray et al., 
1995a; Neu et al., 1998; Deegan et al., 2000; Campbell, Craven & Shrives, 2003; 
Haniffa & Cooke, 2005; De Villiers & Van Staden, 2006; Pratten & Mashat, 2009; 
Mahadeo, Oogarah-Hanuman & Soobaroyen, 2011). This range of studies tends to 
produce more generalised results of the trend of CSRR (e.g. in the context of industry-
specific or country-specific) compared with the specific results of the pattern of CSRR 
in one particular firm (e.g. firm-specific or case-study). 
For example, Patten (1992) observed a change in environmental reporting made by 21 
firms in the US petroleum industry following the Exxon Valdez oil spill. There was 
significantly more environmental reporting made in the post-oil spill accident, reflecting 
the need of the industry to increase reporting in order to manage the increased concern 
of different stakeholders following the accident; thus, being viewed as legitimate in the 
eyes of society.  
An examination of CSRR in a sample of UK firms dictated a change in reporting made 
by firms over a 13-year period of analysis (Gray et al., 1995a). Based on a sample of 
444 random observations from 1979 to 1987, and top 100 firms from 1988 to 1991, 
Gray et al. (1995a) found a significant increase in CSRR disclosed, especially the 
environmental-related information from 1988 onwards. A general rise in the proportion 
of firms reporting CSRR is also dictated by Gray et al. (1995a). Niskala and Pretes 
(1995), who drew their sample from 75 Finnish firms that represented largest firms in 
the most environmentally sensitive industries, observed a significant change in 
environmental reporting practices during the period of study (1987 and 1992). The 
reporting firms increased from slightly over one-quarter of the sample in 1987 to nearly 
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one-half in 1992, with much of the reporting was qualitative in nature (Niskala & 
Pretes, 1995).  
Deegan and Gordon (1996) investigated the extent of environmental reporting of 197 
Australian firms across 50 industries in 1991 and another 25 firms between 1980 and 
1991. They found that only 36 percent of the sampled firms disclosed environmental 
information, with the majority of reporting being positive in nature (Deegan & Gordon, 
1996). A significant increase in environmental reporting was observed during the period 
of study, focused on environmentally sensitive industries (Deegan & Gordon, 1996).  
Deegan and Rankin (1996) also offered similar findings based on their study of 20 firms 
prosecuted for environmental breaches from 1990 to 1993, whereby prosecuted firms 
were found to disclose more environmental information in the post-prosecution period, 
possibly with the intention of responding to the negative publicity resulting from the 
prosecution. In examining the reaction of Australian firms to several major social 
accidents that had far-reaching social and environmental implications, Deegan et al. 
(2000) reported an increase in CSRR following the accidents. The five social incidents 
reviewed in Deegan et al.’s (2000) study are: the Exxon Valdez oil spill; the Bhopal 
disaster; the Moura Mine disaster in Queensland; an oil spill caused by the Iron Baron 
off the coast of Tasmania; and the Kirki oil spill, off the coast of Western Australia. 
Tsang (1998) presented a longitudinal analysis of CSRR made by public-listed 
Singapore-based firms in the banking, food and beverage, and hotel industries from 
1986 to 1995. Out of 33 sampled firms, 16 did not disclose any CSRR throughout the 
10-year period (Tsang, 1998). Based on the analysis of the reporting firms, Tsang 
(1998) reported a low level of CSRR in the beginning, before increasing steadily during 
the late 1980s, and remaining static from 1993 onwards.  
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Several other studies conducting a longitudinal analysis of CSRR also documented an 
increase in CSRR disclosed during the period of study (see Gao et al., 2005; Haniffa & 
Cooke, 2005; Gibson & O'Donovan, 2007; Pratten & Mashat, 2009; Saleh et al., 2010; 
Mahadeo et al., 2011). Gao et al. (2005) relied on 33 Hong Kong listed firms from 1993 
to 1997 as the sample for their study, while Haniffa and Cooke (2005) based their study 
on a sample of public-listed firms in Malaysia in 1996 and 2002. Pratten and Mashat 
(2009) used 56 Libyan firms as a sample in their longitudinal CSRR analysis from 1999 
to 2002, while Mahadeo et al. (2011) derived their sample from listed firms in 
Mauritius between 2004 and 2007.  
Gibson and O’Donovan (2007) presented a 21-year period of environmental reporting 
analysis from 1983 to 2003 based on a sample of Australian firms. Saleh et al. (2010) 
extended the CSRR analysis in Malaysia by using data obtained from 2000 to 2005. 
According to Saleh et al. (2010), even though there is an increasing trend over time, the 
CSRR disclosed by firms varied over the six-year period of analysis.  
A longitudinal analysis of CSRR is also observed in a range of studies that investigated 
the changes in CSRR between the voluntary and mandatory period of reporting. Most 
examined the changes in environmental reporting before and after the regulation was 
introduced (see Larrinaga et al., 2002; Cowan & Gadenne, 2005; Frost, 2007; Criado-
Jimenez et al., 2008).  
Following the introduction of environmental reporting standards in Spain, Larrinaga et 
al. (2002) dictated an increase in the number of reporting firms between the 1997 and 
1999. Later, Criado-Jimenez et al. (2008) reported an increase in the volume and quality 
of environmental reporting in the financial statements of 78 of the largest Spanish firms 
from 2001 to 2003. According to Criado-Jimenez et al. (2008), the increment in 
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reporting reflects the progressive and improved regulation on environmental reporting 
made in the country. In the context of Australia, Frost (2007) observed a significant 
increase in the number of reporting firms and the level of information provided on 
environmental performance, as a result of the introduction of mandatory environmental 
reporting guidelines in the country. Findings from these studies supported Tilt and 
Symes’ (1999) argument on the rise of reporting in the presence of mandatory reporting 
requirements. 
Based on the review of related CSRR literature, it is shown that CSRR practices 
changed over the past decades in order to respond to demand for such reporting. For 
example, greater CSRR is observed in high-profile firms, such as firms that are larger in 
size and classified in environmentally sensitive industries. While the majority of studies 
documented an increase in CSRR over time, several studies reported a reduction in 
CSRR (see Campbell et al., 2003; Kuasirikun & Sherer, 2004; De Villiers & Van 
Staden, 2006; Tilling & Tilt, 2010).  
Campbell et al. (2003), who investigated the voluntary CSRR disclosed by firms in 
tobacco, brewing and retailing industries in the UK from 1975 to 1997, found that 
CSRR made in annual report varies substantially between firms and industries, and over 
time. According to Campbell et al. (2003), firms that are expected to disclose more 
CSRR do not always do so. This argument is supported by De Villiers and Van Staden 
(2006), who reported a reduction in environmental reporting after an initial period of 
increase, based on a sample of 140 South African firms over a 9-year period (1994-
2002). Similar findings can be seen in Tilling and Tilt’s (2010) study on CSRR of 
Rothmans Ltd over a 43-year period.  
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Kuasirikun and Sherer (2004), in observing a slight reduction in the percentage of 
reporting firms in Thailand from 86 percent in 1993 to 77 percent in 1999, argued that 
this might be attributable to the financial crisis of 1997. However, Mia and Mamun 
(2011), who examined the effect of the global financial crisis in year 2008 on CSRR, 
revealed an insignificant upward change in CSRR disclosed by 48 selected utilities and 
industrial firms in Australia between 2006 (before the global financial crisis) and 2008 
(during the global financial crisis). Despite facing a significant drop in profitability 
from 2007 to 2008, the utilities and industrial firms were found not to avoid the CSRR 
during the financial crisis, rather the amount of disclosure increased during the financial 
crisis as compared to the period before the crisis (Mia & Mamun, 2011). Pinto and De 
Villiers (2012), who investigated the trend of CSRR disclosed by top 50 New Zealand 
listed firms from 2005 to 2010, also dictated similar findings; whereby the level of 
CSRR disclosed remained consistent even during the financial crisis. 
There has also been a range of studies that attempted to compare CSRR practices in 
different countries. For example, Guthrie and Parker (1990) compared the CSRR 
disclosed by firms in the US, UK and Australia, whereas Williams (1999) analysed that 
of firms in seven Asia-Pacific nations (Australia, Singapore, Hong Kong, the 
Philippines, Thailand, Indonesia and Malaysia). While Golob and Bartlett (2007) 
compared the CSRR practices of Australia and Slovenia, Xiao et al. (2005) 
differentiated between CSRR disclosed by Hong Kong and the UK firms from 1993 to 
1997. Overall, these studies documented cross-national differences in the CSRR 
released by firms in different countries.  
Adams et al. (1998) found that the amount and nature of CSRR disclosed varies 
significantly across six countries (France, Germany, The Netherlands, Sweden, 
Switzerland and the UK) in Western Europe. Newson and Deegan (2002) revealed that 
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Australian multinational firms disclosed more CSRR, followed by the Singaporean and 
South Korean multinational firms. Large Norwegian/Danish firms were found to have a 
higher level and quality of CSRR than US firms (Smith et al., 2005). Smith et al. (2005) 
suggested that firms from countries with stronger emphasis on social issues have a 
stakeholder orientation, thus provide greater quantity and quality of CSRR compared to 
firms from a country with a weaker emphasis on social issues and have a shareholder 
orientation. In comparing the environmental reporting made between a sample of 
European and American multinational firms, more reporting was revealed in the 
European multinationals’ annual reports than the American multinationals (Saida, 
2009). Comparative studies that relied on separate or stand-alone CSR reports (Chen & 
Bouvain, 2009) and websites (Williams & Pei, 1999; Chapple & Moon, 2005) as 
sources of CSRR also dictated a variation in CSRR disclosed by firms across the 
countries. 
In summary, reviews of the relevant CSRR literature observed a change in CSRR 
disclosed by firms over a period of time. The variation of CSRR is attributed to specific 
events such as major social accidents or imposition of regulation, or general changes in 
stakeholders’ perception that are represented by the intensified awareness of the 
stakeholders on the social and environmental implication of firms’ activities. Moreover, 
the need for greater efforts to analyse CSRR on a longitudinal basis prevails to capture 
the effects of specific events, if any that may occur during the periods of analysis.  
The cross-sectional basis of CSRR analysis that relied on single-year data does not 
permit the analysis of the trend and patterns of CSRR over a period of time. In 
comparison with a case-study basis of CSRR analysis that focuses on a single-firm 
study, the use of multiple firms enables researchers to make generalisations on the 
findings revealed in the study conducted. Nevertheless, the choices of the basis of 
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CSRR analysis performed in one study are largely dependent on the objectives of the 
study. 
2.7 DETERMINANTS OF CSRR 
Significant variations in CSRR disclosed by firms can be explained by a number of 
factors; including firm size and industry. Based on a sample of 207 Australian firms, 
Trotman and Bradley (1981) concluded that a greater amount of CSRR is found in firms 
that are larger in size, have higher systematic risk and place stronger emphasis on long-
term decisions. In examining the association between several firm characteristics, 
specifically, firm size, industry classification, profitability and the presence of a CSR 
committee, and CSRR, Cowen et al. (1987) revealed that firm size and industry 
classification were associated with CSRR disclosed by firm based on their analysis of 
134 US firms. Similar findings were observed in Belkaoui and Karpik’s (1989) study 
that relied on the US-based data of 1973, whereby firms that disclosed CSRR appear to 
be those that were larger in size, with higher systematic risk and lower leverage, and 
perceived to display social responsiveness. 
Patten (1991), in his analysis of 128 US firms in 1985, found that firm size and industry 
classification were related significantly to the level of CSRR disclosed, while 
profitability is not. The same findings were revealed in Hackston and Milne’s (1996) 
study based on their analysis of 47 top firms listed on the New Zealand stock exchange 
in 1992. Patten (1991) argued that CSRR is used to address the exposure faced by firms 
with regard to the social and environmental issues, thus it should be related more 
closely with the public pressure variables such as firm size and industry than 
profitability measures.  
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Gray et al. (1995a) also found firm size as a significant variable in explaining the level 
of CSRR in the UK firms. While firm size and industry were revealed to correlate with 
the level of CSRR disclosed by firms in Hong Kong (Gao et al., 2005), firm size and 
business risk were found to associate with CSRR made by firms in Qatar (Naser, 
Alhussaini, Alkwari & Nuseibeh, 2006). Drawing upon a sample of firms in Malaysia, 
Haniffa and Cooke (2005) discovered that firm size, type of industry, profitability and 
multiple listing were related significantly to CSRR. 
Of five variables, specifically international experience, firm size, media exposure, and 
two proxies represent industry affiliation, namely consumer proximity and 
environmental sensitivity hypothesised in Branco and Rodrigues’ (2008b) study of 
Portuguese firms, media exposure and firm size were found to have positive 
associations with the level of CSRR disclosed. Neu et al. (1998) related shareholder 
concerns, media coverage and general level of societal attention to the level of CSRR 
disclosed by firms. Their study is based on a sample of 15 firms in each of the mineral 
extraction, forestry, oil and gas, and chemical industries in Canada between 1982 and 
1991. Similarly, Brown and Deegan (1998) also documented an association between 
media coverage and environmental reporting in annual reports of Australian firms from 
1981 to 1994. Deegan and Gordon (1996) linked the increase in environmental 
reporting to the apparent increase in societal concerns relating to environmental issues. 
Adams et al. (1998) explored the factors influencing CSRR in Western Europe based on 
a sample of firms from six Western European countries. Their study discovered that 
firm size, industry and ‘country of domicile’ influence the CSRR patterns of a firm. 
Newson and Deegan (2002) found that ‘country of origin’ and ‘industry of operation’ 
influence significantly the CSRR practices of large Australian, Singaporean and South 
Korean multinational firms. Firms operated in high-profile industries such as raw 
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material extraction, chemical, wood, and paper and forestry disclose significantly more 
CSRR compared with firms in low-profile industries, for example, in services, 
healthcare, computers and electronics industries (Newson & Deegan, 2002). Other 
studies that documented the differences in CSRR practices across countries claimed that 
such differences were attributable to the differences in the social, cultural, political and 
economic systems of the countries (Guthrie & Parker, 1990; Williams, 1999; Smith et 
al., 2005; Xiao et al., 2005; Golob & Bartlett, 2007).  
The majority of studies investigating the influential factors in determining the nature 
and extent of CSRR have focused on the impact of firm characteristics (e.g. size, 
industry, profitability, leverage) or general contextual factors (e.g. the social, political 
and economic context). Firms that are larger in size, higher risk, more profitable and 
categorised under high-profile firms (e.g. firms in environmentally-sensitive industry) 
tend to disclose significantly more CSR information compared with other firms.  
Beside firm-specific characteristics, Adams (2002) identified a number of internal 
contextual factors that influencing the nature and extent of CSRR; for example, board of 
directors, corporate social reporting committees, corporate structure, governance 
procedures and regulation. This is based on several interviews conducted with seven 
large multinational firms in chemical and pharmaceutical sectors of the UK and 
Germany. Adams (2002) referred to contextual factors as the internal governance 
structure of firms, including processes of reporting and attitudes of internal players, 
which may influence firms’ decision making.  
The importance of internal contextual factors that include firms’ internal governance 
structure in influencing the nature and extent of CSRR has motivated a number of 
researchers to investigate the link between corporate governance and CSRR (Haniffa & 
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Cooke, 2005; Cooper & Owen, 2007; Gibson & O'Donovan, 2007; Bear et al., 2010; 
Huang & Kung, 2010; Mallin et al., 2012). This is because the manner in which firms 
are governed may influence the way they behave. Moreover, specific internal 
governance structures may become the forces affecting the firms’ decision to disclose 
CSRR for the use of their stakeholders.  
Furthermore, laws and regulations related to CSRR may also influence firms’ decisions 
to disclose CSRR (Lee & Hutchison, 2005). In reviewing the factors that may influence 
firms’ decisions to disclose environmental information, Lee and Hutchison (2005) listed 
five determinants of environmental reporting: (1) laws and regulations; (2) legitimacy; 
public pressure, and publicity; (3) firm/industry characteristics; (4) rational cost-benefit 
analysis; and (5) cultural forces and attitudes.  
Since the current study focuses on corporate ownership structure, board of directors’ 
characteristic and corporate reporting regulation, these three aspects are discussed in 
greater detail in Chapter three and Chapter four. The current study also controls the 
effect of several firm-specific characteristics that may have effect on the levels of 
CSRR disclosed by firms. Five control variables included in the current study are: firm 
size, Shariah status of firm, profitability, leverage and industry. Each of these is 
explained further in Chapter four.  
Other than Shariah status of firms, the impact of firm size, profitability, leverage and 
industry has been documented in a number of CSRR research. The idea for including 
the Shariah status of firms in the current study arises from the increasing importance of 
the Shariah-approved firms in Malaysia (Ousama & Fatima, 2010) and the differences 
observed between corporate reporting made by the Shariah and non-Shariah approved 
firms (Ibrahim et al., 2006; Aribi & Gao, 2010). The Shariah approved firms, which are 
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subjected to the principles of Islamic teaching (Shariah), are expected to practice CSR 
and CSRR. This is due to the relatedness of many principles of Islamic teaching 
(Shariah) to the concept of CSR (Baydoun & Willett, 2000; Lewis, 2001; Kamla et al., 
2006; Dusuki, 2008).  
Lewis (2001) highlighted the aim of the Islamic economic system to promote people to 
live in a fair and profitable way without exploiting others, thus benefiting the whole 
society. The human being, who is appointed as vicegerent (khilafah) according to the 
Islamic world-view, is expected to carry the responsibility of safeguarding the 
environment (Lewis, 2001; Kamla et al., 2006). Being the vicegerent of God (Allah), 
the human being will ultimately be accountable to God for all their actions (Lewis, 
2001). Islam is also concerned with the development of the community (Umma); 
promoting its wellbeing, social justice (adl’), social welfare and countering for 
oppression (Lewis, 2001; Kamla et al., 2006) with knowledge (ilm) being the key in 
such development (Tinker, 2004).  
Following the integration of Islamic teaching in the concept of CSR, the Shariah-
approved firms are expected to be more actively involved in CSR-related activities 
compared with non-Shariah approved firms. A similar trend is expected in terms of 
their disclosures or reporting, as the Islamic perspective highlighted the principle of full 
disclosure and social accountability (Baydoun & Willett, 2000). Since the public has the 
right to be informed on the operational effects of a firm on its wellbeing, the firm is 
urged to fulfil its social accountability through proper disclosure of CSR to the public. 
Further explanation on the association between Shariah status of firm and CSRR is 
presented in Chapter four. 
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2.8 THEORETICAL DEVELOPMENT OF CSRR  
Despite the growing number of CSRR literature (Mathews, 1997; Gray, 2002, 2010; 
Parker, 2005; Deegan & Soltys, 2007; Owen, 2008; Belal & Momin, 2009; Eugenio et 
al., 2010), many researchers continue to argue about the absence of a coherent 
theorising of the field, which, in turn, led to the lack of substantive and systematic 
conclusions (Ullmann, 1985; Gray et al., 1995a; Mathews, 1997; Deegan, 2002; Parker, 
2005). The theoretical development of CSRR began in the 1980s (Mathews, 1997), with 
several classifications of theories emerging in subsequent periods (Gray et al., 1995a; 
Parker, 2005).  
Gray et al. (1995a) classified CSRR research into three different perspectives: decision-
usefulness theory, economic theory, and social and political theory. According to Gray 
et al. (1995a), most of the preceding studies that were based on the decision-usefulness 
theory tend to be inconsistent, and that the economic theory has little or nothing to offer 
to the development of CSRR. Despite the limited contribution of these two theories, the 
popularity of the social and political perspective in CSRR research remains, as indicated 
by the growing volume of literature examining CSRR from this perspective (Gray et al., 
1995a; Deegan, 2002).   
Further theorisation of CSRR has been attempted by Parker (2005), who categorised 
CSRR theories into two groups: augmentation theories, whereby CSRR is seen as 
adding value to the existing conventional accounting (e.g. stakeholder, economic 
agency / decision-usefulness, legitimacy and accountability theories); and heartland 
theories, whereby CSRR is seen as explaining the organisation-society relationship (e.g. 
political economy accounting, deep green ecological, eco-feminist, accountability-
fairness theories). Parker (2005), who noted several arguments in CSRR literature; for 
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example, the absence of a dominant theory to explain CSRR (Ullmann, 1985; Gray et 
al., 1995a; Gray, 2002), the overlapping of a number of CSRR theories (Gray et al., 
1995a; Deegan, 2002; Chen & Roberts, 2010) and the limited contribution of an elusive 
all-embracing unitary theory to explain CSRR (Gray et al., 1995a; Wilmshurst & Frost, 
2000; Adams, 2002; O'Dwyer, 2002), suggested for a multiple perspectives of CSRR 
(see Ratanajongkol, Davey & Low, 2006; Makela & Nasi, 2010).  
Ratanajongkol et al. (2006) argued the use of legitimacy and political economy theory 
in explaining the extent and nature of CSRR practices in Thailand. In exploring an 
organisational downsizing case in the Finnish forest sector, Makela and Nasi (2010) 
adopted a framework comprising stakeholder and legitimacy theory. In their case study, 
CSRR was perceived as a rhetorical means of influencing stakeholder perceptions, and 
that the use of CSRR in legitimising the downsizing decisions was minimal. 
Notwithstanding the variety of perspectives used to explain CSRR, most research has 
adopted the social and political theory, which may be further divided into three groups: 
political economy theory, legitimacy theory and stakeholder theory (Gray et al., 1995a; 
Deegan, 2002). These theories attempt to explain CSRR within a more systems-oriented 
view of the organisation and society, whereby an entity is assumed to be influenced by, 
and, in turn, have an influence upon, the society in which it operates (Gray et al., 1995a; 
Gray et al., 1996; Deegan, 2002).  
In contrast with other theoretical perspectives that suggest somewhat “close” orientation 
(Deegan, 2002), the systems-oriented view of the organisation-society relationship 
enables researchers to concentrate on the role of disclosure in the relationship between 
firms, government, individuals and groups (Gray et al., 1996). Within the systems-
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oriented perspective, management can influence external perceptions about their 
organisations through corporate reporting (Deegan, 2002).  
Each theory categorised under the social and political theory is explained in subsequent 
headings as follows: Section 2.8.1 Political Economy Theory, Section 2.8.2 Legitimacy 
Theory and Section 2.8.3 Stakeholder Theory. 
2.8.1 Political Economy Theory 
Political economy refers to ‘the social, political and economic framework within which 
human life takes place’ (Gray et al., 1996, p. 47). Political economy of accounting, 
generally, looks at accounting functions within the broader structural and institutional 
environment in which it operates (Cooper & Sherer, 1984). It suggests that society, 
politics and economics are inseparable; thus, they cannot be examined individually 
(Gray et al., 1995a; Deegan, 2002). The political economy perspective views corporate 
reporting as a social, political and economic document that emerged from political and 
proactive processes (Guthrie & Parker, 1990; Stanton & Stanton, 2002).  
Therefore, CSRR, when viewed from the perspective of political economy, is viewed as 
a tool for legitimacy that transmits the social, political and economic meanings to a 
wider set of users (Guthrie & Parker, 1990). By considering the political economy, a 
researcher is better able to deliberate broader issues including the environmental and 
societal issues, which impact on how a firm operates and what information it elects to 
report (Deegan, 2002).  
Several CSRR research have employed political economy theory in explaining CSRR in 
their studies; for example, Guthrie and Parker (1990), Williams (1999) and Amran and 
Devi (2007). Guthrie and Parker (1990) highlighted the ability of the political economy 
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perspective in explaining CSRR in three different countries; namely, the US, the UK 
and Australia. Guthrie and Parker (1990) mentioned that firms may elect to disclose 
voluntarily more CSRR in a way to demonstrate a constructive response to government 
or public pressure and to avoid further regulation on CSRR. Based on the content 
analysis of CSRR made, Guthrie and Parker (1990) concluded that firms tend to strive 
in setting the agenda and portraying the social, political and economic world in their 
own way, even in the case of a minimal level of CSRR.  
Williams (1999), who documented cross-national differences in the quantity of CSRR 
released by firms in seven Asia-Pacific nations, attributed such variation to the culture 
and the political and civil systems of respective countries. Nevertheless, economic-
related factors, such as the level of economic development and equity market, did not 
significantly explain the variation of CSRR in those countries (Williams, 1999). 
Overall, Williams (1999) suggested for the use of CSRR as a mechanism to protect 
firms’ self-interests in facing the social and political pressures, which provides support 
for the application of a bourgeois political economy framework (see Figure 2.2) to 
explain the cross-national variations in CSRR disclosed by firms. 
Amran and Devi (2007) also found support for the relevance of the political economy 
perspective in explaining the development of CSRR in Malaysia. Through examining 
the influence of government in spearheading the CSRR development in Malaysia, 
Amran and Devi (2007) revealed that firms with significant government shareholding or 
firms that are dependent on the government disclose more CSRR compared with firms 
with low government shareholding or those that are not dependent on the government. 
Generally, studies that adopted political economy theory tend to suggest the use of 
CSRR as a tool for managing the social and political pressures arising in several 
industries or countries.  
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In describing the political economy theory, Gray et al. (1996) highlighted two streams 
of political economy theory; namely, classical and bourgeois political economy. The 
classical political economy is related greatly to Marxist philosophy, which is concerned 
with struggle, conflict, inequality and the role of government as a focal analysis (Gray 
et al., 1995a; Gray et al., 1996; Deegan, 2002). It views corporate reporting as a means 
of maintaining the ideal position of resource controllers such as shareholders and 
creditors, yet undermining the position of non-resource controllers, for example, 
community. Conversely, the bourgeois political economy tends to ignore those struggles 
and conflicts within the classical political economy, but focuses on the managerial view 
of the interaction between groups in a pluralistic world, for example through negotiation 
between a firm and an environmental pressure group (Gray et al., 1995a; Gray et al., 
1996).  
Figure 2.2 presents the classification of the political economy’s streams according to 
their relevance theories. Basically, legitimacy theory and stakeholder theory are derived 
from the political economy perspective. From Figure 2.2, it is shown that the bourgeois 
political economy, through legitimacy theory of the organisation and stakeholder theory 
of accountability/organisation-centred, can be used to explain much of CSR practice as 
compared to the classical political economy, through legitimacy theory of the system 
(Gray et al., 1996). The classical political economy examines the power of society or 
groups within it to steer firms towards CSRR, whether through legislation or the threat 
of legislation; while the bourgeois political economy focuses on the desire and ability of 
the firms to use the CSRR to manage stakeholders and be seen as legitimate (Gray et 
al., 1996).  
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Figure 2.2: A Tentative Schema of Political and Systems-based Theories of CSRR 
(Source: Gray et al., 1996, p. 49) 
 
2.8.2 Legitimacy Theory 
The term ‘legitimacy’ is defined by Suchman (1995) as ‘a generalized perception or 
assumption that the actions of an entity are desirable, proper, or appropriate within 
some socially constructed system of norms, values, beliefs, and definitions’. It can be 
discussed from two different perspectives; institutional legitimacy and organisational 
legitimacy. Institutional legitimacy, which is derived from the classical political 
economy, focuses on how organisational structure as a whole system has gained 
acceptance by society at large; whereas organisational legitimacy that is also known as 
strategic or instrumental legitimacy, from the bourgeois political economy deals with 
the process by which a firm seeks approval or avoidance of sanction from groups in 
society in order to ensure their continued existence (Gray et al., 1996; Tilling & Tilt, 
2010). According to Chen and Roberts (2010), the process of seeking institutional 
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legitimacy is related directly to institutional theory, while organisational legitimacy is 
related to resource dependence theory and stakeholder theory. Chen and Roberts (2010) 
analysed the overlapping perspectives of these theories to explain the organisation-
society relationship.  
Lindblom (2010) stated that organisational legitimacy refers to ‘a condition or status 
which exists when an entity’s value system is congruent with the value system of the 
larger social system of which the entity is a part. When a disparity, actual or potential, 
exists between the two value systems, there is a threat to the entity’s legitimacy’. 
Lindblom’s (2010) definition of organisational legitimacy is somewhat similar to the 
definition given by Dowling and Pfeffer (1975). Legitimacy theory proposes that a firm 
must act within socially-accepted boundaries of society in order to maintain its 
existence (Guthrie & Parker, 1989; Deegan, 2007; Lindblom, 2010). Failure to comply 
with societal expectations may lead to sanctions being imposed; for example, through 
product boycott and law enforcement (Deegan, 2002, 2007). The dynamic nature of 
‘what is considered to be socially acceptable behaviour within a society’ requires firms 
to be responsive to the changing needs of the culture in which they operate (Deegan, 
2007); for example, through CSRR (Tilling & Tilt, 2010). 
Based on this understanding, legitimacy theory is seen as being related to the concept of 
social contract (Mathews, 1993; Cormier & Gordon, 2001), which stressed on the 
existence of a ‘contract’ between a firm and society in which it operates’ (Deegan, 
2007). Whenever societal expectation is incongruent with how the firm operates, 
society may forfeit the firm’s operational contract (Deegan et al., 2000; Deegan, 2002, 
2007). In this instance, CSRR is perceived as a mechanism used by firms to discharge 
their social contract to society (Gray, Owen & Maunders, 1988).  
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While legitimacy theory has been related to the notion of social contract, it tends to 
ignore accountability and transparency concepts (Parker, 2005). As argued by Cooper 
and Owen (2007), from their analysis of twelve ‘leading edge’ CSRRs, the reports 
provided very little evidence to substantiate claims of enhanced stakeholders’ 
accountability. Rather than fulfilling the accountability role and demonstrating 
transparency to the stakeholders (Gray et al., 1988), legitimacy theory viewed CSRR as 
a tool for firms to establish, maintain or restore legitimacy in the society (Gray et al., 
1995a; Deegan, 2002; O'Donovan, 2002; Makela & Nasi, 2010). This is in agreement 
with Buhr’s (1998) argument, who suggested that firms should have activities, which 
are in line with social value, and communicate such activities to the public. Changing 
activities without communicating such changes is insufficient (Deegan et al., 2000; 
Deegan, 2002). 
‘Legitimacy’ refers to a status or condition, whereas ‘legitimation’ describes the process 
that a firm undertakes in order to achieve the status or condition (Brown & Deegan, 
1998; Lindblom, 2010). It also represents a resource on which a firm is dependent for 
survival (Dowling & Pfeffer, 1975; Hybels, 1995; Suchman, 1995; Branco & 
Rodrigues, 2008b), and that the firm can impact or manipulate (Gray et al., 1995a; 
Woodward, 2001). A number of strategies can be pursued to ensure the continuous 
supply of the resource. These include educating society in terms of changes to the 
firm’s actions; altering how society perceived a firm’s action without making any 
changes; diverting or manipulating attention away from the issue of concern to 
alternative issues; and finally, changing society’s expectations about the firm’s actions 
(Dowling & Pfeffer, 1975; Lindblom, 2010). These strategies can be communicated in 
CSRR, which provides an important instrument to influence society and stakeholders’ 
perceptions about the firms. 
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In general, legitimacy theory has been used widely to explain CSRR (Campbell et al., 
2003). Following Hybels’ (1995) arguments on the need to consider the relevant 
stakeholders, such as government and shareholders, in a good model of legitimacy 
theory, there has been a gradual shift in the focus of CSRR research from ‘legitimacy to 
society’ view, to a ‘legitimacy to stakeholders’ view (O'Donovan, 2002). Overall, 
evidence from the extant literature provided mixed findings on the application of 
legitimacy theory in explaining CSRR.  
Several studies revealed that the threat to legitimacy results in more CSRR (Patten, 
1992; Deegan & Rankin, 1996; Buhr, 1998; Deegan et al., 2000; Cho & Patten, 2007). 
Patten (1992) found that more environmental disclosures were made by petroleum 
firms, following the Exxon Valdez oil spill in Alaska. Furthermore, Deegan et al. 
(2000) reported greater CSRR made by the sample firms following major social 
incidents than they did prior to them. In general, these two studies found that firms 
change their CSRR practices in the wake of particular incidents. The environmental 
performance of a firm was also found to be associated negatively with environmental 
disclosure of a particular firm, providing further evidence on its use as a legitimising 
tool (Cho & Patten, 2007). 
Moreover, regulation has also been considered a threat to legitimacy, which motivates 
firms to disclose more CSRR (Deegan & Rankin, 1996; Buhr, 1998; Tilt & Symes, 
1999). Deegan and Rankin (1996) reported a positive correlation between those firms 
prosecuted by Australian state’s Environmental Protection Authority and an increase in 
the level of environmental disclosures. An analysis of environmental reporting made by 
Falconbridge over a 28-year period (reflected both unregulated and regulated period) 
concluded that the evolution of environmental reporting in the firm’s annual reports 
supports legitimacy theory (Buhr, 1998). The presence of mandatory environmental 
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reporting requirement is seen to lead to an increase in environmental reporting by 
Australian mining firms (Tilt & Symes, 1999). Mobus (2005) highlighted the 
importance of regulation, whereby mandatory disclosure of environmental legal 
sanctions was found to be associated negatively with subsequent regulatory violation.  
A reduction in the levels of CSRR can also be seen as a legitimising strategy (De 
Villiers & Van Staden, 2006). As argued by De Villiers and Van Staden (2006), 
legitimacy theory is applicable in explaining not only an increment and maintenance of 
the levels of CSRR, but also a reduction in the levels of CSRR. De Villiers and Van 
Staden (2006) listed a number of reasons for reductions in CSRR that are consistent 
with legitimacy theory, among others; ‘when societal concerns reduce or disappear’ and 
‘when managers perceive disclosure to be useless in the legitimation effort’.  
Tilling and Tilt (2010), who explored the different strategies used by Rothmans Ltd in 
dealing with threats to legitimacy, such as smoking and health issues, argued that CSRR 
is used to counteract the potentially negative consequences of the firms’ legitimacy. 
However, when the tobacco industry became highly regulated, scrutinised and taxed, 
Rothmans Ltd has suffered a decrease in legitimacy, as demonstrated by the negative 
association between voluntary CSRR and various measures of stakeholder resources 
such as the number of media articles and government regulation (Tilling & Tilt, 2010). 
Tilling and Tilt’s (2010) study was based on a resource-based perspective of legitimacy 
theory. Tilling and Tilt (2010) generally supported De Villiers and Van Staden’s (2006) 
argument on the ‘reduced CSRR as a legitimising strategy’, and later proposed an 
extension of legitimacy theory19 to include a ‘loss’ phase. This was in addition to the 
four existing phases of legitimacy that comprises of establish, maintain, extend and 
defend of legitimacy, as outlined in the extant literature. According to Tilling and Tilt 
                                                 
19 Several researchers claimed that legitimacy theory is still an under-developed theory (Deegan, 2002; De Villiers & Van Staden, 
2006) that need further refinement (Deegan, 2007). 
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(2010), firms in the loss phase are likely to either undergo some form of 
disestablishment, or choose to re-establish its legitimacy once more. 
Conversely, there are several studies that found limited support of legitimacy theory in 
explaining CSRR (Guthrie & Parker, 1989; Wilmshurst & Frost, 2000; Milne & Patten, 
2002; Campbell et al., 2003). Guthrie and Parker (1989), who conducted a longitudinal 
analysis of CSRR in BHP’s annual report, found no association between the observed 
peaks of disclosure frequency over time against the relevant social, economic or 
political events of the firm in the same or immediately preceding time periods. De 
Villiers and Van Staden (2006) attributed such findings to the reactive nature of 
legitimacy theory, as defined by Guthrie and Parker (1989). De Villiers and Van Staden 
(2006), who suggested the ‘reduced CSRR as a legitimising strategy’, based their study 
on the assumption that legitimacy theory can be both reactive and proactive in nature, 
on the grounds that it forms part of the political economy theory. Campbell et al. (2003) 
also documented mixed findings on the use of legitimacy theory in explaining CSRR. 
According to Campbell et al. (2003), the distorting effects of perception (of legitimacy-
threatening factors) and the increase in choices of reporting media may partly explain 
the mixed findings.  
From a decision experiment conducted upon a sample of accountants as proxy for 
investors from the US-based firms, Milne and Patten (2002) found that positive 
environmental disclosures can restore or repair a firm’s legitimacy in some cases, for 
example, when investors make long-term investment decision. Similarly, Wilmshurst 
and Frost’s (2000) study, which is based on a selected sample of Australian firms, 
documented limited support for the applicability of legitimacy theory in explaining the 
firm’s decision to disclose environmental information.  
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Overall, differences in strategies adopted by firms to legitimise their behaviour may 
contribute to the mixed findings indicated in the extant literature (Cormier & Gordon, 
2001; Newson & Deegan, 2002). Legitimacy theory has been criticised for its lack of 
specificity and uncertain ability to anticipate and explain managerial behaviour (Gray et 
al., 1995a; Deegan, 2002). It tends to overlap with other theories, such as stakeholder, 
political economy, institutional and resource dependence theory (Gray et al., 1995a; 
Deegan, 2002, 2007; Chen & Roberts, 2010). An overview of institutional theory and 
resource dependence theory is presented in Section 2.8.4. 
2.8.3 Stakeholder Theory 
Stakeholder theory recognises the organisation-society interdependency. As described 
in the stakeholder theory, organisations have broader responsibilities to their various 
stakeholder groups within the society that go beyond profit-making (Clarkson, 1995; 
Donaldson & Preston, 1995; Freeman et al., 2010). In general, stakeholder theory can 
be divided into two branches: the normative/ethical branch and the positive/managerial 
branch (organisation-centred). The ethical branch of stakeholder theory posits that ‘all 
stakeholders have the right to be treated fairly by an organisation, and that issues of 
stakeholder power are not directly relevant’ (Gray et al., 1996; Deegan et al., 2000), 
whereas the managerial branch of the theory suggests firms to respond to those 
stakeholders that are deemed to be ‘powerful’ or those who can have significant impact 
on the firms (Ullmann, 1985; Gray et al., 1995a; Deegan, 2002; O'Dwyer, 2003). 
Under the ethical branch of stakeholder theory, all stakeholders have a right to be 
provided with information about how the firm is impacting on them, even if they choose 
not to use the information, and even if they cannot directly impact on the survival of the 
firm (Gray et al., 1996; Deegan & Unerman, 2006). This notion of ‘rights to 
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information’ has been discussed within the accountability model proposed by Gray et 
al. (1996), whereby firms are required to provide CSRR to inform society of the extent 
to which actions for which a firm is deemed responsible have been fulfilled. The ethical 
branch of stakeholder theory is argued to overlap with legitimacy theory, since both 
theories observe firms as part of a broader social system wherein the firms impacts, and 
are impacted by, other groups within society (Gray et al., 1995a; Deegan, 2002, 2007).  
However, legitimacy theory differs from the managerial branch of stakeholder theory. 
While legitimacy theory considers firms’ interaction with society as a whole, the 
managerial branch of stakeholder theory deals specifically with how firms manage 
different groups of stakeholders in order to survive. Since different stakeholder groups 
have different views about how a firm should conduct its operation, different social 
contracts are negotiated with different groups (Deegan & Unerman, 2006). This 
contrasts with the legitimacy theory and the ethical branch of stakeholder theory, 
whereby only one contract is made with society in general.  
The managerial branch of stakeholder theory refers explicitly to issues of stakeholder 
power, and how a stakeholder’s relative power impacts their ability to ‘coerce’ the firm 
into complying with the stakeholder’s expectations (Deegan & Unerman, 2006). In this 
regard, Parker (2005) argued that the managerial branch of stakeholder theory is driven 
by strategic reasons rather than through commitment to responsibility and 
accountability. Perhaps, with the limited resources possessed by firms and consideration 
on the costs and benefits of CSRR, the firms may need to seek a balance between the 
strategic motives and the responsibility/accountability motives of reporting CSR 
information in their annual reports. This is to ensure that all stakeholders with their 
diverse interests are taken care of by the firms.  
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Ullmann (1985) viewed a stakeholder’s power to influence corporate decision as a 
function of the stakeholder’s degree of control over resources required by a firm. 
‘Power’, in this sense, relates to the ability to bring about outcomes of the desire, or 
ability, of one actor within a social relationship to have another actor do something that 
they would not otherwise have done (Mitchell, Agle & Wood, 1997). The more critical 
the stakeholder resources are to the continued viability and success of the firm, the 
greater power the stakeholder possesses to influence corporate decisions (Ullmann, 
1985; Friedman & Miles, 2002). These power relativities and expectations of the 
various stakeholders tend to change over time (Mitchell et al., 1997; Friedman & Miles, 
2002; Unerman & Bennett, 2004; Deegan, 2007; Magness, 2008). The dynamic nature 
of stakeholders’ influence on corporate decision (Freeman, 1984) requires firms to 
continually adapt their operating and reporting strategies to meet the changing demands 
and expectations of the stakeholders. In this case, CSRR is regarded as a mechanism 
used by firms to respond to their stakeholders (Huang & Kung, 2010) in order to gain 
their support and approval (Gray et al., 1995a). This is somewhat consistent with the 
legitimation strategies proposed by Lindblom (2010).  
Following Ullmann (1985), there have been a number of studies that tested empirically 
the application of stakeholder theory to explain CSRR. Roberts (1992) revealed that the 
measures of stakeholder power, strategic posture and economic performance are 
significantly related to levels of CSRR disclosed by a sample of the US firms. Within 
stakeholder power, there is no association found between the shareholder power and the 
levels of CSRR disclosed (Roberts, 1992). The shareholder power is measured by the 
concentrated ownership. However, government power and creditor power tend to have 
influence over the levels of CSRR disclosed by the sample firms. In terms of strategic 
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posture and economic performance, all related variables used to represent the two 
concepts were significantly related to CSRR (Roberts, 1992).  
Liu and Anbumozhi (2009), who examined the determinants of environmental reporting 
in China, found that firms tend to fill up the government’s environmental concerns, 
while other stakeholders’ influence on environmental reporting remains weak (e.g. 
shareholders and creditors). This finding is consistent with that reported by Elijido-Ten 
(2009), who applies stakeholder theory in examining the determinants of environmental 
reporting in Malaysia. Liu and Anbumozhi (2009) examined the stakeholder power 
only, whereas Elijido-Ten (2009) included strategic posture and economic 
performance’s dimensions in her analysis. Consistent with Roberts (1992), Elijido-Ten 
(2009) also documented a positive association between strategic posture and 
environmental reporting. However, Elijido-Ten (2009) did not find the influence of 
economic performance in determining the quantity and quality of environmental 
reporting in Malaysia. 
In contrast to the findings by Roberts (1992), Liu and Anbumozhi (2009) and Elijido-
Ten (2009), who found no association between concentrated ownership and CSRR, 
evidence from the UK perspective documented a significant positive association 
between firms with dispersed ownership structure and the amount of environmental 
reporting (Brammer & Pavelin, 2006). Similar results were gathered by Huang and 
Kung (2010), who dictated a significantly-negative association between concentrated 
ownership and environmental disclosure in Taiwan. Based on a sample of 759 firms 
listed on the Taiwan stock exchange from 2003 to 2005, Huang and Kung (2010) 
dictated a strong influence of external stakeholders (government, debtors and 
consumers) over firms’ decision in determining the extent of environmental reporting. 
Internal (shareholders and employees) and intermediate stakeholders (environmental 
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protection organisations and audit firms) were also found to be greatly influenced the 
firms’ decision to disclose CSRR (Huang and Kung, 2010).  
To summarise, findings on the influence of stakeholder power on CSRR have been 
inconclusive, with exception to the government power. Based on a review of prior 
CSRR literature, shareholder power has been represented by either concentrated 
ownership or dispersed ownership. While this type of ownership structure may 
represent the common corporate ownership structure in Western countries, it might not 
reflect that applied to Asian countries. Perhaps, the variables used to represent 
shareholder power could be extended by including the different types of ownership 
structure available in a firm; for example, managerial ownership, family ownership, 
foreign ownership and government ownership. This is particularly relevant to Asian 
countries, which are dominated by family and government-owned structures of 
ownership or shareholding, including Malaysia. This thesis aims to address this research 
gap. 
Furthermore, the existing CSRR literature concurs with Ullmann’s (1985) proposition 
on the importance of strategic posture as a predictor of CSRR (Roberts, 1992; Elijido-
Ten, 2009). According to Ullmann (1985), strategic posture describes the way firms 
respond in fulfilling the social demands of their stakeholders. Perhaps, one of the ways 
to build the strategic posture is through the inclusion of directors with CSR experience 
in the boards of directors of the firms. This is due to the importance of boards of 
directors in corporate governance, in addition to the corporate ownership structure. As 
highlighted by Fama and Jensen (1983) and Eisenhardt (1989), these two components 
were very influential in determining firms’ decision for corporate reporting. The 
presence of directors with CSR experience on the board of directors of a firm may offer 
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some form of strategic posture that is vital for the firm to be viewed by society as 
environmentally and socially responsible. 
Overall, within the stakeholder theory, CSRR is used as a mechanism to manage firm-
stakeholders relationship. A comparison between environmental management 
executives’ perceptions about the determinants of environmental reporting and the 
actual reporting practices also documented an association between the executives’ 
attitudes towards various stakeholders and how those executives responded to the 
stakeholders’ demands to maintain social legitimacy (Cormier, Gordon & Magnan, 
2004).  
Evidence from the extant literature is, generally, supportive of the view that particular 
stakeholders (those deemed to be more important to the survival of a firm) can be more 
effective than others in demanding CSRR, subject to their relative power in influencing 
such reporting. For example, Neu et al. (1998), who investigated the influence of 
external pressure on environmental reporting in annual reports of Canadian firms, 
revealed that firms were more responsive to the demands or concerns of financial 
stakeholders and government regulators, compared with the concerns of 
environmentalists. Since the stakeholder theory is used in the current study, it is 
explained in greater detail in Chapter four. 
In addition to these three theories, there are several other theories that have been 
adopted to explain the motives for CSRR; including decision-usefulness theory, 
institutional theory, resource dependence theory and accountability theory. These are 
explained further in Section 2.8.4. 
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2.8.4 Other CSRR Theories 
CSRR-related literature based on the decision-usefulness theory examines the 
usefulness of CSRR in investment decision-making (Milne & Chan, 1999) and market 
reactions (Murray, Sinclair, Power & Gray, 2006). In examining the overall impact of 
CSRR on investment decision-making, Milne and Chan (1999) conducted experiments 
and a short survey on a sample of investment analysts and accountants in New Zealand 
to represent sophisticated investors. From the decision experiments, Milne and Chan 
(1999) discovered that CSRR does not elicit more than a 15 percent switch in 
investment funds; and this switch is not always in favour of the firm providing the 
CSRR. In addition, findings from the short survey documented a moderate attitude of 
the investors to the decision usefulness of CSRR for investment decision-making 
(Milne & Chan, 1999).  
An examination of the relationship between CSRR and financial market performance in 
the UK firms revealed no direct relationship between share returns and CSRR (Murray 
et al., 2006). Nevertheless, a convincing association between the two variables is shown 
in the longitudinal analysis of the CSRR-financial performance’s relationship (Murray 
et al., 2006). The above reviews of Milne and Chan (1999) and Murray et al. (2006) 
have generally observed, to a certain extent, the usefulness of CSRR. Although the 
ultimate usefulness of CSRR is yet to be revealed, Dierkes and Antal (1985) suggested 
CSRR to be used to monitor and control firms’ behaviour. 
Gray (2006) placed more emphasis on the accountability role of CSRR rather than its 
possibility for value creation. As suggested by Gray et al. (1996), firms are held 
responsible to provide accounts of their actions to the stakeholders, regardless of the 
usefulness of such reporting. There are two important aspects highlighted by Gray et al. 
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(1996) on views of CSRR from the accountability perspectives; (1) organisation-society 
relationship and (2) stakeholders’ rights to information.  
Larrinaga et al. (2002) employed accountability theory to examine the effects of the 
implementation of environmental disclosure standard in Spanish firms. In their study, 
Larrinaga et al. (2002) suggested the use of mandatory environmental reporting as a 
mechanism to enhance the accountability of firms to their stakeholders. Nevertheless, 
findings of their study revealed that the environmental disclosure standard is 
insufficient to enable the accountability relationship between firms and society. This is 
due to the lack of environmental disclosure released by firms despite the 
implementation of the environmental disclosure standard. Perhaps, differences in 
expectations and perceptions between the organisation and society may affect the 
application of accountability theory in explaining the CSRR disclosed by firms.     
CSRR is also found to be influenced by established institutional norms of an 
organisation. This finding is derived from the application of institutional theory in 
explaining CSRR. Institutional theory emphasises the conformity of firms to the 
established institutional norms in order to gain legitimacy (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). 
The legitimisation processes that are normally pressured by institutional environment 
can be diffused to firms through three mechanisms; namely coercive, mimetic and 
normative isomorphism (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). For that reason, several 
researchers acknowledged the overlapping of institutional theory with legitimacy theory 
in the context of CSRR (Gray et al., 1995a; Deegan, 2002; Chen & Roberts, 2010). 
Coercive isomorphism refers to the coercion exerted by other organisations on which 
the particular organisation is dependent on, mimetic isomorphism describes uncertainty 
within the environment, and normative isomorphism represents norms that specify how 
things should be.  
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Campbell (2007) proposed the use of institutional theory to explain the motivations of 
firms to engage in CSR. In the context of CSRR, Amran (2006) seek to examine the 
application of institutional theory in explaining the variation of CSRR in Malaysia. The 
selection of institutional theory by Amran (2006) is based on his observations on the 
factors that motivate firms to disclose CSRR gathered from several interviews 
conducted with the sample firms’ personnel.  
In testing the relevant hypotheses to the larger sample, Amran (2006) found support for 
the application of institutional theory to explain the CSRR disclosed by firms. Amran 
(2006) documented the influence of government dependent (coercive isomorphism), 
goal/mission related to CSR (normative isomorphism) and firm size (mimetic 
isomorphism) on CSRR disclosed by firms in Malaysia. To summarise, CSRR research 
that relied on institutional theory dictates that firms will only change their institutional 
practices when there is pressure from the stakeholders, especially those upon whom the 
firms are dependent (Deegan & Unerman, 2006). 
Findings from the above reviews indicate a variety of theories available to explain 
CSRR practiced by firms. Generally, researchers are in agreement on the absence of one 
best theory to explain CSRR (Gray et al., 1995a; Hackston & Milne, 1996; 
Ratanajongkol et al., 2006). This, in turns motivates several researchers to adopt 
multiple perspectives in explaining CSRR (see Ratanajongkol et al., 2006; Makela & 
Nasi, 2010). The choice of theory depends on the objectives, scope and variables 
involved in a CSRR study (Chen & Roberts, 2010). Perhaps, greater efforts could be 
undertaken to extend the existing theories of CSRR, taking into consideration the 
appropriateness of the theories with the context of studies conducted. For example, the 
existing theories used to explain the CSRR disclosed in the context of developed 
countries might be different from the theories applied in the developing countries. In 
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addition, other theories derived from other field of studies, such as management and 
economy could be applied to the CSRR research, given their relevance to the objectives 
of studies. This promotes more CSRR research within multidisciplinary study (Aguinis 
& Glavas, 2012). 
2.9 SUMMARY 
The changing perception on the role of firms has witnessed many firms to operate in a 
socially responsible manner in the pursuit of their profit maximisation motive. This 
requires firms to consider the economic, legal, ethical and philanthropic responsibilities, 
taking together terms as CSR. CSRR has received so much attention following the 
greater concerns and awareness of stakeholders on the social and environmental issues 
that surrounded firms. Evidence from the extant literature have documented the 
variations of CSRR disclosed across firms, industries and countries.  
Firms that are larger in size, categorised under environmentally-sensitive industry, and 
originated from developing countries are found to disclose greater levels of CSRR 
compared to their counterparts. CSRR disclosed by firms also tends to varied over a 
period of time, depending on the specific events and social incidents that occurred in a 
particular year. The variations of CSRR disclosed could also be explained by a number 
of factors, including the internal (e.g. boards of directors) and external (e.g. ownership 
structure and regulation) contextual factors. The advancement of CSRR research over 
the past decades has contributed to the development of different yet overlapping 
theories of CSRR; among the significant theories are legitimacy and stakeholder theory.  
While most of the extant CSRR literature was derived from the developed countries’ 
perspective, more contributions from developing countries are warranted. The 
difference in CSR focus of different countries calls for an investigation of a country-
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specific’s CSRR research. Consistent with the corporate governance reform around the 
world and the increasing influence of the different governance structure on the levels of 
CSRR disclosed, perhaps additional evidence on the link between corporate governance 
and CSRR may enrich the existing literature in both fields of study. A review of 
literature on the link between corporate governance and corporate reporting, specifically 
CSRR, is presented in Chapter three.  
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CHAPTER 3: CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND CORPORATE 
REPORTING: A REVIEW OF LITERATURE  
 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter offers a discussion of the relationship between corporate governance and 
corporate reporting. It begins with an explanation in Section 3.2 of how corporate 
governance is related to CSR. Then, a review of literature on the association between 
corporate governance and corporate disclosure is provided in Section 3.3. Section 3.4 
provides a specific discussion on corporate governance and CSRR. The chapter 
continues with a review of three important mechanisms of interests in this thesis: 
corporate ownership structure in Section 3.5; board of directors in Section 3.6; and 
corporate reporting regulation in Section 3.7. Then, a review of literature on the 
development of corporate governance, CSR, CSRR and CSRR research in Malaysia is 
presented in Section 3.8 and 3.9. Finally, the summary of the chapter is provided in 
Section 3.10. 
3.2 CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND CSR 
The term ‘governance’ is used to describe a ‘system of control’ in an organisation 
(Turnbull, 1997). The Cadbury Report (1992) broadly defined corporate governance as 
a ‘system by which firms are directed and controlled’. The High Level Finance 
Committee on Corporate Governance (HLFC) was formed to establish a framework for 
corporate governance and set best practices in Malaysia. HLFC refers corporate 
governance as ‘the process and structure used to direct and manage the business and 
affairs of a firm towards enhancing business prosperity and corporate accountability 
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with the ultimate objective of realising long term shareholder value, whilst taking into 
account the interests of other stakeholders’. According to Liew (2007), the definition of 
corporate governance that was provided by HLFC shares many similarities to the 
definitions provided by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD) and other international bodies.  
Although the main concern of corporate governance is to protect the interest of 
shareholders, the broader perspective of corporate governance included an obligation 
for firms to address the needs of diverse stakeholders (Hill & Jones, 1992; Charreaux & 
Desbrieres, 2001; Ayuso, Arino, Castro & Rodriguez, 2007; Solomon, 2010). This 
broader perspective of corporate governance describes the internal and external 
corporate governance systems that enable firms to discharge their accountability to all 
stakeholders and operate in a socially responsible manner (Solomon, 2010). In this case, 
the shareholders may require firms to maximise profit, while stakeholders, such as 
employees and communities, may require firms to take care of their welfare and well-
being.  
Even though the shareholders focus on their profit maximisation’s motive, they 
acknowledge the importance of CSRR in making investment decision. Patten (1990) 
stated that shareholders react to the disclosure of CSR information by firms. Wilmshurst 
and Frost (2000) identified that shareholders’ right to information is listed as an 
important factor that influences the disclosure of environment-related information in 
firms’ annual reports. A survey on a sample of individual shareholders in Australia, the 
UK, the US (De Villiers & Van Staden, 2010) and New Zealand (De Villiers & Van 
Staden, 2012) regarding corporate environmental disclosure, documented the positive 
interest of shareholders in these disclosures.  
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Shareholders require environmental disclosures because they believe managers should 
be accountable to shareholders for their firms’ environmental impacts (De Villiers & 
Van Staden, 2010). Shareholders want environmental disclosures to be made 
compulsory and published in the annual reports (De Villiers & Van Staden, 2012). In a 
similar vein, Holm and Rikhardsson (2008) also discovered the influence of 
environment-related information disclosed by firms on shareholders’ investment 
allocation decision. Overall, the above findings suggest the influence of shareholders on 
the CSRR disclosed by firms.  
Firms are expected to take into consideration the social and environmental implications 
of their business activities through the implementation of CSR-related activities in their 
journey to maximise profit. Creating appropriate balance between these three aspects of 
corporate sustainability, namely economic, environmental and social, is vital to protect 
the interest of both shareholders and other stakeholders. It enables firms to achieve or 
maintain their long-term sustainability. 
Corporate governance and CSR have received much attention, particularly in the post-
Enron period. This has been the consequence of the greater demand for ethical business 
and increased corporate accountability and transparency to the wider stakeholders 
(Owen, 2005; Cooper & Owen, 2007; Aras & Crowther, 2008). Corporate governance 
is related to environmental reporting (Gibson & O’donovan, 2007), corporate 
sustainability (Aras & Crowther, 2008) and CSRR (Cooper & Owen, 2007; Kolk & 
Pinkse, 2010; Mallin et al., 2012). According to Aras and Crowther (2008), corporate 
governance is essential to the continuing operation of a firm. Good corporate 
governance is often associated with effective and efficient CSR within a firm (Shahin & 
Zairi, 2007).  
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Cooper and Owen (2007) suggested firms to practice a broader perspective of corporate 
governance in a way to demonstrate their financial, social and environmental 
accountability to the various stakeholders’ groups. The linkage between corporate 
governance and CSRR (Mallin et al., 2012) has also witnessed the integration of 
corporate governance information in the CSRR disclosed by firms (Kolk & Pinkse, 
2010). Overall, this range of studies suggested the importance role of corporate 
governance in shaping CSRR practices of firms. This is based on the understanding that 
the way firms are governed influence the manner in which the firms behave to ensure 
their future sustainability. Perhaps, a specific governance structure may impact the way 
firms behave and respond to CSR issues. 
Corporate ownership structures and boards of directors have been listed as two 
important elements of corporate governance that are very influential in determining 
firms’ decision for corporate reporting (Fama & Jensen, 1983; Eisenhardt, 1989). 
According to Adams, Hermalin and Weisbach (2008), boards of directors have become 
the centre of the policy debate concerning governance reform and the focus of 
considerable academic research following the corporate scandals and collapses cases, as 
well as the on-going concerns about corporate governance around the world. Boards of 
directors have played a significant role in monitoring management’s performance and 
judgment, and deciding the information to be disclosed in various reporting media, for 
example corporate annual reports, websites and newsletters.  
However, restricting the view of corporate governance to the monitoring role played by 
the board of directors may potentially undervalue the role that corporate governance can 
play, since all major stakeholders in the governance framework (see Figure 3.1), 
including internal (e.g. board of directors) and external (e.g. shareholders, regulators) of 
the firms are important participants in the corporate governance process (Cohen, 
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Figure 3.1: Corporate Governance Mosaic and Financial Reporting Quality 
(Source: Cohen et al., 2004, p. 89) 
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Krishnamoorthy & Wright, 2004). Cohen et al. (2004) suggested that the 
interrelationship between the actors and mechanisms within the corporate governance 
framework is important for firms to achieve effective governance and, subsequently, 
improve their financial reporting quality.  
Probably, the same framework as presented by Cohen et al. (2004) is also applicable for 
firms to improve their quantity and quality of CSRR disclosed. This has been 
demonstrated by the growing volume of literature that investigates the link between 
corporate governance and CSRR. However, a more comprehensive study that includes 
the influence of the multiple components of corporate governance, specifically 
corporate ownership structure, board of directors and corporate reporting regulation, 
and their interactions, seems to be limited. Following the relevance of these three 
mechanisms of corporate governance in explaining CSRR disclosed by firms in 
Malaysia, particularly after the introduction of the CSRR regulation in year 2007, there 
is a need to examine the direct effects and interaction effects (if any) of these corporate 
governance mechanisms on the levels of CSRR disclosed by firms. 
From the various actors and mechanisms proposed by Cohen et al. (2004), the current 
study focuses on three mechanisms: corporate ownership structure to describe the types 
of shareholders/stockholders; corporate reporting regulation to represent regulators and 
stock exchange; and board of directors. These three mechanisms are considered 
important and relevant with the objectives and context of the current study. Corporate 
ownership structure refers to patterns of share ownership in a firm, while corporate 
reporting regulation sets a minimum standards or requirements of reporting that all 
firms must meet if they were to comply with the regulation. Finally, board of directors, 
being the most important internal governance mechanism in firms, serves a variety of 
functions that include monitoring of management and providing resources and strategic 
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directions for firms. Each of these mechanisms is explained separately in specific 
sections: Section 3.5 Corporate Ownership Structure, Section 3.6 Board of Directors 
and Section 3.7 Corporate Reporting Regulation. 
Corporate governance has become an important agenda in the Asian countries, 
particularly after the Asian financial crisis of 1997/1998. According to Cheung and 
Chan (2004), firms that practise good corporate governance not only enhance the 
development of local equity market, but also raise the confidence of foreign investors in 
the Asian capital market to a higher level. Corporate governance practices in the Asian 
countries might differ from those practised in Western developed countries (Cheung & 
Chan, 2004). This is due to the difference in corporate ownership structure between the 
Asian countries and the Western developed countries. While corporate ownership 
structure in the Asian countries is characterised by the concentrated ownership, 
corporate ownership in the Western developed countries is characterised by the diffused 
ownership. 
Malaysia, as an Asian country, has its own code of corporate governance, known as the 
Malaysian Code on Corporate Governance (MCCG) (Cheung & Chan, 2004; Shim, 
2006; Liew, 2007). However, this code is remarkably similar to that adopted by 
Western developed countries, such as the US and the UK (Cheung & Chan, 2004). 
Perhaps, in the future, a more specific code of corporate governance could be published 
that takes into consideration the difference in institutional context between developed 
and developing countries. Overall, the Asian financial crisis of 1997/1998 witnessed a 
significant development of corporate governance in Malaysia. A review of the 
important milestones of corporate governance in Malaysia is provided in Section 3.8. 
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3.3 CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND CORPORATE DISCLOSURE 
The role of corporate governance in promoting corporate transparency and 
accountability has been evident, as demonstrated in the extant literature that 
documented significant associations between various elements of corporate governance 
and corporate disclosures (Chen & Jaggi, 2000). Generally, effective governance may 
improve corporate accountability and transparency, thus consequently led to greater 
levels of corporate reporting measured by the quantity and quality of reporting. For 
example, Chen and Jaggi (2000) dictated a positive association between independent 
non-executive directors and the comprehensiveness of mandatory financial disclosures 
in Hong Kong. However, the observed association appears to be weaker for family-
controlled firms (Chen & Jaggi, 2000). In examining the link between the quality of 
firms’ governance and the informativeness of disclosure, Beekes and Brown (2006) 
showed that better-governed firms provide more informative disclosure than their 
counterparts.  
Consistent with the growing importance of voluntary reporting and non-financial 
reporting (Perrini, 2006); for example, in the area of intangibles, intellectual capital and 
CSR over time, there have been a number of studies that related corporate governance 
with this type of reporting (Eng & Mak, 2003; Haniffa & Cooke, 2005; Barako, 
Hancock & Izan, 2006; Mallin et al., 2012). For example, Eng and Mak (2003) and 
Barako et al. (2006) investigated the influence of corporate governance in the general 
context of voluntary reporting, whereas Haniffa and Cooke (2005) and Mallin et al. 
(2012) examined specifically the impact of corporate governance on CSRR. In 
summary, this range of studies suggests the significant role of corporate governance’s 
structure in influencing corporate reporting behaviour. Specific corporate governance 
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structure is beneficial in promoting greater levels of corporate reporting, including in 
the area of CSRR.  
Within the broader context of voluntary reporting, Chau and Gray (2002) documented a 
positive association between outside ownership and voluntary reporting in Hong Kong 
and Singapore. Wang, Sewon and Claiborne (2008), who examined the determinants of 
voluntary reporting in China, dictated a positive association between state ownership 
and foreign ownership, and the level of voluntary reporting. Eng and Mak (2003) found 
that government ownership is positively related to voluntary reporting, while 
managerial ownership is negatively related to voluntary reporting. Eng and Mak’s 
(2003) study was based on a sample of firms in Singapore. 
Huafang and Jianguo (2007), who based their study on a sample of firms in China, 
reported a positive association between blockholder ownership and foreign 
listing/shares ownership and corporate disclosure. This is partly consistent with the 
findings revealed by Wang et al. (2008). Nevertheless, Huafang and Jianguo (2007) did 
not find any association between managerial ownership, state ownership and legal-
person ownership, and voluntary reporting.  
In terms of board of directors’ characteristics, a higher proportion of independent 
directors in firms is associated with greater levels of corporate disclosure (Eng & Mak, 
2003; Huafang & Jianguo, 2007), while board leadership represented by CEO duality is 
related to lower levels of disclosure (Huafang & Jianguo, 2007). Ho and Wong (2001), 
who investigated the impact of several boards of directors’ characteristics in Hong 
Kong, dictated a significant positive association between the existence of an audit 
committee and the extent of voluntary reporting. Board independence and leadership 
produced insignificant results (Ho & Wong, 2001). The percentage of family members 
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on the board was negatively related to the extent of voluntary reporting (Ho & Wong, 
2001).  
Leung and Horwitz (2004) documented a negative association between board ownership 
and the level of voluntary reporting disclosed by firms in Hong Kong. The negative 
association become stronger when the performance of firms is very poor (Leung & 
Horwitz, 2004). Non-executive directors are found to improve the voluntary reporting 
in firms with low director ownership. Firms with high director ownership normally rely 
on internal information; hence, they become less reliant on public disclosure. 
Gul & Leung (2004), who analysed 385 Hong Kong firms, provided a linkage between 
board leadership structures, outside directors’ expertise and voluntary corporate 
disclosure. According to Gul and Leung (2004), CEO duality that is used to represent 
board leadership structures is associated with lower levels of disclosure. This negative 
association is weaker for firms with a higher proportion of expert outside directors on 
the board (Gul & Leung, 2004). Overall, the study by Gul and Leung (2004) suggested 
the moderating role of expert outside directors in the CEO duality-corporate disclosure 
relationship.  
Chau and Gray (2010) documented significant association between family ownership 
and board independence and the extent of voluntary reporting in Hong Kong. These 
associations were mitigated by the role of independent chairman (Chau & Gray, 2010). 
Analysis of Chau and Gray’s (2010) study also revealed the different effect of the level 
of family shareholding on the extent of voluntary reporting. For example, the extent of 
voluntary reporting is relatively low in firms with less than 25 percent levels of family 
shareholding. Nevertheless, a higher level of voluntary reporting is documented in firms 
with more than 25 percent levels of family shareholding (Chau & Gray, 2010). While 
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the former suggests for the convergence of interest effect, the latter indicates the 
entrenchment effect. 
Based on a sample of firms in Singapore, Cheng and Courtenay (2006) revealed that 
firms with a higher proportion of independent directors on the board are associated with 
higher levels of voluntary disclosure. Although board size and CEO duality are not 
associated with voluntary disclosure, boards with a majority of independent directors 
have significantly higher levels of voluntary disclosure than firms with balanced boards 
(Cheng & Courtenay, 2006). Cheng and Courtenay (2006) also documented the role of 
external governance mechanism, specifically the regulatory environment, in enhancing 
the strength of the association between the proportion of independent directors and the 
level of voluntary disclosure.  
Barako et al. (2006), who investigated the factors that influence voluntary corporate 
disclosure by Kenyan firms based on a longitudinal data from 1992 to 2001, reported a 
negative association between the proportion of non-executive directors on the board and 
the extent of voluntary disclosure. The level of institutional and foreign ownership of a 
firm is also found to have a significantly positive influence on voluntary disclosure. In 
Ireland, Donnelly & Mulcahy (2008) reported an increase in the level of voluntary 
disclosure made by firms with the number of non-executive directors that sit on the 
board of directors. However, no evidence is found on the association between 
ownership structure and voluntary disclosure (Donnelly & Mulcahy, 2008).  
From Malaysia’s perspective, Haniffa and Cooke (2002) documented significant 
associations between non-executive chairman and domination of family members on 
boards and the extent of voluntary reporting. While the existence of a non-executive 
chairman is associated positively with the extent of voluntary reporting, the domination 
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of family members on boards is negatively related to such reporting (Haniffa & Cooke, 
2002). In contrary to Haniffa and Cooke (2002), who relied on data set prior to 1997 
Asian financial crisis, Ghazali and Weetman (2006) examined the association between 
corporate governance and voluntary reporting following the economic crisis. Ghazali 
and Weetman (2006) found that director ownership is related significantly to the extent 
of voluntary reporting, while government ownership and new governance initiatives 
dictated insignificant association with voluntary reporting. 
In summary, there have been mixed findings documented on the link between corporate 
governance and corporate disclosure. Different samples, countries and year of analysis 
used in different studies might partially contribute to the mixed results. Most of the 
studies on this association were derived from Asian countries and a single-year analysis 
of data. It is suggested that more extensive research needs to be undertaken on this topic 
following the greater concerns of many stakeholders on the corporate accountability and 
transparency’s issues. Perhaps, additional evidence on the link between corporate 
governance and corporate disclosure may enable both the stakeholders and the policy-
makers to obtain a better understanding of the ways firms with different governance 
structures behave. Such understanding may be beneficial for the shareholders in making 
their investment decisions, for the other stakeholders in evaluating firm performance, 
and for the regulators in improving the current policies and regulations on corporate 
governance and corporate reporting. 
3.4 CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND CSRR 
Conceptual works relating corporate governance to CSRR promote more empirical 
research conducted on the topic. For example, Adams (2002) proposed a conceptual 
framework on the factors that influence CSRR, which include corporate characteristics, 
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general contextual factors and internal organisational context. According to Adams 
(2002), corporate structure, board of directors and regulation are among the internal 
contextual factors that influence the nature and extent of CSRR disclosed by firms. 
Figure 3.2 presents the diagrammatic portrayal of the influences on CSRR, as suggested 
by Adams (2002).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.2: Diagrammatic Portrayal of the Influences on CSRR 
(Source: Adams, 2002, p. 246) 
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Within a specific context of CSRR, there is a growing body of literature that relates the 
various components of corporate governance to CSRR (Haniffa & Cooke, 2005; Kent & 
Monem, 2008; Lattemann et al., 2009; Kathyayini et al., 2012; Mallin et al., 2012). 
Haniffa and Cooke (2005), who examined the influence of corporate governance on 
CSRR in a sample of 139 non-financial listed firms in Malaysia between 1996 and 
2002, revealed a significant association between CSRR and board dominated by 
executive directors, chairman with multiple directorships and foreign shared ownership. 
Lattemann et al. (2009), who compared the CSRR between the largest multinational 
firms in China and India, reported a higher level of CSRR among Indian firms, mainly 
due to more rule-based governance adopted in the country.  
The link between corporate governance and CSRR is further supported by Kent and 
Monem (2008), who suggested two complementary factors to explain the adoption of 
triple bottom line (TBL) reporting by the Australian firms. They are the firms’ desire to 
legitimise their relationship with society because of adverse publicity from the media 
and to achieve high-quality reporting and transparency inferred by strong corporate 
governance. Kent and Monem (2008) found that firms with TBL reporting had 
significantly more adverse media coverage before implementing the TBL reporting than 
non-TBL firms. TBL reporting is also related significantly and positively to the 
existence of an environmental or sustainable development committee and the frequency 
of meetings of the audit committee.  
Kathyayini et al. (2012) investigated the relationship between corporate governance 
attributes and environmental reporting in the 100 largest firms listed on the Australian 
Stock Exchange in 2008. They found that the proportions of independent and female 
directors on board are positively related to the levels of environmental reporting. Based 
on a sample of 100 firms listed as US Best Corporate Citizens, Mallin et al. (2012) 
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discovered that the stakeholders’ orientation of corporate governance, which is 
represented by the average number of directorships of non-executive directors, is 
positively related to social and environmental disclosure. Overall, these studies 
documented the significant influences of different types of corporate governance 
mechanisms on CSRR. 
Despite the broad area of corporate governance, this thesis examines the influence of 
corporate ownership structure and specific board of directors’ characteristic on CSRR in 
two different regimes; voluntary and mandatory reporting. In other words, the current 
study takes into account the effects of the CSRR regulation to represent the corporate 
reporting regulations on the link between corporate governance and CSRR. The three 
important concepts employed in the current study, namely corporate ownership 
structure, board of directors and corporate reporting regulation are explained in a 
greater detail in specific sections. 
These mechanisms were selected because of their important roles in the firms and their 
relevance in the context of the current study. For example, corporate ownership 
structure and board of directors are two important components of corporate governance 
that influence firms’ decision in determining the contents and levels of corporate 
reporting (Fama & Jensen, 1983; Eisenhardt, 1989; Adams et al., 2008), including the 
quantity and quality of CSRR (Haniffa & Cooke, 2005; Kent & Monem, 2008; 
Lattemann et al., 2009; Kathyayini et al., 2012; Mallin et al., 2012). Following the 
implementation of the mandatory CSRR in Malaysia, there is a need to investigate the 
effectiveness of such corporate reporting regulation in promoting greater quantity and 
quality of CSRR among public listed firms in the country. Findings from such 
investigation may shed some light on how to improve the current policy or regulation 
on CSRR. 
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3.5 CORPORATE OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE  
Corporate ownership structure refers to patterns of share ownership in a firm. It 
represents one of the important corporate governance mechanisms used by firms to 
minimise the agency problems between the shareholders and the management of the 
firms (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). According to Jensen and Meckling (1976), the 
separation of ownership and control of firms yields the potential for agency costs to 
arise due to the conflicts of interest between the contracting parties, for example, 
shareholders and management.  
Firms with widely-held share ownership or diffused ownership structure tend to have 
greater potential for conflicts of interest between the shareholders and the management, 
compared with firms with closely-held share ownership or concentrated ownership 
structure (Fama & Jensen, 1983). Therefore, the widely-held firms are more likely to 
disclose more information to the shareholders in a way to fulfil the information 
demands of their shareholders, and also to signal the action of the management, being 
the agent in the firms, to work in the best interest of the shareholders, being the 
owner/principal of the firms. 
The conflicts of interest that are found in the Western countries are different from that 
faced by firms in the Asian countries (Claessens & Fan, 2002). In the US, where 
diffused corporate ownership structure is very common, the conflict of interest occurs 
between the outside shareholders and the managers of a firm. However, in Asian 
countries, where ownership concentration is prevalent, the agency problem arises as a 
result of the conflicts between the controlling owners and minority shareholders 
(Claessens & Fan, 2002). Unlike the widely-held share ownership practiced in the 
Western countries (Faccio & Lang, 2002), many firms in East Asia are family or owner-
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managed (Ball et al., 2003). The concentration of ownership, for example in the hands 
of single shareholder or family members through pyramidal and cross-holding 
structures, affects the nature of contracting, thus creating agency conflicts between the 
controlling owners and minority shareholders (Fan & Wong, 2002). Generally, the 
controlling owners possess the power to determine the way the firm is run. They tend to 
gain effective control of the firm, which may, in turn, expropriate the minority 
shareholders’ interest.  
Different types of corporate ownership structure have different impacts on corporate 
reporting practices. A number of studies have documented the influence of corporate 
ownership structure on voluntary reporting practices, especially in the Asian context, 
including Eng and Mak (2003) in Singapore, Chau and Gray (2010) in Hong Kong, 
Chau and Gray (2002) in Hong Kong and Singapore, Haniffa and Cooke (2002) and 
Ghazali and Weetman (2006) in Malaysia, Huafang and Jianguo (2007) and Wang et al. 
(2008) in China, and etc.  
In the context of CSR, there has been a range of studies that relate corporate ownership 
structure and CSR performance and reporting. For example, Johnson and Greening 
(1999) documented the effect of institutional ownership on CSR performance in the US, 
while Haniffa and Cooke (2005) investigated the association between foreign share 
ownership and the extent of CSRR in Malaysia.  
A discussion of the different types of corporate ownership structure, specifically 
managerial ownership, family ownership, foreign ownership and government 
ownership, and their relation to corporate reporting and CSR (e.g. CSR performance 
and reporting) is provided in Chapter four, which describes the hypotheses development 
of the current study. 
 
98 
 
3.6 BOARD OF DIRECTORS  
Board of directors is the most important internal governance mechanism within a firm 
(Fama & Jensen, 1983; Daily, Dalton & Cannella, 2003). Being a legally the highest 
authority in a firm, the board undertake both oversight and advisory roles 
(Sundaramurthy & Lewis, 2003; Petrovic, 2008). The board is expected to fulfil a 
variety of functions that include monitoring of management to mitigate agency cost and 
also providing resources and strategic directions for firm survival and success.  
In line with the stakeholder approach of corporate governance that examined the 
broader perspective of corporate governance, there is a shift in the board role, from the 
narrow focus on shareholders to the interest of broader stakeholders’ groups that are 
linked to social and environmental considerations (Cramer & Hirschland, 2006; Ingley, 
2008; Ayuso & Argandona, 2009; Bear et al., 2010). According to Hung (2011), 
directors’ concerns for stakeholders are related positively to directors’ obligations to 
perform their role in CSR. Perrini (2006) also noted that CSR is increasingly on the 
agenda of the corporate boards. Since the boards of directors are instrumental in shaping 
and overseeing firm’s strategies, they also need to pay attention to matters relating to 
CSR (Ingley, 2008).  
In order to discharge their duties effectively, the boards need to acquire certain 
characteristics, which can be classified into several categories; for example, 
demographic characteristics, competencies and personality characteristics (Milliken & 
Martins, 1996; Van Der Walt & Ingley, 2003). Following corporate governance reform 
worldwide, there have been extensive debates over the characteristics of good 
governance (Kang, Cheng & Gray, 2007) and how to develop more effective boards 
(Van Der Walt & Ingley, 2003). According to Kang et al. (2007), board independence 
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and diversity are among the important governance issues in firms. The effectiveness of 
firms’ boards of directors depends on a number of factors such as board composition, 
size, leadership and diversity (Brennan, 2006). Socially-responsible firms have 
characteristics associated with effective board structure (Webb, 2004).  
As boards become more involved in assessing and shaping the firms’ policies and 
practices on a wide range of social and environmental issues, they should consist of 
more active, experienced, diverse, representative and independent directors that reflect 
accurately the broader range of stakeholders. This has been demonstrated through 
evidence in the extant literature investigating the links between board of directors and 
CSR (Ibrahim & Angelidis, 1995). In examining the corporate social responsiveness 
orientation of board members, Ibrahim and Angelidis (1995) found that outside director 
exhibits greater concern for the discretionary component of CSR. 
Moreover, there have also been a number of studies that relate specifically board of 
directors with CSR performance and reporting. For example, Zahra (1989) posited the 
association between outside directors’ composition and other board characteristics such 
as professionalism, stock ownership and membership diversity, with CSR performance. 
Empirically, Coffey and Wang (1998) found that board diversity and managerial control 
are related to corporate philanthropy. Board diversity is represented by the percentage 
of inside to outside directors and percentage of women director, while managerial 
control is represented by the percentage of total shares owned by inside board members 
(Coffey & Wang, 1998). Findings of Williams’ (2003) study on the significant positive 
association between women directors and corporate philanthropy, generally provided 
support for Zahra’s (1989) and Coffey and Wang’s (1998) studies. 
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Johnson and Greening (1999), who focused specifically on two dimensions of CSR 
performance, revealed a positive association between outside director representation 
and both people and product quality dimensions of CSR performance. Bear et al. (2010) 
and Post et al. (2011), who used the CSR rating to represent CSR performance, dictated 
the impact of women directors on CSR performance. However, Stanwick and Stanwick 
(1998) found no significant results on the association between the percentage of women 
and minority directors, and CSR performance. 
Both board’s monitoring and resource provision role were found to have effect on 
firms’ environmental performance in the US (De Villiers, Naicker & Van Staden, 
2011). Based on environmental rating of Kinder Lydenberg Domini (KLD) for 2003 to 
2004, De Villiers et al. (2011) found higher environmental performance in firms with 
higher board independence, which suggest the effect of board’s monitoring role on 
environmental performance. In terms of resource provision role, De Villiers et al. 
(2011) revealed that firms with larger board size, greater representation of active CEOs 
on the board, and more legal experts on the board, have higher environmental 
performance.  
Significant evidence has also been gathered with regards to the association between 
board of directors and CSRR. According to Haniffa and Cooke (2005), CSRR is 
associated with board dominated by executive directors and chairman with multiple 
directorships. An investigation of 40 Kenyan banks revealed board independence and 
gender diversity as significant variables that explained CSRR disclosed by the banks 
(Barako & Brown, 2008). However, Khan (2010), who relied on a sample of private 
commercial banks in Bangladesh, documented contrasting evidence to that of Barako 
and Brown (2008). Khan (2010) observed the significant impact of non-executive 
directors and existence of foreign nationalities directors on CSRR, whereas no 
 
101 
 
significant association was found between the existence of women directors on board 
and CSRR.  
Other than board independence, board leadership is also found to be a significant 
variable that influences CSRR disclosed by 68 of the largest Chinese and Indian 
multinational firms (Lattemann et al., 2009). Post et al. (2011), who related board 
composition to CSR performance and reporting, found that a higher proportion of 
outside directors on board are associated with more favourable environmental reporting 
and higher scores for natural environment ratings of KLD. Based on a sample of US and 
European firms, Michelon and Parbonetti (2012) dictated the effect of board 
characteristics that go beyond the narrow and traditional roles of the board (e.g. 
community influential members) on the level of sustainability disclosure.  
Overall, evidence from the extant literature has documented mixed findings on the 
influences of board characteristics such as board independence and diversity on CSRR, 
depending on the country and time of study. Most studies tend to rely on single-year 
analysis. Perhaps, the urge to conduct research on a longitudinal basis may improve the 
likelihood to reveal any relationship between variables (Gray et al., 2001; Murray et al., 
2006).  
Moreover, there has been a lack of research to investigate the impact of boards of 
directors’ CSR experience on CSRR. This is despite the importance of directors’ 
experience in influencing corporate outcome, as documented by several researchers; for 
example, Carpenter and Westphal (2001), Kroll et al. (2008) and Kor and 
Sundaramurthy (2009). Through experiences, directors may develop specific skills and 
knowledge; for instance, the ways firms or specific industries operate (Kor & 
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Sundaramurthy, 2009). These are essential in enabling directors to become useful 
advisers in firms (Kroll et al., 2008).  
In the context of the current study, boards with CSR experience may advise firms on the 
appropriate methods of practising and reporting CSR activities. Therefore, a greater 
quantity and quality of CSRR is expected in firms with board members that possess 
CSR experience, for example, experience in handling CSR-related projects or managing 
a CSR-related unit. The details on board’s CSR experience are provided in Chapter 
four. 
3.7 CORPORATE REPORTING REGULATION 
Corporate reporting regulation has undergone substantial changes over time. Corporate 
reporting scandals and perceived shortcomings during global financial crises are among 
the contributing factors that lead to the significant changes in corporate reporting 
regulation (Bushman & Landsman, 2010; Leuz, 2010). In general, the needs for 
corporate reporting regulation arise when self-regulation mechanism is found to be 
insufficient (Leuz & Wysocki, 2008; Beyer, Cohen, Lys & Walther, 2010; Leuz, 2010). 
For example, even though additional information would improve social welfare, firms 
may decide not to report that information to the stakeholders when such reporting is not 
mandated (Beyer et al., 2010). The competitive nature of the information and the 
potential conflict of interest among different stakeholders on the information required 
may lead to the non-reporting attitude (Inchausti, 1997). In this case, there is a need for 
regulation; for example, through imposition of relevant reporting requirements or 
standards that allow firms to commit to certain levels of reporting and improve the 
credibility of the reported information (Beyer et al., 2010; Leuz, 2010). A mandatory 
reporting regime can also produce cost savings for the economy as a whole; for 
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example, through standardisation of corporate reporting, which makes it easier for users 
to process the information and compare firms (Leuz & Wysocki, 2008; Leuz, 2010). 
Leuz and Wysocki (2008) offered detailed discussions on the economic consequences 
of financial reporting and disclosure regulation.  
The introduction of new corporate reporting regulation, or any change to existing 
reporting regulations, may have an effect on the level of corporate reporting disclosed. 
Empirical research that discusses the impact of corporate reporting regulation can be 
classified into two groups. One group investigates the impact of corporate financial 
reporting regulation on corporate financial reporting; for example, the impact of 
implementation of the International Financial Reporting Standard (IFRS) on specific 
corporate disclosure or overall corporate financial reporting. The other group examined 
the impact of reporting regulation imposed on non-financial reporting; for example, the 
effect of regulation on CSRR disclosed by firms. The current study focuses on the latter 
group of research. 
In the context of corporate financial reporting, a number of studies have documented 
significant changes in the level of reporting made by firms, following the 
implementation of specific accounting regulations or standards. For example, Inchausti 
(1997) observed a significant increase in corporate disclosure of Spanish firms 
following the regulatory accounting changes in Spain. Owusu-Ansah and Yeoh (2005) 
investigated the effect of the Financial Reporting Act (FRA) of 1993 on mandatory 
disclosure practices of firms listed on the New Zealand Exchange Limited. The FRA 
gave statutory backing on the financial reporting standards in New Zealand and made 
non-compliance illegal. Findings of Owusu-Ansah and Yeoh’s (2005) study revealed 
that mean of corporate disclosure’s compliance levels in the periods after the enactment 
of the legislation are significantly higher than those in the periods before the enactment 
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of the legislation. They also found that the levels of improvement in corporate 
disclosure’s compliance behaviour remain strong, even after controlling several 
variables that may influence the mandatory disclosure’s compliance, specifically firm 
size, age, liquidity and profitability. Al-Akra, Eddie and Ali (2010), who investigated 
the influence of accounting disclosure regulation on mandatory disclosure compliance 
with the IFRS, discovered that disclosure compliance was significantly higher in the 
mandatory period of the IFRS than that in the voluntary period). Their sample of study 
includes 80 non-financial listed Jordanian firms for 1996 and 2004.  
Jennings and Marques (2011) examined the joint effects of corporate governance and 
regulation by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) on the disclosure of 
manager-adjusted non-Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP) earnings 
numbers in the United States. Results from their analysis indicated that investors were 
misled by manager-adjusted non-GAAP disclosures prior to the SEC intervention. 
Nevertheless, the result is applicable to disclosure made by firms with weaker corporate 
governance only. There is no evidence that investors were still being misled after the 
SEC intervention (Jennings & Marques, 2011). 
In summary, regulation may influence the levels of corporate reporting made by firms. 
The influence may differ across countries following the differences in institutional 
background of different countries. However, the efforts towards convergence of 
financial reporting regulation through IFRS in many countries around the world may 
mitigate the problem of differences in financial reporting made by firms in different 
countries. It is not the intention of the current study to elaborate further on the corporate 
financial reporting regulation, as the focal issue in the current study is the non-financial 
reporting regulation. Besides corporate reporting regulation, corporate governance’s 
components, such as corporate ownership structure and board of directors’ 
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characteristics, and other firm-specific characteristics may also impact on the level of 
corporate reporting. 
Following the greater emphasis on non-financial reporting over the years (Perrini, 
2006), there is a growing body of literature that calls for regulation of the non-financial 
reporting aspects, including CSRR. The voluntary CSRR practiced in firms has been 
claimed by a number of researchers as insufficient and ineffective (Deegan & Rankin, 
1996; Adams, 2004; Criado-Jimenez et al., 2008). Therefore, several countries, such as 
Norway, Australia and Sweden, have mandated their public-listed firms to report CSR-
related information with the belief that such regulation may enhance the quality of 
CSRR disclosed by firms. Despite those beliefs, empirical findings on the impact of 
regulation on the quantity and quality of CSRR were mixed. Nevertheless, Ioannou and 
Serafeim (2012) demonstrated that the social responsibility of business leaders increases 
following the adoption of the mandatory CSR laws and regulation. 
While a group of researchers observed an increase in the quantity and quality of CSRR 
following such regulation (Cowan & Gadenne, 2005; Frost, 2007; Llena et al., 2007; 
Criado-Jimenez et al., 2008), another group documented a lack of CSRR in the presence 
of such regulation (Adams, et al. 1995; Larrinaga et al., 2002; Day & Woodward, 
2004). The mixed findings generally offer two possibilities: (1) to replace existing 
CSRR regulation with self-regulation mechanism; or (2) to reinforce the current CSRR 
regulation as to ensure greater levels of disclosure compliance made by firms.  
With the introduction of the CSRR regulation by the Bursa Malaysia upon all public 
listed firms in Malaysia, the need to evaluate its effectiveness arises. This is essential, 
particularly for the regulators, in their efforts to improve the existing CSRR practices 
and CSRR regulation in Malaysia. Since there are several other factors that influence 
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the levels of CSRR, for examples, corporate ownership structure and board of directors, 
an examination of several determinants of CSRR, together with their joint-effect (if 
any), become relevant. By conducting a comprehensive study on the association 
between corporate ownership structure, board of directors, CSRR regulation and the 
levels of CSRR, possibly researchers may document the importance of these 
mechanisms and their interrelationship in determining the levels of CSRR in Malaysia. 
Details on regulation and its impact on CSRR disclosed by firms in different countries 
are discussed in Chapter four. 
3.8 A REVIEW ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE, CSR AND CSRR IN MALAYSIA 
Malaysia has witnessed a significant development of corporate governance, CSR and 
CSRR in order to keep pace with the global trends. In terms of CSR, Baugh et al. 
(2007) noted that Malaysia has shown a level of commitment towards the social aspect 
of CSR, specifically the community dimension that is in the same range of Singapore, 
Japan, Taiwan and Hong Kong. These four countries were found to have quite high 
commitment to social aspect of CSR with similar scores to those of Australia, New 
Zealand and Western Europe. 
As a country that has experienced rapid economic growth, Malaysia is not without its 
share of social and environmental challenges (Abdullah, 2004; Zaimee, 2007; Ang, 
2008; Muyibi et al., 2008; Murad et al., 2010; Oh, 2010). The revelation of several 
corporate misconduct cases and a number of environmental issues has raised the 
importance of good corporate governance and CSR practice in Malaysia (Liew, 2007).  
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To date, a number of initiatives have been undertaken by the Malaysian government 
through various corporate bodies, such as the Securities Commission and the Bursa 
Malaysia, to promote corporate governance and CSR (Lu & Castka, 2009). For 
example, the Bursa Malaysia launched CSR framework in September 2006 with the 
intention of assisting firms in their CSRR practices. This framework provides a set of 
voluntary guidelines for firms to address their CSRR-related matters. Later, the 
revamped of the Bursa Malaysia listing requirement, as at 14 December 2006, has 
witnessed CSRR in respect of annual reports of listed firms become mandatory with 
effect of the 2007’s financial year.  
A specific guideline on CSR, known as ‘The Silver Book’, has also been designed for 
the government-linked companies (GLCs), assuming their important role in driving the 
Malaysian corporate sector. ‘The Silver Book’ was launched by the Khazanah Nasional 
Bhd in September 2006 under its Government-linked Company Transformation 
Programme as guidelines for GLCs to conduct their CSR activities. GLCs are 
encouraged to include CSR as part of their business objectives and corporate 
philosophy, so as to enhance both shareholders and other stakeholders’ value. This is in 
line with the primary commercial objective of the GLCs as well as the objective to 
serve the nations. Esa and Ghazali (2012) dictated an increase in CSRR disclosed by a 
sample of GLCs, following the establishment of ‘The Silver Book’. 
The Ministry of Natural Resources and Environment, Malaysia (formerly known as the 
Ministry of Science, Technology and the Environment, Malaysia) also produced the 
National Policy on the Environment in 2002. This integrates the elements of sustainable 
development that aims to achieve a continuous economic, social and cultural progress 
and enhancement of the quality of life of Malaysian through environmentally sound and 
sustainable development. Among the principles outlined in the national policy include 
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stewardship of the environment, sustainable use of natural resources, role of the private 
sector, and commitment and accountability. The National Policy on the Environment 
plays a vital role in guiding the stakeholders towards a clean, safe, healthy and 
productive environment. 
Furthermore, several awards have been introduced to encourage firm to undertake CSR 
activities and recognise those firms that implement such activities. For examples, the 
professional accounting body, ACCA Malaysia, with the endorsement of the 
Department of Environment, Malaysia, has launched The ACCA Malaysian 
Environmental and Social Reporting Awards (MESRA) since 2002 with the intention of 
recognising firms that disclose CSRR, to raise awareness in corporate transparency, and 
to encourage the uptake of environmental and social reporting in firms. In 2009, the 
award’s name was changed to the ACCA Malaysia Sustainability Reporting Awards. 
The Department of Environment, Malaysia, is an enforcement agency formed under the 
Ministry of Natural Resources and Environment. The department is responsible to 
prevent, control and abate pollution in Malaysia through the enforcement of the 
Environmental Quality Act 1974. 
The Ministry of Women, Family and Community Development of Malaysia also 
launched The Prime Minister’s CSR Awards in 2007 to recognise firms that have made 
a difference to the local community through their CSR activities. A partnership between 
The Star and the Institute of Corporate Responsibility (ICR) Malaysia, together with its 
working partners, ACCA, PricewaterhouseCoopers and Securities Industry 
Development Corporation, has produced The StarBiz-ICR Malaysia Corporate 
Responsibility Awards that recognise firms with outstanding CSR practices that go 
beyond community and philanthropic activities. Several tax incentives have also been 
introduced by the government of Malaysia for firms that undertake CSR-related 
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activities; for example, to reduce the greenhouse gas emissions, to invest in local 
communities and to support for arts and cultural programmes.  
With respect to corporate governance, the enactment of the Malaysian Code on 
Corporate Governance (MCCG) in 2001, and its amendment in 2007 and 2012, has 
been seen as among the significant efforts being undertaken to improve the existing 
corporate governance practice in Malaysian corporate sector (Shim, 2006; Liew, 2007). 
The MCCG outlines the role, composition and structure of the board of directors, being 
the most important internal governance mechanism in firms. Compliance with the 
disclosure provisions of the MCCG has become part of the Bursa Malaysia Listing 
Requirement (Shim, 2006).  
The Malaysian government has also presented the Malaysian ‘Business Code of Ethics’ 
in 2002, supplemented the code with a ‘National Integrity Plan’. Later, the Integrity 
Institute of Malaysia was established in 2004 with the objective of enhancing the 
corporate governance and business ethics standards in Malaysia. All of these efforts are 
intended to promote corporate transparency and accountability, as well as to improve 
the quality of life and the well-being of the citizens (Lu & Castka, 2009).  
As highlighted by Lopez (2010) in presenting the results of a report by ACCA entitled 
‘The Rise of the Report and the Regulator’, both government and regulatory initiatives 
in support of CSR and transparency as well as voluntary award schemes are the key 
factors that drive CSRR’s development in Malaysia. Earlier, the report stated that 
Malaysia boosts the most firms producing sustainability reports within the Association 
of Southeast Asian Nations’ (ASEAN) countries. In other words, the continuous efforts 
that have been taken towards the development of corporate governance, CSR and CSRR 
in Malaysia have motivated a greater CSRR disclosed by firms in the countries. Such 
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development has also encouraged more research to be undertaken, particularly on 
CSRR. 
3.9 CSRR RESEARCH IN MALAYSIA 
The rise of CSRR research in Malaysia is driven by the continuous development of 
corporate governance, CSR and CSRR in the country. To date, there have been a 
number of empirical works conducted on CSRR in Malaysia, investigating the nature 
and extent of reporting and motivations for/determinants of reporting. Studies by Teoh 
and Thong (1984) and Andrew, Gul, Guthrie and Teoh (1989) are among the earliest 
CSRR research in Malaysia. Teoh and Thong (1984) studied three related issues; the 
concept of CSR, the nature and extent of corporate involvement in CSR activities, and 
CSRR. A personal interview questionnaire survey from a combination of 100 foreign 
and locally-owned firms in Malaysia revealed that only 29 percent of the firms reported 
on social performance in their annual reports, with most reporting focused on human 
resources and products/services. Teoh and Thong (1984) has been criticised for relying 
solely on personal interview in examining the themes of CSRR. Ahmad, Sulaiman and 
Siswantoro (2003) suggested that content analysis would be a better choice of 
procedures to examine CSRR in a firm. 
Similar findings were reported by Andrew et al. (1989), who conducted a content 
analysis upon 119 annual reports of public listed firms in Malaysia and Singapore. They 
found that 26 percent of the firms had made some CSRR with human resource theme 
dominated the reporting. A low level of CSRR was documented, ranging from less than 
a quarter of a page to slightly more than one page, with more reporting found in large 
and medium-sized firms, and banking and finance industry. Despite the different 
countries used as sample in Andrew et al. (1989), no comparison was made of the 
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CSRR practices of the two countries, leading to an incomplete picture of the state-of-
the-art of CSRR in the individual countries. 
While evidence presented by Teoh and Thong (1984) and Andrew et al. (1989) seems 
outdated, Ahmad et al. (2003) offered renewed evidence on the nature and extent of 
CSRR. They found that CSRR disclosed by a sample of 98 firms in Malaysia contained 
little quantifiable data, focused on products and consumers, employees and community 
involvement-related information, and reported the ‘good news’ or positive in nature of 
CSRR. Using a larger sample size (257 firms), Thompson and Zakaria (2004) found 
that 81.3 percent of the firm (209 firms) made some form of CSRR in their annual 
reports, with most reporting centred at employee and human resource-related 
information. The focus of firms towards employees’ matters may reflect the importance 
of employees as corporate stakeholders (Puri & Borok, 2002). According to Thompson 
and Zakaria (2004), the low level of CSRR is due to a number of factors, such as, lack 
of government and public pressure, lack of perceived benefits of reporting, and the 
widely-held view that firms do not impact significantly on the environment.  
In contrast to the cross-sectional analysis of CSRR (see Andrew et al., 1989; Ahmad et 
al., 2003; Thompson & Zakaria, 2004), several studies have also examined CSRR on a 
longitudinal basis (see Jamil, Alwi & Mohamed, 2002; Yusoff, Yatim & Nasir, 2005; 
Haron, Yahya, Manasseh & Ismail, 2006; Saleh et al., 2010). Jamil et al. (2002), who 
examined the trend of CSRR disclosed by 100 firms in Malaysia from 1995 to 1999, 
dictated a variation of CSRR disclosed by firms over the five-year period. A similar 
finding was found by Saleh et al. (2010), who examined the CSRR disclosed in firms’ 
annual reports from 2000 to 2005. Haron et al. (2006), who examined the level of 
CSRR during the financial crisis (1998), pre (1996) and post (2000) financial crisis 
periods, found that the highest level of reporting was in 1998, during the financial crisis. 
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They also revealed that most reporting were human resource-related information, 
qualitative and favourable in nature, and reported in chairman’s reports. They suggested 
that firms disclose CSRR to reduce agency cost and boost corporate image. 
Yusoff et al. (2005), who investigated the environmental reporting made by 12 firms 
from environmentally-sensitive industries, observed an improvement in firms’ reporting 
practices between 1999 and 2002. Their results indicated that firms have moved from 
non-disclosure to more qualitative disclosure practices, reported in three common 
locations: environmental section or health, safety and environmental section; 
chairman’s statement; and review of operation. They suggested that the introduction of 
2 awards, namely, National Annual Corporate Report Awards (NACRA) Environmental 
Reporting Award and ACCA Environmental Awards in 2000 and 2002 respectively, 
may have influenced the development of environmental reporting practices, apart from 
the increasing awareness of TBL reporting among firms.  
In summary, there has been some improvement in firms’ CSRR practices over time. 
Despite the low level of CSRR documented in the extant literature, the level of firms’ 
awareness of CSRR seems to have improved, as demonstrated by the increasing number 
of firms disclosing CSRR. Even in the voluntary period of CSRR (prior to 2007), firms 
were seen motivated to disclose/publicise their CSRR due to several reasons that 
include to manage their relationship with the stakeholders and to demonstrate a good 
corporate image or reputation.  
A number of studies have investigated the motivations for/determinants of CSRR in 
Malaysia. Ahmad and Sulaiman (2004) demonstrated limited support for legitimacy 
theory in explaining the nature of and motivations for CSRR in Malaysia. Based on 38 
firms from industrial products and construction industries disclosing environmental 
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information in the annual reports for 2000, it was found that reporting appears to be low 
and restricted to very general, ad-hoc statements on environmental matters. They 
suggested that the absence of mandatory environmental reporting standards has led to 
the lack of uniformity and little informational value of such reporting in Malaysia. 
Hamid (2004) focused specifically on the CSRR practices in highly-regulated 
industries. He found that the product-related information was the most popular theme of 
CSRR disclosed by firms in banking and finance industries. Size, listing status and age 
of business were related significantly to the levels of CSRR disclosed, while 
profitability and firm profile were not (Hamid, 2004). 
In examining the effects of culture and corporate governance on CSRR, Haniffa and 
Cooke (2005) dictated a significant relationship between several variables; for instance, 
boards dominated by Malay directors, boards dominated by executive directors, 
chairman with multiple directorships and foreign share ownership and CSRR. Size, 
profitability, multiple listing and type of industry were also found to influence CSRR, 
with the exception of gearing. Their analysis was based on a sample of 139 non-finance 
firms listed in 1996. Overall, Haniffa and Cooke’s (2005) study provided support for 
legitimacy theory. 
The influence of corporate ownership structure on CSRR is also apparent. Government 
ownership is observed to be positively related to CSRR (Ghazali, 2007; Amran & Devi, 
2008; Lim, Talha, Mohamed & Sallehhuddin, 2008; Said, Zainuddin & Haron, 2009). 
However, there have been mixed findings dictated for other types of ownership 
structure. For example, Haniffa and Cooke (2005) documented a positive association 
between foreign ownership and CSRR, while Amran and Devi (2008) and Said et al. 
(2009) did not list foreign ownership as a significant variable that explain CSRR. A 
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negative association was dictated between director ownership and CSRR in Ghazali 
(2007). However, Said et al. (2009) found no association between the two variables.  
Mixed findings were also documented on the relationship between boards of directors’ 
characteristics and CSRR. For example, Haniffa and Cooke (2005) revealed a negative 
association between the proportion of non-executive directors and the levels of CSRR, 
whereas Lim et al. (2008) found a positive association between the two variables. Said 
et al. (2009) did not observe any association between board size, board independence 
and CEO duality on CSRR. Ghazali (2007) relied on a sample of 87 non-finance firms 
drawn from the top 100 firms (by market capitalisation) for 2001; whereas Amran and 
Devi (2008) used a sample of 133 firms chosen from the stratified random sampling 
technique (by industries) from 2002. Said et al. (2009) relied on a sample of 150 firms 
for 2006, while Lim et al. (2008) used 743 firms in 2003 as the sample in their studies. 
From the stakeholder perspective, Elijido-Ten (2009) investigated the influence of the 
stakeholder power, strategic posture and economic performance on the quantity and 
quality of environmental reporting in firms’ annual reports. Of the variables used to 
represent the stakeholder power, specifically government power, shareholder power and 
creditor power, only government power is related significantly to environmental 
reporting. They also revealed that strategic posture is positively related to 
environmental reporting, while economic performance is not. They argued that there 
was not much demand of environmental reporting from both shareholders and creditors, 
given the low level of environmental awareness in Malaysia. 
In general, the majority of studies that examined the motivation for/determinant of 
CSRR were based on a single year analysis. To draw a conclusion on the determinants 
of CSRR based on a single-year data seems to be insufficient, as findings of the studies 
 
115 
 
tend to vary across different year of analysis. Perhaps, a longitudinal nature of CSRR 
research may enable researchers to observe the consistency of the findings on the 
determinants of CSRR over a period of time. The extant CSRR research also seems to 
focus on the voluntary period of CSRR that is prior to 2007. Following the introduction 
of CSRR regulation in Malaysia, effective from 2007, there is a need to explore the 
effectiveness of such regulation in promoting higher levels of CSRR.  
Othman et al. (2011) documented the impact of CSRR regulation, government 
ownership and family ownership on CSR reputation. Based on their analysis of 117 
firms in three sensitive industries for 2007, Othman et al. (2011) found that CSRR 
regulation and government ownership are related positively to the level of CSR 
reputation, whereas family ownership is negatively associated with the level of CSR 
reputation. Profitability is associated positively with CSR reputation, while firm size is 
not (Othman et al., 2011). In Othman et al. (2011), CSRR regulation is represented by 
changes in CSR disclosure between 2006 and 2007, while the level of CSR reputation is 
represented by CSR reputation index that is developed based on the RepTrake model, 
the Bursa Malaysia’s CSR Framework and the GRI Guidelines.  
Perhaps, study by Othman et al. (2011) could be extended by examining the impact of 
CSRR regulation on the levels of CSRR disclosed, including a more representative 
sample firms from various industries and investigating the moderating effect of CSRR 
regulation on the association between corporate ownership structure and CSRR in a 
longitudinal basis of analysis. Such extension may contribute to the development of 
CSRR, particularly in Malaysia. It could yield a deeper understanding of CSRR 
practices in Malaysia; for example, it may guide the regulators to move forward on the 
regulatory matters of CSRR and provide useful information to both shareholders and 
other stakeholders for the purpose of decision-making. In line with the significant 
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progress of corporate governance in Malaysia, it would be beneficial to include the 
impact of specific board of directors’ characteristics, in particular board CSR 
experience, on the levels of CSRR, owing to its importance and relevance in the context 
of CSRR. Such findings may determine the usefulness of the advisory or strategic roles 
of the board in directing CSRR.  
3.10 SUMMARY 
Corporate governance plays a significant role in determining the levels of corporate 
reporting. Following the broader perspective of corporate governance that looks into the 
protection of interests of both shareholders and other stakeholders, firms are expected to 
consider the social and environmental implications of their business activities along 
with their objective to maximise profit. Both internal (e.g. board of directors) and 
external (e.g. corporate ownership structure and corporate reporting regulation) 
components of corporate governance are important to promote greater quantity and 
quality of corporate reporting, including CSRR.  
In the context of Malaysia, the unique corporate ownership structure characterised by 
family and government-owned firms, offers an ideal setting for researchers to 
investigate the influence of different types of corporate ownership structure on CRRR. 
Such investigation may become more beneficial when considering the effect of CSRR 
regulation imposed by the Bursa Malaysia on all public-listed firms in Malaysia from 
2007 onwards. This is because such findings may signify the effectiveness of the CSRR 
regulation in promoting CSRR in Malaysia.  
Other than corporate ownership structure and corporate reporting regulation, the 
characteristics of the board of directors of firms have also impacted the levels of CSRR 
disclosed. Besides board independence and diversity, other important characteristics of 
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the board, for example, board experience, has received little attention in research. This 
is in spite of its importance in directing strategic positions and decisions of firms. 
Therefore, more research efforts are warranted in this aspect of board of directors; 
specifically, the impact of board of directors’ CSR experience on CSRR.  
Overall, the range of studies examining the link between corporate governance and 
CSRR is very much in need, especially in Malaysia. This is partly to support the 
continuous efforts being undertaken by the government, non-governmental 
organisations and the private sectors in stimulating the development of corporate 
governance, CSR and CSRR in this country. Perhaps evidence derived from the 
empirical studies may further boost the development of corporate governance, CSR and 
CSRR in Malaysia.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                         
 
118 
 
CHAPTER 4: RESEARCH FRAMEWORK AND HYPOTHESES 
DEVELOPMENT 
 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter begins with an introduction to the research model used in the current study 
in Section 4.2. Next, a discussion on the theoretical framework applied in the current 
study is presented in Section 4.3. This is followed by a detailed explanation of the 
relevant hypotheses developed for the purpose of the current study in Section 4.4. 
Finally, Section 4.5 summarises the chapter. 
4.2 RESEARCH MODEL 
The current study examines the association between corporate ownership structures, 
board of directors, corporate reporting regulation and CSRR. With reference to the 
extant literature of corporate governance, corporate disclosure and CSRR as reviewed in 
the preceding chapters, the associations between the variables of interest in the current 
study are illustrated in a research model as presented in Figure 4.1.  
Four variables have been used to represent corporate ownership structure:  managerial 
ownership; family ownership; foreign ownership; and government ownership. Board of 
directors’ CSR experience is used to represent boards of directors’ characteristics 
examined in the current study, while corporate reporting regulation is represented by the 
CSRR regulation. CSRR is measured by two variables, namely the quantity and quality 
of CSRR. Several firm-specific characteristics are also included in the current study as 
control variables; firm size, Shariah status, profitability, industry and leverage. 
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Notes: 
Independent variables: Ownership structure and board of directors 
Dependent variable: Corporate social responsibility reporting 
Moderator: Corporate reporting regulation 
 
Figure 4.1: Research Model of the Current Study 
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4.3 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
There have been a number of theories employed to investigate the motivations for 
CSRR. Among the most widely-used theory in CSRR research are political economy 
theory, legitimacy theory and stakeholder theory. Detailed explanations of these are 
included in Section 2.8.  
The current study adopts stakeholder theory to look into the association between two 
corporate governance’s components, namely corporate ownership structure and boards 
of directors’ characteristic, and CSRR. It is a way to acknowledge the different groups 
of stakeholders that may impact the levels of CSRR disclosed by firms. Although the 
current study focuses specifically on the influence of the different types of corporate 
ownership structure which represents the shareholders, other stakeholders’ group such 
as government and creditors are also included in the investigation as control variables. 
In the current study, government is represented by firm size, Shariah status of firm and 
industry, whereas creditor is represented by leverage.  
Relying on Ullmann’s (1985) model of stakeholder theory (see Figure 4.4), this study 
also recognises the importance of firms’ strategic posture and economic performance in 
determining the levels of CSRR. While board of directors’ CSR experience is used to 
represent firms’ strategic posture, profitability represents the economic performance. 
From the perspective of stakeholder theory, the current study focuses on the impact of 
corporate ownership structure and boards’ CSR experience on the levels of CSRR, thus 
controls for the effect of other related variables such as government power, creditor 
power and economic performance. 
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In addition, the current study also applies contingency theory in examining the 
moderating effect of CSRR regulation on the association between corporate ownership 
structure and CSRR. This is to demonstrate the existence of other determinants of 
CSRR in addition to the corporate governance’s components and firm-specific 
characteristics. Perhaps, the multiple perspective of CSRR examined in the current 
study through stakeholder and contingency theory may offer a comprehensive view of 
CSRR in Malaysia, taking into consideration the internal (e.g. board of directors) and 
external (e.g. shareholders and regulators) players of corporate governance. 
4.3.1 Stakeholder Theory 
Stakeholder theory acknowledges the broader responsibilities of firms to satisfy their 
various stakeholders’ interest that go beyond profit making (Clarkson, 1995; Donaldson 
& Preston, 1995; Freeman et al., 2010). Firms are expected to respond to the multiple 
stakeholders’ groups, both internal and external stakeholders, especially those deemed 
to be powerful, or those who can impact significantly on the firms (Ullmann, 1985; 
Gray et al., 1995a; Deegan, 2002; O’Dwyer, 2003; Huang & Kung, 2010). This is vital 
as to ensure the firms’ survival and continued success. Otherwise, the firms may have to 
face negative confrontations with the stakeholders.  
In a context of a firm, stakeholder can be referred to as any group or individual who can 
affect or is affected by the achievement of a firm’s objectives (Freeman, 1984). To be 
more specific, Clarkson (1995) referred stakeholder as persons or groups that have, or 
claim, ownership, rights, or interests in a firm and its activities. Figure 4.2 outlines the 
classification of stakeholders as suggested by Clarkson (1995). 
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Figure 4.2: Classification of Stakeholders 
(Source: Clarkson, 1995) 
According to Clarkson (1995), firms tend to pay more attention to the interests of the 
primary stakeholders compared with the secondary stakeholders. This is due to the high 
level of interdependence between the firms and the primary stakeholders. The 
continuous participation of the primary stakeholders is necessary for the survival of the 
firms. The secondary stakeholders’ actions, even though their participation is not 
essential to the survival of the firms, can significantly affect the firms, either in a 
positive or negative way (Clarkson, 1995). For example, firms rely on shareholders for 
financial resources that are essential for firms’ survival. Environmentalists, even though 
are not necessary for firms’ survival, they can pressure firms to operate in an 
environmental-friendly manner with the intention of sustaining the environment.  
Subsequently, Mitchell et al. (1997) argued that the levels of attention given by firms to 
their stakeholders depend on several stakeholders’ attributes; they are power, legitimacy 
and urgency. Figure 4.3 illustrates the various combinations of stakeholder attributes 
that indicate the levels of attention paid to a particular stakeholder as suggested by 
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Mitchell et al. (1997). Overall, their stakeholder typology is partly consistent with 
Ullmann’s (1985) conceptual framework that posited the power of stakeholder as one of 
the determinants of social disclosure and performance. 
 
 
 
             
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.3: Stakeholder Typology 
(Source: Mitchell et al., 1997) 
 
Figure 4.4 presents the three-dimensional conceptual framework proposed by Ullmann 
(1985) that can be adopted to predict the levels of social disclosure and performance. 
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resources, the more influence they have in shaping the firms’ decisions or policies. This 
explains the managerial branch of the stakeholder theory.  
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.4: Conceptual Framework of Determinants of Social Disclosure/Performance 
(Source: Ullmann, 1985) 
Three important stakeholders suggested by Ullmann (1985) are governments, 
shareholders and creditors. Shareholders, in most cases, represent the main capital 
providers to the firms that form a substantial group of stakeholders in the firms. While 
the power of creditors lie in their controls over some useful resources, for example, 
financial resources for firms’ continued operations, the power of government is vested 
upon the sanctions and legislations imposed on firms.  
Several empirical works have been undertaken subsequent to Ullman’s (1985) work, 
examining CSRR from the stakeholder’s perspective (see Roberts, 1992; Elijido-Ten, 
2009; Huang & Kung, 2010). These studies dictated that different stakeholders have 
different impacts on CSRR. Moreover, there have been a number of studies 
investigating specifically the association between corporate ownership structure and 
CSR (Ghazali, 2007; Li & Zhang, 2010), mainly from the agency theory perspective. 
Findings of these studies generally demonstrated the impact of different corporate 
ownership structures on CSR performance and CSRR.  
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As the first dimension of Ullmann’s (1985) model, the stakeholder power explains that 
the power possessed by stakeholders may influence the levels of firms’ responsiveness 
towards the stakeholders’ demands. The greater power possessed by the stakeholders, 
for example, when the stakeholders control resources that are critical for firms’ survival, 
the more likely the firms will respond to those stakeholders’ demands. According to 
Roberts (1992), a positive association between stakeholder power and social disclosure 
can be expected whenever social responsibility activities are viewed as an effective 
strategy in managing the stakeholders.  
Figure 4.5 outlines the theoretical framework used by Roberts (1992) to examine the 
determinants of CSR disclosure in US firms. Roberts (1992) aims to operationalise the 
conceptual framework proposed by Ullmann (1985). A similar model to Roberts (1992) 
has been adopted in Elijido-Ten’s (2009) work on the application of stakeholder theory 
in understanding the environmental reporting attitude in Malaysian’s perspective. Liu 
and Anbumozhi (2009) examined specifically the influence of stakeholder power in 
determining the levels of environmental reporting in China. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.5: Model of Determinants of CSR Disclosure 
(Source: Roberts, 1992) 
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Huang and Kung (2010), who looked into the influence of stakeholder expectation on 
environmental disclosure, classified the multiple stakeholder groups into three 
categories; external (government, debtors, consumers, suppliers and competitors), 
internal (shareholders and employees) and intermediary stakeholders (environmental 
protection organisations and accounting firms).  Figure 4.6 presents the classification of 
stakeholders used by Huang and Kung (2010).  
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.6: Classification of Stakeholders 
(Source: Huang and Kung, 2010) 
Overall, prior CSRR research showed some significant findings on the influence of 
different stakeholders groups on CSRR. However, the current study focuses specifically 
on the influence of shareholders on CSRR disclosed by firms. This is due to the greater 
power possessed by the shareholders to influence firms’ decision in comparison to other 
stakeholders.  
Instead of using a single variable to represent the shareholder power, for example 
concentrated ownership or disperse ownership (see Ullmann, 1985; Roberts, 1992; 
Huang & Kung, 2010), the current study classifies the shareholder power into four 
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appropriate, given the prevalent of these types of corporate ownership in Malaysia, 
being the context of the current study. It contributes to the theoretical development of 
CSRR based on the stakeholder theory through the refinement of the existing definition 
of shareholders’ power, taking into account the different nature of corporate ownership 
in the Asian developing countries compared with the Western developed countries. 
The second dimension of Ullmann’s (1985) model that is strategic posture, describes 
the way firms respond in fulfilling the social demands of their stakeholders. An active 
strategic posture involves a continuous monitoring and management of stakeholders by 
the firms, whereas a passive strategic posture occurs when the firms make no effort to 
monitor or manage their relationship with the stakeholders. Roberts (1992) used two 
proxies to represent a firm’s strategic posture: (1) average size of the firm’s public affair 
staff; and (2) the presence or absence of corporate sponsored philanthropic foundation; 
whereas Elijido-Ten (2009) used: (1) the presence/absence of environmental 
committees and/or inclusion/exclusion of environmental concern in their vision/mission 
statement; or (2) the presence/absence of ISO14001 environmental management’s 
certification as proxies for a firm’s strategic posture. Findings revealed by Roberts 
(1992) and Elijido-Ten (2009) have generally supported Ullmann’s (1985) proposition 
of the importance of strategic posture in predicting the level of CSRR disclosed. 
Finally, economic performance is proposed as the third dimension of the model as it 
influences the financial capability of firms to undertake costly programmes related to 
social demands (Ullmann, 1985).  
The model proposed by Ullmann (1985) is intended to improve the existing models that 
investigated the relationship between economic performance, social disclosure and 
social performance. Ullmann (1985) added firm strategy labelled as strategic posture 
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into the model, following its importance in determining the levels of social disclosure 
and performance.  
In the context of CSRR, there have been several studies that adopted Ullmann’s (1985) 
framework as a basis of their studies; for example, Roberts (1992), Elijido-Ten (2009) 
and Huang and Kung (2010). Generally, these studies documented some influence of 
stakeholders’ power, strategic posture and economic performance on CSRR. Details 
findings of these studies have been presented in Section 2.8.3. 
The current study aims to refine the existing model of Ullmann (1985) by using 
different types of corporate ownership structure in Malaysia to represent the shareholder 
power. This is in contrary to the diffused or concentrated types of corporate ownership 
structure used to represent the shareholder power in the existing studies; for example, 
Roberts (1992), Elijido-Ten (2009) and Huang and Kung (2010).  
Acknowledging the importance of firm strategy or strategic posture in determining the 
levels of CSRR (Ullmann, 1985), the current study suggests the appointment of board 
members with CSR experience as one of the strategies that may be used by firms to 
bring their CSRR to a higher levels. Other than the impact of corporate ownership 
structure and board of directors, the current study also controls for the effect of 
economic performance dimension and the other two components of stakeholder power, 
specifically government power and creditor power on CSRR, since they are found to 
impact CSRR in Ullmann (1985) and Roberts’ (1992) study. 
4.3.2 Contingency Theory 
Contingency theory contends that the way to manage an organisation depends on the 
way the organisation ‘fits’ with the environment within which it operates. According to 
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Donaldson (2001), an organisation’s effectiveness can be achieved by fitting the 
organisation’s characteristics with contingencies that relate to specific circumstance in 
the organisation. Originated from the management field of research, contingency theory 
has been increasingly applied in the accounting field of research, especially in the 
management accounting research (Otley, 1980; Chenhall, 2003). For example, the 
contingency perspective of management accounting research has investigated the way 
management accounting and control systems are contingent on organisational structures 
and characteristics. Chenhall (2003) highlighted that managers tend to adapt an 
organisation to environmental changes with the intention of improving performance. 
Viewing contingency theory from the financial accounting perspective suggests that 
management’s choice of reporting practices are contingent upon the differing 
constraints on entities (Thomas, 1986). In explaining the corporate financial reporting 
system, which includes CSRR, Thomas (1991) developed a contingency framework that 
consists of four contingent variables. The contingent variables that may affect the 
choice of accounting methods of an organisation, as outlined by Thomas (1991) 
include: (1) societal variables, (2) the environment of an organisation, (3) organisational 
attributes, and (4) user characteristics and other sources of information.  
Figure 4.7 shows the contingency framework suggested by Thomas (1991). Societal 
variables describe the factors that are common to all organisations within a particular 
country, yet vary between nations, for examples, economic, legal and political systems. 
The environment of an organisation refers to the perceived uncertainty involved in an 
organization, which can be classified into two dimensions, namely stable-dynamic 
dimension and homogeneous-heterogeneous dimension. While the former describes the 
degree of change involved in the internal and external environments that may influence 
an organisation, for example merger, takeover and specific regulation; the latter 
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explains the levels of differences or similarities of the influential environments. 
Organisational attributes refer to the resources that are available in an organisation, 
which can be measured in terms of organisational size and technology. Finally, user 
characteristics describe different users’ decision-making styles and cognitive traits 
(Thomas, 1991). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.7: Contingency Framework for Explaining Corporate Financial Reporting 
Systems 
(Source: Thomas, 1991, p. 42) 
Husted (2000) proposed the use of contingency theory to explain corporate social 
performance. His model suggested that corporate social performance is dependent upon 
the fit between the type of social issue and appropriate strategies and structures. The 
model developed strategies and structures to deal with social issues. The social issue 
strategies aim to close the expectation gaps that occurred between a firm’s management 
and its stakeholders with regards to their perceptions on the levels of corporate social 
performance of the firm. The social structures in his model refer to the organisational 
arrangement that determines information flow, responsibility and decision-making 
processes regarding social issues (Husted, 2000). According to Husted (2000), these 
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strategies and structures bring the firm into alignment with its social environment and 
could represent corporate social responsiveness. 
Contingency theory has also been used to explain voluntary disclosure practice in Egypt 
(Elsayed & Hoque, 2010). According to Elsayed and Hoque (2010), the level of a firm’s 
voluntary disclosure is significantly positively associated with its perceived influence of 
international socio-political institutions, international accounting standards, and 
international financial institutions. Nevertheless, no significant association found 
between voluntary disclosure level and perceived intensity of global competition 
(Elsayed & Hoque, 2010). Overall, their study provides evidence on the perceived 
international environmental factors that may influence the type and level of accounting 
disclosures by organisation. 
In line with the implementation of CSRR regulation by the Bursa Malaysia with effect 
from the 2007 financial year, all public-listed firms in Malaysia are required to disclose 
their CSR activities in the annual reports. CSRR regulation may represent the external 
environment of an organisation that may influence the CSRR practice, in addition to the 
existing influential factors that determine the current CSRR practice in firms, in 
particular corporate ownership structure.  
Therefore, it is of interest to examine the moderating effect of CSRR regulation, being 
an external environment that may influence the CSRR practice in firm, on the 
association between corporate ownership structure and CSRR. Such findings not only 
indicate the level of effectiveness of the CSRR regulation in promoting a higher level of 
CSRR, but also demonstrate the manner in which CSRR regulation impact the existing 
influence of corporate ownership structure on the levels of CSRR. Given the different 
influence placed by the different types of corporate ownership structure on the levels of 
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CSRR disclosed, the implementation of CSRR regulation may have different effect on 
the association between corporate ownership structure and CSRR.  
4.4 HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
This thesis focuses on the relationship between corporate ownership structures, board of 
directors’ characteristics, corporate reporting regulations and CSRR. Specifically, the 
current study examines the influence of different types of corporate ownership structure 
and board of directors’ CSR experience on the quantity and quality of CSRR. In 
addition, the current study also includes an investigation of the moderating effect of 
mandatory CSRR requirements on the association between corporate ownership 
structure and the quantity and quality of CSRR.  
The current study is based on the stakeholder theory and contingency theory. Relying 
upon the Ullmann’s (1985) framework of stakeholder theory, the current study focuses 
specifically on the influence of stakeholder power, which is represented by managerial, 
family, foreign and government ownership, on the quantity and quality of CSRR. The 
current study controls for the other two stakeholder power, namely government power 
and creditor power, as well as the economic performance, which were found to be the 
predicting variables of CSRR as proposed by Ullmann (1985). Government power is 
represented by firm size, Shariah status of firms and industry; creditor power is 
represented by leverage; and economic performance is represented by profitability.  
Strategic posture is represented by the board of directors’ CSR experience. The current 
study also introduces CSRR regulation as a moderating variable that may influence the 
association between corporate ownership structure and the quantity and quality of 
CSRR disclosed by firm, which is examined in the context of contingency theory. 
 
133 
 
4.4.1 Corporate Ownership Structure (Shareholder Power) 
Most of the prior research examining the influence of shareholder power on CSRR from 
the perspective of stakeholder theory has used concentrated ownership as the only 
variable to represent shareholder power (Roberts, 1992; Elijido-Ten, 2009; Liu & 
Anbumozhi, 2009; Huang & Kung, 2010). Owing to the uniqueness of corporate 
ownership structure in Asian countries, including Malaysia, which is characterised by 
family and government-owned structure, the current study suggests for the use of 
additional variables to represent the shareholder power. Instead of defining the 
shareholder power as concentrated ownership or diffused ownership, the current study 
measures specifically the shareholder power in terms of the different types of ownership 
structure; namely managerial, family, foreign and government ownership. These 
variables describe the common features of corporate ownership structure in Malaysia. 
The refinement of the definition of shareholders power in the current study adds to the 
existing CSRR literature from the stakeholder theory based on Ullmann’s (1985) model. 
4.4.1.1 Managerial Ownership 
Managerial ownership refers to the proportion of shares held by managers of a firm; for 
example, the executive directors. A firm in which the directors hold a significant 
portion of the firm’s share is known as an owner-managed firm or a closely-held firm 
(Claessen et al., 2000; Ghazali, 2007). Managerial ownership is one of the mechanisms 
used to mitigate the agency problem resulting from the separation of ownership and 
control between the shareholders and the managers. As suggested by Jensen and 
Meckling (1976), an increase in managerial ownership is seen as promoting the 
alignment of interests between the managers and the shareholders. Managers with a 
high proportion of shares bear the consequences and reap the rewards of managerial 
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actions that destroy and create value; whereas managers with a low proportion of shares 
have greater incentive to consume perquisites and fewer incentives to maximise firm 
value (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). 
Morck, Shleifer and Vishny (1988) suggested two conflicting arguments on the effect of 
managerial ownership on firm’s market valuation, namely the alignment hypothesis and 
the entrenchment hypothesis. The alignment hypothesis, or also known as convergence-
of-interest hypothesis, suggests that a firm’s market valuation increases whenever the 
managers own a higher proportion of shares in the firm. In contrary, the entrenchment 
hypothesis suggests that the managers’ incentive to maximise firm’s value reduced 
whenever their levels of ownership in the firm increases. To explain the entrenchment 
hypothesis, whenever the managers owned a significantly large amount of shares in a 
firm, they tend to behave against the interests of other shareholders due to the greater 
power possess by the managers to control the firm. In this case, a conflict of interest 
may occur between the controlling and external shareholders (Fan & Wong, 2002). 
In discussing the alignment or convergence-of-interests hypothesis in the context of 
corporate disclosure, managers and shareholders are viewed to have the same interests. 
This, in turn, encourages more extensive information to be disclosed by firms, in order 
to fulfil the information needs of the shareholders. Applying the entrenchment 
hypothesis to the concept of corporate disclosure, there will be less reliance of firms 
with a high level of managerial ownership to the public disclosure. This is because the 
high managerial ownership in a firm has led to a little separation between the owners 
and the managers of the firm
20
, which has consequently resulted in a lower demand of 
public disclosure by the owners in a closely-held or owner-managed type of firms 
                                                 
20 Despite the little separation between the owners and the managers of the firm, a conflict of interests may occur between the 
controlling shareholders and outside shareholders (Fan & Wong, 2002).  
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(Wallace & Naser, 1995). The owners of the firm become less likely to rely on public 
disclosure due to their greater access to internal information. 
Extant literature that investigated the association between managerial ownership and 
corporate disclosure has documented mixed findings. On the one hand, there is a list of 
studies that documented a negative association between managerial ownership and 
corporate disclosure (Gelb, 2000; Eng & Mak, 2003; Leung & Horwitz, 2004; Ghazali 
& Weetman, 2006). On the other hand, some studies documented positive associations 
between managerial ownership and corporate disclosure (Warfield, Wild & Wild, 1995; 
Nasir & Abdullah, 2004). There were also several studies that documented no 
association between managerial ownership and disclosure (Huafang & Jianguo, 2007; 
Donelly and Mulcahy, 2008). 
In Sweden, Broberg, Tagesson and Collin (2010) found that firms with a high level of 
managerial ownership disclosed less information than firms with a low level of 
managerial ownership. Managerial ownership is inversely related to the accounting 
disclosure in the US (Gelb, 2000), voluntary disclosure in Singapore (Eng & Mak, 
2003), Hong Kong (Leung & Horwitz, 2004) and Malaysia (Ghazali & Weetman, 
2006). Managerial ownership has also been negatively related to management earning 
forecast (Ruland, Tung & George, 1990) and the timeliness of earnings (Bushman, 
Chen, Engel & Smith, 2004).  
Overall, this range of studies supports the entrenchment hypothesis that suggests the 
incongruent interest between the owners and managers of firms. Therefore, firms may 
opt to implement the monitoring by outside shareholders or provide additional 
disclosures, in a way to reduce the agency problem between the two parties. 
Nevertheless, the high cost associated to the monitoring has made firms opt for 
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additional disclosures as a substitute for monitoring (Eng & Mak, 2003; Bushman et al., 
2004; Ghazali & Weetman, 2006).  
Warfield et al. (1995) found that the level of managerial ownership is related positively 
to the informativeness of earnings. A similar result was documented in Nasir and 
Abdullah (2004), who related managerial ownership with the level of voluntary 
disclosures among Malaysian financially-distressed firms. Their findings were 
consistent with the notion of the alignment hypothesis, suggesting that managerial share 
ownership mitigates agency problems and helps in aligning the interests between the 
managers and the shareholders in firms. 
In term of CSR, Zahra (1989) suggested that the attention of directors to performance 
will reduce as the director ownership increases. Directors with a high level of ownership 
in firms tend to pursue their self-interest objectives more than the interests of other 
stakeholders. Instead of ensuring that the social objectives of the firms are being 
implemented, the director’s objectives tend to resolve around maximising their own 
wealth as shareholders (Zahra, 1989).  
However, empirical studies provided conflicting results on the association between 
managerial ownership and CSR. For example, Coffey and Wang (1998), who 
empirically tested the relation between managerial control and CSR, found that the 
managerial control, which is measured by the percentage of shares owned by insiders, is 
related positively to charitable giving. Johnson and Greening (1999) also dictated a 
positive association between top management shareholding and product quality 
dimension of CSR performance. Nevertheless, no relationship was found between the 
top management shareholding and people dimension of CSR performance (Johnson & 
Greening, 1999).  
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Ghazali (2007) and Barnea and Rubin (2010) dictated a negative association between 
managerial ownership and CSR. Managerial ownership is negatively related to CSRR in 
Malaysia (Ghazali, 2007). The low public interest and accountability in these closely-
held/owner-managed firms has led to little concern being paid on the societal and 
environmental issues, which, in turn, translates into a lower level of CSRR disclosed in 
these firms (Ghazali, 2007). Barnea & Rubin (2010) found that insiders’ ownership is 
negatively related to the firm’s social rating. Oh, Chang and Martynov (2011), who 
used two variables to represent managerial ownership, reported that top management 
shareholding is associated negatively with CSR rating in Korea, whereas no association 
was found for outside director ownership.  
Generally, most prior studies that relate managerial ownership to corporate reporting, 
including CSRR, were based on single-year data. Perhaps, a more consistent finding can 
be generated from a multiple year or longitudinal data. Studies that are based on a 
longitudinal data may also enable researchers to examine change in the association 
between the two variables and the effect of any specific event that may occur in a 
particular year on the association between the two variables.  
Since the current study relies on a sample of firms in Malaysia, it hypothesises a 
negative association between managerial ownership and CSRR. This is based on the 
finding revealed by Ghazali (2007), who examined the managerial ownership-CSRR’s 
association in Malaysia using the data set from 2001. Possibly, the consistency of the 
finding revealed by Ghazali (2007) may be prevailed through a longitudinal data used in 
the current study, reflecting both the voluntary and mandatory period of CSRR. 
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Therefore, the current study hypothesises: 
H1a: Managerial ownership is related negatively to the quantity and quality of CSRR 
disclosed by a firm. 
4.4.1.2 Family Ownership 
The prevalence of family firms in many countries around the world, especially Asian 
countries (La Porta, Lopez & Shleifer, 1999; Claessens et al., 2000; Fan & Wong, 2002; 
Ibrahim & Samad, 2010), has signified the importance of family ownership as a form of 
corporate ownership (Anderson & Reeb, 2003; Miller, Le Breton-Miller, Lester & 
Cannella, 2007; Chen, Chen & Cheng, 2008). In general, family firms are characterised 
by the founding family’s concentrated ownership or the founding family members’ 
active involvement in the firms’ management, either as top executives or directors (La 
Porta et al., 1999; Anderson & Reeb, 2003; Chen et al., 2008; Wan-Hussin, 2009). 
Family firms are controlled and usually managed by family members from multiple 
generations (Miller et al., 2007). Family owners that possess a substantial amount of 
shares in a firm may nominate their family members to sit on the firm’s board of 
directors (Ghazali & Weetman, 2006), as a means to safeguard their interests (Ho & 
Wong, 2001).  
According to Jaggi, Leung and Gul (2009), Indonesia, Malaysia and Hong Kong are 
among the Asian countries with the highest percentage of family ownership in the listed 
firms. A survey conducted by Finance Asia in 2001 stated that Malaysia (67.2 percent) 
and Hong Kong (66.7 percent) are the two economies with the highest percentage of 
family-owned firms based on 20 percent cut-off point (Cheung & Chan, 2004). Based 
on a list of 40 richest Malaysians in 2008 taken from a Malaysian business magazine, 
Ibrahim and Samad (2010) found that 27 (67.5 percent) are involved in family business. 
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Overall, the evidence has partly signified the significant contribution made by the 
family firms in shaping the corporate scene, particularly in Malaysia. The family 
owners, who become the controlling shareholders, often control firms through a 
pyramidal structure and participate actively in the management of the firms.  
The distinguishing features of family firms are found to have effect on corporate 
transparency and disclosure choices. For examples, the presence of several family 
members on the board of directors indicates the existence of a dominant group that may 
strongly influence the board’s decisions on corporate disclosure (Ghazali & Weetman, 
2006; Chen et al., 2008). Furthermore, the active involvement of the family owners in 
firms’ management has led to little separation between the owners and managers (Ali, 
Chen & Radhakrishnan, 2007). This, in turn, results in lower information asymmetry 
between the two parties (Chen et al., 2008).  
Being involved with the firms’ management, the family owners have greater access to 
internal information compared with other shareholders such as non-family and minority 
shareholders. In this case, there is less reliance of the family owners on public 
disclosure, which leads to the lower demand for public disclosure in family-
owned/controlled firms. A similar argument is provided by Bushman et al. (2004), who 
suggested for the substitution role between direct monitoring and corporate disclosure 
in reducing the agency problems between the contracting parties. Chen et al. (2008) 
also found that family firms exhibit a lower likelihood of providing management 
forecasts than non-family firms. Findings by Chen et al. (2008) appear consistent with 
the arguments of the lower information asymmetry between owners and managers, and 
that the family owners are better monitors for the managers in the family-
owned/controlled firms. Bushman et al. (2004) and Chen et al.’s (2008) studies relied 
on a sample of US firms. 
 
140 
 
Several non-US studies that relate family ownership with corporate disclosure also 
documented similar findings as the US-based studies. For example, Chau and Gray 
(2002) documented that family-controlled firms in Hong Kong and Singapore are not 
motivated to disclose more information than mandated. A significant negative 
relationship was documented between the proportion of family members on board and 
the extent of voluntary disclosure in Hong Kong (Ho & Wong, 2001) and Malaysia 
(Haniffa & Cooke, 2002; Ghazali & Weetman, 2006), respectively.  
Haniffa and Cooke (2002) relied on data for the financial year 1995 (prior to the 1997 
financial crisis), whereas Ghazali and Weetman (2006) undertook similar research using 
the data for the 2001 financial year (after the financial crisis). Ghazali and Weetman 
(2006) concluded that corporate reporting practices of family-controlled firms remain 
unchanged with secretive or less disclosure attitude. This is despite of the 
implementation of the Malaysian Code of Corporate Governance in 2001 that was 
aimed to improve corporate governance practice in Malaysia, and subsequently promote 
better corporate transparency, accountability and reporting.  
In spite of the lower demand for public disclosure in the family firms as argued by 
several researchers (Chau & Gray, 2002; Bushman et al., 2004; Haniffa & Cooke, 2005; 
Ghazali & Weetman, 2006), Chen et al. (2008) suggested that the benefits of such 
disclosure, for example reduced cost of capital; and the costs of withholding bad news 
are more important to family owners than to other shareholders. These factors may, in 
turn, lead to the family owners’ preference for more public disclosures. Several studies 
have demonstrated greater quality of disclosure in family firms; for example, Wang 
(2006), Ali et al. (2007), Chen et al. (2008) and Wan Hussin (2009).  
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Wang (2006) and Ali et al. (2007) found that family firms have higher earnings quality 
relative to non-family firms. Family firms are more likely to provide quarterly forecasts 
(Ali et al., 2007). Wang (2006) presented consistent evidence on the associations 
between founding family ownership with lower abnormal accruals, greater earnings 
informativeness, and less persistence of transitory loss components in earnings. Chen et 
al. (2008) documented a higher likelihood of earnings warnings in family firms. In 
summary, these studies signified the greater benefits of disclosure and costs of 
withholding bad news from the family owners, resulting in more information disclosed 
by the family firms from the perspective of US firms. Similarly, Wan Hussin (2009), 
who related family firm to corporate transparency in Malaysia, also dictated greater 
transparency of the family firms. Their analysis showed that family firms, which are 
represented by the proportion of family members on the board, are more inclined to 
disclose all the required items for the primary basis of segment reporting. 
Overall, the presence of family members on board or the proportion of shares owned by 
family owners may influence corporate reporting behaviour. Perhaps, such argument 
could be extended to include an investigation of the impact of family-owned/controlled 
firms on CSRR. While a number of studies have documented a significant influence of 
family firms in determining the extent of voluntary disclosure, its impact on CSRR has 
been limited in focus.  
Following the predominance of family firms in many countries around the world and in 
Malaysia (Ibrahim & Samad, 2010), and the continuous development of CSR over time, 
there is a growing research interest to investigate the link between family ownership 
and CSR. For example, Gallo (2004) observed that family firms are perceived as being 
more capable than other firms in terms of creating economic wealth and delivering 
goods that are useful for society. Webb (2004) listed the presence of family members on 
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board as one of the indications that the firm is socially responsible. A negative 
association is documented between the proportion of family members on board and the 
increase in firm’s CSR reputation in Malaysia (Othman et al., 2011).  
Craig and Dibrell (2006) found that family firms in the US are more likely to engage in 
environmental friendly practices than their non-family counterparts. Dyer and Whetten 
(2006), who compared the CSR performance between family and non-family firms 
based on the KLD’s rating, observed that the family firms have fewer CSR concern 
relative to the non-family firms. However, Dyer and Whetten (2006) found no 
difference between the family and non-family firms with regards to the number of CSR 
initiatives. In examining firms’ reaction to stakeholder pressures in Taiwan, Huang, 
Ding and Kao (2009) observed that family firms pay much more attention to their 
internal stakeholders (e.g. shareholders, managers and employees) than non-family 
firms.  
Based on a survey upon 112 Spanish family firms, Deniz & Suarez (2005) documented 
that different groups of family firms undertake different approach of CSR. They divided 
the firms into three groups; the classical group consists of 33 family firms that do not 
consider CSR to be a source of competitive advantage and do not believe that they 
possess the resources that are necessary to resolve social problem; the philanthropic 
group represents 26 family firms that regard CSR as a source of competitive advantage 
but still believe that they do not possess the resources that are necessary to resolve 
social problems; and finally the socio-economic group comprises firms that take a 
philanthropic view that do not perceive CSR as a competitive advantage, but they 
acknowledge that they possess the resources that are necessary to address social 
problems.  
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To summarise, evidence from the extant literature that relates family firms to CSR has 
documented mixed findings on the way the family firms’ unique characteristics have 
impacted the firm’s CSR practices. Overall, the unique features of the family firms, for 
examples owned and managed by the family members, place different impact on 
different aspects of corporate behaviour, including their behaviour towards CSR 
practices. 
In Malaysia, there has been a practice of the listed firms with substantial family 
shareholdings to elect family members as members of the board of directors, either as 
executive or non-executive directors (Haniffa & Cooke, 2002). Family members, as 
defined by the Section 122A of the Malaysian Companies Act (1965), include spouse, 
parent, child, brother, sister and the spouse of a child, brother or sister. Any family 
relationship that occurs between the family owners and the members of the boards 
needs to be disclosed in the annual reports, as required by the Bursa Malaysia Listing 
Requirements. Such disclosure requirement may indicate the importance of the family 
relationship in a firm to be publicly known, as it affects the way the firm behaves.  
Despite the extant of literature that relates family firm with voluntary disclosure 
(Haniffa & Cooke, 2002; Ghazali & Weetman, 2006), corporate transparency (Wan 
Husin, 2009) and CSR reputation (Othman et al., 2011) in Malaysia, the impact of 
family ownership on CSRR has been limited in focus. Othman et al. (2011), who 
documented a negative association between family firm and CSR reputation in 
Malaysia, relied on a sample of firms in three sensitive industries, namely industrial 
product, property and plantation; and a single-year (2007) analysis only. However, the 
current study aims to contribute to the literature that relates family firms with CSRR, by 
examining firms in both sensitive and non-sensitive industries over a period of time 
from 2005 to 2009 in the analysis.  
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Possibly, the current study may dictate the important role of family members in 
influencing corporate decision with regards to CSRR. The longitudinal data applied in 
the current study that reflect both voluntary and mandatory period of CSRR may also 
enable researchers to document the changes in firms’ behaviour towards CSRR before 
and after the implementation of regulation with effect from 2007.  
Therefore, the current study hypothesises: 
H1b: Family ownership is negatively related to the quantity and quality of CSRR 
disclosed by a firm. 
4.4.1.3 Foreign Ownership 
Foreign ownership refers to the percentage of shares owned by foreign shareholders in a 
firm. A significant amount of shares held by the foreign shareholders may lead to a 
greater influence of the foreign practices in a firm. It may also witness the presence of 
foreign directors in the board of a firm. A number of empirical studies have documented 
the influence of foreign ownership on several firm outcome/performance (Chapple & 
Moon, 2005; Yoshikawa, Rasheed & Brio, 2010; Oh et al., 2011).  
Yoshikawa et al. (2010), who tested the moderating effects of foreign ownership on the 
strategy-pay sensitivity, revealed that foreign ownership negatively moderates the 
relationships between the strategy variables and executive compensation. Their findings 
suggested an active monitoring role played by foreign shareholders in reducing cash 
bonus payments when their invested firms choose to increase R&D or pursue 
diversification strategy.  
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Cross-border ownership of a firm gives rise to geographical separation and information 
asymmetry problems, between the owners and the managers (Mangena & Tauringana, 
2007; Oh et al., 2011). These problems may be reduced through an increased disclosure 
made by the firm. Meek and Gray (1989) emphasised the need for firms to disclose 
more information than the minimum requirements of the stock exchange in order to 
compete in international capital markets. In their study, across all four continental 
European countries (France, Germany, the Netherlands and Sweden), the sample firms 
exceeded the requirements of the London Stock Exchange through a wide range of 
voluntary disclosures (Meek & Gray, 1989). Their study indicated the importance of an 
extensive disclosure for firms that are listed in foreign/multiple stock exchanges.  
This has been further supported by Cooke (1989), who reported more information 
disclosed by firms listed on foreign stock exchanges compared with firms listed only in 
Swiss stock exchange. Furthermore, more voluntary disclosure is observed in firms 
involved in foreign activities or internationally-diversified operations in Switzerland 
(Raffournier, 1995) and France (Depoers, 2000). These studies generally implied a 
greater demand for disclosure in firms involved in foreign activities or owned by 
foreign shareholders. 
According to Oh et al. (2011), foreign shareholders have greater demand for disclosure 
than other shareholders. Compared with the local shareholders, the foreign shareholders 
tend to have different investment’s preference and time horizons. They prefer to invest 
in firms, in which they are well informed, and avoid firms with low disclosure 
(Mangena & Tauringana, 2007). Past empirical research has documented a positive 
association between foreign share ownership and corporate disclosure; for example, in 
Malaysia (Haniffa & Cooke, 2002), Kenya (Barako et al., 2006), Zimbabwe (Mangena 
& Tauringana, 2007) and China (Huafang & Jianguo, 2007). Generally, these studies 
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documented the significant impact of foreign ownership on influencing corporate 
reporting practices. They concur with the need for greater corporate disclosure as a 
means to monitor the actions of management by foreign owners. 
In the context of CSR, Chapple and Moon (2005) revealed that globalisation enhances 
firms’ CSR adoption in Asian countries. They suggested that the current trends of 
CSR’s implementation in many Asian countries have been influenced largely by the 
Western-style of CSR practices, following the increase in activities of the Western 
businesses in the region. Firms in which their shares are significantly held by foreign 
shareholders are more inclined to pay attention to CSR than other firms.  
The influence of foreign shareholders, especially those from the Europe and North 
America, whereby CSR is seen as desirable (Gugler & Shi, 2009), has been apparent 
due to their familiarity with social issues and greater emphasis on CSR in their home 
countries (Oh et al., 2011). In this case, increased disclosure or CSR engagement may 
function as an important signalling mechanism to reduce information asymmetry 
problem between the foreign shareholders and the managers of the firm (Oh et al., 
2011). Finding by Oh et al. (2011) revealed a positive association between foreign 
ownership and CSR rating in Korea.  
Empirical research that relates foreign ownership and CSRR has been mixed. Based on 
a survey with CEOs of 100 firms operating in Malaysia, Teoh and Thong (1989) 
revealed that foreign-owned firms disclose more CSRR than local firms. Past research 
that examined the relationship between foreign ownership and CSRR based on 
secondary data in Malaysia, for examples corporate annual reports and website, also 
produced conflicting results. For example, Haniffa and Cooke (2005) dictated a positive 
relationship between foreign ownership and CSRR, whereas Amran and Devi (2008) 
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and Said et al. (2009) documented no association between the foreign influence 
variables and CSRR. According to Amran and Devi (2008), foreign-owned firms may 
use other reporting media such as stand-alone reporting and websites to disclose their 
CSRR other than the corporate annual reports. 
Haniffa and Cooke (2005) employed a two-year data set (1996 and 2002) and excluded 
firms in the finance industry from their sample firms. Said et al. (2009) used a data set 
of 2006 and content-analysed CSRR from both corporate annual reports and websites. 
Amran and Devi (2008) included finance firms as sample in their study and analysed a 
data set of 2002/03. Overall, differences in terms of sample firms, data sets and sources 
of CSRR employed in these studies may partly explain the conflicting findings. So?? 
Nevertheless, Haniffa and Cooke (2005) suggested that firms in Malaysia use CSRR as 
a proactive legitimating strategy towards ensuring the continuous inflows of capital and 
to be responsible, especially to the ethical investors. Perhaps, an examination of the 
foreign ownership-CSRR’s relationship over a period of time from 2005 to 2009 may 
indicate how the influence of foreign ownership on CSRR changes over the five-year 
period. Furthermore, the inclusion of data sets from both voluntary and mandatory 
CSRR regimes may highlight the effect of the mandatory CSRR upon the association 
between foreign ownership and CSRR. 
The development of the hypothesis on the association between foreign ownership and 
CSRR in the current study is grounded in the findings dictated by Haniffa and Cooke 
(2005) that documented a positive association between the two variables. Haniffa and 
Cooke’s (2005) study is based on two-year data and Malaysia’s context. The positive 
association between foreign ownership and CSRR is also hypothesised based on the 
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argument of information asymmetry problem that is resulted from the geographical 
separation between foreign shareholders and firms’ management.  
Therefore, the current study hypothesises: 
H1c: Foreign ownership is positively related to the quantity and quality of CSRR 
disclosed by a firm. 
4.4.1.4 Government Ownership 
Coporate ownership in several countries within Asian region such as Singapore and 
Malaysia is dominated by government ownership (Claessen et al., 2000; Mak & Li, 
2001; Eng & Mak, 2003). According to Claessen et al. (2000), Singapore is listed as the 
country in the region with the highest percentage of government ownership in the listed 
firms (23.5 percent), followed by Malaysia (13.4 percent). Government ownership in 
firms can be described by the percentage of ownership and controls possessed by the 
government in a particular firm. Generally, the government is interested to invest in 
firms that are of strategic importance to the country. Firms in which some of their 
shares are controlled by the government are commonly known as ‘government-linked 
companies’ or GLCs (Feng, Sun & Tong, 2004).  
In Malaysia, the Putrajaya Committee on GLC High Performance (PCG) defined GLCs 
as firms that have a primary commercial objective and in which the Malaysian 
Government has a direct controlling stake. The term ‘controlling stake’ is referred to the 
percentage of government ownership in a firm, and also the government’s ability to 
appoint board members, senior management, make major decisions (e.g. contract 
awards, strategy, restructuring and financing, acquisitions and divestments etc.) for the 
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GLCs either directly or through government-linked investment companies (GLICs) 
(PCG, 2005).  
GLICs are defined as Federal Government-linked investment companies that allocate 
some or all of their funds to be invested in GLCs. Examples of GLICs include 
Employees Provident Fund (EPF), Khazanah Nasional Bhd (Khazanah), Lembaga 
Tabung Angkatan Tentera (LTAT), Lembaga Tabung Haji (LTH) and Permodalan 
Nasional Bhd (PNB) (PCG, 2005). These also represent large public institutional 
investors in Malaysia. As highlighted by Wahab, How and Verhoeven (2007), the five 
largest public institutional investors are two pension funds (EPF and LTAT); an 
investment fund (PNB); a pilgrim fund (LTH); and an insurance company (SOCSO). 
Collectively, their shareholdings represent nearly 70 percent of total institutional 
shareholdings in firms listed on the main board of the Bursa Malaysia (Wahab et al., 
2007). In other words, government ownership in firm in the context of Malaysia can be 
represented by the percentage of government ownership in a firm, the GLC’s status of a 
firm or the percentage of public institutional investors’ ownership in a firm. 
Operated like other firms with commercial objectives, the GLCs’ goals that related to 
the interest of the nation may be in conflict with their profit-making goal (Mak & Li, 
2001). Consequently, this conflict may affect the level of disclosure made by the GLCs 
(Eng & Mak, 2003). The association between government ownership and corporate 
reporting has been documented in several empirical studies with the directions of the 
association can be explained in either way (e.g. positive or negative association). This is 
because the relation between government ownership and corporate reporting is based on 
two contrasting arguments. On the one hand, government ownership may create a 
certain level of pressure on firms to provide more information to the public, owing to 
the accountability of the government to serve the interests of the nation. On the other 
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hand, it may be argued that the needs for the government-owned firms to provide 
extensive reporting are reduced due to the separate monitoring by the government 
(Ghazali & Weetman, 2006).  
Eng and Mak (2003) documented that GLCs need to provide greater voluntary 
disclosure in a way to reduce the conflict between the pure profit goals of a firm and the 
goals related to the interests of the nation. Conversely, Naser and Nuseibeh (2003), who 
examined a sample of non-financial Saudi firms, highlighted the little incentive for 
GLCs to disclose more information to the public, since the government has guaranteed 
certain amount of returns in those firms. Ghazali and Weetman (2006) also suggested 
for a lower demand for public disclosure in the government-owned firms, following the 
greater access of the firms to the government funding. In this case, there will be less 
reliance of the firms to the external funds, thus providing the firms with little incentive 
to opt for more public disclosure. However, their empirical analysis found no 
association between government ownership and the level of voluntary disclosure in 
Malaysia, even after the corporate governance reform took place in 2001. Huafang and 
Jianguo (2007) also found no association between government ownership and the level 
of voluntary disclosure in China. 
In the context of CSRR, Amran and Devi (2008) dictated a positive association between 
government ownership and CSRR. This supports the evidence provided by Ghazali 
(2007), who reported that firms in which the government is a substantial shareholder 
disclosed significantly more CSR information in their annual reports. By having a high 
proportion of shares held by the government and senior government officer sit in the 
board, the government-owned firms are in a good position to influence directly or 
indirectly the disclosure policies that, in most cases, supported the initiatives outlined 
by the government policies. For example, the Malaysian government has urged the 
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public-listed firms in the country to become more socially and environmentally 
responsible to ensure the future sustainability of their business (Rahman, Zain & Al-
Haj, 2011).  
The concerns of the Malaysian government over many of the CSR issues have been 
apparent with a number of significant initiatives being undertaken. Others include the 
CSR reporting frameworks for public-listed firms launched by the Bursa Malaysia in 
2006 and the CSR guidelines developed specifically for the GLCs, known as the ‘Silver 
Book’. The Malaysian government has also introduced several tax incentives for firms 
that undertake CSR-related activities; for example, to reduce the greenhouse gas 
emissions, to invest in local communities and to support for arts and cultural 
programmes.  
The increasing focus of the government on many CSR issues has motivated more CSRR 
disclosed by the government-owned firms (Ghazali, 2007; Amran and Devi, 2008). 
Probably, this supports the government policies towards the development of CSR and 
CSRR in Malaysia. Rahman et al. (2011), who focused specifically on the CSRR 
practices in the GLCs, observed that these firms not only disclosing good news, but also 
bad/negative news on CSR-related matters. Rahman et al. (2011) found that, to a certain 
extent, some GLCs have influenced other firms’ practices to disclose CSR information.  
While evidence dictated in Ghazali (2007) and Amran and Devi (2008) was based on 
the data derived from the voluntary CSRR period (prior to 2007), perhaps, a renewed 
effort could provide additional evidence on the impact of government ownership on 
CSRR disclosed before and after the CSRR regulation take place. Evidence from such 
investigation may indicate how firms change their behaviour with regards to CSRR 
practice over a period of time. This is particularly important with the introduction of 
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CSRR regulation upon all public listed firms in Malaysia in 2007. Following the 
continuous efforts by the government to promote CSRR and the government’s call for 
public-listed firms to become more socially and environmentally responsible (Amran 
and Devi, 2008; Rahman et al., 2011), a greater level of CSRR is expected in firms with 
higher levels of government ownership (Ghazali, 2007). 
Therefore, the current study hypothesises: 
H1d: Government ownership is positively related to the quantity and quality of CSRR 
disclosed by a firm. 
4.4.2 Board of Directors’ CSR Experience (Strategic Posture) 
The term ‘experience’ can refer to a set of prior or existing career or personal 
experiences of an individual, which may influence the range of decisions made by the 
individual. According to Mcdonald et al. (2008), experience contributes to the 
development of an extensive knowledge base that marks a relatively high level of 
expertise, and supports high-quality decision making. Experience represents one of the 
assets possessed by an individual director that sit on the board of directors of a firm.  
Prior literatures, especially those examined the board’s resource provision role, have 
documented the importance of a director’s experience to a board of directors. For 
example, Westphal and Milton (2000) highlighted the abilities of an experienced 
director to influence board’s decision making, interpret business situations effectively 
and deal with any business challenges. Experienced directors have better understanding 
of cause-and-effect relations in a particular situation and are capable of providing 
valuable guidance for strategic decision-making in firms (Kroll et al., 2008; Mcdonald 
et al., 2008). 
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According to Carpenter and Westphal (2001), directors’ relevant experience influences 
their effectiveness in performing their monitoring and advisory roles. While multiple 
directorship of board members, which describe the experience of a director in other 
firms, provides an important resource for advice and influence in a firm (Kosnik, 1987), 
industrial experience of a director enhances the quality of communication and 
information exchange among directors (Milliken & Martins, 1996). Experienced 
directors also facilitate the development of ties with other directors, executives and 
industry players (Westphal, 1999). This social networking among directors is found to 
facilitate the board members to deal with employees and become more familiar with the 
firm’s management (Kor & Sundaramurthy, 2009).  
Kor and Sundaramurthy (2009) highlighted the importance of directors’ existing and 
past experiences as managers and members of the board. They suggested that these 
experiences direct the thinking and perceptions of the directors, and allow them to 
develop specific skills and knowledge about how boards of directors, firms and 
industries operate. In examining the influence of experience-based human capital on 
firm growth, Kor and Sundaramurthy (2009) revealed that multiple directorship 
experience and managerial experience of a director have positive effects on firm 
growth. The finding of Kor and Sundaramurthy (2009) is somewhat consistent with that 
provided by Mcdonald et al. (2008) and Kroll et al. (2008), respectively. 
Mcdonald et al. (2008) examined the effects of outside director acquisition experience 
on firm acquisition performance. They posited that directors will develop expertise in 
making particular kinds of acquisition decisions through their past experiences at other 
firms with decisions about those specific types of acquisition. These experiences and 
expertise are found to be related positively to the performance of a focal firm’s 
acquisition (Mcdonald et al., 2008).  
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Similarly, Kroll et al. (2008), who studied the role of board of directors in influencing 
corporate acquisition performance, found that vigilant boards with appropriate 
experience are associated with superior acquisition outcomes. Kroll et al. (2008) 
suggested that directors with appropriate knowledge gained through experience will 
become more useful advisers in firms. Generally, both studies provided evidence about 
the influence of directors’ acquisition experience on firm acquisition performance in the 
US, examined using different model specifications and samples. 
Evidence from the extant literature also documented the importance of international 
experience (Carpenter, Sanders & Gregersen, 2001; Magnusson & Boggs, 2006) and 
industry-specific experience (Kor & Misangyi, 2008) of a director. According to 
Carpenter et al. (2001), firms with international assignment-experienced CEOs 
performed better than those led by CEOs without such experience. They revealed that a 
CEO’s international assignment experience relates positively to both accounting and 
market measures of the US multinational firm performance.  
Similarly, Magnusson and Boggs (2006) identified international experience as an 
important variable that relates to accession to the CEO position of large firms in the US. 
In the context of directors’ industry-specific experience, Kor and Misangyi (2008) 
dictated the importance of the presence of outside directors with significant managerial 
industry experience to offset a dearth of top management industry experience in 
younger entrepreneurial firms.  
Overall, findings from the extant literature on a board’s resource provision role 
generally dictated the relation between directors’ experience and firm outcome. They 
also indicated the importance of the relevant experiences possessed by directors in 
influencing a range of firms’ performances and decisions. As suggested by Dearborn 
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and Simon (1958), board members could rely on lessons learned in prior related 
experiences as guidance in future related decision making.  
Several empirical studies have also indicated the influence of board experience on 
corporate disclosure. Variables that have been used to represent board experience 
include multiple directorship (Haniffa & Cooke, 2002; Gul & Leung, 2004), age and 
length of service of directors (Abdelsalam & Street, 2007). Haniffa and Cooke (2002) 
posited that multiple directorships held by board members have important implications 
for corporate disclosure practice. Board members with multiple directorships have 
greater access to information in more than one firm, which promotes information 
sharing indirectly among the firms (Haniffa & Cooke, 2002). Consequently, preference 
for information confidentiality may reduce as firms become more transparent.  
However, empirical findings by Haniffa and Cooke (2002) revealed no significant 
association between multiple directorships and the extent of voluntary disclosure of a 
sample of firms in Malaysia. A negative association was dictated between the 
percentages of ‘expert’ non-executive directors/multiple directorships and a direct 
measure of voluntary disclosure based on a sample of Hong Kong firms (Gul & Leung, 
2004). 
Instead of relying on ‘multiple directorships’ as a sole measure of board experience, 
Abdelsalam and Street (2007), who examined the association between corporate 
governance and the timeliness of corporate internet reporting by UK listed firms, used 
the average age of directors and length of service of executive and non-executive 
directors as proxies for board experience. Their study showed that boards with more 
experience in terms of the average age of directors and lower length of service for 
executive directors provide timelier corporate internet reporting. Overall, evidence from 
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prior studies relating board experience and corporate disclosure has been inconsistent. 
Different findings are revealed in different studies, which call for more accurate 
evidence to be gathered on the influence of board experience on corporate disclosure.  
In the context of CSR, Strandberg (2007) highlighted the need for the boards of 
directors to have the right expertise to understand CSR issues. Such expertise can be 
built through related knowledge, skills and experience (Hillman, Cannella & Paetzold, 
2000). Cramer & Hirschland (2006) suggested that one or more board members with 
knowledge or prior experience in CSR issues should be appointed to manage CSR 
portfolio in a firm. They argued that such an appointment can be used as an alternative 
to the formation of dedicated CSR committees.  
Directors with CSR experience may have better understanding of CSR issues in a firm. 
Therefore, they are expected to have greater capabilities towards enhancing the CSR 
performance of a firm. In line with the ability of directors with relevant experience to 
influence board’s decision, directors with CSR experience is expected to influence 
board’s decision in CSRR. Slater and Dixon-Fowler (2009) documented a significant 
association between CEOs’ international experience and firms’ CSR performance. In 
the specific context of CSRR, Haniffa and Cooke (2005) revealed a significantly-
positive association between a chairman with multiple directorships and the extent of 
CSRR.  
In summary, prior literature relating board experience to CSR has focused on several 
variables; among others, multiple directorship experience and international experience 
to represent board experience. However, there is lack of empirical evidence that relates 
boards’ CSR experience to CSR (e.g. CSR performance or reporting). Perhaps, an 
exploration of the boards’ CSR experience-CSR relationship may contribute to the 
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existing literature and the roles of the boards of directors. Findings of the current study 
on board CSR experience-CSR relationship may demonstrate the importance of a 
director’s experience in driving CSR efforts in a firm.  
Therefore, the current study extends prior works that relate board of directors’ 
experience with CSRR by examining the influence of board’s CSR experience on 
CSRR disclosed by firm. For the purpose of the current study, board’s CSR experience 
refers to past and present experience of directors that sit on the board of directors that 
relates to CSR, for example, experience in handling CSR-related projects or managing a 
CSR-related unit or department. This information can be extracted from the directors’ 
profile section in the firm’s annual report. An experienced board is expected to generate 
a positive firm outcome.  
Therefore, the current study hypothesises: 
H2: Board of directors’ CSR experience is positively related to the quantity and quality 
of CSRR disclosed by a firm. 
4.4.3 CSRR Regulation (Moderating Variable) 
CSRR has been practiced generally as a voluntary activity in many countries around the 
world. However, there have been several claims on the insufficiency and ineffectiveness 
of the voluntary CSRR. For example, Deegan and Rankin (1996) and Adams (2004) 
highlighted the lack of neutrality and objectivity of the voluntary CSRR, which, in turn, 
led to its failure to meet stakeholder demands (DeTienne & Lewis, 2005). Kathyayini et 
al. (2012) claimed that the motivation to produce CSRR is low in the absence of 
relevant legislation. As seen in Gray et al.’s (1995a) study, the mandated CSRR had 
been the highest proportion of CSRR disclosed in the UK, in comparison with the 
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voluntary CSRR items. Consequently, this has elevated the need for CSRR regulation 
(Spence, Gray & Trust, 2007; Unerman & O'dwyer, 2007).  
Several countries have started to introduce the mandatory reporting requirement of 
CSR-related information; for example, in the US, the UK, the Netherlands, Denmark, 
Sweden, Norway, New Zealand and Australia. These countries have enacted 
legislations for specified firms to report their environmental impacts, based on the belief 
that compulsory/legally specified reporting requirement and enforcement mechanism 
will enhance the quality of CSRR disclosed (Criado-Jimenez et al., 2008; Ioannou & 
Serafeim, 2012).  
Mandatory CSRR may partly resolve the problems related to diversity of reporting and 
providing a greater degree of certainty than practice of voluntary initiatives (Waagstein, 
2011). Despite the benefits that CSRR regulation offers, Waagstein (2011) argued that 
the mandatory CSRR also opens up new problems with respect to substance and 
procedure relating to its implementation. To ensure an effective implementation of the 
regulation, Waagstein (2011) suggested for a placement of a detailed enforcement 
mechanisms following the regulation.  
CSRR regulation has also been seen as an alternative to the dominant business 
discourse. The ‘business case’ for CSRR that seeks to establish an alignment of interests 
between the wider stakeholders with social and environmental interests and the 
shareholders with economic interests, to show that all parties benefit through the 
voluntary CSRR; has been claimed to be a dominant business discourse by a number of 
commentators (see Gonzalez & Martinez, 2004; Brown & Fraser, 2006; Spence et al., 
2007; Unerman & O'dwyer, 2007).  
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As an alternative to the dominant business discourse, Unerman and O’dwyer (2007) 
proposed for an effective statutory regulation of CSRR as a mean of protecting the 
social and environmental interest of the stakeholders as well as enhancing the firms’ 
economic performance and shareholder value. Drawing on Becks and Giddens’ theories 
on reflexive modernity, Unerman and O’Dwyer (2007) argued that reflexivity processes 
can lead to an increase in public perceptions of risk that they may encounter as a 
consequence of firms’ business activities, which, in turns, leads to a loss of trust in an 
individual firm or an industrial sector as a whole. According to Unerman and O’Dwyer 
(2007), these outcomes could be avoided through a tighter and more rigorously 
enforced independent regulation of CSRR.  
CSRR regulation has also been suggested to promote CSRR (Gonzalez & Martinez, 
2004). For example, it has been used to explain an increase in CSRR disclosed by firms 
in selected industries (Buhr, 1998; Tilt & Symes, 1999), and a variation of CSRR 
disclosed in different countries (Harte & Owen, 1991). In other words, the imposition of 
CSRR regulation may have effect on the CSRR disclosed by firms. In respect to 
regulation on corporate equal opportunities reporting in the UK, Adams et al. (1995) 
revealed little detailed reporting made by firms in spite of the presence of the 
regulation. They found that only a minority (34 percent) of firms in the sample comply 
fully with the reporting regulation. Even though the regulation stated the requirement of 
firms with more than 250 employees to disclose their policy on the applications of 
disabled employees, 14 firms did not comply with the requirement.  
Similarly, Day and Woodward (2004) observed an apparent disregard of top firms in the 
UK for the statutory requirement to disclose information about employees in the 
Directors’ report in the financial statements. Cooper and Owen (2007), who evaluated 
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critically the voluntary and mandatory CSRR by the UK firms, argued the limited 
contribution of both forms of reporting in demonstrating stakeholders’ accountability. 
With regards to the firms’ compliance to Spanish environmental reporting standard, 
Larrinaga et al. (2002) dictated a low level of compliance, with nearly 80 percent of the 
sample firms not providing any environmental information. This is based on the 
analysis conducted between 1997 and 1999. Those reporting firms are found to be 
selective in their choice of disclosure, whereby they tend to neglect the reporting 
regulation’s aspects that are not in their interest to disclose (Larrinaga et al., 2002).  
Following the implementation of an improved standard of environmental reporting in 
Spain with effect from March 2002, there has been an increase in environmental 
reporting disclosed by firms in the country (Llena, Moneva & Hernandez, 2007; Criado-
Jimenez et al., 2008). Llena et al. (2007) dictated a significant increase in 
environmental information disclosed by firms for the period 2001-2002 compared with 
the 1992-1994 period. In a similar vein, Criado-Jimenez et al. (2008), who surveyed the 
CSRR pattern of 78 largest Spanish firms between 2001 and 2003, also revealed an 
increase in the volume and quality of CSRR disclosed, as a result of the progressive and 
improved reporting regulation in Spain. 
In Australia, the government has enacted a regulation that requires firms to report their 
environmental performance within the annual report with effect from 1998 (Cowan & 
Gadenne, 2005; Frost, 2007). Frost (2007) examined the impact of the introduction of 
the mandatory reporting guidelines on environmental reporting based on a sample of 71 
Australian firms for two reporting periods prior to, and two periods after, the operative 
date of the legislation. He revealed a significant increase in the number of firms 
reporting and the level of information provided on environmental performance in the 
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annual reports. A considerable variation was identified in the approaches adopted for 
reporting, which confirming concerns expressed as to the practical application of the 
legislation (Frost, 2007). He also reported an increase in the level of total environmental 
disclosure, most significantly for firms that reported breaches of regulations and that do 
not issue a stand-alone environmental report. His study suggested the limitations of 
continual reliance upon voluntary reporting to provide consistent substantive 
information on environmental performance.  
In comparing the corporate environmental reporting practices across voluntary and 
mandatory reporting regime, Cowan and Gadenne (2005) noted that firms have a 
propensity to disclose higher levels of positive environmental disclosure in the 
voluntary sections of the annual reports than in the statutory sections. They suggested 
that firms tend to adopt different disclosure approach when reporting are potentially 
under surveillance or increase scrutiny via legislated environmental disclosure 
requirement. A greater level of voluntary environmental disclosure is expected to avoid 
stricter regulation and further enforcement of existing regulation. 
Fallan and Fallan (2009), who conducted a longitudinal analysis of CSRR in Norwegian 
firms over a 19-year period, suggested that no statutory regulations are required to make 
firms increase and adapt their environmental reporting to the demand from their 
stakeholders and legitimate their existence towards society. They found that the 
voluntary approach of CSRR improves the variety of environmental reporting made by 
firms. According to Fallan and Fallan (2009), regulatory approach of CSRR has a 
significant and immediate effect on mandatory environmental reporting only, and that 
firms do not comply fully with such statutory regulations.  
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In contrary to Fallan and Fallan’s (2009) findings, Crawford & Williams (2010) 
suggested that CSRR regulation is needed to promote a higher quality of CSRR 
disclosed by firms. Crawford and Williams’ (2010) study is based on a sample of firms 
from banking sectors in France and the US. Findings from Crawford and Williams’ 
(2010) study showed that the French firms, which operate in a highly-regulated 
environment in terms of CSRR, provide a higher level of CSRR quality compared with 
the US, which practiced self-regulation of CSRR. Mandatory CSRR regulation is found 
to improve the social responsibility of business leaders, for example in the area of 
sustainable development, employee training and ethical practices (Ioannou & Serafeim, 
2012). Consistent with Crawford and Williams (2010), Ioannou and Serafeim (2012) 
also documented greater improvement of CSR practices in countries with stronger law 
enforcement. Ioannou and Serafeim’s (2012) study is based on the data of 58 countries, 
including Malaysia. 
Overall, evidence from the extant CSRR literature has documented mixed findings on 
the impact of regulation on the levels of CSRR disclosed by firms. While several 
studies reported an increase in the number of reporting firms, and the quantity and 
quality of CSRR as a result of regulation, other studies argued on the lack of CSRR in 
spite of the presence of regulation. Perhaps, drawing upon a sample of public-listed 
firms in Malaysia, to examine the impact of CSRR regulation on the levels of CSRR 
disclosed by firms may contribute to the existing literature of CSRR regulation in the 
context of developing and Asian countries that has been limited in focus. 
In Malaysia, the mandatory CSRR requirement has been incorporated into the Listing 
Requirement of the Bursa Malaysia (Appendix 9C, Part A, Paragraph 29), which 
obligates all public-listed firms to include a description of the CSR activities or 
practices undertaken by the firms and its subsidiaries or, if there are none, a statement to 
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that effect. The mandatory CSRR requirement was introduced by the Bursa Malaysia 
with effect from the financial year 2007, as one of the government’s initiatives to 
promote CSR to a higher level of development. It also aims to stimulate the uptake of 
CSRR in the country. Following the imposition of the mandatory CSRR, the interest to 
investigate the firms’ response towards such reporting regulation arises (Bursa 
Malaysia, 2007). This can be revealed through an examination of the impact of the 
CSRR requirement on the quantity and quality of CSRR disclosed by firms.  
Othman et al. (2011), who used firms in highly-sensitive industries as sample firms in 
their study, suggested that CSRR regulation in Malaysia forms a significant mechanism 
in promoting CSR reputation. In their study, CSRR regulation is represented by the 
changes in the extent of CSRR, which is measured in terms of words, from 2006 to 
2007. The CSRR regulation is regressed upon the CSR reputation index, which is 
developed based on the RepTrake model, the Bursa Malaysia CSR Framework and the 
GRI Guidelines. According to Othman et al. (2011), the RepTrake model from the 
Reputation Institute is one of the most frequently-used models for measuring corporate 
reputation. 
Moving forward, there is a growing body of literature that investigate the 
interrelationship between corporate reporting regulation and corporate ownership 
structure in influencing corporate behaviour. For example, Warfield et al. (1995) found 
that regulation influence the relationship between managerial ownership and managers’ 
accounting choice (Warfield et al., 1995). According to Warfield et al. (1995), the 
association between managerial ownership and managers’ accounting choice become 
weaker in the presence of regulation. In other words, managerial ownership is less 
important for regulated firms as the regulatory setting may monitor managers’ 
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accounting choice, which provides the managers less opportunities to pursue non-value 
maximising actions.  
In examining the regulatory compliance of firms to corporate insider trading regulation 
in Italy, Bajo, Bigelli, Hillier and Petracci (2009) found that family firms are most 
likely to comply with the regulation. Overall, the above findings signify the importance 
of regulation in influencing corporate behaviour alongside with corporate ownership 
structure. Perhaps, the presence of specific regulation related to corporation, for 
example, corporate reporting regulation including CSRR regulation, may affect the 
association between corporate ownership structure and the levels of corporate reporting, 
including CSRR in different manners. 
Gray (1988), who examined the cultural influence on the development of accounting 
systems internationally, observed the general nature of corporate behaviour of the Asian 
countries, including Malaysia that are characterised by high level of statutory control 
despite of high level of secrecy. Following that, probably the implementation of CSRR 
regulation in Malaysia is expected to produce a high level of firms’ compliance towards 
the regulation imposed. This is despite the high level of secrecy documented in firms, 
especially in owner-managed or family-owned firms (Ghazali, 2007). 
Motivated from Gray (1988), Warfield et al. (1995) and Bajo et al.’s (2009) work, the 
current study intends to examine the effect of CSRR regulation on the association 
between corporate ownership structure and CSRR. Despite a number of studies 
documenting significant associations between different types of corporate ownership 
structure and CSRR, the moderating role of corporate reporting regulation, specifically 
CSRR regulation, on these associations have yet to be established. This is important as 
 
165 
 
the imposition or change in CSRR regulation may lead to a change in the association 
between the corporate ownership structure and corporate disclosure.  
Therefore, the current study examines the moderating effect of mandatory regulation on 
the association between corporate ownership structure and CSRR. Such investigation is 
useful to observe the role of CSRR regulation in influencing the way a firm with 
different types of ownership structure determines its quantity and quality of CSRR 
disclosed in the firm’s annual report. Different types of ownership structure in a firm 
may affect the quantity and quality of CSRR in a different manner during the voluntary 
CSRR period compared with the mandatory period.  
As presented in Section 4.4.1.1, managerial ownership is expected to be negatively 
related to the quantity and quality of CSRR (Ghazali, 2007). In other words, firms with 
higher levels of managerial ownership tend to provide lower levels of CSRR, both in 
terms of quantity and quality. However, in line with Gray’s (1988) argument on the 
high level of statutory control among firms in Malaysia, the presence of CSRR 
regulation may weaken the negative association between the two variables. Warfield et 
al. (1995) also documented the role of regulation in weakening the association between 
managerial ownership and managers’ accounting choice. While firms with high 
managerial ownership may choose to report or not to report CSR information in their 
annual reports during the voluntary period of CSRR, they are obligated to report at least 
a minimum level of CSR information in their annual reports following the CSRR 
regulation that took effect from the 2007 financial year, if they were to comply with 
such regulation.  
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Therefore, the current study hypothesised: 
H3a: The negative association between managerial ownership and the quantity and 
quality of CSRR is weaker in the mandatory CSRR period than the voluntary period.  
In examining the association between family ownership and CSRR, a negative 
association between the two variables is hypothesised. This is in line with the argument 
of the lower demand of public disclosure in family-controlled firms, as the family 
owners can gain access to internal information compared to other stakeholders (Ali et 
al. 2007; Ghazali, 2007; Chen et al., 2008). Details on the hypothesis development have 
been discussed in Section 4.4.1.2. Nevertheless, the introduction of the mandatory 
CSRR requirement by Bursa Malaysia with effect from the financial year 2007 may 
lead to a weaker association dictated between the level of family ownership and the 
quantity and quality of CSRR disclosed. This is based on Bajo et al.’s (2009) argument, 
which suggested a high level of regulatory compliance by the family firms. Gray (1988) 
also highlighted the high level of statutory control of firms in Malaysia. Following that, 
firms with a higher level of family ownership are expected to disclose more CSR 
information in their annual reports after the CSRR regulation take place. This is in spite 
of their popularity of being ‘secrecy’ in corporate disclosure. 
Therefore, the current study hypothesised: 
H3b: The negative association between family ownership and the quantity and quality 
of CSRR is weaker in the mandatory CSRR period than the voluntary period.  
Evidence presented in Section 4.4.1.3 on the association between foreign ownership and 
CSRR has highlighted two important factors that led to the hypothesis of the positive 
association between the two variables. They are: (1) the information asymmetry 
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problem between foreign shareholders and management of firms that may require firms 
to consider a provision of greater amount of public disclosure (Mangena & Tauringana, 
2007; Oh et al., 2011); and (2) the greater emphasis on CSR placed by the foreign 
shareholders, especially those from the Europe and North America, compared with the 
local shareholders (Oh et al., 2011). With the mandatory CSRR requirement in place, 
greater reporting of CSR information is expected from the firms with a higher level of 
foreign ownership. This is to demonstrate their compliance to the mandatory reporting 
requirement.  
Therefore, the current study hypothesised: 
H3c: The positive association between foreign ownership and the quantity and quality 
of CSRR is stronger in the mandatory CSRR period than the voluntary period.  
Section 4.4.1.4 has generally reviewed the association between government ownership 
and CSRR. In summary, existing CSRR research documented a positive association 
between the two variables (Ghazali, 2007; Amran & Devi, 2008). The imposition of the 
mandatory CSRR requirement in 2007 may encourage firms with higher government 
ownership to report greater amount of CSR information, as to exhibit their adherence to 
the mandatory reporting requirement and support for continuous development of CSRR 
in Malaysia.  
Therefore, the current study hypothesised: 
H3d: The positive association between government ownership and the quantity and 
quality of CSRR is stronger in the mandatory CSRR period than the voluntary period.  
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4.4.4 Control Variables (Government Power, Creditor Power and Economic 
Performance) 
Several firm-specific characteristics that were found to influence the levels of corporate 
reporting, specifically CSRR, are included as control variables in the current study. 
Based on the theoretical framework applied for the purpose of the current study, the 
following variables are introduced as control variables. They are firm size, Shariah 
status, profitability, leverage and industry.  
Refers to the Ullmann’s (1985) model, these variables represent the government power 
(firm size, Shariah status, and industry), creditor power (leverage) and economic 
performance (profitability). These firm-specific characteristics are included in the 
current study, as they may have effects on the levels of CSRR, along with the three 
components of corporate governance examined in the current study; namely, corporate 
ownership structure, board of directors’ CSR experience and CSRR regulation. Their 
relevance to the context of the current study may enable this researcher to suggest a 
comprehensive model in explaining the levels of CSRR in Malaysia. This could be 
demonstrated, for example, through a higher explanatory power (R
2
) of the suggested 
model in explaining the levels of CSRR disclosed by firms in Malaysia.  
Each of these variables is explained in the following sections: Section 4.4.4.1 Firm Size, 
Section 4.4.4.2 Shariah Status, Section 4.4.4.3 Profitability, Section 4.4.4.4 Industry 
and Section 4.4.4.5 Leverage. 
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4.4.4.1 Firm Size (Government Power)   
Firm size represents one of the important determinants of firms’ disclosure level (Eng & 
Mak, 2003; Huafang & Jianguo, 2007). In terms of CSRR, larger firms are found to 
disclose more than the smaller firms (Patten, 1991; Hackston & Milne, 1996; Branco & 
Rodrigues, 2008a). Larger firms tend to involve in more business activities, which 
expose them to a greater impact on society (Trotman & Bradley, 1981; Teoh & Thong, 
1984; Andrew et al., 1989). They also possess greater resources to devote to CSR issues 
(Bowen, 2002) and are subject to greater visibility to various stakeholders’ scrutiny, 
especially the regulators (Cowen et al., 1987; Chapple & Moon, 2005). Cowen et al. 
(1987) argued that larger firms tend to receive more attention from the public and are 
under great pressure to exhibit CSR. In response to the growing public attention and 
pressures, CSRR has been used by firms as a mechanism to legitimise their existence 
and to enhance their reputation (Patten, 1991; Branco & Rodrigues, 2008a).  
Prior CSRR literature has generally documented a positive association between firm 
size and the extent of CSRR (Trotman & Bradley, 1981; Cowen et al., 1987; Belkaoui 
& Karpik, 1989; Patten, 1991; Hackston & Milne, 1996; Haniffa & Cooke, 2005; 
Branco & Rodrigues, 2008b). Firm size has also been used as a proxy for public 
pressure or visibility in examining the motives for CSRR (Patten, 1991; Branco & 
Rodrigues, 2008a). Several measures have been used to represent firm size, among 
others, total assets (Hackston & Milne, 1996; Haniffa & Cooke, 2005; Branco & 
Rodrigues, 2008b), market capitalisation (Ghazali, 2007), revenue (Patten, 1991), 
ranking (Cowen et al., 1987), and number of employees and branches (Branco & 
Rodrigues, 2008a).  
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Despite the variety of measures used to represent firm size, the current study adopts 
‘total assets’ as a measure of firm size. ‘Total assets’ provides a more stable and reliable 
measure of firm size, since it is based on audited information that is publicly made 
available by firms on a regular basis. It has also been used widely to represent firm size 
in a number of CSRR studies. It is less subjected to manipulation compared with the 
‘revenue’.  
Consistent with the findings from prior CSRR research, the current study also expects a 
positive association between firm size and the quantity and quality of CSRR. Within the 
stakeholders’ perspective of CSRR as proposed by Ullmann (1985), firm size is used to 
represent the government power. This is because larger firms are more subjected to the 
laws and regulations imposed by the government (Belkaoui & Karpik, 1989; Brown & 
Deegan, 1998). 
4.4.4.2 Shariah Status (Government Power) 
The term ‘Shariah’ refers to the Islamic law of human conduct, which regulates all 
aspects of Muslim life. It is based on God’s (Allah) holy word in the Al-Quran, the 
deeds and sayings of the prophet Muhammad (peace be upon him), and the consensus 
of Islamic religious scholars (Maali et al., 2006). In general, Shariah law influences the 
legal requirements in most Muslim countries, including Malaysia.  
In the context of corporations in Malaysia, there are two Shariah Advisory Councils 
(SAC) that function as advisers to firms: (1) the SAC of Bank Negara Malaysia (BNM) 
for the Islamic banking and insurance sectors, acts as an adviser on matters relating to 
Islamic banking and insurance businesses or any other Islamic finance area supervised 
and regulated by BNM; and (2) the SAC of the Securities Commission Malaysia for the 
Islamic Capital Market (ICM) that advises on matters pertaining to the ICM. Members 
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of the two SACs are qualified individuals who can present Shariah opinions and have 
vast experience in banking, finance, economics, law and application of Shariah, 
particularly in the areas of Islamic economics and finance. 
Under the ICM, all public-listed firms in Malaysia undergo several screening processes 
by the SAC of the Securities Commission Malaysia, to determine the status of a firm as 
either Shariah-approved or non Shariah-approved. Shariah-approved firms refer to 
those that conduct activities as permitted by the Shariah and have been approved by the 
SAC. Therefore, firms whose activities are in contrary with the Shariah rules, for 
example, activities that involve ambiquity (gharar), interest (riba) and gambling 
(maysir), are classified as non Shariah-approved firms. The increasing number of 
Shariah-approved firms listed on the main board of the Bursa Malaysia indicates the 
importance of these firms as components of the overall capital market (Ousama & 
Fatima, 2010).  
The Shariah status of a firm may expose the firm to a greater public visibility, which 
requires the firm to conduct its business according to the rules stated by the Islamic 
laws; specifically, the rules and regulations outlined by the SAC of the Securities 
Commission Malaysia. The Securities Commission Malaysia represents one of the 
statutory bodies vested with investigative and enforcement powers by the government 
of Malaysia. Therefore, the Shariah status of a firm may represent the government 
power, as firms that granted with the Shariah status are subjected to the rules and 
regulations imposed by the government. 
The Shariah-approved firms are expected to conduct more CSR activities and disclose 
more CSRR than their counterparts. This is based on the grounds that the Islamic 
teaching promotes social accountability concepts and full disclosure principles 
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(Baydoun & Willett, 2000). Many principles of the Islamic teaching are related to the 
concept of CSR; for example, accountability, equality and social justice (Lewis, 2001; 
Sulaiman, 2005; Kamla et al., 2006; Dusuki, 2008). To a certain extent, justifications 
underpinning social and environmental accounting in which CSRR is a part are parallel 
to Islamic accounting that is governed by Islamic values and its economic system 
(Zulkifli, 2012).  
With regards to Islamic corporate reporting, although the Islamic teaching promotes the 
principles of full disclosure (Baydoun & Willett, 2000), several empirical studies that 
examined corporate reporting by firms practising the Islamic principles, dictated a 
minimal levels of reporting in the annual reports (Sulaiman, 2005; Maali et al., 2006; 
Othman & Thani, 2010). Nevertheless, literature that investigated difference in the 
extent of reporting made between the Islamic and non-Islamic practising firms did 
report a significant difference in the levels of reporting made by these two types of 
firms (Ibrahim et al., 2006; Aribi & Gao, 2010).  
Aribi and Gao (2010), who examined the influence of Islam on CSR disclosure in the 
financial industry, revealed significant differences in the level and the extent of CSR 
disclosures made between the Islamic financial institutions (IFIs) and conventional 
financial institutions (CFIs). Their analyses were based on the annual reports of 21 CFIs 
and 21 IFIs that operate in the Gulf region. Aribi and Gao (2010) explained that the 
significant differences in the level and the extent of the disclosures between the two 
types of institutions are largely due to the disclosures made by the IFIs, which are 
religious-related themes such as Shariah supervisory board reports, charitable practice 
(Zakah), charity donations (Sadaqah) and free interest loans. In examining differences 
in social and environmental performance between Shariah and non-Shariah approved 
firms in Malaysia, Ibrahim et al. (2006) found that the Shariah approved firms were 
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only marginally better than those of non-Shariah approved firms. However, their study 
were based on two CSR performance measures only; ISO 14001 and OHSAS 18001 
certification.   
Based on the reviews of prior literature, it is evident that more efforts should be 
undertaken to examine the influence of Shariah status of firms on CSRR using a 
comprehensive checklist that encompassed both conventional and Islamic aspects of 
CSR. In the current study, the Shariah status of a firm is measured by a dichotomous 
variable, whereby the variable takes a value of ‘1’ if the firm is listed as Shariah-
approved firm; and a value of ‘0’ if otherwise. The current study expects a positive 
association between the Shariah status of a firm and the quantity and quality of CSRR 
disclosed by the firm, as the Shariah-approved firms are supposed to practise 
responsible business conduct in line with the Shariah requirement.  
4.4.4.3 Profitability (Economic Performance) 
Empirical research that examines the determinants of CSRR has documented an 
inconclusive finding on the association between profitability and the extent of CSRR. 
Profitability represents one of the important economic performances of firms. Despite 
the positive association revealed between profitability and the extent of CSRR in 
several studies (Roberts, 1992; Haniffa & Cooke, 2005; Othman et al., 2011), other 
studies indicated weak or no association between these two variables (Belkaoui & 
Karpik, 1989; Patten, 1991; Hackston & Milne, 1996; Richardson & Welker, 2001; 
Ghazali, 2007).  
Huang and Kung (2010) dictated a significant negative association between profitability 
and the extent of environmental disclosure in Taiwan. According to Huang and Kung 
(2010), less profitable firms tend to disclose greater amount of CSR information to 
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improve the firms’ corporate image. Profitable firms disclose CSR information with the 
intention of contributing to society’s wellbeing and legitimise their existence in the 
society (Haniffa & Cooke, 2005). CSRR were also found to be related positively to 
profitability (Saleh et al., 2011). 
Based on the findings by Haniffa and Cooke (2005) and Othman et al. (2011), who 
conducted their CSRR research in Malaysia, the current study hypothesises a positive 
association between profitability and the quantity and quality of CSRR. The current 
study measures profitability by the total return on assets (ROA), as the variables 
adopted in many prior literatures that examined the association between profitability 
and the extent of CSRR.  
4.4.4.4 Industry (Government Power)  
The influence of firms’ industry type on CSRR practices depends on how critical the 
effects of firms’ economic activities to the society (Haniffa & Cooke, 2005). For 
example, Lattemann et al. (2009) found that firms in the manufacturing industry tend to 
disclose more CSR. While industry type appears to influence certain CSRR’s themes, 
for examples energy and community involvement themes, it does not affect the 
disclosure levels of other themes of CSRR (Cowen et al., 1987). Halme and Huse 
(1997) listed industry as one of the important variables that may explain the 
environmental disclosure in annual report of large firms in Finland, Norway, Spain and 
Sweden. From the stakeholders’ perspective of CSRR, as suggested by Ullmann (1985), 
industry may represent government power. For example, firms in high-profile industries 
may be subject to greater scrutiny by the government and regulators; thereby, requiring 
more CSRR to be disclosed by the firms. 
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In general, firms in high profile industries tend to disclose significantly more CSRR in 
their annual reports than their counterparts in low profile industries (Patten, 1991; 
Hackston & Milne, 1996; Newson & Deegan, 2002). Firms in high-profile industries 
are those with consumer visibility, a high level of political risk or concentrated intense 
competition (Roberts, 1992; Hackston & Milne, 1996; Newson & Deegan, 2002). 
Patten (1991) specifically identified in his study firms in forest and paper, petroleum 
and chemical industries as high profile firms. According to Newson and Deegan (2002), 
firms in high-profile industries, such as raw material extraction, chemical, wood, and 
paper and forestry industries, are more exposed to the political and social environment 
than those in low profile industries. Newson and Deegan (2002) categorised firms 
operating in services, healthcare, computers, and electronics industries as low profile.  
For the purpose of the current study, industry is measured by a dichotomous variable 
with a value of ‘1’ if the firm is classified as high profile firm and a value of ‘0’ if the 
firm is classified as low-profile firm. High-profile firm refers to firms in consumer 
products, industrial products, infrastructure project companies and plantation industry, 
while low-profile refers to firms in construction, finance, hotel, properties, technology 
and trading/service industry (Hackston & Milne, 1996; Newson & Deegan, 2002). In 
contrary to the classification of industry type into environmentally-sensitive and non-
environmentally-sensitive industry, which is more suitable for research that 
concentrated on environmental-related reporting, the classification of industry into high 
and low profile is consider relevant in the context of CSRR.  
Given the variety of industry types involved in the current study (see Table 5.3), their 
classification into high and low profile is considered appropriate as it may facilitate the 
data analysis processes. This classification also reflects the industry’s classification 
used in the context of CSRR in other existing studies; for example, Hackston and Milne 
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(1996) and Newson and Deegan (2002). Adopting the high-low profile firm’s 
classification as suggested by Hackston and Milne (1996) and Newson and Deegan 
(2002), the current study expects a greater CSRR disclosed by firms in high profile 
industries owing to their exposure to greater visibility and associated risks. In other 
words, a positive association is expected between industry and the quantity and quality 
of CSRR.  
4.4.4.5 Leverage (Creditor Power) 
Leverage is an indicator to show the levels of firms’ dependence on debt in order to 
operate. It represents the creditor power, as outlined by Ullmann (1985). In highly 
leverage firms, creditors represent one of the important stakeholders that may put 
pressure on firms to behave in a way that the creditors’ right and interest will be 
preserved. The creditors tend to have greater influence on firms’ policies owing to their 
power to control the firms’ access to financial resources that may be necessary for the 
firms’ survival (Roberts, 1992; Huang & Kung, 2010). Creditors are highly concerned 
about firms’ activities because whenever the activities generate a negative impact on 
either the environment or the society, the firms will face some risks associated to their 
actions. For example, the firms may face the risk of litigations, penalties or fines, and 
boycotts. This may in turns undermine the creditors’ rights and interests.  
Furthermore, creditors tend to call for greater corporate integrity and require the firms 
to provide greater reporting to keep them informed on the firms’ latest status and 
protected against firms’ opportunistic behaviour (Huang & Kung, 2010). In response to 
creditors’ expectations and demands, firms may be more willing to disclose CSR-
related information to legitimise their actions to creditors (Haniffa & Cooke, 2005). 
Among the measurements used to indicate firm’s leverage include total debt to total 
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assets and total debt to total equity. A positive association was found between leverage 
and CSRR in Roberts (1992) and Huang and Kung’s (2010) studies. Total debt to total 
assets is used to measure leverage in the current study, as it captures a firm’s financial 
risk by determining the amount of firm’s assets being financed by debt. Therefore, the 
current study expected a positive association between leverage and CSRR. 
4.5 SUMMARY 
The construction of the research model of the current study is based on the stakeholder 
theory and contingency theory. Stakeholder theory suggests firms to fulfil their broader 
responsibilities to both shareholders and other stakeholders, whereas contingency theory 
posits that the choices of corporate reporting practices depend on the differing 
constraints surrounded the firms. Relying upon the stakeholder theory, the current study 
examines the association between corporate ownership structure and board’s CSR 
experience and CSRR. The contingency theory is used in examining the effect of CSRR 
regulation on the association between corporate ownership structure and CSRR.  
Applying the Ullmann’s (1985) model of the determinants of CSRR, the current study 
examines the influence of shareholder power, which is represented by managerial, 
family, foreign and government ownership, on the levels of CSRR that are measured by 
the quantity and quality of reporting. The different types of shareholders investigated in 
the current study reflect the characteristics of corporate ownership structure in Malaysia 
that are dominated by family and government shareholders, in contrary with the 
concentrated and disperse ownership types of corporate shareholding that are apparent 
in the developed countries. The current study control for the effect of creditor power 
(e.g. leverage), government power (e.g. firm size, Shariah status and industry) and 
economic performance (e.g. profitability), as they are suggested by Ullmann (1985) to 
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influence the levels of CSRR disclosed by firms. Board of directors’ CSR experience 
represents the strategic posture of a firm as defined by Ullmann (1985). Finally, the 
current study examines the effect of the introduction of the CSRR regulation in 
Malaysia that take into effect from financial year 2007 on the association between 
corporate ownership structure and CSRR in the context of contingency theory. 
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CHAPTER 5: RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY 
 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter provides a detailed explanation of the research design and methodology 
adopted in this thesis. First, Section 5.2 explains the research paradigm employed for 
this thesis. Then, Section 5.3 highlights the sample selection procedure involved in the 
current study. Section 5.4 outlines the measurements of all variables (independent, 
dependent and moderating) used in the current study. The data collection technique 
applied in the current study is discussed in Section 5.5. Section 5.6 specifically 
elaborates the related issues regarding content analysis, as the main data collection 
technique applied in the current study. Next, the research instrument of the current 
study is explained in Section 5.7. Then, Section 5.8 presents the regression models 
applied, followed by a discussion on the data analysis used in the current study. Finally, 
Section 5.9 presents the summary of this chapter. 
5.2 RESEARCH PARADIGM 
Academic research is generally developed within the bound of some theoretical and 
philosophical assumptions as defined by researcher. Chua (1986) suggested three 
paradigms underpin the accounting research, namely mainstream, interpretive and 
critical paradigm. This is based on the sociological research paradigm, which was 
introduced by Burrell and Morgan (1979). The differences between these three 
methodological approaches of research have been apparent, with the mainstream 
paradigm dominates the research in the field of accounting (Chua, 1986; Lukka & 
Kasanen, 1995; Baker, 2011).   
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The mainstream paradigm seeks to find rational explanations to solve problems using 
scientific methods. Since the underlying philosophical perspective of the mainstream 
research relies on quantitative data and scientific research approach, it is also known as 
positivist paradigm (Baker, 2011). The positivist research involves hypothesis testing 
that enable researchers to explain and predict a specific situation in the social world by 
searching for patterns and relationships. 
Next, the interpretive paradigm pursues to explain the nature of the social world based 
on the researchers’ interactions with other human actors in the research process (Chua, 
1986). Interpretive researchers use their subjective experience to describe, understand 
and interpret their actions as well as others who interact with them within the setting 
specified by the researchers. Instead of observing the phenomenon of study, interpretive 
researchers participate in the research process in a way to understand better of the 
behaviour of human actors within their studies. 
Finally, the critical paradigm strives to evaluate the research being undertaken in a 
critical manner.  Critical researchers assume that theories and facts are only reflections 
of a realistic worldview. It explores the possibility of change to happen in a society as 
an outcome of research (Chua, 1986; Baker, 2011). This is in contrast to the mainstream 
and interpretive paradigms that preserve the status quo of the social world being 
described (Laughlin, 1995). 
In the context of the current study, mainstream or positivist paradigm is chosen as a 
preferred methodological approach of research. This is in line with the objectives of the 
current study that seek to investigate the association between corporate ownership 
structure, board of directors, CSRR regulation and the levels of CSRR disclosed by 
firms, based on stakeholder and contingency theory. The associations between these 
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concepts are tested based on several hypotheses developed specifically for the current 
study. A set of quantitative variables is used in the current study. By relying on the 
quantitative method in data collection and analysis, the researcher of the current study 
may allow generalisation from the study conducted (Chua, 1986; Lukka & Kasanen, 
1995), yet preserving the status quo of the phenomena being described (Laughlin, 
1995). 
5.3 SAMPLE SELECTION 
The population of interest in the current study includes all firms listed on the Main 
board of Bursa Malaysia. Previously known as the Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange 
(KLSE, or Bursa Saham Kuala Lumpur in Malay language), Bursa Malaysia is one of 
the largest bourses in Asia offering a wide range of investment choices to the world 
(http://www.bursamalaysia.com). In Bursa Malaysia, firms are either listed on the Main 
market (merging of Main Board and Second board) or Access, Certainty and Efficiency 
(ACE) market (revamp of MESDAQ market) with effect from 3 August 2009 
(http://www.bursamalaysia.com).  
The current study focuses on firms listed on the Main board of the Bursa Malaysia from 
2005 to 2009. Firms listed on the Main board have a minimum of RM60 million of 
issued and paid-up capital, which imply large firms in terms of size. In comparison, 
firms listed on the Second Board have minimum of RM40 million of issued and paid-up 
capital. The sample-firms are chosen based on the firms that maintained their positions 
in top 300 firms (by market capitalisation) for the five-year period (2005 to 2009).  
Market capitalisation indicates the size of a firm. Firms with high-market capitalisation 
(market value) represent large firms. Larger firms are more likely to be agenda setters in 
CSR and possess a relatively greater amount of resources to devote to CSR activities 
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(Chapple & Moon, 2005). They also tend to have greater public visibility and impact on 
society (Teoh & Thong, 1984; Cowen et al., 1987; Belkaoui & Karpik, 1989; Lepoutre 
& Heene, 2006; Branco & Rodrigues, 2008a). Further, they are more likely to use 
CSRR to respond to the public pressures (Patten, 1991; Branco & Rodrigues, 2008a).  
The selection of sample, which is based on market capitalisation, is consistent with 
prior CSRR research (Guthrie & Parker, 1990; Hackston & Milne, 1996; Thompson & 
Zakaria, 2004; Saleh et al., 2011). The cut-off point of 300 top firms (by market 
capitalisation) is used to select the sufficient large sample firms that are representative 
of all firms listed on the Main board of Bursa Malaysia. For example, Hackston and 
Milne (1996) relied on a sample of largest 50 firms listed on the New Zealand Stock 
Exchange that represent 92 percent of the total market capitalisation of the listed firms 
as at 31 December 1992, whereas Thompson and Zakaria (2004) examined a sample of 
the largest 250 firms listed on the Main board of Bursa Malaysia, comprising 90 percent 
of the total market capitalisation of listed firms as at 31 December 2000. 
In choosing the sample of the current study, the following procedures were undertaken. 
Firstly, the list of firms listed in the Main board of Bursa Malaysia for each year (from 
2005 to 2009) is obtained. Next, the list of firms (for each year), in Excel format, is 
sorted in terms of the firm’s market capitalisation in descending order. The list of top 
300 firms (by market capitalisation) for each year is obtained using this procedure. 
Then, the list of top 300 firms (by market capitalisation) for each year is arranged 
alphabetically. Finally, the list is updated to include only firms that maintained their 
positions in top 300 firms (by market capitalisation) for the five-year period. This is to 
ensure that only the large firms are selected as the sample in the current study.     
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Table 5.1 summarises the detailed sampling procedure. From a total of 1500 firm-year 
observations derived from 300 firms over the five-year period (from 2005 to 2009), 600 
firm-year observations (equivalent to 120 firms over the five-year period) were 
excluded, leaving the final sample of 900 firm-year observations (equivalent to 180 
firms over the five-year period) used as sample in the current study. The exclusion is 
due to the inability of the particular firms to maintain their firms’ position in top 300 
firms (by market capitalisation) over the five-year period of analysis. The list of sample 
firms used in the current study is provided in Appendix A.   
Table 5.1: Sampling Procedure 
Sampling procedures No. of firms (per year) No. of firm-year 
observation                
(from 2005-2009) 
Firms that are positioned in Top 
300 firms (by market 
capitalisation) for the five-year 
period (from 2005 to 2009). 
300 1500 
Firms that have not maintained 
their position in top 300 firms 
(by market capitalisation) for 
the five-year period (from 2005 
to 2009). 
120 600 
Final Sample 180 900 
 
As evidenced in Table 5.2, the representation of sample for each year (from 2005-2009) 
is more than 75 percent of the market capitalisation of all firms listed in the Main board 
of Bursa Malaysia. This is comparable with the sample size used in previous CSRR 
research, particularly in Malaysia; for example, 66.1 percent (Ghazali, 2007), 83 percent 
(Haniffa & Cooke, 2005), 90 percent (Thompson & Zakaria, 2004). Even though the 
representation of sample used in the current study is less than the one used by 
Thompson and Zakaria (2004), it is considered appropriate given the multiple-year 
analysis conducted in the current study. The study by Thompson and Zakaria (2004) is 
based on single-year data.  
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Table 5.2: Representation of Sample (by Market Capitalisation) 
Description 
YEAR 
2009 2008 2007 2006 2005 
Total market 
capitalisation  
of the sample 
firms (1) 782,796,326 544,295,455 894,324,499 641,249,974 513,978,862 
Total market 
capitalisation of all 
firms listed on the 
Main board (2) 974,136,594 633,521,897 1,048,950,411 803,373,973 659,848,595 
Representation of 
Sample (1:2) 80.36 85.92 85.26 79.82 77.89 
Number of 
companies  
in Main board 849 634 636 649 646 
 
Table 5.2 shows the excerpt of the representation of sample (by market capitalisation), 
while the full data (with list of sample firms) is attached in Appendix B. The 
representation of sample of the current study (by market capitalisation) is derived by 
dividing the total market capitalisation of the sample firms with the total market 
capitalisation of all firms listed on the Main board. Overall, the representation of sample 
for the current study ranges from 77.89 percent to 85.92 percent over the five-year 
period of analysis.  
Table 5.3 presents the distribution of sample firms according to its industry’s sector. 
Overall, the 180 sample firms included for each year are classified into 10 different 
industry sectors. These firms maintained their position in top 300 firms by market 
capitalisation over the five-year period. The same 180 firms were analysed over the 
five-year period from 2005 to 2009. Most of the sample firms included in the current 
study is represented by the trading/service industry (25 percent) and industrial product 
industry (21.66 percent), while the least sample firms come from hotel industry and 
technology industry.  
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Table 5.3: Classification of Sample Firm by Industry 
Industry No. of firm Percentage of firm (%) 
Construction 8 4.44 
Consumer product 19 10.56 
Finance 22 12.22 
Hotel 2 1.11 
Industrial product 39 21.66 
Infrastructure project company (IPC) 5 2.78 
Plantation 19 10.56 
Properties 19 10.56 
Technology 2 1.11 
Trading/Service 45 25.00 
Total 180 100.00 
 
In comparison with several CSRR studies that focused on selected industries only (e.g. 
sensitive industry and finance industry), sample of the current study includes firms from 
sensitive and non-sensitive industries, and finance and non-finance industries. Haniffa 
and Cooke (2005) and Ghazali (2007) excluded finance firms from their sample, while 
Hamid (2004) specifically studied finance firms only. Probably, researchers tend to 
exclude finance firms in their studies or conduct separate research specifically on 
finance firms due to the highly regulated nature of the finance firms compared to firms 
in other industries. Othman et al. (2011) investigated firms in three sensitive industries 
only. Classified under the sensitive industry, firms in industrial product, property and 
plantation industries are more exposed to high risks of having a negative impact on the 
environment. As a result, greater levels of CSRR are expected from these firms 
(Othman et al., 2011).  
Despite the arguments offered by a number of researchers, the current study includes 
firms from a wide range of industries. This is based on the view that CSR is the agenda 
for all firms regardless of industries. For example, Maybank Berhad that represents 
firms in financial industry in Malaysia has been actively involved in undertaking CSR-
related programmes especially through employee voluntary programme. Maybank won 
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the category of ‘Culture and Heritage’ in the Prime Minister’s CSR Award21. Similarly, 
Shangri-La Hotels Malaysia Berhad, being one of the firms in hotel industry, has also 
adopted several environmentally-friendly measures in an effort to preserve and protect 
the environment. The continuous commitments of the hotel in CSR matters have been 
rewarded with several recognitions, among others ‘green hotel’ by the Malaysian 
Tourism Ministry and ‘Honourable Mention’ in environment category of the Prime 
Minister’s CSR Award 200922. 
Besides the increasing concerns of firms in sensitive industries on CSR issues, Chung & 
Parker (2010) noted the growing social and environmental concerns of firms in the 
service industry. This highlights the needs of researchers to take into consideration the 
firms in non-sensitive industries, in contrary to the argument provided by Othman et al. 
(2011). Even though the finance industry is highly regulated, they are not subjected to 
different regulation in terms of CSRR. The inclusion of the wide range of industries in 
the current study also enables the researcher to conclude more representative findings of 
CSRR in Malaysia across different industries. 
The data set used in the current study includes a five-year-period of data (from 2005 to 
2009), which represents two periods: voluntary, that is the period before the mandatory 
CSRR requirement takes effect (year 2005 and 2006); and mandatory, that is the period 
after the mandatory CSRR requirement takes effect (2007 to 2009). In 2005, CSRR was 
practiced voluntarily by firms. In 2006, even though CSRR was still made voluntary, 
there is anticipation that it will become mandatory soon, particularly with the 
introduction of CSR framework for public-listed firms by Bursa Malaysia in September 
2006. Following that, a number of firms have already started to report CSR in 2006 in 
anticipation of the mandatory requirement. 
                                                 
21 See http://www.anugerahcsrmalaysia.org/category/archives/2009-csr-awards/. 
22 The Star, July 9, 2012, ‘Hotel gets rewarded for adopting environmentally-friendly measures’. 
 
187 
 
2007 marked a significant development of CSRR in Malaysia, whereby it was made 
mandatory in public-listed firms’ annual reports under the Listing Requirement of the 
Bursa Malaysia (Appendix 9C, Part A, Paragraph 29). The requirement obligates all 
public-listed firms to include a description of the CSR activities or practices undertaken 
by the firms and its subsidiaries or, if there are none, a statement to that effect. 
Following that, firms are expected to fully comply with the CSRR requirements.  
By examining the CSRR disclosed for the first three-year of the implementation of the 
CSRR regulation (from 2007 to 2009), the current study may capture the trend of CSRR 
during the mandatory CSRR regulation. For examples, improvement in the levels of 
CSRR disclosed may signal the effectiveness of the regulation, whereas lack of 
compliance may alert the regulators to further deliberate the effectiveness of the current 
reporting regulation and design relevant actions to improve the current practices. 
The reason to include the 5-year data is to reflect both the voluntary and mandatory 
period of CSRR. The 5-year data may capture changes in CSRR disclosed during the 
transition periods from voluntary to mandatory reporting regimes. It is comparable with 
several prior CSRR literature, for example, Larrinaga et al. (2002) and Criado-Jimenez 
et al. (2008), who used 3-year data, in observing the changes in environmental reporting 
behaviour of firms in pre- and post-regulation periods. 
5.4 MEASUREMENT OF RESEARCH VARIABLES 
This section defines each variable used in the current study. Generally, there are four 
categories of variables used: independent (managerial ownership, family ownership, 
foreign ownership, government ownership and board’s CSR experience); moderating 
(CSRR regulation); control (firm size, Shariah status, profitability, industry and 
leverage); and dependent (CSRR quantity and quality). Table 5.4 presents a summary of 
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the measurement of the relevant variables used in the current study. Discussion on the 
measurement of the independent variables, moderating variable and control variables is 
provided in Section 5.4.1, whereas for the dependent variables is discussed in Section 
5.4.2. 
Table 5.4: Summary of the Measurement of Research Variables 
Variables Acronym Measurement 
Dependent variables: CSRR 
CSRR 
quantity 
CSRRQN 
Number of sentences related to each item in the CSRR 
checklist. 
CSRR quality CSRRQL 
CSRR index (based on a weighted scoring method) that is 
computed by the ratio of actual score of CSRR awarded to the 
maximum score of CSRR attainable by the firm. 
Independent variables: Ownership Structure 
Managerial MGRLOWN 
Percentage of shares held by executive directors to total 
numbers of shares issued 
Family FAMOWN 
Percentage  of family members on board to total number of 
directors on the board 
Foreign FOROWN 
Percentage of shares held by foreign shareholders to total 
numbers of shares issued 
Government GOVOWN 
Percentage of shares held by government to total numbers of 
shares issued 
Independent variables: Board of Directors 
Board’s CSR 
Experience 
CSREXP 
Percentage  of members of the board with CSR experience to 
total number of directors on the board 
Moderating variable: Corporate Reporting Regulation 
CSRR 
Regulation 
REG 
Dichotomous with 1 for firm-year observations in year 2007, 
2008 and 2009, and 0 for year 2005 and 2006 
Control variables: Firm-specific characteristics 
Firm size SIZE Natural log of total assets 
Shariah status SHARIAH 
Dichotomous with 1 if the firm is listed as Shariah-approved 
firm and 0 if otherwise 
Profitability ROA Return on Asset 
Industry IND 
Dichotomous with 1 if the firm is classified as high profile firm 
and 0 if the firm is classified as low profile firm 
Leverage LEV Total debt to total assets 
 
5.4.1 Measurement of Independent, Moderating and Control Variables 
There are five independent variables involved in the current study; four of which 
represent the corporate ownership structure, while another variable represents the board 
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of directors’ characteristic. Corporate ownership variables studied include managerial 
ownership, family ownership, foreign ownership and government ownership. 
Managerial ownership (MGRLOWN) is measured by the percentage of shares held by 
executive directors to total numbers of shares issued, while family ownership 
(FAMOWN) is measured by the percentage of family members on board to total 
number of directors on the board. Foreign ownership (FOROWN) is referred to the 
percentage of shares held by foreign shareholders to total numbers of shares issued; 
whereas, government ownership (GOVOWN) is referred to the percentage of shares 
held by government to total numbers of shares issued. This has been consistent with the 
one adopted in prior CSRR research (Haniffa & Cooke, 2005; Ghazali, 2007; Amran & 
Devi, 2008; Othman et al., 2011).  
Information relating to managerial ownership, foreign ownership and government 
ownership are visible in the analysis of shareholding’s section of the firm annual report. 
However, it is difficult to determine the percentage of family ownership as family 
shares is held by nominees, which are not apparent in the analysis of shareholding. 
Therefore, the most suitable alternative variable is used for the purpose of the current 
study that is the percentage of family members on board to total number of directors on 
the board. 
In the current study, board of directors’ CSR experience is used to represent board of 
directors’ characteristics. It is measured by comparing the percentage of directors with 
CSR experience with the total number of directors on the board. Directors with CSR 
experience are defined as those with past or present CSR-related experiences that may 
be useful in overseeing or managing CSR portfolio or any CSR-related tasks in firms. A 
director is considered to possess CSR experience; for example, leading or managing a 
firm’s specific department related to CSR (e.g. CSR or environmental affair’s 
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department of a firm), or holding a position in any non-profit/non-governmental 
organisation (NGO) that undertakes CSR-related activities (e.g. Protect and Save the 
Children Association, Federal Land Development Authority Community Social 
Development Committee, Yayasan Budi Penyayang Malaysia
23
). This information is 
provided in the directors’ profile section in the annual report. 
The moderating variable in the current study is the CSRR regulation (REG). It 
differentiates between the voluntary and mandatory period of CSRR. It takes a value of 
‘1’ for firm-year observations in the year 2007, 2008 and 2009 that marked the 
mandatory period of CSRR, and a value of ‘0’ for firm-year observations in the year 
2005 and 2006. 
Five control variables included in the research model are: firm size, which is measured 
by the log of total assets; Shariah status of a firm, which is given a value of ‘1’ if the 
firm is listed as Shariah-approved firm and a value of ‘0’ if otherwise; profitability that 
is referred to the return on assets of a firm; industry, which is measured by a 
dichotomous variable with a value of ‘1’ if the firm is classified as high profile firm and 
a value of ‘0’ if the firm is classified as low profile firm; and leverage, which is 
measured by the total debt to total assets. Detailed explanation on the control variables 
used in the current study is provided in Chapter four of this thesis. 
5.4.2 Measurement of Dependent Variables 
Empirical studies that investigate the levels of CSRR have investigated generally the 
quantity and quality of CSRR, which can be measured in terms of index, words, 
sentences, paragraph, pages, and etc. Each of this measurement has its own advantages 
                                                 
23 Yayasan Budi Penyayang Malaysia (PENYAYANG) is a foundation incorporated for the purposes of receiving donations, 
subscriptions or otherwise, and to administer such funds for education, public welfare, research, health, medical and other charitable 
purposes for the benefit of needy Malaysians, irrespective of colour, race or creed (http://www.penyayang.org.my).  
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and disadvantages. The levels of CSRR, being the dependent variable in the current 
study, are referred to the quantity and quality of CSRR disclosed by firms in Malaysia. 
While the former captures the extent, volume or amount of CSRR, the latter captures 
the variety of CSRR (Haniffa & Cooke, 2005) and the level of importance placed by 
firms on the CSRR disclosed (Freedman & Jaggi, 2005; Hooks & Van Staden, 2011; 
Joseph & Taplin, 2011). In the current study, the quantity of CSRR is measured by the 
number of CSR-related sentences disclosed by firms, whereas the quality of CSRR is 
measured by a CSRR index that is based on a weightage procedure. The use of both 
measurements (quantity and quality of CSRR) is to balance between the advantages and 
disadvantages of the various CSRR’s measurements (Al-Tuwaijri, Christensen & 
Hughes, 2004; Haniffa & Cooke, 2005; Elijido-Ten, 2009). 
Hasseldine, Salama and Toms (2005), who examined the impact of environmental 
disclosures on the UK firms’ reputation, highlighted the importance of the quality of 
environmental disclosure rather than mere quantity of environmental disclosure. 
According to Hasseldine et al. (2005), a content analysis that is based on the mere 
quantity of disclosures is insufficient. In their study, Hasseldine et al. (2005) found that 
the quality of environmental disclosure (37.5 percent) has a higher explanatory power 
(in terms of R
2
) than the quantity of environmental disclosure (32.4 percent) in 
explaining the variation of firms’ reputation in the UK.  
Joseph and Taplin (2011), who used these two measurements of CSRR in their analysis 
of Malaysian local governments’ websites, also found similar evidence. Joseph and 
Taplin (2011) suggested that the quality of CSRR is a more predictable measurement of 
CSRR on website than the quantity of CSRR. This was evidenced by a greater 
explanatory power and more significant independent variables produced in the 
hypothesised relationship between several independent variables and the CSRR.  
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Overall, findings from the related literature (e.g. Haniffa & Cooke, 2005; Hasseldine et 
al., 2005; Joseph & Taplin, 2011) acknowledged the importance of examining both the 
quantity and quality of CSRR as the mere focus on the quantity of CSRR is insufficient 
(Hooks & Van Staden, 2011). According to Hooks and Van Staden (2011), by 
evaluating the quality of CSRR, it may recognise the relative usefulness of certain types 
of CSR information to readers. Furthermore, the use of both measurements of CSRR in 
the current study is considered appropriate. Further elaboration on these two 
measurements of CSRR is presented in Section 5.4.2.1 and Section 5.4.2.2. 
5.4.2.1 Quantity of CSRR 
Quantity of CSRR refers to the amount, volume or extent of CSRR (Joseph & Taplin, 
2011; Hooks & Van Staden, 2011). Prior literature examining CSRR, particularly in 
annual reports, has documented a number of different methods to measure the quantity 
of CSRR, among others, number of pages (Guthrie & Parker, 1990; Patten, 1992; Gray 
et al., 1995a; Unerman, 2000; Kuasirikun & Sherer, 2004; Pratten & Mashat, 2009); 
sentences (Hackston & Milne, 1996; Buhr, 1998; Tsang, 1998; Hasseldine et al., 2005; 
Amran & Devi, 2008; Elijido-Ten, 2009; De Villiers & Van Staden, 2011); lines 
(Trotman & Bradley, 1981); and words (Zeghal & Ahmed, 1990; Deegan & Rankin, 
1996; Wilmshurst & Frost, 2000; Campbell et al., 2003; Campbell et al., 2006; Gao et 
al., 2005; Haniffa & Cooke, 2005; Othman et al., 2011). Despite the variety of 
measurements use to quantify CSRR, words, sentences and pages tend to be the 
preferred units of analysis of CSRR in written communications (Gray et al., 1995b).  
Each of these measurements has its own strengths and weaknesses, as evident in the 
extant literature (Gray et al., 1995b; Milne & Adler, 1999; Unerman, 2000; Al-Tuwaijri 
et al., 2004). For example, number of words and sentences are preferable as they can be 
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easily identified (Gray et al., 1995b; Milne & Adler, 1999). However, the use of words 
and sentences may ignore necessary graphs and tables (Al-Tuwaijri et al., 2004). These 
two measurements (words and sentences) can also cause difficulties due to different 
style in writing (Unerman, 2000). While pages may include pictures that have no 
information on environmental or social activities (Al-Tuwaijri et al., 2004), they tend to 
ignore issues related to different font, margin or page size (Unerman, 2000). 
The use of words as a basis for measuring the quantity of CSRR tends to complicate 
reliability, as the word alone is meaningless without referring to the sentence and its 
context (Milne & Adler, 1999). Following that, Milne and Adler (1999) suggested the 
use of ‘sentence’ as a more reliable basis for both ‘coding’ and ‘measurement’ of CSRR 
than other units of analysis to provide complete, reliable and meaningful data for further 
analysis. ‘Coding’ refers to the process of identifying a sentence as a CSR-related 
sentence or not, while ‘measurement’ of CSRR involves the process of counting the 
coded sentence, that is the CSR-related sentence (Milne & Adler, 1999). 
For the purpose of the current study, the number of sentences is chosen over the other 
methods of quantifying the CSRR. The number of sentences is chosen because it is 
easily identified (Gray et al., 1995b; Milne & Adler, 1999) and is less subject to inter-
judge variation than other measures, such as themes, words and pages (Ingram & 
Frazier, 1980). It also overcome the problems related to; font, margin or page size; word 
standardisation; and reliability of inter-rater coding (Hackston & Milne, 1996; Milne & 
Adler, 1999); and provides more detailed analysis of specific issues and themes 
(Deegan et al., 2002). Therefore, to measure the quantity of CSRR in the current study, 
the number of sentences that relate to each item in the CSRR checklist (the research 
instrument of the current study) is counted.  
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Despite its advantages, the number of sentences has also been criticised for not 
capturing pictures and graphics (Unerman, 2000; Al-Tuwaijri et al., 2004), which are 
potentially powerful and highly effective methods of communication (Beattie & Jones, 
1992; Beattie & Jones, 1994; Kuasirikun & Sherer, 2004) and to cause difficulties due 
to different styles of writing (Cowen et al., 1987; Unerman, 2000). Following that, the 
application of both measurements of CSRR (quantity and quality of CSRR) is 
considered appropriate to overcome the weaknesses inherited from the nature of 
‘sentences’ as explained earlier.  
5.4.2.2 Quality of CSRR 
Quality of CSRR refers to the quality of reporting made on a particular CSRR item 
listed in a CSRR index (Joseph & Taplin, 2011). It captures the variety of CSRR 
disclosed by firms (Haniffa & Cooke, 2005) and indicates the importance (or weight) 
given to a particular CSRR item relative to other items (Freedman & Jaggi, 2005; 
Hooks & Van Staden, 2011; Joseph & Taplin, 2011). It also aims to distinguish between 
poor and excellent reporting of the CSRR items (Hooks & Van Staden, 2011). The 
measurement of the quality of CSRR is based on a CSRR index. It involves the process 
of identifying the presence of CSR-related information through either a dichotomous 
(Haniffa & Cooke, 2005; Freedman & Jaggi, 2005) or weighted scoring method 
(Hughes, Anderson & Golden, 2001; Al-Tuwaijri et al., 2004; Freedman & Jaggi, 2005; 
Aerts, Cormier & Magnan, 2008; Hooks & Van Staden, 2011).  
Under the dichotomous scoring method, researchers apply an ‘equal weight’ or 
‘unweighted’ scoring method in identifying the presence of CSR-related information 
disclosed by firms. Based on a research instrument (the CSRR checklist) designed for 
the purpose of a study, a score of ‘one’ is given if an item in the research instrument is 
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disclosed, and ‘zero’ if it is not disclosed with no penalty imposed if the item is 
considered irrelevant (Haniffa & Cooke, 2005). It is observed that the same score is 
given to the reported CSRR items under the dichotomous scoring method. This is 
because each CSRR item reported is treated as equally important (Hackston & Milne, 
1996; Haniffa & Cooke, 2005; Joseph & Taplin, 2011). 
The use of the ‘unweighted’ scoring method is simpler and less controversial compared 
with the weighted scoring method (Freedman & Jaggi, 2005). Haniffa and Cooke 
(2005) highlighted the potential scoring bias and scaling problems surround the 
weighted scoring method. However, the limitation of the dichotomous scoring method 
lies in its inability to indicate the levels of emphasis given to a particular CSRR’s 
dimension (Al-Tuwaijri et al., 2004, Freedman & Jaggi, 2005). For example, the 
dichotomous scoring method treats reporting of a general qualitative in nature (indicates 
a low emphasis on the CSRR item) as equal to firms that report quantitative information 
(indicates a greater emphasis on the CSRR item). This is illustrated in the latter part of 
this section. 
Following that, several researchers have attempted to refine the ‘unweighted’ scoring 
method by assigning scores for the CSRR items disclosed; for example, between 0 and 
3 (Al-Tuwaijri et al., 2004; Cormier et al., 2004; Freedman & Jaggi, 2005; Aerts et al., 
2008) and between 0 and 4 (Hughes et al., 2001; Hooks & Van Staden, 2011). This 
method is known as the weighted scoring method. Relying on this method, a higher 
score given for a particular CSRR item indicates the greater level of importance placed 
by firms on that CSRR item in relation to other CSRR items (Freedman & Jaggi, 2005). 
A higher score for a specific CSRR item also denotes better quality of CSRR disclosed 
by firms (Hughes, et. al, 2001). Details on the application of the weighted scoring 
method are illustrated in the subsequent paragraphs explaining its usage in this thesis.  
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The current study uses the weightage scoring method to examine the quality of CSRR 
disclosed by firms in Malaysia. The decision to choose the weightage scoring method 
over the dichotomous scoring method is grounded upon the advantages that this method 
offers, as highlighted in the preceding paragraph. With reference to the CSRR checklist 
designed specifically for the current study, the score of each CSR-related item disclosed 
by firms is measured by assigning a score of 3 (if there is quantitative disclosure – 
highest weightage); 2 (if there is qualitative specific information); 1 (if there is general 
qualitative disclosure – lowest weightage); and 0 (if there is no disclosure). As an 
example, an item from the community dimension of CSRR checklist, that is education, 
is used to illustrate the assignment of value using the weightage procedure.  
A score of 3 is given for reporting that contains quantitative information:  
“TNB through its foundation, Yayasan Tenaga Nasional (YTN) provided scholarships 
and study loans amounting to RM34.6 million to 2,478 outstanding and deserving 
students to pursue their tertiary education at local and world renowned universities 
abroad. This is a direct contribution towards the development of professional 
manpower for TNB and the Country. Since its inception in 1993, YTN has provided 
education sponsorship to more than 8,820 students.” 
 
A score of 2 is given for reporting with qualitative specific information:  
“38 students received the Young Achievers’ Award from Yayasan Tan Sri Lee Shin 
Cheng (“Yayasan”) at Palm Garden Hotel, IOI Resort. Various awards from primary 
to upper secondary levels namely UPSR, PMR, SPM, STPM and A-levels are 
distributed to young students to motivate them to strive for excellence in their studies.”  
 
A score of 1 is given for reporting that contains general qualitative information:  
“Our contribution towards education can best be described as wide-ranging. In support 
of national schools and national-type vernacular schools located in the Group’s 
Malaysian estates and property townships, the Group has made contributions in the 
form of land for the school premises as well as regular donations in cash and kind to 
meet the varied needs of the schools and their students.” 
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Based upon the illustration given, the current study assumes that a higher reporting 
weightage (based on a score between 0 and 3) demonstrates greater emphasis placed by 
firms on the specific CSRR item, relative to a lower reporting weightage. For example, 
CSRR item with a score of 3 indicates a greater emphasis placed by firms on that 
particular CSRR item, while CSRR item with a score of 1 indicates otherwise. A higher 
score obtained on specific CSRR item also denotes a better quality of reporting on that 
particular item. Further, the application of the weightage scoring method in the current 
study is considered appropriate, as it may overcome the problem of inability of the 
dichotomous procedure to reflect the emphasis attached (the level of importance) to 
each CSR-related item disclosed (Cooke, 1989; Zeghal & Ahmed, 1990; Hackston & 
Milne, 1996; Al-Tuwaijri et al., 2004; Hooks & Van Staden, 2011).   
While the use of the ‘number of sentences’ as a quantity of CSRR’s measures has been 
criticised for not capturing pictures and graphics (Unerman, 2000; Al-Tuwaijri et al., 
2004), the CSR-related items relating to graphical presentation in the checklist are 
considered in the quality of CSRR that is measured by a CSRR index. Consistent with 
the decision rules on CSRR proposed by Hackston and Milne (1996), any graphical 
presentation, such as table or graph, which relates to the items included in the CSRR 
checklist should be interpreted as one line equals one sentence and classified 
accordingly. However, it is important to note that any graphical presentation must be 
specifically stated (e.g. have specific description) to be counted as a CSR sentence. This 
is because CSRR cannot be implied (Hackston & Milne, 1996). Following that, a 
picture without any description cannot be considered as CSR sentence because CSRR 
cannot be implied. Several examples to illustrate the way graphical presentations are 
captured in the current study are highlighted in Figures 5.1 and 5.2.  
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Figure 5.1 presents the statistics of human resource of Maybank Berhad for 2009. For 
example, the distribution of employee according to gender (female/male), as shown in 
Figure 5.1 is counted as 2 sentences. This is based on the decision rule of ‘one line 
equals one sentence’ as highlighted by Hackston and Milne (1996). Since the number of 
female and male employees is provided, such reporting is classified as W3 (workplace 
diversity and equal opportunity) under the workplace dimension of CSRR with a value 
of ‘2’ (qualitative specific information) is assigned. 
 
Figure 5.1: Statistics of Human Resource of Maybank Berhad 2009. 
(Source: The Annual Report of Maybank Berhad for the year 2009, p. 173)  
 
Figure 5.2 presents the statistics of accidents occurred in the workplace of Telekom 
Malaysia in 2009. Based on the graph presented in Figure 5.2, the severity rates (SR), 
incident rates (IR) and fatality rates (FR) are counted as 3 sentences based on the 
decision rule of ‘one line equals one sentence’ as highlighted by Hackston and Milne 
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(1996). They are classified as W1 (employee health and safety) with a value of ‘2’ 
(qualitative specific information) assigned.  
 
Figure 5.2: Statistics of Accidents in Workplace of Telekom Malaysia Berhad 2009 
(Source: The Annual Report of Telekom Malaysia Berhad for 2009, p. 164) 
 
In some cases, repeated CSR items disclosed in the annual reports is also observed. The 
same information tends to appear in different sections of the annual reports. While it 
may be seen as redundancy, Beattie & Jones (2001) highlighted that repetition is a 
communication strategy used for emphasis and reinforcement, and signals the 
importance placed by firms on certain issues. Therefore, any repeated sentence found in 
the annual reports is counted every time it appears in the documents. 
A CSRR index is derived by computing the ratio of actual scores awarded (based on 
weighted scoring approach) to the maximum score attainable by the firm. The final 
CSRR index that is used to measure the quality of CSRR:  
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CSRRQLj = 
 
∑nj t=1 Xij 
     nj 
Where:   
CSRRQLj = corporate social responsibility reporting index for j
th
 firm, 
nj = total number of items expected for j
th
 firm, 
Xij = 3 if i
th
 item is quantitative information disclosed, 2 if i
th
 item 
is qualitative specific information disclosed, 1 if i
th
 item is 
general qualitative information disclosed, and 0 if i
th
 item 
does not disclosed any information. 
5.5 DATA COLLECTION METHOD 
There are four categories of variables used for the purpose of the current study: 
independent, dependent, moderating and control variables. Data pertaining to the 
independent variables, which consist of corporate ownership structure and board of 
directors, were manually-collected through examination of firms’ annual reports that are 
available on the Bursa Malaysia website (http://www.bursamalaysia.com). Information 
pertaining to corporate ownership structure and board of directors were extracted from 
the respective sections in the corporate annual report (e.g. analysis of shareholdings and 
board of directors’ profile). 
Information on managerial ownership that is represented by the percentage of shares 
held by the executive directors is collected from the director shareholding’s section of 
the annual reports. Based on the definition of managerial ownership provided in the 
current study, only the percentage of shares held by the executive directors, who are the 
members of the board of directors, is counted. Family members who sit on the board of 
directors (family ownership) are identified through board members’ relationship with 
substantial shareholders of particular firms. The relationship of each member of the 
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board of directors with substantial shareholders of the firms is disclosed in either the 
directors’ profile or statement of corporate governance’s section of the annual reports.  
The percentage of foreign shareholding (foreign ownership) and government 
shareholding (government ownership) in a firm are gathered by counting the percentage 
of shares held by the respective shareholders as listed in the analysis of shareholdings’ 
section of the annual reports. Members of the boards with CSR experience are identified 
by reading the directors’ profile. A director is said to have CSR experience if the 
director has past or present CSR-related experiences; for example, managing a specific 
department related to CSR or holding position in any organisation that involves in CSR 
activities (e.g. World Wildlife Fund, Malaysian Nature Society, and Protect and Save 
the Children Association).     
Information regarding the moderator (CSRR regulation) and control variables (firm 
size, Shariah status, profitability, industry and leverage) were gathered manually from 
the Bursa Malaysia website (e.g. industry, Shariah status, CSRR regulation) and the 
financial statements’ section of firms’ annual reports (e.g. firm size, profitability and 
leverage). Some of the data that were not available in the annual reports and the Bursa 
Malaysia website were obtained directly from the information service centre of the 
Bursa Malaysia; for example, market capitalisation.  
CSRR, which represents the dependent variable of the current study, is measured by its 
quantity (sentences) and quality (index). Information relating to CSRR is gathered 
through content analysis of the annual report, which has been used widely in many prior 
CSRR research (Zeghal & Ahmed, 1990; Gray et al., 1995b; Hackston & Milne, 1996; 
Milne & Adler, 1999; Unerman, 2000; Haniffa & Cooke, 2005; Tilling & Tilt, 2010; De 
Villiers & Van Staden, 2011).  
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5.6 CONTENT ANALYSIS  
Content analysis is a technique for gathering data. It enables researchers to make 
replicable and valid inferences from data to their context (Krippendorff, 2004). This 
technique is one of the best known methods used to examine the level and content of 
reporting in corporate annual reports (Marston & Shrives, 1991; Krippendorff, 2004). It 
has been applied widely to analysing narrative reporting, including CSRR in corporate 
annual reports, other reports and websites (Gray et al., 1995a; Haniffa & Cooke, 2005; 
De Villiers & Van Staden, 2011; Hooks & Van Staden, 2011). 
In content analysis, a piece of writing is classified into various categories (Weber, 
1990). Information is coded into several categories to derive quantitative scales of 
varying levels of complexity (Abbott & Monsen, 1979). This process involves 
subjective judgement to be made by researchers (Milne & Adler, 1999; Zwetsloot & 
Van Marrewijk, 2004). Following that, it is important to ensure that data collected using 
content analysis fulfil the following criteria: 1) objective (the ability of independent 
parties to identify similarly what is and what is not a CSRR); 2) systematic (a set of 
exhaustive rules which define CSR in a mutually exclusive and all-embracing manner); 
and 3) reliable (the extent to which identical results would be obtained if the same 
process was undertaken either by the analyst on a different sample, or by a different 
analyst) (Gray et al., 1995b). The data should also have a high level of external validity 
and permits analysis of large volumes of data, which can be coded by several 
individuals if necessary (Gray et al., 1995b).  
A clear defined unit of analysis used in a research, such as words, sentences or pages 
must be specified to demonstrate the objectivity of the data. Specific measurement of 
CSRR used in the current study has been explained in Section 5.4.2 Measurement of the 
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dependent variable. A systematic data depends on a well-designed research instrument, 
which in the current study refers to the CSRR checklist. In Section 5.7, the CSRR 
checklist outlines the stages involved in designing a well-specified checklist for the 
purpose of the current study. Other than being objective and systematic, the data 
collected using the content analysis procedure should also be reliable.  
In the context of content analysis, reliability refers to the possibility of replication of 
results when using the content analysis procedure (Marston & Shrives, 1991; Gray et 
al., 1995b). It represents among the important issues in content analysis. According to 
Krippendorff (2004), there are three types of reliability in content analysis. The first is 
stability, which represents the weakest form of reliability. It refers to the ability of a 
coder to code data the same way over time. This can be demonstrated through several 
rounds of tests undertaken by a coder in different time period. The second type of 
reliability is reproducibility, which refers to the extent that the coding produces the 
same result when multiple coders are used. This can be measured by the inter-coder 
reliability test, whereby the differences arise between coders must be reanalysed and 
resolved. The third type is accuracy, which is determined by assessing coding 
performance of coders against a pre-determined standard set by a panel of experts. This 
is the strongest form of reliability, as dictated by Krippendoff (2004). In the current 
study, the reliability of the coding process is examined by applying both the stability 
and reproducibility tests.  
Milne and Adler (1999) highlighted the needs of researchers to demonstrate the 
reliability of both their research instruments and data collected from the content analysis 
procedure. However, very few studies have demonstrated explicitly the reliability of 
these two subjects (Milne & Adler, 1999; Unerman, 2000). To ensure the reliability of 
the research instrument, well-specified decision categories with well-specified decision 
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rules should be presented. The instrument should produce fewer discrepancies when 
used by relatively inexperienced coders (Milne & Adler, 1999). In designing the 
research instrument of the current study, several procedures have been undertaken, as 
explained in Section 5.7. The reliability of the data collected can be achieved through 
the use of 1) multiple coders (whereby any discrepancy between coders must be re-
analysed and resolved); or 2) single coder with sufficient experience (coded the data in 
multiple time period) (Milne & Adler, 1999). Both methods have been adopted in the 
current study whenever necessary. While the former is used in the pilot test of the 
current study, the latter is used to randomly check the content analysis done in the larger 
sample of the current study. Details on this issue are explained in Section 5.7. 
The current study involves a content analysis of CSRR data derived from the corporate 
annual reports. There has been a number of media used to communicate CSRR; for 
example, annual reports, stand-alone reports, websites, newsletter and bulletins (Zeghal 
& Ahmed, 1990). Despite the variety of mediums used for reporting, annual reports 
have been recognised as the main avenue for CSRR (Brown & Deegan, 1998; Belal & 
Momin, 2009; Tilling & Tilt, 2010; De Villiers & Van Staden, 2011). Section 2.5 
included a discussion on the importance of annual reports as a medium of 
communication for corporate reporting.  
While there have been claims on the failure of annual reports to capture all CSRR 
(Zeghal & Ahmed, 1990; Guthrie et al., 2008a) and the increasing popularity of stand-
alone and internet CSRR, Belal and Momin (2009) argued that such observation might 
be valid from the context of Western developed economies, and it may not hold in the 
context of emerging economies given the differences in the level of socio-economic 
(Xiao et al., 2005) and technological development (Williams & Pei, 1999) between 
these two groups of countries. Despite the various advantages offered by the web-based 
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communication media, a number of studies found that many firms did not fully utilised 
the functionality of the web as a CSRR communication media (Adams & Frost, 2006). 
The five-year data involved in the current study has made annual report as the most 
appropriate sources to examine CSRR in a longitudinal basis. Therefore, the current 
study focuses on CSRR made in corporate annual reports only.  
5.7 RESEARCH INSTRUMENT: CSRR CHECKLIST 
Different categories of CSRR have been used in different studies. A review of literature 
on the different CSRR categories/themes used in prior studies has been presented in 
Section 2.6.1. The variety of CSRR categories used reflects the different agenda set in 
different countries (Newell, 2005; Welford, 2005; Baughn et al., 2007; Visser, 2008) 
and changes in CSR focus over time (Gray et al., 1995a; Owen, 2008).  
The developing countries have a set of CSR agenda that are collectively quite different 
to those faced in the developed world (Newell, 2005; CSR Asia, 2008; Visser, 2008; 
Saleh et al., 2011). For example, the developing countries place greater emphasis on 
philanthropic responsibilities (particularly on community development), whereas the 
developed countries focus more on ethical and legal responsibilities (e.g. adherence to 
rules and regulations pertain to business ethics and environment) (Visser, 2008). This 
comparison is based on Carroll’s (1991) CSR pyramid.  
Following that, different CSR programmes or activities should be undertaken in 
different countries to cater the different needs of society in a particular country (Newell, 
2005; CSR Asia, 2008). Among the important CSR agenda in developing countries 
includes combating Human Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV) infection/Acquired 
Immunodeficiency Syndrome (AIDS), reducing poverty and building human capital 
(Blowfield & Frynas, 2005; Welford, 2013). Differences in CSR focus of different 
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countries was also highlighted by Welford (2005), who assessed firms’ CSR policies in 
15 countries in Europe, North America and Asia. Welford (2005) noted that many CSR 
policies are based on localised issues and cultural traditions at a country level.  
Therefore, to measure the level of CSRR in the context of Malaysia, a preliminary 
research instrument that includes five categories of CSRR (environment, community, 
workplace, marketplace and others) is developed. The construction of the CSRR 
checklist, which consists of 40 items, was based on the checklists employed in prior 
CSRR research, taking into account both conventional and Islamic corporate reporting 
instruments (Hackston & Milne, 1996; Haniffa & Cooke, 2005; Sulaiman, 2005; Maali 
et al., 2006; Kamla, 2007; Othman et al., 2011). While most of the prior CSRR 
literature examined the conventional and Islamic perspective of CSRR separately, the 
inclusion of the Islamic perspective of CSRR in the current study along with the 
conventional perspective of CSRR in the context of Malaysia is considered appropriate 
and relevant. This is based on two arguments: (1) the relatedness of many of the 
principles in the Islamic teaching to the concept of CSR (Baydoun & Willett, 2000; 
Lewis, 2001; Kamla et al., 2006; Dusuki, 2008); (2) the growth of the Shariah-
approved firms in the Malaysia’s capital market (Ousama & Fatima, 2010).  
Reference was also made to the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI) Sustainability 
Reporting Framework and Bursa Malaysia’s CSR Framework for Malaysian firms. GRI 
is a non-profit organisation that works towards a sustainable global economy by 
providing organisational reporting guidance on several key areas of economic, 
environmental, social and governance performance. The Bursa Malaysia’s CSR 
Framework was introduced as a set of guidelines for public-listed firms, who wish to 
practice CSR. The framework was developed by the Bursa Malaysia following the 
continuous development of corporate governance and CSR in Malaysia. Such reference 
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is required to capture the new CSR agendas that are considered important, particularly 
in the context of Malaysia. Each item included in the preliminary CSRR checklist is 
defined and explained to ensure its clarity.  
The preliminary checklist was sent to several CSRR experts for a face validation 
process. Further refinements were made to the preliminary checklist to incorporate 
experts’ opinions and suggestions. The refined CSRR checklist was then reviewed by 
two accounting academics specialising in the area of financial reporting and disclosure. 
The refined checklist has also been checked to ensure that each component in the 
checklist is applicable to all firms; regardless of industry and types of firms (e.g. 
Shariah approved firms and non-Shariah approved firms). This is important to avoid 
research penalising the non-reporting firms (Inchausti, 1997). For example, a few CSRR 
components such as ‘Muslim employees are allowed to perform their obligatory prayers 
during specific times and fasting during Ramadhan on their working day’ (Sulaiman, 
2005) and ‘disclosure of Shariah supervisory board opinion’ (Maali et al., 2006) are 
applicable to selected firm types (e.g. Shariah-approved firms) and industries (e.g. 
finance industry) only; therefore, they must be excluded from the final CSRR checklist.  
Table 5.5 presents the final CSRR checklist used in the current study. Detailed 
description of the CSRR checklist is provided in Appendix C and the research 
instrument used for coding purpose is attached in Appendix D. Generally, there are five 
themes or categories of CSRR adopted in the current study. They are: environment with 
7 items, community with 11 items, workplace with 10 items, marketplace with 9 items 
and others with 3 items, which make a total of 40 items.  
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Table 5.5: Final CSRR Checklist Used in the Current Study 
DIMENSION/COMPONENTS CODE REFERENCES 
ENVIRONMENT 
Pollution control / abatement 
 
E1 
Hackston & Milne, 1996; Haniffa & 
Cooke, 2005; Sulaiman, 2005; Kamla, 
2007; Othman et al. 2011. 
Environmental conservation and repairs 
 
E2 
Hackston & Milne, 1996; Haniffa & 
Cooke, 2005; Sulaiman, 2005; Maali et 
al., 2006; Kamla, 2007; Othman et al. 
2011. 
Energy conservation 
 
E3 
Hackston & Milne, 1996; Haniffa & 
Cooke, 2005; Sulaiman, 2005; Kamla, 
2007; Othman et al. 2011. 
Resource conservation and waste 
management 
E4 
Hackston & Milne, 1996; Haniffa & 
Cooke, 2005; Sulaiman, 2005; Kamla, 
2007; Othman et al. 2011. 
ISO 14001 (Environmental Management 
System) certification 
E5 
Yusoff, Yusoff and Lehman, 2007; 
Othman et al. 2011. 
 
Environmental awards 
 
E6 
Hackston & Milne, 1996; Haniffa & 
Cooke, 2005; Othman et al. 2011. 
Other commitments towards 
environmental protection / sustainability 
E7 
Hackston & Milne, 1996; Haniffa & 
Cooke, 2005; Kamla, 2007; Othman et al. 
2011. 
COMMUNITY 
Education 
 
C1 
Hackston & Milne, 1996; Haniffa & 
Cooke, 2005; Kamla, 2007; Othman et 
al., 2011. 
Charity 
 
C2 
Hackston & Milne, 1996; Haniffa & 
Cooke, 2005; Sulaiman, 2005; Maali et 
al. 2006; Kamla, 2007; Othman et al., 
2011. 
Art, culture and heritage C3 
Hackston & Milne, 1996; Kamla, 2007; 
Othman et al., 2011. 
Equality in community C4 Kamla, 2007; AlNaimi et al., 2012 
Youth development and graduate 
employment programme 
C5 
Haniffa & Cooke, 2005; Othman et al., 
2011. 
Employees participation in community 
service 
C6 Othman et al., 2011. 
Community health and safety 
 
C7 
 
Hackston & Milne, 1996; Haniffa & 
Cooke, 2005; Kamla, 2007; Othman et 
al., 2011. 
Community and infrastructure support C8 
Hackston & Milne, 1996; Othman et al., 
2011. 
Community awards C9 Othman et al., 2011. 
Community engagement C10 Othman et al., 2011. 
Support for national pride/government 
social campaigns 
C11 
Hackston & Milne, 1996; Haniffa & 
Cooke, 2005. 
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Table 5.5: Final CSRR Checklist Used in the current study (Continued) 
DIMENSION/COMPONENTS CODE REFERENCES 
WORKPLACE 
Employee health and safety (H&S) 
 
W1 
Hackston & Milne, 1996; Haniffa & Cooke, 
2005; Maali et al., 2006; Kamla, 2007; 
Othman et al., 2011. 
Human capital development 
 
W2 
Hackston & Milne, 1996; Haniffa & Cooke, 
2005; Sulaiman, 2005; Maali et al., 2006; 
Kamla, 2007; Othman et al., 2011. 
Workplace diversity and equal opportunity 
 
W3 
Hackston & Milne, 1996; Haniffa & Cooke, 
2005; Sulaiman, 2005; Maali et al., 2006; 
Kamla, 2007; Grosser & Moon, 2008; 
Othman et al., 2011. 
Employee appreciation W4 
Hackston & Milne, 1996; Haniffa & Cooke, 
2005; Kamla, 2007; Othman et al., 2011. 
OHSAS 18001 (Occupational Health and 
Safety Management Systems) certification 
W5 Othman et al., 2011. 
Employee relation/engagement 
 
W6 
Hackston & Milne, 1996; Haniffa & Cooke, 
2005; Kamla, 2007; Othman et al., 2011. 
Workplace awards W7 
Hackston & Milne, 1996; Othman et al., 
2011. 
Employee remuneration, benefit and 
assistance 
W8 
Hackston & Milne, 1996; Haniffa & Cooke, 
2005; Sulaiman, 2005; Maali et al., 2006; 
Kamla, 2007; Othman et al., 2011. 
Work-life balance 
 
W9 
Hackston & Milne, 1996; Sulaiman, 2005; 
Othman et al., 2011. 
Industrial relations W10 Hackston & Milne, 1996. 
MARKETPLACE 
Product development 
 
M1 
Hackston & Milne, 1996; Haniffa & Cooke, 
2005; Sulaiman, 2005; Maali et al., 2006; 
Kamla, 2007; Othman et al., 2011. 
Product/service quality 
 
M2 
Hackston & Milne, 1996; Haniffa & Cooke, 
2005; Sulaiman, 2005; Maali et al., 2006; 
Kamla, 2007; Othman et al., 2011. 
Product/service safety M3 
Hackston & Milne, 1996; Othman et al., 
2011. 
Corporate governance M4 Othman et al., 2011. 
Supplier relation/engagement M5 Kamla, 2007. 
Customer relation/satisfaction 
 
M6 
Haniffa & Cooke, 2005; Kamla, 2007; 
Othman et al., 2011. 
Stakeholder engagement M7 Othman et al., 2011. 
Other stakeholders’ matters M8 Othman et al., 2011. 
Marketplace awards M9 Haniffa & Cooke, 2005; Othman et al., 2011. 
OTHERS 
CSR reporting standard/quality O1 The current study 
CSR committee O2 Hackston & Milne, 1996; Kamla, 2007. 
Other commitment statements to CSR O3 
Hackston & Milne, 1996; Haniffa & Cooke, 
2005; Kamla, 2007; Othman et al., 2011. 
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In line with the development of CSRR in Malaysia, the current study has specifically 
introduced an item under the ‘others’ theme that is CSR reporting standards/quality 
(O1). This item describes the initiatives undertaken by firms to produce a high-quality 
of CSRR; for example, a CSRR that enables firms to receive recognition/award from 
external organisations, such as ACCA and GRI; or CSRR that includes an assurance 
statement from a third-party to ensure the credibility and reliability of the CSRR 
(Perego & Kolk, 2012).  
Moroney, Windsor and Aw (2012) suggested that assurance enhances the quality of 
voluntary environmental disclosures. Any recognition/award received in relation to 
CSRR (e.g. the ACCA Malaysia Sustainability Reporting Awards, the Prime Minister’s 
CSR Award, the StarBiz-ICR Malaysia Corporate Responsibility Award and GRI 
rating) is counted as CSR-related sentences under CSR reporting standards/quality (O1) 
item, as that recognition/award marks good quality of CSRR produced by the firms (see 
Table 5.6 for examples of CSR-related sentences for this item). 
Two items used by Kamla (2007), in her study of CSRR in Arab countries, are also 
applied to the current study. They are: equality in community (C4: under the 
community’s theme) and supplier relation/engagement (M5: under the marketplace’s 
theme). AlNaimi, Hossain and Momin (2012) also take into account the concept of 
equality (e.g. race, gender and disability) in their descriptive analysis of CSRR in Qatar. 
While equality in workplace (W3) has received a considerable attention in academic 
research (Grosser & Moon, 2005; 2008), perhaps, equality in community (C4) will 
follow suit, driven by several motivations. For example, the global emphasis towards 
equality and justice, and preventing discrimination, violence and injustice, and the 
growing importance of the Shariah-approved firms in Malaysia may bring equality in 
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community (C4) items to a higher level of importance. As the number of the Shariah-
approved firms increases, the number of firms that is practising Islamic teaching, which 
promote social accountability and social justice increases. Grounded on these 
motivations, more efforts are expected to promote equality in community by firms over 
time.  
For the purpose of the current study, equality in community (C4) refers to the initiatives 
used to promote equality in the community; for instance, in terms of rights and 
opportunities, learn to respect each other, equal opportunity for women, the disabled 
and minority/indigenous groups. This includes firms’ effort to build walkways or 
facilities for the disabled people especially in public places (see Table 5.6 for examples 
of CSR-related sentences for this item). ‘Supplier relation/engagement’ (M5), which 
was included in Kamla’s (2007) study, has been listed in the marketplace’s theme of the 
Bursa Malaysia CSR framework for public-listed firms. Such listing indicates the 
importance of the ‘supplier relation/engagement’ item (M5) as part of the CSRR in 
Malaysia. Supplier relation/engagement (M5) refers to the initiatives undertaken by 
firms to promote transparent and ethical procurement, and to ensure suppliers’ quality 
and satisfaction (see Table 5.6, p. 216 for examples of CSR-related sentences for this 
item).  
To date, there has been limited research that included the ‘supplier relation/engagement’ 
(M5) item in the CSRR’s checklist, with exception of Kamla (2007). Following its 
prominence in the context of CSRR, the examination of ‘supplier relation/engagement’ 
(M5) information disclosed by firms is in need. The inclusion of the ‘supplier 
relation/engagement’ item (M5) in the CSRR checklist of the current study reflects the 
changes in CSR focus over time, particularly in Malaysia. In line with the development 
of CSR in the global context, supplier has been considered as one of the important 
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stakeholders in firms along with shareholder, employee, community and customer 
(Panapanaan, Linnanen, Karvonen & Phan, 2003). Therefore, it is important to observe 
the way firms behave to manage their relationship with their suppliers along with other 
stakeholders. 
In the context of Malaysia, the inclusion of these three items, namely CSRR 
standards/quality (O1), equality in community (C4) and supplier relation/engagement 
(M5) may signal the existence of additional/new CSRR items to supplement the existing 
CSRR checklist, consistent with the development of CSRR in the country. These three 
items represent important CSRR items that have been limited in focus in the extant 
CSRR research. With the emphasis given on the three items of CSRR, perhaps, future 
research conducted in other countries could also consider for inclusion of these CSRR 
items, wherever possible.  
In the current study, the final CSRR checklist is then being pilot tested on a sample of 
20 annual reports for the year 2005 (reflect the voluntary period of CSRR) to ensure 
that there is some variability in reporting between different firms and to capture the 
items not yet included in the existing checklist, before being tested to the larger sample. 
This sample size is consistent with the one adopted by Haniffa and Cooke (2005) and 
Ghazali (2007), who used 20 firms and 25 firms respectively as sample in their pilot 
study. The sample of 20 annual reports for 2005, used in the pilot study, is represented 
by the two selected firms from each industry, as outlined in Table 5.3. Out of 20 annual 
reports, 10 of them were coded independently by two coders that possess good 
understanding and knowledge in CSRR and qualification in corporate reporting. 
Inconsistency (if any) reported between the two coders was re-analysed and resolved.  
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Inter-coder reliability test is also performed using the Krippendorff’s alpha to assess the 
levels of inter-coder agreement on the quality of CSRR based on a dichotomy procedure 
(whereby a value of ‘1’ is given if the CSR item is disclosed and a value of ‘0’ is given 
if there is no disclosure). This is based on the sample of 10 annual reports that were 
coded independently by the two coders. According to Krippendorff (2004), the 
Krippendorff’s alpha is able to account for chance agreement among multiple coders. 
The Krippendorff’s alpha is computed using an online calculator of inter-coder 
reliability known as ReCal (Freelon, 2010) and a macro written for SPSS software 
(Hayes & Krippendorff, 2007).  
In computing the inter-coder reliability using ReCal online calculator of inter-coder 
reliability, a CSRR coding worksheet is uploaded into a website, 
http://dfreelon.org/utils/recalfront. Result from the inter-coder reliability test showed an 
acceptable agreement of the two coders, whereby the Krippendorff’s alpha of 0.87 was 
achieved. The same result produced when the inter-coder reliability is computed using 
the SPSS’s software. The outputs produced from the above calculations are enclosed in 
Appendix E.  
The Krippendorff’s alpha of 0.87 is comparable with the one obtained by Hackston and 
Milne (1996) in their study of CSRR in New Zealand (with the Krippendorff’s alpha of 
0.90) and by Tilt (2001a) in her study of environmental reporting in Australia (with the 
Krippendorff’s alpha of above 0.80). While there has been no standard established for 
inter-coder reliability of content analysis (Hackston & Milne, 1996), it is suggested that 
80 percent or above is an acceptable level of inter-coder reliability (Guthrie & Mathews, 
1985, cited in Hackston and Milne 1996). 
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In testing the larger sample, only one researcher codes all of the annual reports 
involved. This is to ensure that a consistent judgement is made during the coding 
process. A set of coding rules is constructed to facilitate a consistent interpretation of 
the CSRR checklist during the coding process (Hackston & Milne, 1996) and to ensure 
the reliability and validity of the data collected (Haniffa & Cooke, 2005). Six coding 
rules have been outlined in coding the CSRR in the current study, most of which 
follows the one adopted by Hackston and Milne (1996). They are: 
1. Discussion of directors’ activities is not to be included as a discussion on 
employees. 
2. All sponsorship activity is to be included no matter how much it is advertising. 
3. All disclosures must be specifically stated, they cannot be implied. 
4. If any sentence has more than one possible classification, the sentence should be 
classified as to the activity most emphasised in the sentence. 
5. Tables (monetary and non-monetary) which provide information which is on the 
checklist should be interpreted as one line equals one sentence and classified 
accordingly. 
6. Any disclosure which is repeated shall be recorded as a CSRR sentence each 
time it is discussed. 
A random check is also done by repeating the coding process for selected annual reports 
after some time; in this case, the third months after the first round of data collection 
completed. Manual search of CSRR items is conducted throughout all sections of the 
annual reports. Discussion on the measurement of CSRR used in the current study is 
provided in Section 5.4.2. While the quantity of CSRR is measured by the number of 
sentences, the quality of CSRR is measured by a CSRR index. Each firm has its own 
CSRR score sheet that documented the number of CSR-related sentences disclosed and 
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value assigned (from 0 to 3) for each CSR’s item included in the CSRR checklist (see 
Appendix D for the research instrument or coding Sheet used in the current study). 
To summarise, the following steps are taken in content analysis of CSRR from a firm’s 
annual report: a score sheet is prepared (1 score sheet per firm-year). Since the current 
study involves a five-year analysis, five score sheets are prepared for each sample firm. 
For each firm-year, the number of CSR-related sentences is counted and categorised 
according to the CSRR checklist provided in the score sheet. In measuring the quality of 
CSRR, the CSR-related sentences that have been categorised is given a specific value 
(from 0 to 3) based on the criteria determined in the score sheet. Table 5.6 provides 
examples of CSR-related sentences with their respective score. These examples are 
extracted from firms’ annual reports of 2009 that represents the most recent year of data 
used in the current study.  
The use of self-constructed reporting index involves subjective assessment by 
researcher, who administers the reporting index (Botosan, 1997). In this case, 
Cronbach’s coefficient alpha (Cronbach, 1951) is used to assess the internal consistency 
reliability and validity of the CSRR’s measurements used in the current study. 
Cronbach’s coefficient alpha of 0.850 for CSRR quantity and 0.862 for CSRR quality 
were obtained, which is above the minimum acceptable level of reliability (Cronbach’s 
coefficient alpha of 0.80) as suggested by Lance, Butts and Michels (2006). In other 
words, both CSRR quantity (CSRRQN) and CSRR quality (CSRRQL) used in study 
provide reliable measurement of CSRR based on the Cronbach’s coefficient alpha 
reported.  
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Table 5.6: Examples of CSR-related sentences with their respective score 
Example of extracts Firm Name 
Location 
(Page) 
Score 
ENVIRONMENT 
Pollution control/abatement (E1) 
RWG has implemented various initiatives in 2009 to 
prevent water, land and air pollution. To prevent water 
pollution, the Yearly Sanitary Survey is conducted on 
the water supply system and remedial actions are 
taken to trace and remove possible contamination 
sources. Biodegradable chemicals were used for 
laundry, rooms, cleaning of public areas and 
stewarding. Besides this, diesel engines at pump 
houses were replaced with electrical motors to reduce 
water source contamination from diesel spillage. To 
prevent land pollution, recycling is practised to reduce 
waste disposal at landfill sites and the use of bio-
degradable products such as plastic bags and paper 
wrappers are promoted. To control air pollution, 
smoke density meters were installed to monitor flue 
gas quality generated by boilers. Flue gas analyses 
were also carried out for generator sets, boilers and 
incinerators in accordance with Written Approval 
issued by the Department of Environment, in line with 
the Environmental Quality Act. Air pollution control 
systems were also installed to treat the flue gas. 
GENTING 38 1 
We have a single-minded goal of reducing our Carbon 
emissions by 50% by 2012. To ensure this, we 
initiated the Deep Green Programme – a holistic 
approach which helps map out and internalize our 
approach towards the environment. 
DIGI 37 2 
Raw water contamination can lead to plant shutdown 
cases, especially during periods of dry weather when 
the river level is reduced significantly and yet the 
pollution remain unchanged due to continuous 
discharges from industries or activities upstream of the 
intake. In 2009, although only 21 cases of plant 
shutdowns were recorded, there was a loss of 
production of 5,822.50 hours with a revenue loss of 
RM756,880.00 (2008:247 cases, 5,720.11 hours of 
production loss with RM261,144.00 loss in revenue) 
due to the longer periods of plant shutdown time. 
PUNCAK 130 3 
Environmental conservation and repairs (E2) 
We practise internationally-recognised Reduced 
Impact Logging (‘RIL’) techniques in our harvesting 
operations. RIL is a technique that minimises damage 
to the residual stands and soil. 
JTIASA 18 1 
 
217 
 
Table 5.6: Examples of CSR-related sentences with their respective score (Continued) 
Example of extracts Firm Name 
Location 
(Page) 
Score 
Environmental conservation and repairs (E2) (Continued) 
For decades, we have focused on maintaining 
environmental awareness and striving to the best of 
our abilities to create a balance between economy and 
ecology within the framework of our plantations’ 
ecosystem. Conservation of jungle reserves and 
wildlife sanctuaries as well as promoting green 
corridors are examples of this commitment to the 
environment. To date, United Plantations has set aside 
about 4,000-5,000 hectares of land for conservation 
representing approximately 8-10% of our total land 
area. 
UTDPLT 42 2 
The AmBank Group’s sponsorship of Zoo Negara’s 
Dromedary Camels for a 24th consecutive year 
continued with a contribution of RM40,000. 
AMMB 54 3 
Energy conservation (E3) 
A professional consultant is engaged to conduct an 
energy audit to identify cost-effective energy-saving 
opportunities in line with the building energy 
efficiency index. Measures include installation of 
energy-saving lights and reduction of heat loads from 
air-conditioning systems. Escalators are switched off 
during off-peak times and sensors are installed to 
control operations. Employees are also briefed on 
Energy Conservation Awareness by the Group’s 
Engineering Department. In 2009, RWG employed a 
heat recovery system by installing air pre-heaters at 
steam plants to conserve energy. Traps were replaced 
with fixed orifice steam traps to limit steam loss. 
Steam plant operations were also optimised to reduce 
steam losses and leakages, and to prevent short 
cycling on boiler operations. 
GENTING 38 1 
The biomass co-gen power plant commissioned in 
2008 is another initiative towards reducing global 
warming. The wood residue is converted into 
renewable energy, capable of generating up to 11.4 
megawatts of electricity, which provides the power to 
run the plywood mill and sawmill thereby savings on 
electricity bill. 
TAANN 43 2 
Within ExxonMobil's global refining business, the 
Port Dickson Refinery (PDR) is among the leaders in 
energy conservation. It sustained high levels of energy 
efficiency, and reduced greenhouse gas emissions at 
the plant by applying ExxonMobil's Global Energy 
Management System Best Practices across all aspects 
of refinery operations. Operational efficiencies at PDR 
have resulted in savings of almost RM7 million. 
ESSO 15 3 
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Table 5.6: Examples of CSR-related sentences with their respective score (Continued) 
Example of extracts Firm Name 
Location 
(Page) 
Score 
Resource conservation and waste management (E4)  
All industrial wastes from the Group’s operations are 
properly treated and disposed of in safe and 
environmental friendly ways. 
HIAPTEK 32 1 
In 2009, CMS Cement which is certified with the ISO 
14001 Environmental Management System achieved a 
33% reduction in wastage from spilt cement. 
CMSB 27 2 
KFCH has set up a waste water treatment plant at 
Kompleks KFC Glenmarie, which houses the Bakery 
and Commissary division. The plant uses a system that 
treats the final discharge waste water in accordance 
with the DOE Standard B for discharge. The proposed 
treatment process will use the Biological Treatment 
System, which uses a UASB (Up-Flow Anaerobic 
Sludge Bed) and AICAR (Alternative Intermittent 
Cyclic Reactor). The estimated cost of the entire 
project is RM1.5 million. 
KFC 45 3 
ISO 14001/14004 (Environmental Management System) certification (E5) 
Our Sedenak Estate was among the first palm oil 
estates in the world to achieve ISO 14001 
certification, and we apply the system to manage our 
environmental impact throughout our operations. 
KULIM 128 1 
Currently, 11 Group companies have successfully 
attained the ISO MS 14001. 
DRBHCOM 79 2 
N/A   3 
Environmental awards (E6) 
In March 2010, Shangri-La Hotel Kuala Lumpur was 
honoured with an award under the Environment 
category at the Prime Minister’s CSR Awards 2009. 
This award is the highest accolade for corporate 
organisations, and aims to recognise companies which 
have made a difference to the communities in which 
they operate through their CSR programmes. The 
Environment category recognises companies that have 
demonstrated leadership and commitment in the 
improvement, preservation and protection of the 
environment. 
SHANG 44 1 
The mine achieved significant progress in its 
management of the environment. Two of employees 
received awards in 2009 for their outstanding efforts 
in pollution control and management. The first award 
was given by the Pollution Control Association of the 
Philippines, Inc (PCAPI) to Ms Carmelita Pacis for 
being one of the outstanding pollution control officers 
in 2009. The other award went to Mr Roger Corpus 
for being one of the Outstanding Mining Engineers for 
2009 in the field of Mine Management.  
MSC 23 2 
N/A   3 
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Table 5.6: Examples of CSR-related sentences with their respective score (Continued) 
Example of extracts Firm Name Location 
(Page) 
Score 
Other commitments towards environmental protection/sustainability (E7) 
In-house talk on 30 June 2009 to raise environmental 
awareness among Suria Group staff. 
SURIA 24 1 
Our commitment to the three-year ‘Going Green’ 
campaign implemented last year to inculcate an 
environmental conscious corporate culture amongst 
the employees of the Group began with raising 
awareness of the importance of reducing carbon 
footprint in the environment. The campaign had been 
structured into three phases. Phase 1 kicked off with a 
series of talks presented by several environmental 
specialists, amongst which are specialists from the 
Malaysian Nature Society, Forestry Department and 
Department of Environment, in which they presented 
current state of destruction and deterioration of the 
environment and shared environmental conservation 
tips. Over the 10 ‘lunch-and-learn’ sessions held 
during the financial year, more than 350 employees 
participated. The immediate results of such talks were 
seen in the many good ideas that were shared by the 
employees for reducing, reusing and recycling in the 
office, home and environment. These ideas were 
shared on a quarterly basis in the Group’s newsletter, 
The LOOP. 
HDBS 37 2 
A joint venture project with the Ministry of Housing 
and Local Government to publish awareness materials 
on recycling and solid waste management in the form 
of books and VCDs, cost RM1.5 million. 
DRBHCOM 81 3 
COMMUNITY 
Education (C1) 
Our contribution towards education can best be 
described as wide-ranging. In support of national 
schools and national-type vernacular schools located 
in the Group’s Malaysian estates and property 
townships, the Group has made contributions in the 
form of land for the school premises as well as regular 
donations in cash and kind to meet the varied needs of 
the schools and their students. 
GENP/ 
ASIATIC 
25 1 
38 students received the Young Achievers’ Award 
from Yayasan Tan Sri Lee Shin Cheng (“Yayasan”) at 
Palm Garden Hotel, IOI Resort. Various awards from 
primary to upper secondary levels namely UPSR, 
PMR, SPM, STPM and A-levels are distributed to 
young students to motivate them to strive for 
excellence in their studies. 
IOICORP 64 2 
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Education (C1) (Continued) 
TNB through its foundation, Yayasan Tenaga 
Nasional (YTN) provided scholarships and study 
loans amounting to RM34.6 million to 2,478 
outstanding and deserving students to pursue their 
tertiary education at local and world renowned 
universities abroad. This is a direct contribution 
towards the development of professional manpower 
for TNB and the Country. Since its inception in 1993, 
YTN has provided education sponsorship to more than 
8,820 students. 
TENAGA 179 3 
Charity (C2) 
Additionally, the Company also makes monetary 
donations and contributions to charitable organisations 
from time to time. 
CHIN TECK 22 1 
HSL’s traditional Chinese New Year donation 
programme saw grants to 14 local charitable 
organisations. 
HSL 9 2 
In the Klang Valley, Star Foundation donated a total 
of RM700,000 to charitable organisations, namely 
Hospis Malaysia, National Association of Women 
Entrepreneurs Malaysia (NAWEM), The Heart 
Foundation of Malaysia, Ti-Ratana Welfare Society, 
Ti- Ratana Community Centre Penchala, The Special 
Children Society of Ampang and the National Stroke 
Association of Malaysia (NASAM). 
STAR 56 3 
Art, culture and heritage (C3) 
Championing arts and culture, the Group was also the 
platinum sponsor of the Penang World Music Fest 
held in May 2008. 
E&O 34 1 
JTI Malaysia is committed to contributing in a 
meaningful and sustainable manner to the 
communities in which it serves. In 2009, the Company 
continued its Corporate Philanthropy programmes 
under two main pillars – ‘Support to the Elderly’ and 
providing financial assistance to the culture and arts 
industry. JTI Malaysia also renewed its support to two 
organisations that provide platforms to cultivate 
creativity and promote the performing arts. 
JTINTER 13 2 
To date, MRCB has spent more than RM1 million for 
the MRCB Art Awards. The event is open to all 
Malaysians with disabilities either mental or physical. 
All artworks were sold to raise money for charity. We 
aim to support our local professional artists by inviting 
them to donate their paintings for this competition. 
MRCB 14 3 
 
221 
 
Table 5.6: Examples of CSR-related sentences with their respective score (Continued) 
Example of extracts Firm Name Location 
(Page) 
Score 
Equality in community (C4) 
The Group continues to employ those with hearing 
impaired but able bodied as toll tellers. Most of these 
toll tellers have stayed with the group from as early as 
its inception whilst some went on retirement. 
MTD 
 
44 1 
The Hari Muhibah annual sports carnival is another 
unique event of the Group which showcases the mettle 
of some 400 disabled persons each year. 
TANJONG 29 2 
TNB continues its commitment to the public by 
contributing to the Ministry Of Education for the 
setting up of the “Centre of Special Education 
Services” in Putrajaya to cater for the educational 
needs of disabled children. For the financial year 
under review, YTN increased the donation by 
RM180,000.00, resulting in total contributions 
amounting to RM562,000.00 thus far. 
TENAGA 179 3 
Youth development and graduate employment programme (C5) 
The Group’s Graduate Development Programme aims 
to identify and develop young graduates into 
engineering talents to support the growth of the 
Group. This programme entails classroom training, 
on-the-job familiarisation, learning assignments as 
well as mentoring. 
HLIND 15 1 
The Management Trainee Programme exposes fresh 
graduates to all facets of Scomi’s business in 
preparation for senior executive positions. Nine new 
management trainees were recruited during the year 
under review, who will be rotated to three different 
departments over an 18 month period. Each rotation 
would last six months and is intended to provide them 
with a broad base on which to build their careers in 
Scomi. 
SCOMI 31 2 
AmBank Group continues to place emphasis on youth, 
and also in developing talent and stimulating 
excellence and achievement in games and sports. 
AmBank (M) Berhad contributed RM10,000 and 300 
NexG iTalk cards as main sponsor of the 4th Asian 
Universities Debating Championship 2008. It also 
became a three-year Charter Member of SportExcel, in 
support of sports development platform for youth, 
donating RM45,000 to the foundation. Concurrently, it 
also sponsored RM26,860 for the AmBank Group- 
rest Link-Sport Excel International Junior Golf 
Championship 2008 and the Grand Finals of the 
National Junior Golf Circuit 2008. As Main Sponsor, 
AmBank Group contributed RM200,000 to the 
Selangor Masters Golf Tournament held at the Seri 
Selangor Golf Club. 
AMMB 54 3 
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Employees participation in community service (C6)  
During the year, our subsidiary, Eluxion Media Sdn 
Bhd (“Eluxion Media”) organized a charity visit to the 
House of Joy and Sungei Way Old Folks Home. All 
the employees pulled together efforts to donate money 
and contribute goods to help these homes. The team 
spent a day with the kids and senior folks, bringing 
them food to share and cheer to their faces. 
GOLDIS 23 1 
Since 2007, CMS employees have been actively 
encouraged to directly participate in a variety of 
activities under the 'CMS Doing Good' community 
outreach programme. The programme serves in part to 
inculcate in our employees amore caring attitude 
towards those in need, and in part to profile CMS to 
the community at large that it is a company whose 
employees truly care about those in need and who are 
prepared to help outside of their office hours. Many 
employees have also opted to include their pledges of 
'Doing Good' as part of the annual Key Performance 
Indicators (KPI). In 2009, the aim was to continue the 
'Doing Good' culture of employee volunteerism and to 
improve safety at our workplace. The result was 4,218 
man-hours of employee volunteerism, out of which 
89%of this time went towards sustainable CSR causes. 
CMSB 26 2 
As part of the Group’s long-term community 
programme with the Ministry of Women, Family & 
Community Development, the employee volunteerism 
efforts under the Cahaya Kasih project continued with 
a total of 20 activities at seven adopted welfare homes 
nationwide. Maybank also contributed encyclopedias, 
electrical items, water coolers, birthday gifts and 
sports attire worth over RM100,000 to the residents of 
the homes. 
MAYBANK 178 3 
Community health and safety (C7) 
In addition, we conduct regular occupational safety 
and awareness programmes for our employees and 
participate in road safety campaigns during festive 
seasons to promote civic consciousness and safe 
driving habits in our community. Our Yamaha 
division has been working together with the Ministry 
of Transport to intensify its road safety riding 
programme for motorcyclists, Yamaha Safety Riding 
Science, by reaching out to a wider audience of 
factory workers who use motorcycles as their primary 
means of transport, while continuing with free 
inspection checks for all brands of motorcycles during 
the Hari Raya festive period. 
HLIND 16 1 
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Community health and safety (C7) (Continued) 
The Group embarked on a year-long road safety 
campaign with the Ministry of Transport, Ministry of 
Education, Road Safety Department and the Road 
Safety Marshal Club - ‘Kempen Topi Keledar Kanak-
Kanak Genting’. Some 4,500 primary school students 
from nine states were educated on various road safety 
practices such as crossing the road safely, adhering to 
traffi c and road signs, fastening seat belts and on 
proper helmet usage. All the students were each 
presented with a SIRIM-approved helmet. 
GENTING 41 2 
On 11 November 2009, Lonpac organised its 
Community Health Day 2009 with the support from 
the National Kidney Foundation (‘NKF’). The 
programme was opened to the participation of Lonpac 
staff and the working community at Bangunan Public 
Bank, Jalan Sultan Sulaiman, Kuala Lumpur. During 
the event, NKF conducted kidney outreach 
programme through activities such as health talk on 
‘Kidney Disease: Common, Harmful But Treatable’, 
health screening and counselling. A total of 101 
participants undergone the health screening and 
counselling provided by NKF personnels during the 
Lonpac Community Health Day. In support of the 
NKF’s good work, Lonpac contributed RM28,000 to 
NKF towards the purchase of the much needed 
dialysis equipment for their centres with the hope that 
many Malaysians who have been diagnosed with 
kidney damage will be able to receive the proper 
counsel and dialysis support from the foundation. 
LPI 134 3 
Community and infrastructure support (C8) 
Our Group has over the years placed great emphasis 
on enhancing the quality of life of the communities 
where we operate. This is evidenced by the Group’s 
wide-ranging contributions in areas of education, 
infrastructure, cultural and social development 
initiatives. It is the Group’s practice to create and offer 
priority in job opportunities to local villagers, either 
by way of direct employment or through the award of 
contract works.  
KMLOONG 35 1 
The Bank also collaborated with JAKIM to sponsor 13 
episodes of a television programme to raise public 
awareness on the need to elevate the well-being of 
communities. 
BIMB 31 2 
QL’s FAS continue to provide financial assistance 
through interest free advances to fishermen in the rural 
region. These advances are to help them to build, 
upgrade and modernize their fishing fleet. Our 
advances to fishermen (totalling more than 690 
fishermen) to-date amount to more than RM23million. 
QL 32 3 
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Community awards (C9)  
TM won the coveted Starbiz-ICRM CR Awards 2009 
in the Community category for its best practices. 
TM 171 1 
N/A   2 
N/A   3 
Community engagement (C10) 
Our dialogue sessions with the community have also 
been useful in establishing good rapport and better 
understanding in resolving issues of mutual interests. 
TWS 66 1 
 
MRCB conducts community dialogue with three 
stakeholders at Symphony Hall, Level 3, Stesen 
Sentral Kuala Lumpur to inform all relevant 
stakeholders of the impending development of Lot G 
as well as the traffic diversions at Kuala Lumpur 
Sentral, specifically Jalan Stesen Sentral 3. 
MRCB 24 2 
Community Leaders Outreach Programme or better 
known as CLOP is one of TNB’s CSR programmes 
inspired by TNB’s President/Chief Executive Officer 
in early 2005 to enhance the existing platform to 
communicate with customers and the local 
community. Its main objective is to obtain feedback 
on the quality of services provided by TNB and 
provide information on company policies and services 
to community leaders and the community at large. The 
programme was conducted through dialogue sessions 
where TNB top management and local management 
served as panellists. It allowed community leaders as 
well as heads of political parties at the district level, 
heads of local Government departments, heads of 
villages, and stakeholders to engage in discussions on 
specific issues on TNB services, complaints, enquiries 
and ideas. The feedback is used as an indicator to 
improve services. In conjunction with the programme, 
TNB had organised exhibitions to disseminate 
information about the company, its products, services 
and activities. In FY2008/2009, a cost of 
RM170,000.00 was incurred in organizing this 
programme at 21 locations nationwide. 
TENAGA 177-178 3 
Support for national pride / government sponsored campaigns (C11) 
In 2009, Pos Malaysia continued to support its 
adopted schools under the PINTAR Programme. 
Students from Sekolah Menengah Kebangsaan Sungai 
Acheh, Nibong Tebal and Sekolah Kebangsaan Kuala 
Perai, Bagan Dalam, Pulau Pinang were sent to 
motivational camps to guide them in their preparations 
for SPM and UPSR. 
POS 
 
74 1 
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Support for national pride / government sponsored campaigns (C11) (Continued) 
To promote a sense of unity within a celebratory 
experience for the nation, the Ambang 2009 Kuala 
Lumpur concert was held to usher in the new year 
with a myriad of popular Malaysian artistes at Dataran 
Merdeka. Similarly, in conjunction with the 51st 
Merdeka celebrations, the Group sponsored a 10-
minute firework display and 50,000 ballons for a 
festive evening at Dataran Merdeka.  
AMMB 55 2 
To celebrate Malaysia’s 51 years as a nation in 2008, 
Maybank joined in as principal coordinator leading the 
financial sector contingent in the Merdeka Parade. The 
Group spent RM1.2 million for various programmes 
during the month long Merdeka celebrations, 
including TV commercials to promote the spirit of 
patriotism and unity among Malaysians. 
MAYBANK 178 3 
WORKPLACE 
Employee health and safety (H&S) (W1) 
The Group strived to ensure a creation of a safe and 
healthy working environment for its employees to 
work in. During the year, the Group has organised fire 
drills, safety and health talks as well as plant 
evacuation exercises at its various properties. Steps 
were also taken to ensure that equipment and building 
safety systems were functioning properly and well 
maintained. 
ASIAFLE 14 1 
Overall, efforts in reducing work accidents have been 
positive. We have been experiencing a steady 
reduction in the number of incidences since 2008. The 
number of incidents in the year 2009 saw a decline of 
41% compared to the year 2008. 
STAR 51 2 
The H 1N1 (swine flu) outbreak began in April 2009. 
A flu pandemic is a global outbreak of disease that 
occurs when a new influenza virus appears to which 
people have little or no immunity. It affects people of 
all ages, backgrounds and locations, and could cause 
high numbers of illness and death as well as social and 
business disruption. TM took a serious view of the 
possible effects of this pandemic on its employees and 
their families, thus applied concrete actions by 
activating the Pandemic Preparedness Team. The 
existing Pandemic Preparedness Plan was reviewed to 
identify appropriate steps to prevent the spread of the 
virus in TM’s premises. About RM80,000 was spent 
on providing protective equipment, sanitisers and 
thermometers to staff in all premises. The Plan was 
successfully carried out, resulting in minimal impact 
of internal infection. The experience places TM in 
good stead face the Second Wave if it comes. 
TM 165 3 
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Human capital development (W2) 
As a learning-based organisation, we firmly believe in 
continuous training and development. Various 
programmes were held throughout the year to focus on 
upgrading the competencies of our people in order to 
unleash their hidden potential while creating a talent 
pool for succession planning. Investment is made in 
structured on-the-job training, workshops and 
seminars covering areas on management, technical, 
communication, leadership and soft-skills. 
DLADY 15 1 
A firm believer in life-long learning, AEON continued 
to encourage its people to pursue further education for 
their personal and career growth. Under the OUM 
programme in which AEON collaborated with the 
Open University Malaysia, AEON subsidised 80% of 
the education fees of its people. For 2009, a total of 95 
employees were enrolled under this programme in 
various academic fields. 
AEON 7 2 
Goldis regards human resources as “assets” and 
supports activities that enable employees to become 
aware of their personal development and heighten 
their abilities. The greater part of personal growth is 
realised through work. Therefore, Goldis is focused on 
building a workplace environment where each 
employee can work cheerfully and energetically, and 
on bringing out employees’ distinctive qualities to the 
maximum extent. Employees are encouraged to attend 
Training and Development (‘T&D’) programmes to 
enhance their skills and competencies and to ensure 
that they are equipped, empowered and motivated to 
carry out their duties. The Group spent a total of 
RM172,870.00 on T&D programmes for the year 
under review. 
GOLDIS 23 3 
Workplace diversity and equal opportunity (W3) 
The Group develops talent regardless of race, gender 
or religious belief. 
GUOCO 30 1 
Diversity and inclusion at MRCB focuses on gender, 
race and religion. The total number of employees at 
MRCB was 1,149 at the end of 2009. MRCB’s 
workforce is 100% Malaysian, out of which 89.2% are 
Malay, 5.6% Chinese, 3.6% Indian and 1.6% of other 
ethnicities. 28.1 % of our total workforce and 20% of 
managerial staff are women. We practice equal 
opportunity in hiring and internal control and in 
remuneration between men and women at MRCB. We 
are a bias-free organisation and motivate our staff to 
perform at their best. 
MRCB 14 2 
N/A   3 
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Employee appreciation (W4) 
In appreciating the contribution of our staff, an annual 
dinner was organised. 
DAIMAN 23 1 
We celebrate and award our employees who attain 
their career milestone every five-year with the Long 
Service Award banquet and company keep sakes. In 
March 2010, the Company rewarded a total of 878 
employees who have completed 5, 10 and 15 years of 
service with the Company. 
UNISEM 17 2 
In 2009, despite the recessionary economic conditions, 
the Public Bank Group continued to reward 
performing staff with handsome bonuses and generous 
increments based on their contribution to the Group’s 
performance in 2008. A sum of RM106 million was 
paid in performance bonuses to all levels of staff with 
top performers being paid bonuses of up to 23 months 
of salary.  
PBBANK 178 3 
OHSAS 18001 (Occupational Health and Safety Management Systems) certification (W5) 
RWG’s Human Resources Department, through its 
Occupational, Safety and Health (“OSH”) Section, has 
initiated Mentoring Programme on ISO 14001 and 
OHSAS 18001 for Awana Genting Highlands, Awana 
Langkawi, Awana Kijal and Casino Department.  
GENTING 38 1 
There is strong commitment and a clear policy to 
provide a safe and healthy work environment for all. 
Safety standards are continuously being improved and 
in 2009, six (6) companies in the Group achieved 
OHSAS 18001:2007 certification. 
UMW 30 2 
N/A   3 
Employee relation/engagement (W6) 
Quarterly staff meetings, regular digital corporate 
updates and employee engagement activities are some 
of the platforms used to promote better employee 
communication. 
AMWAY 26 1 
About 15 employees from around the nation are 
selected on a random basis every month to have 
evening tea with the Group CEO. The Group CEO 
himself makes regular state visits and presents the 
Group’s financial results every quarterly, the briefings 
streamed live to all state offices. Employees are 
further kept up-to-date with developments in the 
Group via print and electronic newsletters. These 
initiatives have had a positive impact, as reflected in 
the annual Employee Satisfaction Index. In 2009, TM 
scored 8.5%, compared with 8.6% in 2008. 
TM 169 2 
N/A                                                                3 
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Workplace awards (W7) 
Our high safety standards have been acknowledged by 
the Department of Occupational Safety and Health, 
Ministry of Human Resources in the award to KLK 
for “Best Estate OSH Practice in Perak”. 
KLK 32 1 
Apart from the Group’s property development awards, 
it has also made it to the Hewitt Best Employers list 
thrice. The first was in 2003 where S P Setia was 
named one of the top 10 Best Employers in Malaysia 
followed by 2005 where the Group emerged as one of 
the top three employers – the only Malaysian company 
amongst the three with the other two being 
multinationals – and again in 2009. 
SPSETIA 2 2 
N/A   3 
Employee remuneration, benefit and assistance (W8) 
The Bank also provides incentives for children of 
employees with excellent examination results, has 
made a sundry fund available to employees requiring 
financial assistance, and offers staff daily religious 
lectures delivered by notable in-house and invited 
speakers. 
BIMB 28 1 
In 2009, nine needy employees and their families 
benefited from financial assistance by the Group 
rendered through the Compassionate Fund. Monies 
disbursed were to assist with mishaps to homes 
following natural disasters or fire, injury due to freak 
accidents, for medical ailments, and for death.  
CMSB 25 2 
Since January 2009, 100 children of staff have been 
granted RM50 per month under the education 
assistance allowance provision for staff. As of June 
2009, a total of RM29,100 has been paid out. 
SUNRISE 61 3 
Work-life balance (W9)  
The Group continued to make an effort towards 
encouraging work-life balance to its employees. 
Various recreational activities were organised during 
the year by the Group’s Sports and Social Club. 
Among them are family days, trips to local tourist 
destinations, futsal and bowling tournaments and 
badminton competitions. 
KIANJOO 7 1 
During 2009, Sports & Recreation Club of the 
Company (the “Club”) organised sports events such as 
Badminton, Bowling, Carrom, Chess, Fishing, Futsal, 
Netball, Paintball, Snooker, Table Tennis and 
Volleyball competitions. The Club also organised 
Miss Kebaya Queen and Fresh Flower Decoration 
Competitions to promote employees’ teamwork in 
terms of planning, creativity, innovation and time 
management. There were 17 and 26 employees 
participated in the Miss Kebaya Queen and Fresh 
Flower Decoration Competitions respectively. 
UNISEM 18 2 
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Work-life balance (W9) (Continued) 
The Group continued to support Maybankers by 
encouraging the pursuit of a healthy lifestyle. During 
the year, more than RM1.5 million was disbursed for 
employee sport activities as well as the upgrading of 
the Menara Maybank Recreation Centre. In the 
tournaments which Maybank participated, the Bank 
emerged champions in the inter-financial institution 
games in golf, football, carrom and snooker. The 
annual Maybank Games which includes badminton, 
netball, basketball, football, hockey, table tennis, 
sepak takraw, tennis, futsal, squash and golf, attracted 
over 1,800 Maybankers from its Malaysian and 
Singapore operations. 
MAYBANK 183 3 
Industrial relations (W10) 
The company continues to support the Code of 
Conduct for Industrial Harmony that provides for 
freedom of association with regard to employees 
joining unions. The harmonious relationship between 
the unions and management has been beneficial to the 
organisation’s growth. 
STAR 51 1 
TM has three in-house unions – the National Union of 
Telecommunication Employees (NUTE), Sabah Union 
of Telecommunication Employees (SUTE) and Union 
of Telecommunication Employees Sarawak (UTES), 
representing non-executives in Peninsular Malaysia, 
Sabah and Sarawak respectively. TM maintains 
regular and open dialogue with these unions, updating 
them of major business changes and resolving matters 
pertaining to collective agreements or operational 
issues. Issues are mediated primarily by the National 
Joint Council (NJC) and the Standing Committee 
(SC), both of which are equally represented by TM 
and the unions. The NJC holds at least four meetings a 
year, while the SC convenes to deal with matters that 
failed to be resolved at lower levels, or when the 
interpretation of a collective agreement is in question. 
Cordial relations with the unions are strengthened by 
inviting their representatives to company activities and 
events. 
TM 170 2 
As a responsible employer, PowerSeraya is committed 
to the principles of the Tripartite approach in 
Singapore and has pledged a phased contribution of 
SGD350,000 over a period of five years from 2008 at 
SGD70,000 per year to the Union of Power and Gas 
and Employees (“UPAGE”) in Singapore. The 
objective of the fund is to aid UPAGE in diversifying 
and developing new revenue streams, so as to ensure 
the optimal delivery of membership services in the 
areas of welfare, leadership development and training. 
YTLPOWR 13 3 
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MARKETPLACE 
Product development (M1) 
Eco World consists of a range of environmental-
friendly stationary products comprising envelopes, 
papers and files; with future additions as NTHB 
continues to put in-depth research into its 
environmental friendly production processes. The 
materials are sourced from recyclable paper or 
production waste generated from NTHB’s existing 
tissue manufacturing plant. 
NTPM 14 1 
The Group’s 20-year agreement with the Forestry 
Tasmania, an Australian government agency for the 
monthly supply of 15,000m
3
 of planted eucalyptus 
billets from re-growth forests to each of the two 
veneer mills, is our first step towards production of 
products that are environmentally friendly. The two 
mills, located at Huon and Smithton, Tasmania have 
created new jobs for the local community, and more 
importantly enable the Group to produce 
environmentally friendly eco-products from their 
PEFC certified forests that are envisaged in our 
mission statement. 
TAAN 44 2 
During the year, the Group invested RM267 million in 
capital expenditures, mainly in new manufacturing 
lines which will increase production capacity as well 
as provide flexibility for product innovations and 
renovations. 
NESTLE 19 3 
Product/service quality (M2) 
MIECO upgraded its Quality Management System 
certificate to MS ISO 9001:2008, which was awarded 
by AJA EQS Certification (M) Sdn Bhd and 
accredited by Standards Malaysia.                                                                                                                                                                                       
BRDB 50 1 
This year, the Bank achieved the ISO 9001:2000 
Quality Management System certification for another 
30 branches in Kuala Lumpur which brings the total 
number of branches with this certification to 65 
branches. 
HLBANK 24 2 
N/A   3 
Product/service safety (M3) 
Our plywood mill has also obtained ‘CE marking’ for 
its products, another European product marking and 
certification system that guarantees our products 
comply with all applicable European product safety, 
health and environmental requirements within the CE 
marking system. This achievement is the result of our 
active pursuit of manufacturing products that are 
environmentally-friendly. 
TAANN 44 1 
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Product/service safety (M3) (Continued) 
Electricity Safety Awareness Campaign is a 
programme designed to disseminate information and 
foster a positive awareness and better knowledge on 
electricity safety amongst school teachers and all 
members of society. School teachers were identified as 
the target group for this campaign as it is believed that 
they can play an important role in spreading awareness 
among the students on the dangers of misuse of 
electricity and the proper way to handle electrical 
appliances. The campaign was conducted through half 
day seminars with three main modules that provide 
information related to basic electricity safety, safety 
for electrical domestic installations; and safety at or 
near TNB’s electricity installations. TNB had been 
working closely with State Education Departments to 
ensure the success of this campaign. During the period 
under review, 2,112 teachers throughout Malaysia had 
benefitted from this program. 
TENAGA 177 2 
In 2009, we invested RM443 million on maintenance 
activities to ensure the safety and comfort of highway 
users. 
PLUS 87 3 
Corporate governance (M4) 
At Goldis Group, we believe in conducting our 
business ethically, with integrity and transparency, 
which is one of the hallmarks of our culture. Our 
shared beliefs and values ensure that we have high 
moral standards, respect our people, clients, 
community and the law as we continue to strive for 
excellence in everything we do. 
GOLDIS 24 1 
N/A   2 
N/A   3 
Supplier relation/engagement (M5) 
From time to time, we organise seminars with our 
contractors and suppliers, in addition to the 
programmes held for contractors to upgrade their class 
of contractors. Such seminars are aimed at improving 
the overall quality of workmanship and supplies in 
order to meet the highest standards of quality we 
require. 
RANHILL 35 1 
A half-day Safety Dialogue with our suppliers was 
organised in May. The aim of the dialogue was to 
improve communication with our key suppliers on 
safety initiatives and to follow-up on any safety issue 
or concern. Four main safety topics were discussed 
through an interactive workshop setting. From the 
exchange of views with our suppliers, they have a 
clearer understanding of the Lafarge Safety Vision.  
LMCEMNT 17 2 
N/A   3 
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Table 5.6: Examples of CSR-related sentences with their respective score (Continued) 
Example of extracts Firm Name Location 
(Page) 
Score 
Customer relation/satisfaction (M6) 
As one of the key players in the global timber 
industry, we have an extensive list of customers. 
Strong customer loyalty has brought us long-term 
support from those who are impressed by our 
expertise, values and services. We place great 
emphasis on customer feedback as we deem it to be an 
important element in ensuring continuous 
improvements of our products, services and processes. 
JTIASA 22 1 
Through the SEGAR initiative (Service Excellence 
(SE) – KPJ Way Group Alignment and Re-
engineering), KPJ propagates ‘Service Excellence – 
the KPJ Way’. Under SEGAR, Standard Operating 
Procedures are issued to provide guidelines, policies 
and procedures, Standard People Practice and Quality 
Objectives with the purpose of developing Core 
Processes for all services. SEGAR emphasises on 
having unit based guidelines with a focused point of 
entry and the enhancement of the autonomy of staff in 
performing their daily tasks. Nine core processes, 
mainly for finance services, have so far been 
developed, followed next by the development of core 
processes for Allied Health and Support Services. 
KPJ 30 2 
Public Bank participated in Bank Negara Malaysia’s 
Financial Awareness Week Exhibition 2009 with a 
sponsorship of RM25,000. The exhibition was held in 
Kuala Terengganu from 22 to 24 October 2009 and 
sought to provide a platform to increase the financial 
knowledge and awareness among the consumers in the 
East coast states. 
PBBANK 182 3 
Stakeholder engagement (M7) 
The Group recognises the importance of maintaining 
transparency and accountability to the investment 
community and is thus committed to cultivate the best 
practices in complying with all laws and regulations 
and maintaining the highest Corporate Governance 
standards. Our carefully planned investor relations 
programme aims to establish and maintain open 
communications with shareholders and investors so as 
to provide timely information and assure the best 
possible transparency. We keep the market and 
investors well versed with our key business activities, 
strategies and performance through general meetings, 
briefings and road shows. In addition, our website at 
www.jayatiasa.net also provides a wide range of 
information on the Group. 
JTIASA 22 1 
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Table 5.6: Examples of CSR-related sentences with their respective score (Continued) 
Example of extracts Firm Name Location 
(Page) 
Score 
Stakeholder engagement (M7) (Continued) 
As part of our ongoing commitment to hold open 
dialogues with all stakeholders, Nestlé held two 
Stakeholder Convening sessions on 9 January and 8 
December. In the session, we took the opportunity to 
share the development and improvements that we have 
undertaken to address the issues and suggestions 
highlighted in the previous convening principally in 
the areas of standards, nutrition, environment and 
supply chain. It was followed by roundtable 
discussions that resulted in recommendations, 
challenges and setting of expectations of Nestlé 
Malaysia in our position as the leading Nutrition, 
Health and Wellness company in the country. The 
session enabled us to gain valuable perspective and 
further insight into the priorities and areas of interest 
in the context of the participating stakeholders.  
NESTLE 37 2 
N/A   3 
Other stakeholders’ matters (M8) 
Through its participation in various public and 
industry programmes, JTI Malaysia remains 
committed to cooperating with the Government’s law 
enforcement agencies, key policymakers and retailers 
in the fight to eradicate the illicit cigarettes trade. 
JTINTER 13 
 
1 
MNRB is conscious of its commitment to all 
stakeholders and, in particular, the insurance industry. 
To instil a higher degree of professionalism in the 
industry by developing more professionals, MNRB 
identifies, organises and offers training programmes to 
the industry that are aimed to provide a platform for 
participants to exchange ideas and update themselves 
on current industry developments. More than ten (10) 
market training courses had been organised in 2008. 
These include the Annual Programme for Insurance 
Executives Development (PIED), which covers four 
(4) classes of insurance and two (2) outdoor training 
programmes including the Outward Bound School 
(OBS). 
MNRB 28 
 
2 
N/A   3 
Marketplace awards (M9) 
We were awarded several accolades in 2009, most 
notably the Malaysia Sustainability Reporting Awards 
(“MaSRA”) 2009, as Winner of the Best First Time 
Reporter and Commendation for Reporting on 
Strategy and Governance. 
KULIM 16 1 
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Table 5.6: Examples of CSR-related sentences with their respective score (Continued) 
Example of extracts Firm Name Location 
(Page) 
Score 
Marketplace awards (M9) (Continued) 
For the seventh consecutive year, we also clinched the 
Laboratory Excellence Award by the Malaysian 
Institute of Chemistry for demonstrating quality, 
safety, technical competency and a high standard of 
analytical services and industry. Your Company also 
had the privilege of receiving a Certificate of Merit in 
the National Annual Corporate Report Awards 
(‘NACRA’) once again, and won Shell’s 2009 
Manufacturing Executive Vice President’s Award, in 
recognition of its best practices and high level 
adherence in the area of Process Safety. 
SHELL 49 2 
N/A   3 
OTHERS  
CSR reporting standard/quality (O1) 
PNHB was the Winner for Integrated Reporting in an 
Annual Report for the ACCA Malaysia Sustainability 
Reporting Awards (MaSRA) 2009. 
PUNCAK 122 1 
We continue to maintain our excellent disclosure in 
reporting by achieving Application Level A+ in 
accordance to the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI-
G3) framework for Sustainability Reporting 2009. Our 
achievements were also recognised when MRCB won 
three categories of the ACCA Malaysia Sustainability 
Reporting Awards 2009 (ACCA MaSRA) – ‘Best 
Environmental Performance Report’, ‘Special 
Mention – Assurance Approach’ and was a finalist for 
the whole award. 
MRCB 11 2 
N/A   3 
CSR committee (O2) 
The Company’s Safety, Health & Environment Policy 
outlines Dutch Lady’s commitment and position on 
this. A specific department has the responsibility of 
maintaining occupational safety, health and 
environmental practices within the Company. It 
conducts periodic reviews, provide training and issue 
guidelines to equip our people with the necessary 
skills and knowledge to inculcate environmental 
awareness.XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX 
DLADY 15 1 
While a dedicated Corporate Social Responsibility 
(CSR) team is tasked to coordinate and implement CR 
initiatives, the Company is governed by a CSR 
Committee that comprises all members of British 
American Tobacco Malaysia’s functional directors, or 
Top Team as they are called. Chaired by the Managing 
Director, the CSR Committee reports on the 
Company’s CR initiatives to the Board of Directors 
via the Audit Committee and meets at least twice a 
year. 
BAT 55 2 
N/A   3 
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Table 5.6: Examples of CSR-related sentences with their respective score (Continued) 
Example of extracts Firm Name Location 
(Page) 
Score 
Other commitment statements to CSR (O3) 
Implementation of best practices for sustainable 
agriculture and environment are being pursued. Its 
Tawau Sabah plantations have obtained the certificate 
of sustainability under the Roundtable of Sustainable 
Palm Oil (‘RSPO’) certification scheme and more of 
its plantations in Malaysia and Indonesia will be 
applying for such certification. 
BKAWAN 12 1 
Sime Darby Berhad is a socially responsible corporate 
citizen committed to delivering a sustainable future. 
Towards this goal, four pillars – Environment, 
Community, Education and Sports – have been 
identified to support its corporate social responsibility 
initiatives, all predicated on the principles of nation 
building. The approach underlying Sime Darby 
Berhad’s corporate social responsibility initiatives 
reflects its core values of Respect & Responsibility, 
Excellence, Entrepreneurship and Integrity. 
SIME 84 2 
Provision of Value Added Statements PLUS 44 3 
 
5.8 REGRESSION MODEL 
The current study uses multiple regression analysis to test the influence of independent 
variables of corporate ownership structure and board of directors’ CSR experience on 
the dependent variable of CSRR quantity and quality. The regression analysis is also 
applied in examining the moderating effect of CSRR regulation on the association 
between corporate ownership structure and the quantity and quality of CSRR disclosed 
by firms. The use of multiple regression analysis is in line with the nature of the current 
study that looks into the association between a set of independent variables (a mix 
between dichotomous and continuous variables), moderating variable (dichotomous 
variable) and dependent variable (continuous variables) (Hayes & Matthes, 2009).  
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Moreover, several control variables were also included in the model to test the proposed 
hypotheses. All data used in the current study is analysed using SPSS version 19. Even 
though the data used in the current study involve multiple year data, the current study 
uses dichotomous variable to represent the moderating variable. The regulatory regime 
or CSRR regulation that is used to represent the moderating variable is divided into two 
periods only, namely voluntary and mandatory CSRR periods. In this case, using SPSS 
regression analysis as suggested by Hayes and Matthes (2009) is considered sufficient.  
The basic regression models examine the association between the independent and 
dependent variables used in the current study are as follows: 
Model 1 
CSRRQNit = β0 + β1MGRLOWNit + β2FAMOWNit + β3FOROWNit + 
β4GOVOWNit + β5CSREXPit + β6SIZEit + β7SHARIAHit + β8ROAit + 
β9INDit + β10LEVit + εit 
Model 2 
CSRRQLit = β0 + β1MGRLOWNit + β2FAMOWNit + β3FOROWNit + 
β4GOVOWNit + β5CSREXPit + β6SIZEit + β7SHARIAHit + β8ROAit + 
β9INDit + β10LEVit + εit 
To control the effect of different years of data sets used in the current study (from 2005 
to 2009), four dummy variables (DUM_YR06, DUM_YR07, DUM_YR08 and 
DUM_YR09) are introduced into the pooled data models as specified in Model 1a and 
Model 2a with 2005 representing the base year. The use of the different years of data 
sets in examining the association between corporate governance and CSRR may enable 
researcher of the current study to capture the effect of specific events (if any) that have 
occurred in a particular year, which affect the levels of CSRR disclosed by firms.  
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The specification of Model 1a and Model 2a are as follows: 
 Model 1a 
CSRRQNit = β0 + β1MGRLOWNit + β2FAMOWNit + β3FOROWNit + 
β4GOVOWNit + β5CSREXPit + β6SIZEit + β7SHARIAHit + β8ROAit + 
β9INDit + β10LEVit + β11DUM_YR06it + β12DUM_YR07it + 
β13DUM_YR08it + β14DUM_YR09it + εit 
 
Model 2a 
CSRRQLit = β0 + β1MGRLOWNit + β2FAMOWNit + β3FOROWNit + 
β4GOVOWNit + β5CSREXPit + β6SIZEit + β7SHARIAHit + β8ROAit + 
β9INDit + β10LEVit + β11DUM_YR06it + β12DUM_YR07it + 
β13DUM_YR08it + β14DUM_YR09it + εit 
Before testing the moderating role of CSRR regulation, multiple regression analysis is 
performed in order to examine the effect of CSRR regulation on the levels of CSRR 
disclosed. In other words, CSRR regulation is used as an independent variable to 
explain the variation in the levels of CSRR disclosed. The specifications for Model 1b 
and Model 2b are as follows:  
Model 1b 
CSRRQNit = β0 + β1MGRLOWNit + β2FAMOWNit + β3FOROWNit + 
β4GOVOWNit + β5CSREXPit + β6REGit + β7SIZEit + β8SHARIAHit + 
β9ROAit + β10INDit + β11LEVit + εit 
Model 2b 
CSRRQLit = β0 + β1MGRLOWNit + β2FAMOWNit + β3FOROWNit + 
β4GOVOWNit + β5CSREXPit + β6REGit + β7SIZEit + β8SHARIAHit + 
β9ROAit + β10INDit + β11LEVit + εit 
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The full multiple regression models adopted in the current study that include the 
moderating effect of CSRR regulation on the association between corporate ownership 
structure and CSRR disclosed by firms are as follows: 
Model 3 
CSRRQNit = β0 + β1MGRLOWNit + β2FAMOWNit + β3FOROWNit + 
β4GOVOWNit + β5CSREXPit + β6REGit + β7SIZEit + β8SHARIAHit + 
β9ROAit + β10INDit + β11LEVit + β12MGRLOWN*REGit+ 
β13FAMOWN*REGit + β14FOROWN*REGit + β15GOVOWN*REGit 
+ εit 
Model 4 
CSRRQLit = β0 + β1MGRLOWNit + β2FAMOWNit + β3FOROWNit + 
β4GOVOWNit + β5CSREXPit + β6REGit + β7SIZEit + β8SHARIAHit + 
β9ROAit + β10INDit + β11LEVit + β12MGRLOWN*REGit+ 
β13FAMOWN*REGit + β14FOROWN*REGit + β15GOVOWN*REGit 
+ εit 
Where: 
CSRRQNit = Number of sentences related to each item in the CSRR 
checklist, 
CSRRQLit = CSRR index (based on a weighted scoring method) that is 
computed by the ratio of actual score of CSRR awarded to the 
maximum score of CSRR attainable by the firm, 
MGRLOWNit = Percentage of shares held by executive directors to total 
numbers of shares issued, 
FAMOWNit = Percentage of family members on the board to total number of 
directors on the board, 
FOROWNit = Percentage of shares held by foreign shareholders to total 
numbers of shares issued, 
GOVOWNit = Percentage of shares held by government to total numbers of 
shares issued, 
CSREXPit = Percentage of directors with CSR experience to total number of 
directors on the board, 
REGit = Dichotomous with 1 for firm-year observations in year 2007, 
2008 and 2009, and 0 for year 2005 and 2006, 
SIZEit = Log of total assets, 
SHARIAHit = Dichotomous with 1 if the firm is listed as Shariah-approved 
firm and 0 if otherwise, 
ROAit = Return on asset, 
INDit = Dichotomous with 1 if the firm is classified as high profile firm 
and 0 if the firm is classified as low profile firm, 
LEVit = Total debt to total assets, 
 
239 
 
DUM_YR06it = Year 2006 
DUM_YR07it = Year 2007 
DUM_YR08it = Year 2008 
DUM_YR09it = Year 2009 
εit = Error term. 
Besides the main regression analysis based on Models 3 and 4, additional analysis is 
also conducted by using alternative measures to represent certain variables. This is to 
determine whether the existing results have been changed due to the adoption of 
different measures to represent certain variables. These additional analyses may indicate 
the consistency of the findings of the current study. Detailed discussions on the 
additional analysis performed in the current study are provided in Chapter six of this 
thesis. 
The application of the multiple regression analysis in testing the hypotheses of a study 
requires the establishment of sufficient sample size to ensure generalisability. 
According to Tabachnick and Fidell (2007), the following formula is used to calculate 
the sample size requirements, taking into account the number of independent variables 
used: N>50 + 8m (where m=number of independent variables). Hair, Black, Babin, 
Anderson and Tatham (2006) suggested a research to have 15 to 20 observations for 
each independent variable. Since five independent variables is used in the current study, 
the suggested sample size as formulated by Hair et al. (2006) and Tabachnick and Fidell 
(2007) is 100 and 90 observations, respectively. With reference to both requirements as 
outlined by Hair et al. (2006) and Tabachnick and Fidell (2007), the sample size used in 
the current study that is 180 firms with 5 year data, which is equivalent to 900 firm-year 
observations) is sufficient enough to make generalisation. The sample size is 
comparable with the one used in prior CSRR research, for example Haniffa and Cooke 
(2005) with 139 firms with 2 year data and Mallin et al. (2012) with 100 firms with 3 
year data. 
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The use of the multiple regression analysis also requires the data used in the current 
study to fulfil the assumptions of normality, multicollinearity, linearity and 
homoscedasticity. Detailed explanation and examination of the assumptions of the 
multiple regression analysis are provided in Chapter six. 
5.9 SUMMARY 
The current study is based on a set of research design and methodology that is aimed to 
meet the objectives of the study. Discussions that are presented in this chapter include 
research paradigm, sample selection process, measurements of research variable, data 
collection method and research instrument employed for the purpose of the current 
study. The current study adopts positivist research paradigm that applies quantitative 
techniques in conducting the research.  
In examining the association between corporate governance and CSRR, the current 
study investigates a sample of 180 public listed firms in Malaysia over a five-year 
period from 2005 to 2009. These time periods reflect both voluntary and mandatory 
CSRR period. A specific section is also allocated to explain about content analysis, 
being the procedure employed to analyse the quantity and quality of CSRR in the 
current study. The measurement of CSRR is based on a research instrument or a CSRR 
checklist that is designed specifically for the current study.  
The hypothesised relationship between independent (corporate ownership structure and 
board of directors’ CSR experience), dependent (quantity and quality of CSRR) and 
moderating variables (CSRR regulation) is demonstrated in the regression models. All 
the data involved in the current study are hand-collected based on secondary data 
sources that are publicly-available. Based on the nature of the data dan variables 
employed, the current study uses the SPSS software for data analysis purposes.  
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Overall, the current study has undergone rigorous research process to ensure the validity 
and reliability of both data collected and analysis. The research instrument of the 
current study was sent to the experts for validation process before being applied in the 
study. Pilot test and several reliability tests have also been performed to the research 
instrument and data collected in the current study to ensure the validity and reliability of 
both. This is vital as it reflects the validity and reliability of the data analysis performed 
and findings of the study. 
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CHAPTER 6: DATA ANALYSIS 
 
6.1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter aims to present the results revealed from content analysis and statistical 
analyses performed for the purpose of the current study, with discussions of the results 
are provided in Chapter seven. First, Section 6.2 provides the descriptive analysis of 
CSRR disclosed by firms in Malaysia over a five-year period from 2005 to 2009. Next, 
Section 6.3 elaborates the results generated from the correlation analysis and multiple 
regression analyses performed. These include descriptive analysis of the continuous and 
dichotomous variables used in the regression analyses in Section 6.3.1, correlation 
analysis in Section 6.3.2, results of the testing of the assumptions of multiple regression 
analysis in Section 6.3.3 and results of the multiple regression analyses performed in 
Section 6.3.4.  
Results of the hypotheses developed for the purpose of the current study are 
demonstrated in Section 6.4. The current study examines the association between 
corporate ownership structure (H1), board of directors’ CSR experience (H2) and the 
levels of CSRR disclosed by firms. In addition, the current study also investigates the 
moderating effect of CSRR regulation on the association between corporate ownership 
structure and CSRR (H3). Then, Section 6.5 discusses the additional analyses 
performed to test the robustness of the findings presented in Section 6.4. Finally, 
Section 6.6 summarises the chapter. 
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6.2 DESCRIPTIVE ANALYSIS OF CSRR 
Descriptive analysis of CSRR presented in the current study is based on the information 
gathered from the content analysis procedure. Five dimensions of CSRR used in the 
current study include the ‘environment’, ‘community’, ‘workplace’, ‘marketplace’ and 
‘others’. The five dimensions of CSRR reflect the continuous development of CSRR in 
Malaysia. These dimensions have been included in the Bursa Malaysia CSR Framework 
(2006) and Othman et al.’s (2011) study, with exception to ‘others’ dimension. The 
inclusion of ‘others’ dimension is important to take into account other CSR information 
that is not captured by the four dimensions of CSRR, for example, CSR development 
plans/policies/strategies/performance/reporting media.  
The descriptive analysis of CSRR of the current study presents the number and 
percentage of firms reporting at least one sentence on the respective CSRR items over 
the five-year period from 2005 to 2009 in Table 6.1, the quantity of CSRR measured by 
the number of sentences in Table 6.2, and the quality of CSRR analysed in terms of the 
number and percentage of firms reporting the different quality of CSRR, specifically 
non-reporting firms (see Table 6.3), general qualitative (see Table 6.4), qualitative 
specific (see Table 6.5) and quantitative (see Table 6.6) CSR information.  
Next, the descriptive statistics of CSRR quantity and CSRR quality are presented in 
Table 6.7 and Table 6.8, respectively. For the purpose of the current study, the levels of 
CSRR refer to the quantity and quality of CSRR disclosed by firms in Malaysia. While 
the quantity of CSRR describes the extent, amount or volume of CSRR disclosed, the 
quality of CSRR denotes the variety of reporting as well as the levels of importance 
placed by firms on certain items of CSRR. 
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6.2.1 Quantity of CSRR (By the Number of Reporting Firms and Sentences) 
The quantity of CSRR refers to the extent, amount or volume of CSRR disclosed. Table 
6.1 presents the number and percentage of firms reporting at least one sentence on the 
respective CSRR items over the five-year period from 2005 to 2009. ‘n’ refers to the 
number of reporting firms, while ‘%’ refers to the percentage of reporting firms. For 
example, under the environment’s dimension, 43 out of 180 firms report at least one 
sentence of pollution control/abatement (E1) information in their annual reports in year 
2005. This is equivalent to 23.89 percent of the sample firms. Overall, results presented 
in Table 6.1 indicates an increase in the number of firms that report at least one 
sentence on the respective CSRR items in their annual reports over the five year-period. 
This is consistent with the evidence found in prior longitudinal CSRR studies, for 
example, Gray et al. (1995a) in the UK, Niskala and Pretes (1995) in Finland, Saleh et 
al. (2010) in Malaysia and Mahadeo et al. (2011) in Mauritius. 
Nevertheless, several CSRR items show an immaterial reduction in the number of 
reporting firms in the selected year (see the shaded boxes in Table 6.1). For example, 
the number of firms reporting on ISO 14001/14004 (Environmental Management 
System) certification (W5) fell from 44 firms in 2007 to 36 firms in 2008. The 
percentage of firms reported on customer relation/satisfaction (M6) decline from 50.56 
percent in 2006 to 48.89 percent in 2007. Perhaps, these results may indicate the 
variation of CSRR disclosed by firms from time to time, as highlighted by several 
researchers; for example, Tsang (1998), Campbell et al. (2003) and Saleh et al. (2010).  
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Table 6.1: Number and Percentage of Firms Reporting at Least One Sentence on Respective CSRR Items in Corporate Annual Reports from 2005 to 2009 
No CSRR 
Number and Percentage of Reporting Firms                                                                           
(providing at least one sentence on respective CSRR item) 
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
n % n % n % n % n % 
 Environment            
1 Pollution control/abatement E1 43 23.89 58 32.22 91 50.56 110 61.11 121 67.22 
2 Environmental conservation and repairs E2 47 26.11 59 32.78 81 45.00 97 53.89 101 56.11 
3 Energy conservation E3 25 13.89 38 21.11 54 30.00 78 43.33 89 49.44 
4 Resource conservation and waste 
management 
E4 42 23.33 63 35.00 96 53.33 126 70.00 128 71.11 
5 ISO 14001/14004 (Environmental 
Management System) certification 
E5 21 11.67 30 16.67 44 24.44 36 20.00 49 27.22 
6 Environmental awards E6 10 5.56 8 4.44 13 7.22 20 11.11 23 12.78 
7 Other commitments towards environmental 
protection/sustainability 
E7 21 11.67 29 16.11 33 18.33 53 29.44 62 34.44 
 Community            
1 Education C1 54 30.00 77 42.78 103 57.22 117 65.00 116 64.44 
2 Charity C2 82 45.56 109 60.56 134 74.44 150 83.33 148 82.22 
3 Art, culture and heritage C3 18 10.00 22 12.22 33 18.33 38 21.11 44 24.44 
4 Equality in community C4 7 3.89 11 6.11 11 6.11 12 6.67 14 7.78 
5 Youth development and graduate 
employment programme 
C5 30 16.67 56 31.11 78 43.33 78 43.33 88 48.89 
6 Employees participation in community 
service 
C6 40 22.22 60 33.33 84 46.67 97 53.89 98 54.44 
7 Community health and safety C7 52 28.89 56 31.11 73 40.56 85 47.22 82 45.56 
8 Community and infrastructure support C8 46 25.56 75 41.67 93 51.67 98 54.44 105 58.33 
9 Community awards C9 1 0.56 5 2.78 4 2.22 10 5.56 15 8.33 
10 Community engagement C10 14 7.78 16 8.89 27 15.00 26 14.44 33 18.33 
11 Support for national pride/government 
sponsored campaigns 
C11 28 15.56 39 21.67 57 31.67 40 22.22 42 23.33 
Note: Shaded boxes indicate reduction in the number of reporting firms in selected years.  
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Table 6.1: Number and Percentage of Firms Reporting at Least One Sentence on Respective CSRR Items in Corporate Annual Reports from 2005 to 2009 (Continued) 
No CSRR 
Number and Percentage of Reporting Firms                                                                                 
(providing at least one sentence on respective CSRR item) 
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
n % n % n % n % n % 
 Workplace            
1 Employee health and safety (H&S) W1 54 30.00 75 41.67 112 62.22 127 70.56 123 68.33 
2 Human capital development W2 100 55.56 101 56.11 127 70.56 133 73.89 138 76.67 
3 Workplace diversity and equal opportunity W3 16 8.89 24 13.33 41 22.78 50 27.78 43 23.89 
4 Employee appreciation W4 178 98.89 176 97.78 179 99.44 180 100.00 179 99.44 
5 
OHSAS 18001 (Occupational Health and 
Safety Management Systems) certification 
W5 18 10.00 23 12.78 36 20.00 34 18.89 33 18.33 
6 Employee relation/engagement W6 66 36.67 73 40.56 87 48.33 95 52.78 96 53.33 
7 Workplace awards W7 19 10.56 17 9.44 26 14.44 28 15.56 30 16.67 
8 
Employee remuneration, benefit and 
assistance 
W8 45 25.00 49 27.22 69 38.33 85 47.22 92 51.11 
9 Work-life balance W9 29 16.11 50 27.78 64 35.56 86 47.78 80 44.44 
10 Industrial relations W10 12 6.67 16 8.89 14 7.78 15 8.33 23 12.78 
 Marketplace            
1 Product development M1 17 9.44 27 15.00 38 21.11 40 22.22 48 26.67 
2 Product/service quality M2 54 30.00 57 31.67 61 33.89 66 36.67 63 35.00 
3 Product/service safety M3 31 17.22 33 18.33 35 19.44 41 22.78 43 23.89 
4 Corporate governance M4 174 96.67 179 99.44 180 100.00 179 99.44 180 100.00 
5 Supplier relation/engagement M5 15 8.33 23 12.78 35 19.44 44 24.44 44 24.44 
6 Customer relation/satisfaction M6 90 50.00 91 50.56 88 48.89 103 57.22 103 57.22 
7 Stakeholder engagement M7 178 98.89 177 98.33 180 100.00 180 100.00 180 100.00 
8 Other stakeholders’ matters M8 51 28.33 59 32.78 70 38.89 85 47.22 91 50.56 
9 Marketplace awards M9 20 11.11 23 12.78 27 15.00 28 15.56 25 13.89 
 Others            
1 CSR reporting standard/quality O1 5 2.78 7 3.89 8 4.44 13 7.22 13 7.22 
2 CSR committee O2 11 6.11 16 8.89 33 18.33 30 16.67 30 16.67 
3 Other commitment statements to CSR O3 79 43.89 93 51.67 144 80.00 163 90.56 164 91.11 
Note: Shaded boxes indicate reduction in the number of reporting firms in selected years.  
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A similar pattern of reporting is observed for the quantity of CSRR measured by the 
number of sentences as shown in Table 6.2. The increasing pattern of reporting is 
observed for each CSRR dimension and total CSRR; with the exception of several 
CSRR items that indicate a slight reduction in reporting during selected years (see the 
shaded boxes in Table 6.2). For example, the number of reported sentences on 
education (C1) decreases from 923 sentences in 2008 to 813 sentences in 2009, and 
human capital development (W2) information falls from 1473 sentences in 2008 to 
1423 sentences in 2009.  
Table 6.2: Quantity of CSRR (Measured by the Number of Sentences) 
No CSRR 
Quantity of CSRR 
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
 Environment       
1 Pollution control/abatement E1 277 421 616 754 848 
2 Environmental conservation and repairs E2 326 450 563 587 809 
3 Energy conservation E3 115 140 249 305 369 
4 Resource conservation and waste 
management 
E4 250 292 422 608 651 
5 ISO 14001/14004 (Environmental 
Management System) certification 
E5 58 76 114 97 123 
6 Environmental awards E6 29 30 52 56 59 
7 Other commitments towards 
environmental protection/sustainability 
E7 91 131 170 214 305 
 Total Environment (E)  1146 1540 2186 2621 3164 
 Community       
1 Education C1 323 505 717 923 813 
2 Charity C2 562 715 824 1051 1175 
3 Art, culture and heritage C3 124 111 142 144 167 
4 Equality in community C4 17 20 22 25 31 
5 Youth development and graduate 
employment programme 
C5 123 205 376 415 454 
6 Employees participation in community 
service 
C6 122 221 308 448 473 
7 Community health and safety C7 235 269 470 553 546 
8 Community and infrastructure support C8 210 385 507 556 586 
9 Community awards C9 2 7 8 23 45 
10 Community engagement C10 61 41 74 123 104 
11 Support for national pride/government 
sponsored campaigns 
C11 97 181 271 238 274 
 Total Community (C)  1876 2660 3719 4499 4668 
Note: Shaded boxes indicate reduction in the number of sentences in selected years.  
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Table 6.2: Quantity of CSRR (Measured by the Number of Sentences) (Continued) 
No CSRR 
Quantity of CSRR 
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
 Workplace       
1 Employee health and safety (H&S) W1 495 637 924 1125 1187 
2 Human capital development W2 829 929 1218 1473 1423 
3 Workplace diversity and equal opportunity W3 67 75 137 175 217 
4 Employee appreciation W4 479 453 507 571 641 
5 OHSAS 18001 (Occupational Health and 
Safety Management Systems) certification 
W5 43 62 76 62 70 
6 Employee relation/engagement W6 357 404 572 566 663 
7 Workplace awards W7 54 61 73 125 139 
8 Employee remuneration, benefit and 
assistance 
W8 144 182 253 399 421 
9 Work-life balance W9 112 152 221 309 348 
10 Industrial relations W10 26 36 50 66 105 
 Total Workplace (W)  2606 2991 4031 4871 5214 
 Marketplace       
1 Product development M1 58 89 146 199 265 
2 Product/service quality M2 165 187 223 248 211 
3 Product/service safety M3 161 279 267 336 331 
4 Corporate governance M4 814 880 1055 1178 1088 
5 Supplier relation/engagement M5 57 116 150 216 262 
6 Customer relation/satisfaction M6 907 1018 1036 1366 1451 
7 Stakeholder engagement M7 1676 1693 1919 2031 2143 
8 Other stakeholders’ matters M8 248 306 399 555 628 
9 Marketplace awards M9 105 69 140 86 77 
 Total Marketplace (M)  4191 4637 5335 6215 6456 
 Others       
1 CSR reporting standard/quality O1 12 27 56 64 74 
2 CSR committee O2 25 39 91 82 93 
3 Other commitment statements to CSR O3 334 640 1163 1259 1265 
 Total Others (O)  371 706 1310 1405 1432 
 Total CSRR Quantity (E+C+W+M+O)  10190 12534 16581 19611 20934 
Note: Shaded boxes indicate reduction in the number of sentences in selected years.  
 
Overall, the increasing trend of CSRR disclosed by firms over a period of time is 
consistent with the findings revealed in the prior CSRR research; for examples, Gray et 
al. (1995a) in the UK, Tsang (1998) in Singapore, Gao et al. (2005) in Hong Kong, 
Criado-Jimenez et al. (2008) in Spain and Pratten and Mashat (2009) in Libya. In line 
with Criado-Jimenez et al. (2008), perhaps the rising trend of CSRR in Malaysia could 
be explained by the implementation of CSRR regulation that take into effect from 
financial year 2007.  
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The shaded boxes in Table 6.1 and Table 6.2 denote the specific CSRR items that 
experienced a reduction in the number and percentage of firms that report at least one 
sentence on the respective CSRR items and the number of CSR-related sentences 
disclosed by firms. Among the CSRR items that experienced a reduction in the number 
of reporting firms from 2008 to 2009 are: community health and safety (C7), employee 
health and safety (W1), workplace diversity and equal opportunity (W3), and work-life 
balance (W9). In terms of the number of CSR-related sentences, education (C1), human 
capital development (W2) and corporate governance (M4) are among the CSRR items 
that incur a decline in reporting from 2008 to 2009. It is observed that such reduction is 
more apparent in the later period of the research data that is from 2008 to 2009. 
Referring to Table 6.1, under the environment’s dimension, a higher number of firms 
reports pollution control/abatement (E1), environmental conservation and repairs (E2) 
and resource conservation and waste management (E4), compared with the other 
environment-related items over the five-year of CSRR analysis. Two community-
related CSRR items with the highest percentage of reporting firms are education (C1) 
and charity (C2). For workplace’s dimension, employee health and safety (W1), human 
capital development (W2) and employee appreciation (W4), are the three items that 
dictated higher percentage of reporting firms than other workplace-related items. Two 
popular CSRR items under the marketplace’s dimension with the highest number of 
reporting firms are corporate governance (M4) and stakeholder engagement (M7). 
Many firms have also included other commitment statements to CSR (O3) in their 
corporate annual reports, describing their commitments towards CSR that were not 
captured by the four specific dimensions as highlighted earlier. In terms of the number 
of CSR-related sentences (see Table 6.2), the same CSRR items (e.g. E1, E2, E4, C1, 
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C2, W1, W2, W4, M4, M7, O3) are found to have greater number of sentences 
disclosed by firms compared to other CSRR items over the five-year period. 
6.2.2 Quality of CSRR (By the Number of Reporting Firms) 
The quality of CSRR in the current study, which is measured by a CSRR index, is 
coded into 4 different levels of reporting. This is to indicate the levels of importance 
placed by firms for the CSRR items disclosed. A score of ‘0’ is given for firms that did 
not report the particular CSRR items in their annual reports; ‘1’ for firms that report 
general qualitative CSR information; ‘2’ for firms with qualitative specific CSR 
information; and ‘3’ for firms with quantitative CSR information. For the purpose of the 
current study, firms with qualitative specific CSR information (with a score of 2) and 
quantitative CSR information (with a score of 3) are considered to demonstrate a higher 
quality of CSRR compared to firms that report general qualitative CSR information 
(with a score of 1). Table 6.3 to Table 6.6 describes the quality of CSRR by the number 
of reporting firms.  
Table 6.3 demonstrates the number and percentage of non-reporting firms for respective 
CSRR items in corporate annual reports from 2005 to 2009. As shown in Table 6.3, the 
number of non-reporting firms decreases over the five-year period from 2005 to 2009. 
For example, the number of non-reporting firms for charity information (C2) reduces 
from 98 firms in 2005 to 32 firms in 2009. Perhaps, the reduction in the number of non-
reporting firms is justified by several reasons, among others, the growing awareness of 
firms on the social and environmental implication of their business activities; and the 
introduction of the CSRR regulation from 2007 onwards. These motivations encourage 
firms to disclose their CSRR to the stakeholders. 
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Table 6.3: Number and Percentage of Non-Reporting Firms for Respective CSRR Items in Corporate Annual Reports from 2005 to 2009 
No CSRR 
Number and Percentage of Firms With ‘0’ score (did not report the respective CSRR items) 
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
n % n % n % n % n % 
 Environment            
1 Pollution control/abatement E1 137 76.1 122 67.8 89 49.4 70 38.9 59 32.8 
2 Environmental conservation and repairs E2 133 73.9 121 67.2 99 55.0 83 46.1 79 43.9 
3 Energy conservation E3 155 86.1 142 78.9 126 70.0 102 56.7 91 50.6 
4 Resource conservation and waste 
management 
E4 138 76.7 117 65.0 84 46.7 54 30.0 52 28.9 
5 ISO 14001/14004 (Environmental 
Management System) certification 
E5 159 88.3 150 83.3 136 75.6 144 80.0 131 72.8 
6 Environmental awards E6 170 94.4 172 95.6 167 92.8 160 88.9 157 87.2 
7 Other commitments towards environmental 
protection/sustainability 
E7 159 88.3 151 83.9 147 81.7 127 70.6 118 65.6 
 Community            
1 Education C1 126 70.0 103 57.2 77 42.8 63 35.0 64 35.6 
2 Charity C2 98 54.4 71 39.4 46 25.6 30 16.7 32 17.8 
3 Art, culture and heritage C3 162 90 158 87.8 147 81.7 142 78.9 136 75.6 
4 Equality in community C4 173 96.1 169 93.9 169 93.9 168 93.3 166 92.2 
5 Youth development and graduate 
employment programme 
C5 150 83.3 124 68.9 102 56.7 102 56.7 92 51.1 
6 Employees participation in community 
service 
C6 140 77.8 120 66.7 96 53.3 83 46.1 82 45.6 
7 Community health and safety C7 128 71.1 124 68.9 107 59.4 95 52.8 98 54.4 
8 Community and infrastructure support C8 134 74.4 105 58.3 87 48.3 82 45.6 75 41.7 
9 Community awards C9 179 99.4 175 97.2 176 97.8 170 94.4 165 91.7 
10 Community engagement C10 166 92.2 164 91.1 153 85 154 85.6 147 81.7 
11 Support for national pride/government 
sponsored campaigns 
C11 152 84.4 141 78.3 123 68.3 140 77.8 138 76.7 
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Table 6.3: Number and Percentage of Non-Reporting Firms for Respective CSRR Items in Corporate Annual Reports from 2005 to 2009 (Continued) 
No CSRR 
Number and Percentage of Firms With ‘0’ score (did not report the respective CSRR items) 
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
n % n % n % n % n % 
 Workplace            
1 Employee health and safety (H&S) W1 126 70.0 105 58.3 68 37.8 53 29.4 57 31.7 
2 Human capital development W2 80 44.4 79 43.9 53 29.4 47 26.1 42 23.3 
3 Workplace diversity and equal opportunity W3 164 91.1 156 86.7 139 77.2 130 72.2 137 76.1 
4 Employee appreciation W4 2 1.1 4 2.2 1 0.6 156 86.7 1 0.6 
5 
OHSAS 18001 (Occupational Health and 
Safety Management Systems) certification 
W5 162 90 157 87.2 144 80.0 146 81.1 147 81.7 
6 Employee relation/engagement W6 114 63.3 107 59.4 93 51.7 85 47.2 84 46.7 
7 Workplace awards W7 161 89.4 163 90.6 154 85.6 152 84.4 150 83.3 
8 
Employee remuneration, benefit and 
assistance 
W8 135 75.0 131 72.8 111 61.7 95 52.8 88 48.9 
9 Work-life balance W9 151 83.9 130 72.2 116 64.4 94 52.2 100 55.6 
10 Industrial relations W10 168 93.3 164 91.1 166 92.2 165 91.7 157 87.2 
 Marketplace            
1 Product development M1 163 90.6 153 85.0 142 78.9 140 77.8 132 73.3 
2 Product/service quality M2 126 70.0 123 68.3 119 66.1 114 63.3 117 65.0 
3 Product/service safety M3 149 82.8 147 81.7 145 80.6 139 77.2 137 76.1 
4 Corporate governance M4 2 1.1 1 0.6 174 96.7 1 0.6 N/A N/A 
5 Supplier relation/engagement M5 165 91.7 157 87.2 145 80.6 136 75.6 136 75.6 
6 Customer relation/satisfaction M6 90 50.0 89 49.4 92 51.1 77 42.8 77 42.8 
7 Stakeholder engagement M7 2 1.1 3 1.7 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
8 Other stakeholders’ matters M8 129 71.7 121 67.2 110 61.1 95 52.8 89 49.4 
9 Marketplace awards M9 160 88.9 157 87.2 153 85.0 152 84.4 155 86.1 
 Others            
1 CSR reporting standard/quality O1 175 97.2 173 96.1 172 95.6 167 92.8 167 92.8 
2 CSR committee O2 169 93.9 164 91.1 147 81.7 150 83.3 150 83.3 
3 Other commitment statements to CSR O3 101 56.1 87 48.3 36 20.0 17 9.4 16 8.9 
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Table 6.4 and Table 6.5 present the number and percentage of firms reporting the 
general qualitative CSR information and the qualitative specific CSR information, 
respectively. As indicated in Table 6.4 and Table 6.5, it is apparent that a higher 
percentage of firms report general qualitative CSR information compared to the 
qualitative specific CSR information. Taken pollution control/abatement (E1) 
information in 2009 as an example, 52.8 percent of the sample firms report general 
qualitative CSR information (see Table 6.4), while only 12.8 percent of the sample 
firms report qualitative specific CSR information (see Table 6.5). This may imply a low 
quality of CSRR disclosed by firms in Malaysia.  
Nevertheless, a longitudinal analysis of CSRR over a five-year period from 2005 to 
2009 reflecting the voluntary and mandatory period of CSRR reveals an improvement 
in the percentage of firms that report qualitative specific CSR information over time. 
For example, the percentage of firms that report qualitative specific pollution 
control/abatement (E1) information increases from 5 percent in 2005 to 12.8 percent in 
2009. Perhaps, this finding may support the argument by Criado-Jimenez et al. (2008) 
and Crawford and Williams (2010) that documented an increase in the quality of CSRR 
disclosed in regulated-environments. While Criado-Jimenez et al. (2008) and Crawford 
and Williams (2010) conducted their study in Spain and France respectively, the current 
study is based on a sample firms in Malaysia. 
By examining the CSRR in a longitudinal basis, the changes in pattern of reporting (if 
any) can be observed, unlike in the cross-sectional basis. This enables the researcher of 
the current study to report the improvement (if any) of the quality of CSRR disclosed by 
firms over the five-year period.  
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Table 6.4: Number and Percentage of Firms Reporting General Qualitative CSR information in Corporate Annual Reports from 2005 to 2009 
No CSRR 
Number and Percentage of Firms With ‘1’ score (report general qualitative CSR information) 
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
n % n % n % n % n % 
 Environment            
1 Pollution control/abatement E1 33 18.3 44 24.4 75 41.7 86 47.8 95 52.8 
2 Environmental conservation and repairs E2 33 18.3 44 24.4 55 30.6 72 40.0 71 39.4 
3 Energy conservation E3 19 10.6 25 13.9 37 20.6 58 32.2 61 33.9 
4 Resource conservation and waste 
management 
E4 30 16.7 50 27.8 70 38.9 95 52.8 99 55.0 
5 ISO 14001/14004 (Environmental 
Management System) certification 
E5 18 10.0 27 15.0 38 21.1 34 18.9 44 24.4 
6 Environmental awards E6 7 3.9 7 3.9 12 6.7 17 9.4 22 12.2 
7 Other commitments towards environmental 
protection/sustainability 
E7 16 8.9 25 13.9 25 13.9 42 23.3 47 26.1 
 Community            
1 Education C1 24 13.3 26 14.4 44 24.4 47 26.1 51 28.3 
2 Charity C2 27 15.0 39 21.7 68 37.8 72 40.0 67 37.2 
3 Art, culture and heritage C3 11 6.1 12 6.7 24 13.3 25 13.9 29 16.1 
4 Equality in community C4 2 1.1 8 4.4 9 5.0 7 3.9 7 3.9 
5 Youth development and graduate 
employment programme 
C5 16 8.9 33 18.3 47 26.1 41 22.8 53 29.4 
6 Employees participation in community 
service 
C6 21 11.7 40 22.2 54 30.0 56 31.1 57 31.7 
7 Community health and safety C7 29 16.1 35 19.4 45 25.0 51 28.3 46 25.6 
8 Community and infrastructure support C8 32 17.8 52 28.9 69 38.3 70 38.9 81 45.0 
9 Community awards C9 1 0.6 5 2.8 4 2.2 10 5.6 15 8.3 
10 Community engagement C10 14 7.8 15 8.3 25 13.9 25 13.9 29 16.1 
11 Support for national pride/government 
sponsored campaigns 
C11 20 11.1 28 15.6 35 19.4 23 12.8 26 14.4 
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Table 6.4: Number and Percentage of Firms Reporting General Qualitative CSR information in Corporate Annual Reports from 2005 to 2009 (Continued) 
No CSRR 
Number and Percentage of Firms With ‘1’ score                                                                          
(report general qualitative CSR information) 
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
n % n % n % n % n % 
 Workplace            
1 Employee health and safety (H&S) W1 33 18.3 56 31.1 92 51.1 99 55.0 89 49.4 
2 Human capital development W2 68 37.8 67 37.2 87 48.3 77 42.8 76 42.2 
3 Workplace diversity and equal opportunity W3 11 6.1 19 10.6 33 18.3 34 18.9 26 14.4 
4 Employee appreciation W4 149 82.8 152 84.4 153 85.0 156 86.7 157 87.2 
5 
OHSAS 18001 (Occupational Health and 
Safety Management Systems) certification 
W5 16 8.9 19 10.6 33 18.3 33 18.3 29 16.1 
6 Employee relation / engagement W6 49 27.2 56 31.1 65 36.1 78 43.3 78 43.3 
7 Workplace awards W7 15 8.3 9 5.0 24 13.3 23 12.8 23 12.8 
8 
Employee remuneration, benefit and 
assistance 
W8 34 18.9 35 19.4 51 28.3 63 35.0 70 38.9 
9 Work-life balance W9 24 13.3 42 23.3 51 28.3 71 39.4 71 39.4 
10 Industrial relations W10 11 6.1 16 8.9 11 6.1 9 5.0 17 9.4 
 Marketplace            
1 Product development M1 15 8.3 25 13.9 34 18.9 37 20.6 41 22.8 
2 Product/service quality M2 48 26.7 51 28.3 55 30.6 58 32.2 60 33.3 
3 Product/service safety M3 24 13.3 30 16.7 29 16.1 36 20.0 32 17.8 
4 Corporate governance M4 170 94.4 172 95.6 174 96.7 171 95.0 174 96.7 
5 Supplier relation/engagement M5 13 7.2 19 10.6 30 16.7 37 20.6 37 20.6 
6 Customer relation/satisfaction M6 79 43.9 70 38.9 68 37.8 78 43.3 75 41.7 
7 Stakeholder engagement M7 154 85.6 147 81.7 144 80.0 138 76.7 132 73.3 
8 Other stakeholders’ matters M8 49 27.2 56 31.1 67 37.2 81 45.0 87 48.3 
9 Marketplace awards M9 14 7.8 20 11.1 25 13.9 25 13.9 22 12.2 
 Others            
1 CSR reporting standard/quality O1 4 2.2 6 3.3 6 3.3 11 6.1 11 6.1 
2 CSR committee O2 10 5.6 14 7.8 32 17.8 28 15.6 27 15.0 
3 Other commitment statements to CSR O3 73 40.6 85 47.2 130 72.2 144 80.0 147 81.7 
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Table 6.5: Number and Percentage of Firms Reporting Qualitative Specific CSR information in Corporate Annual Reports from 2005 to 2009 
No CSRR 
Number and Percentage of Firms With ‘2’ score (report qualitative specific CSR information) 
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
n % n % n % n % n % 
 Environment            
1 Pollution control/abatement E1 9 5.0 14 7.8 15 8.3 22 12.2 23 12.8 
2 Environmental conservation and repairs E2 9 5.0 7 3.9 19 10.6 19 10.6 21 11.7 
3 Energy conservation E3 5 2.8 9 5.0 13 7.2 16 8.9 23 12.8 
4 Resource conservation and waste 
management 
E4 7 3.9 7 3.9 21 11.7 22 12.2 24 13.3 
5 ISO 14001/14004 (Environmental 
Management System) certification 
E5 3 1.7 3 1.7 6 3.3 2 1.1 5 2.8 
6 Environmental awards E6 3 1.7 1 0.6 1 0.6 3 1.7 1 0.6 
7 Other commitments towards environmental 
protection/sustainability 
E7 3 1.7 3 1.7 7 3.9 10 5.6 12 6.7 
 Community            
1 Education C1 13 7.2 23 12.8 25 13.9 26 14.4 18 10.0 
2 Charity C2 10 5.6 28 15.6 16 8.9 17 9.4 26 14.4 
3 Art, culture and heritage C3 4 2.2 5 2.8 4 2.2 6 3.3 11 6.1 
4 Equality in community C4 3 1.7 2 1.1 2 1.1 5 2.8 5 2.8 
5 Youth development and graduate 
employment programme 
C5 11 6.1 17 9.4 25 13.9 31 17.2 30 16.7 
6 Employees participation in community 
service 
C6 13 7.2 16 8.9 22 12.2 29 16.1 25 13.9 
7 Community health and safety C7 7 3.9 9 5.0 10 5.6 13 7.2 18 10.0 
8 Community and infrastructure support C8 10 5.6 10 5.6 11 6.1 11 6.1 8 4.4 
9 Community awards C9 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
10 Community engagement C10 N/A N/A 1 0.6 2 1.1 1 0.6 3 1.7 
11 Support for national pride/government 
sponsored campaigns 
C11 6 3.3 8 4.4 12 6.7 10 5.6 10 5.6 
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Table 6.5: Number and Percentage of Firms Reporting Qualitative Specific CSR information in Corporate Annual Reports from 2005 to 2009 (Continued) 
No CSRR 
Number and Percentage of Firms With ‘2’ score (report qualitative specific CSR information) 
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
n % n % n % n % n % 
 Workplace            
1 Employee health and safety (H&S) W1 20 11.1 19 10.6 19 10.6 28 15.6 33 18.3 
2 Human capital development W2 24 13.3 23 12.8 27 15.0 37 20.6 40 22.2 
3 Workplace diversity and equal opportunity W3 5 2.8 5 2.8 8 4.4 16 8.9 17 9.4 
4 Employee appreciation W4 23 12.8 21 11.7 22 12.2 20 11.1 15 8.3 
5 
OHSAS 18001 (Occupational Health and 
Safety Management Systems) certification 
W5 2 1.1 4 2.2 3 1.7 1 0.6 4 2.2 
6 Employee relation / engagement W6 15 8.3 16 8.9 20 11.1 15 8.3 16 8.9 
7 Workplace awards W7 4 2.2 8 4.4 2 1.1 5 2.8 7 3.9 
8 
Employee remuneration, benefit and 
assistance 
W8 2 1.1 6 3.3 10 5.6 11 6.1 17 9.4 
9 Work-life balance W9 5 2.8 8 4.4 12 6.7 14 7.8 7 3.9 
10 Industrial relations W10 1 0.6 N/A N/A 3 1.7 6 3.3 1 0.6 
 Marketplace            
1 Product development M1 2 1.1 N/A N/A 2 1.1 1 0.6 6 3.3 
2 Product/service quality M2 6 3.3 6 3.3 6 3.3 8 4.4 2 1.1 
3 Product/service safety M3 6 3.3 3 1.7 6 3.3 5 2.8 9 5.0 
4 Corporate governance M4 8 4.4 5 2.8 6 3.3 8 4.4 6 3.3 
5 Supplier relation/engagement M5 1 0.6 3 1.7 4 2.2 5 2.8 6 3.3 
6 Customer relation/satisfaction M6 9 5.0 17 9.4 17 9.4 20 11.1 21 11.7 
7 Stakeholder engagement M7 23 12.8 29 16.1 36 20.0 42 23.3 46 25.6 
8 Other stakeholders’ matters M8 2 1.1 3 1.7 3 1.7 4 2.2 3 1.7 
9 Marketplace awards M9 6 3.3 3 1.7 2 1.1 3 1.7 2 1.1 
 Others            
1 CSR reporting standard/quality O1 1 0.6 1 0.6 2 1.1 1 0.6 1 0.6 
2 CSR committee O2 1 0.6 2 1.1 1 0.6 2 1.1 3 1.7 
3 Other commitment statements to CSR O3 2 1.1 5 2.8 9 5.0 7 3.9 7 3.9 
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Table 6.6 shows the number and percentage of firms reporting quantitative CSR 
information in corporate annual reports from year 2005 to 2009. From Table 6.6, it is 
observed that the percentage of firms with quantitative CSR information remains low 
over the period of analysis (ranged from 0 percent to 12.2 percent), with exception to 
education (C1) and charity (C2). The percentage of firms with quantitative education 
information (C1) increases from 9.4 percent in 2005 to 26.1 percent in 2009. In a similar 
vein, the percentage of firms that report quantitative charity information (C2) rises from 
25 percent in 2005 to 30.6 percent in 2009. 
There is only a slight increase in the number of firms reporting quantitative CSR 
information in corporate annual reports over the five-year period. Probably, the above 
result supports Sawani et al.’s (2010) finding of firms’ selective reporting on issues 
relating to quantitative CSR information to avoid criticisms from minority shareholders, 
who demand for better returns on their money invested. To minimise the risks of being 
questioned by the shareholders, firms may choose to report their CSR information in 
qualitative nature. As a consequence, the quality of CSRR disclosed by firms in Malaysia 
remains low.  
Overall, the current study demonstrates a minimal improvement of the quality of CSRR 
disclosed by firms in Malaysia. This is based on the examination of CSRR data from 
2005 to 2009, reflecting the voluntary and mandatory period of CSRR. The above finding 
call for more aggressive efforts, particularly on the side of the regulators; to further 
enhance their levels of enforcement of existing CSRR regulation and propose for the 
implementation of CSRR standards, which may increase the firms’ motivations to 
improve their quality of CSRR disclosed to the stakeholders. 
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Table 6.6: Number and Percentage of Firms Reporting Quantitative CSR information in Corporate Annual Reports from 2005 to 2009 
No CSRR 
Number and Percentage of Firms With ‘3’ score (report quantitative CSR information) 
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
n % n % n % n % n % 
 Environment            
1 Pollution control/abatement E1 1 0.6 N/A N/A 1 0.6 2 1.1 3 1.7 
2 Environmental conservation and repairs E2 5 2.8 8 4.4 7 3.9 6 3.3 9 5.0 
3 Energy conservation E3 1 0.6 4 2.2 4 2.2 4 2.2 5 2.8 
4 Resource conservation and waste 
management 
E4 5 2.8 6 3.3 5 2.8 9 5.0 5 2.8 
5 ISO 14001/14004 (Environmental 
Management System) certification 
E5 N/A N/A 3 1.7 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
6 Environmental awards E6 N/A N/A 1 0.6 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
7 Other commitments towards environmental 
protection/sustainability 
E7 2 1.1 1 0.6 1 0.6 1 0.6 3 1.7 
 Community            
1 Education C1 17 9.4 28 15.6 34 18.9 44 24.4 47 26.1 
2 Charity C2 45 25.0 42 23.3 16 8.9 61 33.9 55 30.6 
3 Art, culture and heritage C3 3 1.7 5 2.8 5 2.8 7 3.9 4 2.2 
4 Equality in community C4 2 1.1 1 0.6 N/A N/A N/A N/A 2 1.1 
5 Youth development and graduate 
employment programme 
C5 3 1.7 6 3.3 6 3.3 6 3.3 5 2.8 
6 Employees participation in community 
service 
C6 6 3.3 4 2.2 8 4.4 12 6.7 16 8.9 
7 Community health and safety C7 16 8.9 12 6.7 18 10.0 21 11.7 18 10.0 
8 Community and infrastructure support C8 4 2.2 13 7.2 13 7.2 17 9.4 16 8.9 
9 Community awards C9 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
10 Community engagement C10 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 1 0.6 
11 Support for national pride/government 
sponsored campaigns 
C11 2 1.1 3 1.7 10 5.6 7 3.9 6 3.3 
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Table 6.6: Number and Percentage of Firms Reporting Quantitative CSR information in Corporate Annual Reports from 2005 to 2009 (Continued) 
No CSRR 
Number and Percentage of Firms With ‘3’ score (report quantitative CSR information) 
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
n % n % n % n % n % 
 Workplace            
1 Employee health and safety (H&S) W1 1 0.6 N/A N/A 1 0.6 N/A N/A 1 0.6 
2 Human capital development W2 8 4.4 11 6.1 13 7.2 19 10.6 22 12.2 
3 Workplace diversity and equal opportunity W3 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 17 9.4 
4 Employee appreciation W4 6 3.3 3 1.7 4 2.2 4 2.2 7 3.9 
5 
OHSAS 18001 (Occupational Health and 
Safety Management Systems) certification 
W5 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
6 Employee relation/engagement W6 2 1.1 1 0.6 2 1.1 2 1.1 2 1.1 
7 Workplace awards W7 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
8 
Employee remuneration, benefit and 
assistance 
W8 9 5.0 8 4.4 8 4.4 11 6.1 5 2.8 
9 Work-life balance W9 N/A N/A 8 4.4 1 0.6 1 0.6 2 1.1 
10 Industrial relations W10 1 0.6 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 1 0.6 
 Marketplace            
1 Product development M1 N/A N/A 2 1.1 2 1.1 2 1.1 1 0.6 
2 Product/service quality M2 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 1 0.6 
3 Product/service safety M3 1 0.6 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 2 1.1 
4 Corporate governance M4 N/A N/A 2 1.1 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
5 Supplier relation/engagement M5 1 0.6 1 0.6 1 0.6 2 1.1 1 0.6 
6 Customer relation/satisfaction M6 2 1.1 4 2.2 3 1.7 5 2.8 7 3.9 
7 Stakeholder engagement M7 1 0.6 1 0.6 N/A N/A N/A N/A 2 1.1 
8 Other stakeholders’ matters M8 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 1 0.6 
9 Marketplace awards M9 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 1 0.6 
 Others            
1 CSR reporting standard/quality O1 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 1 0.6 1 0.6 
2 CSR committee O2 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 3 1.7 
3 Other commitment statements to CSR O3 4 2.2 5 2.8 9 5.0 12 6.7 10 5.6 
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6.2.3 Descriptive Statistics of CSRR 
Table 6.7 and Table 6.8 present the descriptive statistics of the quantity and the quality of 
CSRR disclosed over the five-year period. While the quantity of CSRR is measured by 
the number of CSR-related sentences, the quality of CSRR is measured by a CSRR 
index.  
Table 6.7: Descriptive Statistics of CSRR Quantity 
CSRR 
Dimension 
Year Mean 
Mean 
Difference 
Standard 
Deviation 
Minimum Maximum 
Environment 
2005 6.367 
 
14.906 0.000 109.000 
2006 8.556 2.189 17.192 0.000 109.000 
2007 12.144 3.588 20.623 0.000 148.000 
2008 14.561 2.417 22.013 0.000 134.000 
2009 17.578 3.017 27.378 0.000 179.000 
Community 
2005 10.422 
 
16.911 0.000 101.000 
2006 14.778 4.356 21.688 0.000 140.000 
2007 20.661 5.883 24.187 0.000 150.000 
2008 24.994 4.333 29.833 0.000 206.000 
2009 25.933 0.939 27.228 0.000 134.000 
Workplace 
2005 14.478 
 
23.519 1.000 130.000 
2006 16.617 2.139 25.576 1.000 143.000 
2007 22.394 5.777 32.069 1.000 224.000 
2008 27.061 4.667 39.691 1.000 232.000 
2009 28.967 1.906 43.458 1.000 242.000 
Marketplace 
2005 23.283 
 
28.938 4.000 246.000 
2006 25.761 2.478 32.577 5.000 226.000 
2007 29.639 3.878 36.057 5.000 286.000 
2008 34.528 4.889 42.226 5.000 287.000 
2009 35.867 1.339 46.766 5.000 302.000 
Others 
2005 2.061 
 
4.497 0.000 32.000 
2006 3.922 1.861 7.395 0.000 55.000 
2007 7.278 3.356 12.635 0.000 115.000 
2008 7.806 0.528 12.648 0.000 136.000 
2009 7.956 0.150 13.087 0.000 133.000 
Total 
2005 56.611 
 
72.209 5.000 396.000 
2006 69.633 13.022 89.238 6.000 562.000 
2007 92.117 22.484 104.417 6.000 716.000 
2008 108.950 16.833 123.639 9.000 714.000 
2009 116.300 7.350 133.817 9.000 758.000 
Note: Shaded boxes indicate that the highest mean difference for most of the CSRR’s dimensions appear to be in 2007.   
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Table 6.8: Descriptive Statistics of CSRR Quality 
CSRR 
Dimension 
Year Mean 
Mean 
difference 
Standard 
Deviation 
Minimum Maximum 
Environment 
2005 0.073 
 
0.108 0.000 0.524 
2006 0.097 0.024 0.121 0.000 0.714 
2007 0.140 0.043 0.131 0.000 0.571 
2008 0.174 0.034 0.137 0.000 0.571 
2009 0.194 0.020 0.141 0.000 0.762 
Community 
2005 0.109 
 
0.138 0.000 0.576 
2006 0.147 0.038 0.152 0.000 0.667 
2007 0.188 0.041 0.150 0.000 0.636 
2008 0.210 0.022 0.148 0.000 0.636 
2009 0.215 0.005 0.150 0.000 0.727 
Workplace 
2005 0.133 
 
0.124 0.033 0.567 
2006 0.146 0.013 0.131 0.033 0.633 
2007 0.180 0.034 0.129 0.033 0.633 
2008 0.204 0.024 0.135 0.033 0.700 
2009 0.211 0.007 0.144 0.033 0.733 
Marketplace 
2005 0.145 
 
0.078 0.037 0.519 
2006 0.156 0.011 0.091 0.074 0.667 
2007 0.166 0.010 0.091 0.074 0.481 
2008 0.181 0.015 0.091 0.074 0.481 
2009 0.187 0.006 0.106 0.074 0.815 
Others 
2005 0.066 
 
0.090 0.000 0.444 
2006 0.081 0.015 0.097 0.000 0.444 
2007 0.130 0.049 0.103 0.000 0.556 
2008 0.149 0.019 0.105 0.000 0.556 
2009 0.148 -0.001 0.105 0.000 0.667 
Total 
2005 0.105 
 
0.087 0.014 0.401 
2006 0.125 0.020 0.097 0.021 0.472 
2007 0.161 0.036 0.096 0.021 0.452 
2008 0.184 0.023 0.096 0.021 0.498 
2009 0.191 0.007 0.104 0.040 0.597 
Note: Shaded boxes indicate that the highest mean difference for most of the CSRR’s dimensions appear to be in 2007.   
In general, the results shown in Table 6.7 and Table 6.8 indicate an increasing trend of 
both quantity and quality of CSRR disclosed by firms over the five-year period from 
2005 to 2009. The mean of the total CSRR quantity increases from 56.6 sentences in 
2005 to 116.3 sentences in 2009. In terms of the quality of CSRR, there is a slight 
increase in the mean of the total CSRR quality from 0.105 in 2005 to 0.191 in 2009. 
Overall, results from the descriptive statistics are seen supporting the evidence presented 
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in Table 6.1 to Table 6.6, which show the descriptive analysis of the quantity and quality 
of CSRR by the number of reporting firms and the number of CSR-related sentences. 
The highest mean difference for most of the component of CSRR appear to be in 2007 
(see shaded boxes in Tables 6.7 and Table 6.8); that is, the first year CSRR was made 
mandatory in Malaysia. Even though CSRR has been made mandatory upon all public 
listed firms in Malaysia with effect from the financial year 2007, firms seem to report 
selected components of CSRR only, rather than all components of CSRR. For example, 
there were firms who chose not to report their environment and community-related 
activities or information to the stakeholders, in spite of the introduction of the mandatory 
CSRR requirement.  
Rather than addressing the interests of all stakeholders, firms were seen to manage the 
demand of selected stakeholders’ group that directly impacted the firms’ operations. For 
example, firms are more likely to fulfil the interest of important stakeholders such as 
shareholders and employees. This scenario is apparent when all sample-firms did provide 
minimum reporting for workplace-related (1 sentence) and marketplace-related (4 
sentences) information over the five-year period (see Table 6.7). To a certain extent, this 
observation may reflect the use of stakeholder theory in explaining CSRR.  
Stakeholder theory suggests firms to fulfil the interests of both internal (e.g. employees) 
and external (e.g. shareholders) stakeholders, especially those deemed to be powerful and 
have significant impact on the firms (Ullmann, 1985; Mitchell et al., 1997; Huang & 
Kung, 2010). The continuous participation of these groups of stakeholders is vital to 
ensure the long-term survival of the firms. The relative power of the stakeholders impacts 
their ability to influence firms to comply with the stakeholders’ expectations (Deegan & 
Unerman, 2006). Given the limited resources available for CSR-related activities, the 
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firms may choose to be selective in reporting their CSR-related information, focusing on 
the stakeholders’ groups that are deemed important. In the following section, an 
investigation of the influence of shareholders in determining the levels of CSRR 
disclosed is presented. 
6.3 HYPOTHESES TESTING 
Several hypotheses are developed to fulfill the objectives of the current study. An in-
depth discussion on the hypotheses developed is provided in Chapter four of this thesis. 
As highlighted in Section 5.8, multiple regression analysis is performed to test the 
relevant hypotheses. In performing the multiple regression analysis, several preliminary 
testing and analysis need to be conducted. For examples, descriptive analysis of the 
research variables is provided in Section 6.3.1 and correlation analysis is presented in 
Section 6.3.2. Results of the testing of the assumptions of multiple regression analysis, 
such as multicollinearity, normality, linearity and homoscedasticity are presented in 
Section 6.3.3. Next, Section 6.3.4 presents the results of the multiple regression analyses 
performed for the purpose of the current study. 
6.3.1 Descriptive Analysis of Continuous and Dichotomous Variables 
Table 6.9 and Table 6.10 present the descriptive statistics of the continuous and 
dichotomous variables used in the regression tests for each year (2005 to 2009) as well as 
for the pooled data. As shown in Table 6.9, the mean of CSRR quantity and CSRR 
quality increases over the five-year period. On average, the quantity of CSRR measured 
by the number of sentences rises from 56 sentences in 2005 to 116 sentences in 2009, 
while the quality of CSRR, which is measured by the CSRR index, increases from 0.105 
in 2005 to 0.191 in 2009. The quantity of CSRR reported by firms ranges from a 
minimum of 5 sentences to a maximum of 758 sentences, while the quality of CSRR 
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Table 6.9: Descriptive Statistics of Continuous Variables 
All years (2005-2009)                   N=900 Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Minimum Maximum 
CSRR Quantity (CSRRQN) 88.722 109.178 5.000 758.000 
CSRR Quality (CSRRQL) 0.153 0.101 0.010 0.600 
Managerial Ownership (MGRLOWN) 3.595 9.622 0.000 61.270 
Family Ownership (FAMOWN) 16.700 21.200 0.000 75.000 
Foreign Ownership (FOROWN) 24.730 22.058 0.000 88.300 
Government Ownership (GOVOWN) 11.751 16.166 0.000 82.240 
CSR Experience (CSREXP) 0.119 0.150 0.000 0.670 
Firm Size (SIZE) 7.770 1.412 5.200 12.640 
Profitability (ROA) 0.062 0.074 -0.470 0.550 
Leverage (LEV) 0.451 0.225 0.020 0.900 
2005                                                
N=180 
Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Minimum Maximum 
CSRR Quantity (CSRRQN) 56.611 72.209 5.000 396.000 
CSRR Quality (CSRRQL) 0.105 0.087 0.010 0.400 
Managerial Ownership (MGRLOWN) 3.811 10.153 0.000 60.950 
Family Ownership (FAMOWN) 16.800 21.500 0.000 67.000 
Foreign Ownership (FOROWN) 22.147 21.140 0.220 83.590 
Government Ownership (GOVOWN) 11.920 17.010 0.000 80.130 
CSR Experience (CSREXP) 0.090 0.121 0.000 0.500 
Firm Size (SIZE) 7.566 1.418 5.200 12.160 
Profitability (ROA) 0.060 0.066 -0.270 0.350 
Leverage (LEV) 0.440 0.223 0.020 0.900 
2006                                            
N=180 
Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Minimum Maximum 
CSRR Quantity (CSRRQN) 69.633 89.238 6.000 562.000 
CSRR Quality (CSRRQL) 0.126 0.096 0.020 0.470 
Managerial Ownership (MGRLOWN) 3.612 9.663 0.000 61.160 
Family Ownership (FAMOWN) 16.600 21.100 0.000 67.000 
Foreign Ownership (FOROWN) 25.172 22.543 0.000 88.300 
Government Ownership (GOVOWN) 11.357 15.122 0.000 78.140 
CSR Experience (CSREXP) 0.104 0.138 0.000 0.630 
Firm Size (SIZE) 7.666 1.418 5.240 12.320 
Profitability (ROA) 0.062 0.062 -0.080 0.450 
Leverage (LEV) 0.449 0.225 0.020 0.900 
2007                                           
N=180 
Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Minimum Maximum 
CSRR Quantity (CSRRQN) 92.117 104.417 6.000 716.000 
CSRR Quality (CSRRQL) 0.161 0.096 0.020 0.450 
Managerial Ownership (MGRLOWN) 3.432 9.233 0.000 61.160 
Family Ownership (FAMOWN) 16.500 21.100 0.000 67.000 
Foreign Ownership (FOROWN) 27.870 22.539 0.200 86.200 
Government Ownership (GOVOWN) 11.007 16.260 0.000 82.000 
CSR Experience (CSREXP) 0.120 0.150 0.000 0.640 
Firm Size (SIZE) 7.787 1.406 5.340 12.450 
Profitability (ROA) 0.077 0.068 -0.080 0.510 
Leverage (LEV) 0.445 0.223 0.020 0.900 
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Table 6.9: Descriptive Statistics of Continuous Variables (Continued) 
2008 
N=180 
Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Minimum Maximum 
CSRR Quantity (CSRRQN) 108.950 123.639 9.000 714.000 
CSRR Quality (CSRRQL) 0.184 0.096 0.020 0.500 
Managerial Ownership (MGRLOWN) 3.527 9.483 0.000 61.270 
Family Ownership (FAMOWN) 16.400 20.900 0.000 67.000 
Foreign Ownership (FOROWN) 24.230 21.945 0.000 85.500 
Government Ownership (GOVOWN) 12.185 16.254 0.000 82.240 
CSR Experience (CSREXP) 0.131 0.157 0.000 0.630 
Firm Size (SIZE) 7.887 1.391 5.340 12.500 
Profitability (ROA) 0.062 0.084 -0.410 0.550 
Leverage (LEV) 0.464 0.224 0.020 0.900 
2009                                           
N=180 
Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Minimum Maximum 
CSRR Quantity (CSRRQN) 116.300 133.817 9.000 758.000 
CSRR Quality (CSRRQL) 0.191 0.104 0.040 0.600 
Managerial Ownership (MGRLOWN) 3.591 9.661 0.000 61.270 
Family Ownership (FAMOWN) 17.100 21.500 0.000 75.000 
Foreign Ownership (FOROWN) 24.230 21.945 0.000 85.500 
Government Ownership (GOVOWN) 12.289 16.274 0.000 82.230 
CSR Experience (CSREXP) 0.150 0.174 0.000 0.670 
Firm Size (SIZE) 7.944 1.407 5.240 12.640 
Profitability (ROA) 0.053 0.083 -0.470 0.520 
Leverage (LEV) 0.458 0.234 0.020 0.900 
shows a range between 0.010 and 0.600, over the five-year period. Overall, the results 
indicate that all sample firms in the current study report minimum CSR information in 
their annual reports. To a certain extent, both the quantity and quality of CSRR increases 
over the five-year period from 2005 to 2009.  
The percentage of each type of corporate ownership structure ranges from zero percent 
to; 61 percent for managerial ownership; 75 percent for family ownership; 88 percent for 
foreign ownership; and 82 percent for government ownership. The average percentage of 
managerial ownership and government ownership experiences a slight decline from 2005 
to 2007; from 3.811 percent to 3.432 percent for managerial ownership; and from 11.920 
percent to 11.007 percent for government ownership. Nevertheless, the percentage rises 
during the period of 2008 to 2009, with a mean of 3.527 in 2008 and 3.591 in 2009 for 
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managerial ownership, and a mean of 12.185 in 2008 and 12.289 in 2009 for government 
ownership.  
The average percentage of foreign ownership escalates from 22.147 in 2005 to 27.870 in 
2007. However, it reduces to 24.230 percent in 2008 and 2009. Family ownership, which 
is measured by the percentage of family members on board to total number of directors 
on the board, shows a slightly decreasing trend of family representation on the board of 
directors of a firm from 2005 to 2008. The average percentage of family members on 
board decreases from 16.8 percent in 2005 to 16.4 percent in 2008. Nevertheless, the 
average percentage of family members on board rises to 17.1 percent in 2009. Overall, 
the percentages of shares held by different shareholders’ groups fluctuate over the period 
of study. 
The average percentage of directors with CSR experience rises from 9 percent in 2005 to 
15 percent in 2009. The mean of firm size, based on the log of total assets, reports a slight 
increase from 7.566 in 2005 to 7.944 in 2009. Firm profitability, which is measured by 
return on assets, dictates a growth in mean from 6 percent in 2005 to 7.8 percent in 2007. 
However, the mean of firm profitability reduces to 6.2 percent in 2008 and 5.3 percent in 
2009. A consistent mean of leverage is reported during the period of study, whereby the 
mean lies between 0.440 and 0.464. Observation from the current study reveals that a 
higher level of leverage is found in firms in the finance sector compared to other sectors. 
This was reflected in the range of leverage from a minimum of 2 percent to a maximum 
of 90 percent.  
From Table 6.10, it is shown that the majority of the sample firms are classified as 
Shariah-approved firms (71 percent), while the remaining (29 percent) are the non-
Shariah approved firms. One firm in trading/service industry, which was classified as 
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non-Shariah approved firm in 2005 to 2007, was granted its Shariah status in 2008. This 
change is reflected in the increase in the number of Shariah approved firms from 127 
firms in 2007 to 128 firms in 2008.  
In terms of industry’s classification, 46 percent of the sample firms are categorised under 
the high-profile industry, while the remaining 54 percent are categorised under the low-
profile industry. Regulation is used to differentiate between the voluntary (from year 
2005 to 2006) and mandatory (from year 2007 to 2009) period of CSRR. Results in Table 
6.10 indicated that 40 percent of the firm-year’s observation derived from the voluntary 
CSRR regime, while another 60 percent represents firm-year’s observation derived from 
the mandatory CSRR regime.  
Table 6.10: Descriptive Statistics of Dichotomous Variables 
 Shariah Status 
(SHARIAH) 
Industry (IND) Regulation (Reg) 
Dichotomous 
Variables 
1 0 1 0 1 0 
All N=900 
639 261 411 489 540 360 
(71%) (29%) (46%) (54%) (60%) (40%) 
2005 N=180 
127 53 82 98 
N/A N/A 
(71%) (29%) (46%) (54%) 
2006 N=180 
127 53 82 98 
N/A N/A 
(71%) (29%) (46%) (54%) 
2007 N=180 
127 53 82 98 
N/A N/A 
(71%) (29%) (46%) (54%) 
2008 N=180 
128 52 82 98 
N/A N/A 
(71%) (29%) (46%) (54%) 
2009 N=180 
128 52 82 98 
N/A N/A 
(71%) (29%) (46%) (54%) 
 
6.3.2 Correlation Analysis 
Correlation analysis measures the relationship between two variables (Hair et al., 2006). 
Table 6.11 presents the correlation analysis of research variables used in the current study 
based on the Pearson product moment correlation coefficient (r).  
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Table 6.11: Pearson Product Moment Correlation Coefficient (N=900) 
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MGRLOWN 1 0.290
**
 -0.100
**
 -0.113
**
 -0.109
**
 -0.010 -0.237
**
 0.093
**
 0.000 0.027 0.139
**
 -0.186
**
 -0.159
**
 
FAMOWN 0.290
**
 1 -0.155
**
 -0.252
**
 -0.037 -0.001 -0.221
**
 0.154
**
 0.013 -0.090
**
 0.323
**
 -0.344
**
 -0.320
**
 
FOROWN -0.100
**
 -0.155
**
 1 -0.248
**
 -0.046 0.040 -0.023 -0.185
**
 0.203
**
 -0.012 0.073
*
 0.118
**
 0.049 
GOVOWN -0.113
**
 -0.252
**
 -0.248
**
 1 0.051 0.006 0.282
**
 -0.062 -0.101
**
 0.164
**
 -0.127
**
 0.345
**
 0.342
**
 
CSREXP -0.109
**
 -0.037 -0.046 0.051 1 0.119
**
 0.194
**
 0.082
*
 0.038 0.002 0.027 0.274
**
 0.282
**
 
REG -0.010 -0.001 0.040 0.006 0.119
**
 1 0.089
**
 -0.002 0.010 0.024 0.002 0.306
**
 0.192
**
 
SIZE -0.237
**
 -0.221
**
 -0.023 0.282
**
 0.194
**
 0.089
**
 1 -0.287
**
 -0.321
**
 0.547
**
 -0.294
**
 0.410
**
 0.371
**
 
SHARIAH 0.093
**
 0.154
**
 -0.185
**
 -0.062 0.082
*
 -0.002 -0.287
**
 1 0.071
*
 -0.292
**
 0.286
**
 -0.043 -0.018 
ROA 0.000 0.013 0.203
**
 -0.101
**
 0.038 0.010 -0.321
**
 0.071
*
 1 -0.290
**
 0.196
**
 0.062 0.059 
LEV 0.027 -0.090
**
 -0.012 0.164
**
 0.002 0.024 0.547
**
 -0.292
**
 -0.290
**
 1 -0.231
**
 0.184
**
 0.176
**
 
IND 0.139
**
 0.323
**
 0.073
*
 -0.127
**
 0.027 0.002 -0.294
**
 0.286
**
 0.196
**
 -0.231
**
 1 -0.077
*
 -0.083
*
 
CSRRQL -0.186
**
 -0.344
**
 0.118
**
 0.345
**
 0.274
**
 0.306
**
 0.410
**
 -0.043 0.062 0.184
**
 -0.077
*
 1 0.850
**
 
CSRRQN -0.159
**
 -0.320
**
 0.049 0.342
**
 0.282
**
 0.192
**
 0.371
**
 -0.018 0.059 0.176
**
 -0.083
*
 0.850
**
 1 
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level. 
* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level. 
 
Notes: MGRLOWN=Managerial ownership, FAMOWN=Family ownership, FOROWN= Foreign ownership, GOVOWN=Government ownership, CSREXP=Board’s CSR 
experience, REG=CSRR regulation, SIZE=Firm size, SHARIAH=Shariah status, ROA=Profitability, LEV=Leverage, IND=Industry, CSRRQN=CSRR quantity, 
CSRRQL=CSRR quality. 
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Managerial ownership (MGRLOWN), family ownership (FAMOWN), foreign ownership 
(FOROWN), government ownership (GOVOWN) and the board’s CSR experience 
(CSREXP) are the independent variables; CSRR regulation (REG) is the moderating 
variable, firm size (SIZE), Shariah status (SHARIAH), profitability (ROA), industry 
(IND) and leverage (LEV) are the control variables; and CSRR quality (CSRRQL) and 
CSRR quantity (CSRRQN) are the dependent variables used in the current study. 
The correlation coefficients (r) provide a numerical summary of the direction and the 
strength of the linear relationship between two variables. It ranges between ‘+1’, which 
indicates a perfect positive correlation, to ‘-1’, which indicates a perfect negative 
correlation. In general, two variables are said to be correlated if changes in one variable 
are associated with changes in the other variables (Hair et al., 2006). Results shown in 
Table 6.11 indicates that the correlation coefficient, r between the independent variables 
ranges between 0.037 (CSREXP-FAMOWN) and 0.290 (MGRLOWN-FAMOWN). This 
range falls within the acceptable level of correlation as suggested by Gujarati (2003), 
which is less than 0.80.  
Family ownership (FAMOWN) is significantly positively correlated with managerial 
ownership (MGRLOWN), which suggests that firms with greater number of family 
members sit on the board of directors possess a higher level of managerial ownership. In 
contrast, the negative correlation dictated between family ownership (FAMOWN) and 
foreign ownership (FOROWN) and government ownership (GOVOWN), respectively 
implies that firms with greater number of family members sit on the board of directors 
have generally a lower level of foreign ownership and government ownership, 
respectively. 
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Significant negative correlations between managerial ownership (MGRLOWN) and 
foreign ownership (FOROWN), government ownership (GOVOWN) and the board’s 
CSR experience (CSREXP), respectively, denote a lower level of managerial ownership 
in firms with higher level of foreign ownership, government ownership and the board’s 
CSR experience. Foreign ownership (FOROWN) is significantly negatively correlated 
with government ownership (GOVOWN), which implies that government-owned firms 
possess lower level of foreign ownership. 
Even though the board’s CSR experience (CSREXP) was found to be correlated 
negatively to managerial ownership (MGRLOWN), it is not correlated to other types of 
corporate ownership structure. The results indicate that firms with greater level of 
managerial ownership seem to have less number of directors with CSR experience, while 
other types of corporate ownership structure (family ownership, foreign ownership and 
government ownership) have no effect on the changes in the number of directors with 
CSR experience. 
CSRR regulation (REG), being the moderating variable of the current study, has no 
relationship with all types of corporate ownership structure. In other words, the change in 
CSRR requirement from voluntary to mandatory reporting has no effect on the corporate 
ownership structure. Nevertheless, CSRR regulation (REG) is positively related to the 
board’s CSR experience (CSREXP), CSRR quantity (CSRRQN) and CSRR quality 
(CSRRQL). These findings suggest that the number of directors with CSR experiences, 
the quantity and quality of CSRR generally increases following the implementation of the 
CSRR regulation. 
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The correlation between the independent variables and the dependent variables ranges 
between 0.118 (FOROWN-CSRRQL) and 0.345 (FOROWN-CSRRQL). All of the 
independent variables are significantly related to both measurements of the dependent 
variables used in the current study (with p-value of 0.01), with exception of FOROWN. 
Foreign ownership (FOROWN) is significantly related to the quality of CSRR 
(CSRRQL) with p-value of 0.01, whereas there is no correlation exists between foreign 
ownership (FOROWN) and the quantity of CSRR (CSRRQN). This finding suggests that 
firms with higher level of foreign ownership emphasise on the quality of CSRR rather 
than the quantity. 
6.3.3 Testing the Assumptions of Multiple Regression Analysis 
The application of multiple regression analysis for the purpose of the current study 
requires the data used to meet all the assumptions underlying the multiple regression 
analysis. They are multicollinearity, normality, linearity and homoscedasticity. All of the 
assumptions must be met before the regression is performed. 
Normality describes the normal shape of data distribution of an individual variable (Hair 
et al., 2006). It can be observed from skewness, kurtosis or test of normality. Skewness 
indicates the symmetry of data distribution, while kurtosis describes the ‘peakedness’ or 
‘flatness’ of a distribution compared to a normal distribution. Test of normality can also 
be conducted using the Kolmogorov Smirnov (K-S) test. 
Table 6.12 shows the results of normality tests. Based on 900 firm-year observations 
gathered over the five-year period from 2005 to 2009, results from the Kolmogorov 
Smirnov test indicated a non-normal data distribution for the variables used in the current 
study. As shown in Table 6.12, only data about leverage for 2005 and 2006 are normally 
distributed (indicated by the K-S (Lilliefors) with significance level of more than 0.05).  
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Table 6.12: Results of Normality Tests (Skewness, Kurtosis and K-S Statistics) 
All years (2005-2009)                            N=900 Skewness Kurtosis Kolmogorov-
Smirnov (K-S) 
CSRR Quantity (CSRRQN) 2.792 9.774 0.223 
CSRR Quality (CSRRQL) 0.920 0.836 0.096 
Managerial Ownership (MGRLOWN) 3.625** 13.685** 0.354 
Family Ownership (FAMOWN) 0.910 -0.498 0.329 
Foreign Ownership (FOROWN) 0.973 -0.071 0.143 
Government Ownership (GOVOWN) 2.361 5.681 0.234 
CSR Experience (CSREXP) 1.374 1.393 0.262 
Firm Size (SIZE) 1.029 0.982 0.107 
Profitability (ROA) 0.792 12.082 0.126 
Leverage (LEV) 0.402 -0.421 0.047 
2005                                                         
N=180 
Skewness Kurtosis Kolmogorov-
Smirnov 
CSRR Quantity (CSRRQN) 2.429 6.406 0.237 
CSRR Quality (CSRRQL) 1.051 0.239 0.164 
Managerial Ownership (MGRLOWN) 3.408** 11.825** 0.366 
Family Ownership (FAMOWN) 0.930 -0.465 0.332 
Foreign Ownership (FOROWN) 1.083 0.188 0.152 
Government Ownership (GOVOWN) 2.516 6.295 0.242 
CSR Experience (CSREXP) 1.251 0.769 0.323 
Firm Size (SIZE) 1.052 0.969 0.125 
Profitability (ROA) 0.609 6.456 0.123 
Leverage (LEV) 0.469 -0.377 0.061* 
2006                                                        N=180 Skewness Kurtosis Kolmogorov-
Smirnov 
CSRR Quantity (CSRRQN) 2.772 9.309 0.238 
CSRR Quality (CSRRQL) 1.095 0.915 0.140 
Managerial Ownership (MGRLOWN) 3.619** 13.859** 0.360 
Family Ownership (FAMOWN) 0.895 -0.538 0.329 
Foreign Ownership (FOROWN) 0.948 -0.138 0.150 
Government Ownership (GOVOWN) 2.428 6.241 0.226 
CSR Experience (CSREXP) 1.458 1.825 0.291 
Firm Size (SIZE) 1.089 1.174 0.120 
Profitability (ROA) 2.144 9.554 0.111 
Leverage (LEV) 0.411 -0.398 0.062* 
2007                                                         N=180 Skewness Kurtosis Kolmogorov-
Smirnov 
CSRR Quantity (CSRRQN) 2.536 8.663 0.205 
CSRR Quality (CSRRQL) 0.772 0.277 0.072 
Managerial Ownership (MGRLOWN) 3.844** 16.063** 0.355 
Family Ownership (FAMOWN) 0.920 -0.483 0.332 
Foreign Ownership (FOROWN) 0.810 -0.339 0.128 
Government Ownership (GOVOWN) 2.514 6.404 0.254 
CSR Experience (CSREXP) 1.357 1.398 0.265 
Firm Size (SIZE) 1.041 1.042 0.104 
Profitability (ROA) 2.272 10.214 0.131 
Leverage (LEV) 0.418 -0.306 0.075 
Notes: * K-S (Lilliefors) with significance >0.05, hence data is normally distributed. 
 **Skewness >3.0 and kurtosis>10.0, indicate serious normality problem. 
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Table 6.12: Results of Normality Tests (Skewness, Kurtosis and K-S Statistics) (Continued) 
2008                                                        N=180 Skewness Kurtosis Kolmogorov-
Smirnov 
CSRR Quantity (CSRRQN) 2.474 6.996 0.213 
CSRR Quality (CSRRQL) 0.916 0.672 0.099 
Managerial Ownership (MGRLOWN) 3.736** 14.845** 0.355 
Family Ownership (FAMOWN) 0.904 -0.521 0.328 
Foreign Ownership (FOROWN) 1.040 0.080 0.159 
Government Ownership (GOVOWN) 2.223 5.146 0.227 
CSR Experience (CSREXP) 1.282 1.007 0.231 
Firm Size (SIZE) 1.031 1.039 0.113 
Profitability (ROA) 0.413 11.373 0.126 
Leverage (LEV) 0.327 -0.355 0.059 
2009                                                        N=180 Skewness Kurtosis Kolmogorov-
Smirnov 
CSRR Quantity (CSRRQN) 2.668 7.981 0.211 
CSRR Quality (CSRRQL) 1.192 1.857 0.089 
Managerial Ownership (MGRLOWN) 3.671** 14.034** 0.355 
Family Ownership (FAMOWN) 0.926 -0.430 0.319 
Foreign Ownership (FOROWN) 1.040 0.080 0.159 
Government Ownership (GOVOWN) 2.170 4.936 0.225 
CSR Experience (CSREXP) 1.199 0.618 0.210 
Firm Size (SIZE) 1.056 1.077 0.121 
Profitability (ROA) 0.053 14.877 0.181 
Leverage (LEV) 0.394 -0.550 0.091 
Notes: * K-S (Lilliefors) with significance >0.05, hence data is normally distributed. 
 **Skewness >3.0 and kurtosis>10.0, indicate serious normality problem. 
Other research variables show the K-S (Lilliefors) with significance level of less than 
0.05, which imply the non-normal data distribution.  
In terms of skewness and kurtosis, all of the research variables are within the acceptable 
level of normality as suggested by Kline (1998), with the exception of managerial 
ownership. According to Kline (1998), a variable experiences a serious problem of 
normality if the skewness value is more than 3.0 and the kurtosis value is more than 10.0. 
Nevertheless, Tabachnick and Fidell (2007) mentioned that the skewness value does not 
make a substantive difference in an analysis with reasonably large samples. 
Even though the kurtosis value can result in an underestimate of the variance, the risk is 
reduced with a large sample; for example, more than 200 cases (Tabachnick & Fidell, 
2007). Since larger sample sizes reduce the detrimental effects of non-normality, 
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researchers can be less concerned with non-normal variable when the sample sizes 
become larger (Hair et al., 2006). Following Hair et al. (2006) and Tabachnick and Fidell 
(2007), the effects of the non-normality can be considered to be negligible due to the 
larger sample size employed in the current study (more than 200 samples).  
Nevertheless, the research variables were transformed to normal scores before further 
analyses are made. This was suggested by Cooke (1998) in dealing with a research that 
the theoretically correct form of the relationship between the dependent and independent 
variables is not known. According to Cooke (1998), this problem could arise in 
accounting disclosure studies when a researcher attempts to explain the variability in 
disclosure index. Transformation of data is also needed when the measurements used to 
represent a research variable are merely proxies for underlying construct (Cooke, 1998). 
Cooke (1998) highlighted the important of researchers to examine the structure of the 
research data before regression analysis is performed.  
Consistent with Cooke (1998), the current study involves an explanation of the variability 
in corporate disclosure. In general, the presence of outliers originated from the nature of 
the research variables, such as the different types of corporate ownership structure, 
contributes to the non-normal data distribution of the variables used in the current study. 
For example, variables that represent corporate ownership structure include the 
percentage of managerial ownership, family ownership, foreign ownership and 
government ownership. In many cases, firms may possess an extremely higher 
percentage of one type of ownership structure (e.g. family ownership) compared with the 
other types of ownership structure (e.g. foreign ownership, government ownership). To 
achieve the objectives of the current study, these outliers are important as they indicate 
the power possessed by specific types of shareholding structure in determining the level 
of CSRR disclosed. Therefore, transformation of the research variables is considered 
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appropriate to overcome the non-normality problem in the current study, in line with the 
suggestion made by several researchers; for example, Cooke (1998), Osborne and Waters 
(2002) and Haniffa and Cooke (2005). 
Multicollinearity refers to a statistical phenomenon in which two or more independent 
variables/predictors in a multiple regression model are strongly correlated.  When two 
independent variables are highly correlated, both convey essentially the same 
information. Therefore, one of the independent variables should be removed from the 
regression model to avoid redundancy. According to Gujarati (2003), multicollinearity 
exists when the correlation between two independent variables exceeds a correlation, r of 
0.8. The existence of multicollinearity can be tested using the Pearson correlation matrix. 
The correlation matrix analysis of the variables used in the current study is shown in 
Table 6.11.   
Generally, the correlation between each of the independent variables used in the current 
study indicates no multicollinearity problem since the correlation, r between them is less 
than 0.8. The low and moderate correlations among the predictors, as shown in Table 
6.11, suggest the independence of the predictors’ measures used in the current study. The 
independent variables also show some relationship with the dependent variable, with 
correlation, r is less than 0.7, which is desirable in a research. Explanations of the 
correlations between the research variables are provided in Section 6.3.2. 
The four assumptions of multiple regressions, namely multicollinearity, normality, 
linearity and homoscedasticity, can also be checked from the outputs generated as part of 
the multiple regression procedures. For example, multicollinearity can be detected from 
the tolerance and Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) value, while normality, linearity and 
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homoscedasticity can be observed by inspecting the Normal Probability Plot (P-P) of the 
regression standardised residual and the scatterplot.  
Linearity assumes that the residuals, which refer to the difference between predicted 
value and observed value of the dependent variables, have a straight-line relationship 
with the dependent variables (Hair et al., 2006). In other words, there should be a linear 
relationship between the independent variables and the dependent variables. 
Homoscedasticity assumes that the dependent variable exhibits equal levels of variance 
or constant variance across a range of independent variables (Hair et al., 2006).  
Overall, the current study meets all the assumptions of the multiple regression analysis. 
The Normal Probability Plot (P-P) of the regression standardised residual (see Figure 6.1) 
show a reasonably straight diagonal line from bottom left to top right of the dependent 
variables used in the current study (CSRRQN and CSRRQL). The pattern of the 
scatterplot (see Figures 6.2) shows that the standardised residuals are roughly 
rectangularly distributed, with most of the scores concentrated in the centre, along the 
‘zero’ point. Results of the Normal Probability Plot (P-P) of the regression standardised 
residual and the scatterplot indicate the non-violation of the normality, linearity and 
homoscedasticity assumption.  
The tolerance value and the VIF value of the independent variables used in the current 
study also indicate the non-violation of the multicollinearity assumption (see Table 6.13). 
Multicollinearity exists when the tolerance value is less than 0.10 or the VIF value is 
more than 10. These collinearity diagnostics are also performed to detect 
multicollinearity problem that may not evident in the correlation matrix.  
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Figure 6.1: Normal P-P Plot of Regression Standardised Residual for CSRR 
 
 
Figure 6.2 Scatterplot for CSRR 
 
Table 6.13: Collinearity Diagnostics (Tolerance and VIF) 
Research Variables Tolerance VIF 
Managerial ownership 0.740 1.352 
Family ownership 0.692 1.445 
Foreign ownership 0.823 1.215 
Government ownership 0.793 1.261 
Board’s CSR experience 0.903 1.108 
Firm size  0.529 1.889 
Shariah status 0.797 1.255 
Profitability 0.690 1.450 
Industry 0.775 1.291 
Leverage 0.693 1.442 
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6.3.4 Multiple Regression Analysis 
Several regression analysis are performed in examining the association between corporate 
ownership structure, boards of directors’ CSR experience, CSRR regulation and the 
levels of CSRR disclosed by firms. The results of the regression analyses are presented in 
their respective sections. Section 6.3.4.1 presents the results of the regression analysis 
made on corporate ownership structure, boards’ CSR experience and CSRR. In Section 
6.3.4.2, several dummy variables are introduced to control the effect of different year of 
analysis. Finally, Section 6.3.4.3 includes the effect of CSRR regulation on the analysis 
made in Section 6.3.4.1.  
6.3.4.1 Corporate Ownership Structure, Boards’ CSR Experience and CSRR 
Table 6.14 and Table 6.15 present the results for pooled data (for all the five years of 
analysis) as well as for each year of analysis (from 2005 to 2009) that relate corporate 
ownership structure, board of directors and CSRR (measured by the quantity and quality 
of CSRR). The F-value for each year and the pooled data is statistically significant at the 
1 percent level for both the quantity and quality of CSRR. The adjusted R
2 
for each year 
and pooled data ranges from 37.3 percent (in 2008) to 46.6 percent (in 2007) for the 
quantity of CSRR (Model 1). It ranges from 32.6 percent (in 2008) to 42.2 percent (in 
2006) for the quality of CSRR (Model 2). Based on the results of the pooled data, Model 
1 explains 42.3 percent of the variance in the quantity of CSRR, while Model 2 explains 
36.9 percent of the variance in the quality of CSRR.  
In general, results of the current study are comparable with other studies that investigate 
the association between corporate governance and CSRR. For example, Haniffa and 
Cooke (2005), who related corporate governance and CSRR in Malaysia using data sets 
of 1996 and 2002, reported adjusted R
2 
of 38.9 percent and 45.3 percent, respectively.  
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Table 6.14: Multiple Regression Results (Model 1: Ownership Structure, Boards of Directors and CSRR Quantity) 
 
 
Notes: 
*** Significant at 0.01 level; ** Significant at 0.05 level; * Significant at 0.10 level. 
CSRRQN=CSRR quantity, MGRLOWN=Managerial ownership, FAMOWN=Family ownership, FOROWN= Foreign ownership, GOVOWN=Government ownership, 
CSREXP=Board’s CSR experience, SIZE=Firm size, SHARIAH=Shariah status, ROA=Profitability, IND=Industry, LEV=Leverage. 
 
 
Model 1 
CSRRQNit =β0 + β1MGRLOWNit + β2FAMOWNit + β3FOROWNit + β4GOVOWNit + β5CSREXPit + β7SIZEit + β8SHARIAHit + β9ROAit + β10INDit + β11LEVit + εit 
 All 2009 2008 2007 2006 2005 
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Constant 0.004 0.166 0.317 6.084*** 0.252 4.814*** 0.048 0.862 -0.209 -3.743*** -0.347 -5.782*** 
MGRLOWN -0.037 -1.130 -0.123 -1.933* -0.152 -2.268** -0.099 -1.417 0.032 0.420 0.088 1.175 
FAMOWN -0.299 -8.139*** -0.224 -3.197*** -0.227 -2.924*** -0.278 -3.670*** -0.358 -4.334*** -0.423 -5.190*** 
FOROWN 0.131 4.723*** 0.088 1.624* 0.107 1.852* 0.171 2.882*** 0.104 1.702* 0.107 1.662* 
GOVOWN 0.304 10.207*** 0.206 3.681*** 0.297 4.991*** 0.385 6.231*** 0.404 5.705*** 0.339 4.889*** 
CSREXP 0.260 8.432*** 0.233 4.347*** 0.223 3.587*** 0.236 3.744*** 0.188 2.631*** 0.237 2.912*** 
SIZE 0.226 6.544*** 0.212 3.033*** 0.074 1.026 0.142 1.940** 0.290 3.765*** 0.240 3.153*** 
SHARIAH 0.104 2.391** 0.033 0.379 -0.010 -0.116 0.133 1.499* 0.173 1.802* 0.122 1.242*** 
ROA 0.186 6.170*** 0.158 2.796*** 0.061 1.054 0.189 2.750*** 0.291 3.909*** 0.317 4.386** 
LEV 0.118 3.893*** 0.109 1.793* 0.081 1.248 0.154 2.454** 0.131 1.982** 0.158 2.346 
IND 0.026 0.612 0.037 0.454 -0.015 -0.166 0.023 0.263 0.041 0.440 0.015 0.153 
Adjusted R
2
 0.423 0.435 0.373 0.466 0.462 0.430 
F-Value 66.881*** 14.806*** 11.656*** 16.623*** 16.391*** 14.525*** 
N 900 180 180 180 180 180 
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Table 6.15: Multiple Regression Results (Model 2: Ownership Structure, Boards of Directors and CSRR Quality) 
 
Notes: 
*** Significant at 0.01 level; ** Significant at 0.05 level; * Significant at 0.10 level. 
CSRRQL=CSRR quality, MGRLOWN=Managerial ownership, FAMOWN=Family ownership, FOROWN= Foreign ownership, GOVOWN=Government ownership, 
CSREXP=Board’s CSR experience, SIZE=Firm size, SHARIAH=Shariah status, ROA=Profitability, IND=Industry, LEV=Leverage. 
 
 
Model 2 
CSRRQLit = β0 + β1MGRLOWNit + β2FAMOWNit + β3FOROWNit + β4GOVOWNit + β5CSREXPit + β7SIZEit + β8SHARIAHit + β9ROAit + β10INDit + β11LEVit + εit 
 All 2009 2008 2007 2006 2005 
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Constant 0.004 0.148 0.367 6.927*** 0.315 6.159*** 0.050 0.882 -0.232 -4.177*** -0.445 -6.989*** 
MGRLOWN -0.008 -0.232 -0.076 -1.183 -0.105 -1.606 -0.086 -1.211 0.053 0.709 0.087 1.088 
FAMOWN -0.255 -6.665*** -0.171 -2.397** -0.180 -2.375** -0.244 -3.160*** -0.280 -3.400*** -0.408 -4.721*** 
FOROWN 0.135 4.670*** 0.105 1.887* 0.149 2.631*** 0.184 3.058*** 0.070 1.156 0.084 1.234 
GOVOWN 0.283 9.132*** 0.202 3.540*** 0.295 5.075*** 0.354 5.629*** 0.380 5.382*** 0.302 4.099*** 
CSREXP 0.212 6.605*** 0.182 3.325*** 0.150 2.477*** 0.177 2.752*** 0.161 2.258** 0.178 2.055** 
SIZE 0.277 7.724*** 0.244 3.429*** 0.126 1.800* 0.180 2.407** 0.339 4.418*** 0.286 3.542*** 
SHARIAH 0.079 1.756* 0.007 0.080 -0.040 -0.464 0.095 1.050 0.108 1.127 0.147 1.408 
ROA 0.180 5.741*** 0.158 2.744*** 0.064 1.132 0.199 2.846*** 0.289 3.888*** 0.284 3.715*** 
LEV 0.088 2.797*** 0.103 1.675* 0.038 0.595 0.121 1.893* 0.100 1.509* 0.117 1.645* 
IND 0.083 1.889* 0.096 1.138 0.066 0.770 0.074 0.830 0.070 0.760 0.076 0.739 
Adjusted R
2
 0.369 0.374 0.326 0.414 0.422 0.365 
F-Value 53.480*** 11.697*** 9.661*** 13.625*** 14.065*** 11.281*** 
N 900 180 180 180 180 180 
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Kathyayini et al. (2012) documented an adjusted R
2
 of 44.3 percent in their investigation 
of the association between corporate governance and environmental reporting in 
Australia. Other Malaysian studies that test the association between corporate governance 
and CSRR reported a lower adjusted R
2
 compared to the one reported in the current 
study, such as studies by Lim et al. (2008), Said et al. (2009) and Elijido-Ten (2009), 
which were 14.36 percent, 19 percent and 23.7 percent, respectively. The differences in 
the adjusted R
2 
reported is partly due to the different variables used in representing 
corporate ownership structure, board of directors’ characteristics and CSRR in different 
studies. 
6.3.4.2 Corporate Ownership Structure, Boards’ CSR Experience and CSRR (With 
Dummies) 
In Model 1a and Model 2a, four dummy variables (DUM_YR06, DUM_YR07, 
DUM_YR08 and DUM_YR09) are introduced into the pooled data models to control the 
effect of different years of data sets used in the current study. Table 6.16 compares the 
results of multiple regression analysis between models without dummies (Model 1 and 
Model 2) and models with dummies (Model 1a and Model 2a).  
As shown in Table 6.16, the inclusion of dummy variables (in Model 1a and Model 2a) 
has led to an increase in the adjusted R
2 
reported by the models. The adjusted R
2
 for 
CSRR quantity increases from 42.3 percent (in Model 1) to 49 percent (in Model 1a); and 
for CSRR quality increase from 36.9 percent (Model 2) to 46.9 percent (Model 2a). The 
findings may imply the influence of specific events that had occurred in a particular year 
(which is represented by the different years of data set used) on CSRR, along with the 
corporate governance variables and other control variables.  
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Table 6.16: Summary of Multiple Regression Results of Model 1 and Model 2 (Pooled Data) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes: 
*** Significant at 0.01 level; ** Significant at 0.05 level; * Significant at 0.10 level. 
CSRRQN=CSRR quantity, CSRRQL=CSRR quality, MGRLOWN=Managerial ownership, FAMOWN=Family ownership, FOROWN= Foreign ownership, 
GOVOWN=Government ownership, CSREXP=Board’s CSR experience, SIZE=Firm size, SHARIAH=Shariah status, ROA=Profitability, IND=Industry, LEV=Leverage, 
DUM_YR06=Year 2006 (Dummy), DUM_YR07=Year 2007 (Dummy), DUM_YR08=Year 2008 (Dummy), DUM_YR09=Year 2009 (Dummy). 
 CSRR Quantity (CSRRQN) CSRR Quality (CSRRQL) 
 Model 1 Model 1a Model 2 Model 2a 
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Constant 0.004 0.166 -0.059 -2.324** 0.004 0.148 -0.076 -2.955*** 
MGRLOWN -0.037 -1.130 -0.055 -1.758* -0.008 -0.232 -0.029 -0.929 
FAMOWN -0.299 -8.139*** -0.301 -8.707*** -0.255 -6.665*** -0.256 -7.322*** 
FOROWN 0.131 4.723*** 0.123 4.694*** 0.135 4.670*** 0.124 4.679*** 
GOVOWN 0.304 10.207*** 0.314 11.201*** 0.283 9.132*** 0.295 10.369*** 
CSREXP 0.260 8.432*** 0.227 7.807*** 0.212 6.605*** 0.173 5.850*** 
SIZE 0.226 6.544*** 0.186 5.696*** 0.277 7.724*** 0.229 6.907*** 
SHARIAH 0.104 2.391** 0.096 2.347** 0.079 1.756* 0.069 1.668* 
ROA 0.186 6.170*** 0.188 6.569*** 0.180 5.741*** 0.182 6.255*** 
LEV 0.118 3.893*** 0.125 4.389*** 0.088 2.797*** 0.096 3.327*** 
IND 0.026 0.612 0.018 0.446 0.083 1.889* 0.074 1.823* 
DUM_YR06   0.099 2.030** 
  
0.149 2.998*** 
DUM_YR07   0.271 5.468*** 
  
0.340 6.764*** 
DUM_YR08   0.397 8.071*** 
  
0.502 10.063*** 
DUM_YR09   0.456 9.202*** 
  
0.553 11.014*** 
Adjusted R
2
 0.423 0.490 0.369 0.469 
F-Value 66.881*** 62.750*** 53.480*** 57.816*** 
N 900 900 900 900 
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The specific events that may occur in a particular year, for example, the introduction 
of/change in regulation (Buhr, 1998; Tilt & Symes, 1999; Frost, 2007; Criado-Jimenez et 
al., 2008; Tilling & Tilt, 2010), and the occurrence of environmental/social accidents 
(Patten, 1992) and global financial crisis (Kuasirikun & Sherer, 2004; Mia & Mamun, 
2011), may have effects on the levels of CSRR disclosed by firms. These events may lead 
to the variation of CSRR disclosed by firms. For example, firms may increase or decrease 
their levels of involvement in CSR and CSRR in rensponse to the occurrence of specific 
event. This is in a way to maintain their legitimacy in society and manage their 
stakeholders, particularly the important stakeholders. 
6.3.4.3 Corporate Ownership Structure, Boards’ CSR Experience, CSRR 
Regulation and CSRR 
The specific events that may occur in a particular year, for example, the introduction 
of/change in regulation (Buhr, 1998; Tilt & Symes, 1999; Frost, 2007; Criado-Jimenez et 
al., 2008; Tilling & Tilt, 2010), and the occurrence of environmental/social accidents 
(Patten, 1992) and global financial crisis (Kuasirikun & Sherer, 2004; Mia & Mamun, 
2011), may have effects on the levels of CSRR disclosed by firms.  
The occurrence of specific events such as social accidents, financial crisis and regulation, 
in a particular year may affect the levels of CSRR disclosed by firms. Nevertheless, the 
focus of the current study is on the effect of CSRR regulation, in line with the 
introduction of CSRR regulation by the Bursa Malaysia in 2007. While evidence from 
the extant CSRR literature have documented the effect of regulation on the level of 
CSRR disclosed (Frost, 2007; Llena et al., 2007; Criado-Jimenez et al., 2008), the current 
study contributes to the existing literature by examining the effect of CSRR regulation on 
the association between corporate ownership structure and CSRR.  
 
285 
 
Other than the influence of the different types of corporate ownership structure on the 
levels of CSRR, which is very much relevant in the context of Malaysia owing to its 
unique features of corporate ownership structure, the introduction of CSRR regulation 
upon all public listed firms in Malaysia with effect from the financial year 2007 may 
affect the association between corporate ownership structure and the levels of CSRR. For 
the purpose of the current study, CSRR regulation is considered to be a moderating 
variable that may affect the association between corporate ownership structure and 
CSRR. In other words, CSRR regulation represents one of the important factors that may 
influence the levels of CSRR, along with the corporate ownership structure.  
While evidence demonstrated in Table 6.14 and Table 6.15 indicate the different 
influences of the different types of corporate ownership structure on the levels of CSRR, 
perhaps the inclusion of the effect of CSRR regulation on the association between 
corporate ownership structure and CSRR may offer some incremental contribution in 
terms of demonstrating the effectiveness of the CSRR regulation in promoting a higher 
levels of CSRR across the structure. As indicated in Table 6.17 and Table 6.18, CSRR 
regulation is introduced as a moderating variable in Model 3 and Model 4 of the current 
study.  
However, before testing the moderating role of CSRR regulation, multiple regression 
analysis is performed in order to examine the effect of CSRR regulation on the levels of 
CSRR disclosed. In this case, CSRR regulation is used as an independent variable. 
Overall, the inclusion of CSRR regulation as one of the determinants of CSRR in the 
current study, along with corporate governance’s variables and other control variables 
(see Model 1b and Model 2b), has witnessed an increase in the adjusted R
2 
from 42.3 
percent (see Model 1) to 48.1 percent (see Model 1b) for the quantity of CSRR; and from 
36.9 percent (see Model 2) to 45.4 percent (see Model 2b) for the quality CSRR. In other  
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Table 6.17: Multiple Regression Results (Model 3: The Moderating Effect of CSRR Regulation-CSRR Quantity) 
Notes: 
*** Significant at 0.01 level; ** Significant at 0.05 level; * Significant at 0.10 level. 
CSRRQN=CSRR quantity, MGRLOWN=Managerial ownership, FAMOWN=Family ownership, FOROWN= Foreign ownership, GOVOWN=Government ownership, 
CSREXP=Board’s CSR experience, REG=CSRR regulation, SIZE=Firm size, SHARIAH=Shariah status, ROA=Profitability, IND=Industry, LEV=Leverage. 
Model 3: CSRRQNit  = β0 + β1MGRLOWNit + β2FAMOWNit + β3FOROWNit + β4GOVOWNit + β5CSREXPit + β6REGit + β7SIZEit + β8SHARIAHit + β9ROAit + β10INDit + 
β11LEVit + β12MGRLOWN*REGit+ β13FAMOWN*REGit + β14FOROWN*REGit + β15GOVOWN*REGit + εit 
 Model 1b All Moderators MGRLOWN*REG  FAMOWN*REG FOROWN*REG GOVOWN*REG 
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Constant 0.014 0.577 0.016 0.656 0.015 0.632 0.014 0.573 0.014 0.578 0.013 0.536 
MGRLOWN -0.053 -1.684* -0.053 -1.684* -0.055 -1.743* -0.053 -1.677* -0.053 -1.684* -0.050 -1.603* 
FAMOWN -0.300 -8.620*** -0.299 -8.620*** -0.300 -8.620*** -0.300 -8.585*** -0.300 -8.615*** -0.302 -8.672*** 
FOROWN 0.122 4.633*** 0.123 4.662*** 0.123 4.671*** 0.122 4.622*** 0.122 4.614*** 0.123 4.656*** 
GOVOWN 0.316 11.186*** 0.323 11.459*** 0.317 11.235*** 0.318 11.227*** 0.316 11.180*** 0.319 11.266*** 
CSREXP 0.236 8.041*** 0.232 7.957*** 0.234 7.975*** 0.235 8.034*** 0.236 8.037*** 0.237 8.074*** 
REG 0.364 10.044*** 0.365 10.090*** 0.367 10.135*** 0.361 9.927*** 0.364 10.037*** 0.366 10.102*** 
SIZE 0.186 5.656*** 0.188 5.719*** 0.189 5.744*** 0.186 5.640*** 0.186 5.639*** 0.186 5.634*** 
SHARIAH 0.097 2.346** 0.096 2.344** 0.097 2.348** 0.097 2.354** 0.097 2.345** 0.096 2.334** 
ROA 0.173 6.066*** 0.174 6.090*** 0.172 6.010*** 0.175 6.103*** 0.173 6.038*** 0.176 6.157*** 
LEV 0.122 4.243*** 0.126 4.378*** 0.121 4.211*** 0.123 4.270 0.122 4.239*** 0.125 4.340*** 
IND 0.022 0.549 0.020 0.502 0.022 0.557 0.022  0.022 0.549 0.020 0.503 
MGRLOWN*REG   -0.147 -3.203*** -0.080 -1.977**       
FAMOWN*REG   0.110 2.230**   0.058 1.338     
FOROWN*REG   -0.021 -0.562     -0.002 -0.049   
GOVOWN*REG   -0.083 -2.014**       -0.069 -1.776* 
Adjusted R
2
 0.481 0.487 0.490 0.489 0.488 0.489 
F-Value 76.802*** 57.966*** 70.958*** 70.614*** 70.323*** 70.836*** 
N  900 900 900 900 900 
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Table 6.18: Multiple Regression Results (Model 4: The Moderating Effect of CSRR Regulation-CSRR Quality) 
Notes: 
*** Significant at 0.01 level; ** Significant at 0.05 level; * Significant at 0.10 level. 
CSRRQL=CSRR quality, MGRLOWN=Managerial ownership, FAMOWN=Family ownership, FOROWN= Foreign ownership, GOVOWN=Government ownership, 
CSREXP=Board’s CSR experience, REG=CSRR regulation, SIZE=Firm size, SHARIAH=Shariah status, ROA=Profitability, IND=Industry, LEV=Leverage. 
Model 4: CSRRQLit  = β0 + β1MGRLOWNit + β2FAMOWNit + β3FOROWNit + β4GOVOWNit + β5CSREXPit + β6REGit + β7SIZEit + β8SHARIAHit + β9ROAit + β10INDit + 
β11LEVit + β12MGRLOWN*REGit+ β13FAMOWN*REGit + β14FOROWN*REGit + β15GOVOWN*REGit + εit 
 Model 2b All Moderators MGRLOWN*REG  FAMOWN*REG FOROWN*REG GOVOWN*REG 
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Constant 0.016 0.632 0.016 0.641 0.017 0.675 0.015 0.628 0.014 0.581 0.015 0.591 
MGRLOWN -0.027 -0.831 -0.026 -0.825 -0.028 -0.876 -0.026 -0.823 -0.027 -0.829 -0.024 -0.750 
FAMOWN -0.256 -7.210*** -0.254 -7.188*** -0.256 -7.204*** -0.255 -7.173*** -0.256 -7.210*** -0.258 -7.260*** 
FOROWN 0.124 4.612*** 0.126 4.697*** 0.125 4.640*** 0.124 4.601*** 0.126 4.660*** 0.125 4.635*** 
GOVOWN 0.298 10.320*** 0.303 10.551*** 0.298 10.352*** 0.299 10.366*** 0.298 10.320*** 0.300 10.398*** 
CSREXP 0.183 6.111*** 0.179 6.013*** 0.181 6.054*** 0.182 6.103*** 0.182 6.100*** 0.183 6.142*** 
REG 0.438 11.838*** 0.438 11.847*** 0.440 11.902*** 0.434 11.711*** 0.438 11.846*** 0.439 11.896*** 
SIZE 0.230 6.838*** 0.233 6.942*** 0.232 6.902*** 0.229 6.822*** 0.232 6.877*** 0.229 6.817*** 
SHARIAH 0.071 1.682* 0.071 1.687* 0.071 1.682* 0.071 1.690* 0.071 1.689* 0.070 1.669* 
ROA 0.165 5.656*** 0.168 5.756*** 0.163 5.608*** 0.166 5.697*** 0.167 5.705*** 0.168 5.745*** 
LEV 0.093 3.169*** 0.095 3.245*** 0.092 3.142*** 0.094 3.199*** 0.092 3.134*** 0.096 3.266*** 
IND 0.079 1.919* 0.077 1.886* 0.079 1.926** 0.079 1.917* 0.079 1.919* 0.077 1.874* 
MGRLOWN*REG   -0.126 -2.693*** -0.064 -1.549       
FAMOWN*REG   0.115 2.267**   0.064 1.448     
FOROWN*REG   0.017 0.442     0.031 0.845   
GOVOWN*REG   -0.068 -1.630*       -0.069 -1.754* 
Adjusted R
2
 0.454 0.459 0.462 0.462 0.461 0.463 
F-Value 68.966*** 51.835*** 63.518*** 63.472*** 63.258*** 63.623*** 
N 900 900 900 900 900 900 
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words, the inclusion of CSRR regulation (see Model 1b and Model 2b) has generally 
improved the existing models (Model 1 and Model 2).  
 The inclusion of CSRR regulation as a moderating variable on the association between 
corporate ownership structure and CSRR has further increased the adjusted R
2
. In 
comparison with Model 1b (adjusted R
2
: 48.1), the adjusted R
2 
reported for Model 3 (with 
moderator) is slightly higher (48.7 percent). The same pattern of analysis applies for 
Model 2b (without moderator) and Model 4 (with moderator), whereby the adjusted R
2 
reported for Model 4 is slightly higher (45.9 percent) compared with the one reported in 
Model 2b (45.4 percent). 
These results imply that a better model is developed with the inclusion of CSRR 
regulation as a moderating variable. In other words, CSRR regulation represents one of 
the important factors that may influence the levels of CSRR along with corporate 
ownership structure. Nevertheless, the moderating effect of CSRR regulation on the 
association between corporate ownership structure and CSRR varies across the different 
types of corporate ownership structure. These variations are elaborated in Section 6.4.3. 
6.4 RESULTS OF THE HYPOTHESES TESTING 
The current study examines the direct association between corporate ownership structure 
and CSRR (see Section 6.4.1). It also includes third variable that is CSRR regulation as a 
moderating variable that may influence the association between corporate ownership 
structure and CSRR (see Section 6.4.3). In addition, the current study also demonstrates 
the importance of board of directors’ CSR experiences as one of the significant board of 
directors’ characteristics to improve the quantity and quality of CSRR disclosed (see 
Section 6.4.2). 
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6.4.1 Corporate Ownership Structure and CSRR 
The influence of different types of corporate ownership structure on the quantity and 
quality of CSRR is shown in Table 6.14 and Table 6.15, respectively. Based on the 
pooled data, there is no association between managerial ownership (MGRLOWN) and 
the quantity of CSRR (CSRRQN) and the quality of CSRR (CSRRQL). Even though a 
significant negative association is found between managerial ownership and the quantity 
of CSRR (CSRRQN) for the yearly data of 2008 (p-value<0.05) and 2009 (p-
value<0.10), the strength of the association is generally weak. Overall, these findings do 
not provide support for H1a of the current study. Instead of documenting a negative 
association between managerial ownership and CSRR as dictated by Ghazali (2007) in 
Malaysia based on year 2001’s data set (with p-value<0.01), the current study reveals no 
association between the two variables based on the data set of 2005 to 2009.  
The current study also documents a strong negative association between family 
ownership (FAMOWN) and the quantity of CSRR (CSRRQN) (p-value<0.01) for both 
pooled data and each year of analysis. While the strength of the negative association 
remained (p-value<0.01) for the pooled data and the yearly data of 2005 to 2007 for the 
quality of CSRR (CSRRQL), it reduces to a moderate level of significance (p-
value<0.05) for the yearly data of 2008 and 2009. In general, the above findings provide 
support for H1b of the current study, whereby family ownership is related negatively to 
the quantity and quality of CSRR disclosed by firms.  
Even though foreign ownership (FOROWN) demonstrates a significant positive 
association with the quantity (CSRRQN) and the quality of CSRR (CSRRQL) for the 
pooled data of the current study, results for the yearly data are mixed. There is a strong 
positive association (p-value<0.01) between foreign ownership and the quantity of CSRR 
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for the yearly data of 2007 (the first year CSRR is made mandatory in Malaysia). 
Nevertheless, the association is weak (p-value<0.10) for other years of analysis (2005, 
2006, 2008 and 2009). In terms of the quality of CSRR, the influence of foreign 
ownership is strong (p-value<0.01) for the yearly data of 2007 and 2008; and weak (p-
value<0.10) for the yearly data of 2009. There is no association between foreign 
ownership and the quality of CSRR for the yearly data of 2005 and 2006 (the voluntary 
period of CSRR). Based on the results of the pooled data for the quantity (CSRRQN) and 
quality (CSRRQL) of CSRR, the current study provides support for H1c, which generally 
suggests a positive association between foreign ownership and CSRR.  
Government ownership (GOVOWN) is significantly positively related to the levels of 
CSRR disclosed, indicating the support for H1d of the current study. There is a strong 
association between these two variables (p-value<0.01) for both pooled data and each 
year of analysis. In comparison with other types of corporate ownership structure used in 
the current study, government ownership seems to produce the most consistent influence 
on CSRR over the five-year period of analysis.  
Overall, the findings of the current study demonstrate the different power possesses by 
different types of shareholders in influencing the CSRR disclosed by firms. Based on a 
five-year analysis of data from 2005 to 2009, it is shown that the greater level of 
government ownership lead to the greater levels of CSRR disclosed, while the greater 
level of family ownership lead to the lower levels of CSRR disclosed by firms. The other 
two types of corporate ownership structure examined in the current study reported mixed 
findings.  
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The associations between several corporate ownership structures and CSRR seem to be 
affected by the specific year of analysis, which imply the specific events that may occur 
in a particular year. Perhaps, specific events that occur in a particular year of analysis, for 
example, the introduction of CSRR regulation in 2007 and the global financial crisis of 
2008, may affect the association between corporate ownership structures and CSRR. 
Therefore, the current study includes an investigation of the effect of the introduction of 
CSRR regulation on the association between corporate ownership structure and CSRR. 
The results of the analysis are presented in Section 6.4.3. 
6.4.2 Board of Directors’ CSR Experience and CSRR 
In the current study, board of directors’ CSR experience (CSREXP) is used to indicate 
strategic posture in firms. As evidenced in Table 6.14 and Table 6.15, board of directors’ 
CSR experience is strongly related to the quantity (CSRRQN) and the quality of CSRR 
(CSRRQL) disclosed by firms (p-value<0.01). The strong positive association between 
the board of directors’ CSR experience and CSRR is documented for both pooled data 
and each year of analysis. These results provide support for H2 of the current study. In 
other words, firms with a greater number of board members that possess CSR experience 
are more likely to disclose a greater level of CSRR. This finding is evidenced over the 
five-year period of analysis from 2005 to 2009. Overall, this finding signifies the 
importance of board of directors’ CSR experience as firms’ strategic posture that drive 
CSR activities and CSRR in firms. 
6.4.3 Corporate Ownership Structure and CSRR:  The Effect of CSRR Regulation  
Table 6.17 and Table 6.18 show the results of the regression analysis performed to 
investigate the moderating effect of CSRR regulation on the association between 
corporate ownership structure and CSRR. Generally, CSRR regulation is significantly 
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positively related to the levels of CSRR disclosed. A strong significant association (p-
value<0.01) is dictated between the two variables for pooled data and each year of 
analysis (see Model 1b and Model 2b). However, the inclusion of CSRR regulation as a 
moderating variable on the association between corporate ownership structure and CSRR 
produces mixed findings. The moderating effect of CSRR regulation tends to vary across 
different types of corporate ownership structure.  
While the addition of CSRR regulation as an independent variable in Model 1b has 
showed a weak negative association between managerial ownership and the quantity of 
CSRR (p-value<0.10), the association become stronger (p-value<0.01) when CSRR 
regulation is introduced as a moderator (measured by an interaction term of managerial 
ownership and CSRR regulation, labelled as MGRLOWN*REG). Despite the low levels 
of CSRR disclosed by firms with higher level of managerial ownership during the 
voluntary period of CSRR, the presence of CSRR regulation has further reduced the 
quantity of CSRR disclosed by the firms. A similar pattern of analysis is apparent for the 
quality of CSRR, whereby the presence of CSRR regulation has made the negative 
association between managerial ownership and the quality of CSRR become strongly 
significant (p-value<0.01). Overall, the above findings indicate no support for H3a of the 
current study, which stated that the negative association between managerial ownership 
and the quantity and quality of CSRR is weaker in the mandatory period of CSRR than 
the voluntary period of CSRR.  
The significant negative association between family ownership and CSRR is moderated 
by CSRR regulation. The presence of CSRR regulation has weaken the negative 
association between the two variables (p-value<0.05), thus provides support for H3b of 
the current study. This is shown by the positive association between the interaction term 
of family ownership and CSRR regulation (FAMOWN*REG) and the levels of CSRR. 
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Even though a lower level of CSRR is apparent in firms with higher level of family 
ownership during the voluntary period of CSRR, the introduction of CSRR regulation 
from 2007 onwards has witnessed a greater level of CSRR disclosed by firms with higher 
level of family ownership.  
The five-year analysis involved in the current study also documents a significant positive 
association between foreign ownership and CSRR. However, the interaction term of 
foreign ownership and CSRR regulation (FOROWN*REG) has no association on the 
levels of CSRR disclosed (p-value>0.10). The evidence shows no support for H3c of the 
current study, which hypothesised that the positive association between foreign 
ownership and the quantity and quality of CSRR is stronger in the mandatory CSRR 
period than the voluntary CSRR period.  
In general, the current study documented a positive association between government 
ownership and CSRR (p-value<0.01). With the inclusion of an interaction term of 
government ownership and CSRR regulation (GOVOWN*REG) into the government 
ownership-CSRR association, the significant positive association is altered to a 
significant negative association for the quantity of CSRR (p-value <0.05) and the quality 
of CSRR, respectively (p-value<0.10). Therefore, H3d of the current study, which 
hypothesised a stronger positive association between government ownership and the 
quantity and quality of CSRR in the mandatory period of CSRR, is not supported.  
6.4.4 Control Variables 
There are five control variables included in the current study. They are firm size (SIZE), 
Shariah status (SHARIAH), profitability (ROA), leverage (LEV) and industry (IND). 
These variables have been found to influence the level of CSRR disclosed in many prior 
CSRR’s research. In general, firm size (SIZE), which is measured by the natural log of 
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total assets, is significantly positively related to the quantity (CSRRQN) and the quality 
(CSRRQL) of CSRR disclosed (p-value<0.01). However, no association dictated 
between firm size and the quantity of CSRR for the yearly data of 2008 (see Table 6.14). 
There is a weak association between firm size and the quality of CSRR for the yearly 
data of 2008 (see Table 6.15). The findings indicate that larger firms tend to disclose 
greater amount and quality of CSRR. The greater visibility of these larger firms has made 
them become more subjected to the regulations prescribed by the regulators and 
government authorities. 
Other than firm size, Shariah status and industry classification of a firm also indicate the 
government power, as the status and classification made firms being subjected to certain 
rules and regulations as determined by the regulators or government authorities. For 
example, firms that are granted with Shariah status have to ensure that their business 
activities are in line with the Islamic principles and are free from prohibited activities and 
elements such as ambiguity (gharar), usury (riba) and gambling (maisir). Firms in high 
profile industry such as in industrial product, plantation and properties industries are 
more likely to cause environmental problems and damages. They tend to have greater 
public visibility and receive greater focus from the government as to ensure that they 
operate in responsible manners to prevent environmental problems and damages. 
The association between Shariah status of a firm (SHARIAH) and the quantity 
(CSRRQN) and the quality (CSRRQL) of CSRR disclosed by the firm over the five-year 
period is inconsistent. There is a strong positive association between Shariah status and 
the quantity of CSRR for the yearly data of 2005 (p-value<0.01). Nevertheless, only a 
moderate (weak) association dictated between the two variables for the pooled data 
(yearly data of 2006 and 2007). No association found between Shariah status and the 
quantity of CSRR for the yearly data of 2008 and 2009. While there is a weak positive 
 
295 
 
association between Shariah status and the quality of CSRR for the pooled data, no 
association found between the two variables for each year of analysis. The influence of 
industry types (IND) on CSRR is also seemed very weak, whereby the only significant 
association between the two variables was for the pooled data of Model 2 (the quality of 
CSRR with p-value<0.10). Firms in high profile industries tend to disclose a greater 
quality of CSRR.  
The effect of firms’ profitability (ROA) on the levels of CSRR disclosed is established 
through a significant positive association between the two variables for both pooled data 
and each year of analysis, with exception of the yearly data of 2008. The result signifies 
the influence of firms’ economic performance in determining the quantity and quality of 
CSRR disclosed by firms.  
Leverage (LEV), which represents the creditors’ power, is also found to be significantly 
positively related to the quantity and quality of CSRR for the pooled data. However, 
results from the yearly data revealed an inconsistent finding on the association between 
the two variables. For example, there is a moderate association between leverage and the 
quantity of CSRR for the yearly data of 2006 and 2007, while no association between the 
two variables for the yearly data of 2005 and 2008. A weak association is found between 
leverage and the quality of CSRR disclosed for each year of analysis, with exception of 
the yearly data of 2008. Four dummy variables (DUM_YR06, DUM_YR07, 
DUM_YR08 and DUM_YR09) included to control the effect of different years of data 
sets used in the current study also show significant influence on the quantity and quality 
of CSRR disclosed by firms (p-value<0.01). 
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For the five control variables used in the current study, results from the multiple 
regression analysis performed on Model 3 and Model 4, where the moderating effect of 
CSRR regulation is included (refer Table 6.17 and Table 6.18), is consistent with the 
result produced on Model 1 and Model 2 for the pooled data. Firm size, profitability and 
leverage were found to be significantly positively related to the quantity and quality of 
CSRR disclosed with p-value of 0.01. Shariah status is significantly positively related to 
the quantity and quality of CSRR with p-value of 0.05 and 0.10, respectively. While a 
weak association is dictated between industry and the quality of CSRR with p-value of 
less than 0.10, no association found between industry and the quantity of CSRR.  
Overall, findings of the current study provide support for the influence of several firm-
specific characteristics, such as firm size, profitability and leverage on the levels of 
CSRR disclosed by firms, as evidenced in the existing CSRR’s literature, for examples, 
Patten (1991), Roberts, 1992, Haniffa and Cooke (2005), Branco and Rodrigues (2008a) 
and Huang and Kung (2010). Such supports are valid in all the four models examined in 
the current study. To a certain extent, the current study also highlights the importance of 
the Shariah status of firms in influencing the levels of CSRR disclosed. Despite several 
studies that documented the difference in corporate reporting and performance between 
the conventional and Islamic organisations (Ibrahim et al., 2006; Aribi & Gao, 2010), the 
current study specifically dictates the impact of the Shariah status of firms, which imply 
greater emphasis on CSR in this type of firms, on the levels of CSRR in Malaysia. In 
contrary to CSRR literature that revealed the impact of industry in influencing the levels 
of CSRR disclosed, the current study observes otherwise. Rather than impacted the total 
CSRR, possibly industry have influence on selected CSRR dimensions only. This is 
examined in Section 6.5. 
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6.5 ADDITIONAL ANALYSES  
Several additional analyses are conducted to test the robustness of the findings revealed 
in Model 3 and Model 4 of the current study. Firstly, the government ownership of a 
firm, which is represented by the percentage of shares held by government to total 
numbers of shares issued, is substituted with other variables that may represent 
government ownership. For the purpose of the current study, two alternative 
measurements used to represent government ownership are: the status of being a GLC, 
and the percentage of shares held by five largest institutional investors in Malaysia to 
total numbers of shares issued (INSTOWN).  
The five largest institutional investors in Malaysia include Permodalan Nasional Berhad 
(PNB), Lembaga Tabung Haji (LTH), Social Security Organization (SOCSO), Lembaga 
Tabung Angkatan Tentera (LTAT), and Employee Provident Fund (EPF) (Wahab et al., 
2007; Saleh et al., 2010). These organisations are owned by the government of Malaysia, 
and may provide good proxies to represent government ownership. Further analysis is 
conducted upon the government ownership because this variable produces the most 
consistent finding on its association with CSRR over the five year period from 2005 to 
2009 (see Table 6.14 and Table 6.15). Therefore, the performance of these additional 
analyses may inform the robustness of the findings revealed using different 
measurements of government ownership. 
Table 6.19 and Table 6.20 present the multiple regression results of the full models 
(Model 3 and Model 4) using alternative measures to indicate government ownership. 
Government ownership is represented by the GLC in Model 5 (for CSRR Quantity) and 
Model 6 (for CSRR Quality), and the percentage of shares held by five largest 
institutional investors in Malaysia to the total numbers of shares issued (INSTOWN) in  
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Table 6.19: Multiple Regression Results (Alternative Measures of Government Ownership-
CSRR Quantity) 
 
 
Notes: 
*** Significant at 0.01 level; ** Significant at 0.05 level; * Significant at 0.10 level. 
CSRRQN=CSRR quantity, MGRLOWN=Managerial ownership, FAMOWN=Family ownership, 
FORDIR=Foreign director, GOVOWN=Government ownership, GLC=Government-linked firm, 
INSTOWN=Institutional ownership, CSREXP=Board’s CSR experience, REG=CSRR regulation, 
SIZE=Firm size, SHARIAH=Shariah status, ROA=Profitability, IND=Industry, LEV=Leverage. 
 
 
Model 3: CSRRQNit  = β0 + β1MGRLOWNit + β2FAMOWNit + β3FOROWNit + β4GOVOWNit + 
β5CSREXPit + β6REGit + β7SIZEit + β8SHARIAHit + β9ROAit + β10INDit + β11LEVit + 
β12MGRLOWN*REGit+ β13FAMOWN*REGit + β14FOROWN*REGit + β15GOVOWN*REGit + εit 
 
Model 5: CSRRQNit  = β0 + β1MGRLOWNit + β2FAMOWNit + β3FOROWNit + β4GLCit + 
β5CSREXPit + β6REGit + β7SIZEit + β8SHARIAHit + β9ROAit + β10INDit + β11LEVit + 
β12MGRLOWN*REGit+ β13FAMOWN*REGit + β14FOROWN*REGit + β15GLC*REGit + εit 
 
Model 7: CSRRQNit  = β0 + β1MGRLOWNit + β2FAMOWNit + β3FOROWNit + β4INSTOWNit + 
β5CSREXPit + β6REGit + β7SIZEit + β8SHARIAHit + β9ROAit + β10INDit + β11LEVit + 
β12MGRLOWN*REGit+ β13FAMOWN*REGit + β14FOROWN*REGit + β15INSTOWN*REGit + εit 
 
 GOVOWN (Model 3) GLC (Model 5) INSTOWN (Model 7) 
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Constant 0.016 0.656 -0.001 -0.035 0.019 0.765 
MGRLOWN -0.053 -1.684* -0.058 -1.776* -0.072 -2.229** 
FAMOWN -0.299 -8.620*** -0.286 -7.762*** -0.329 -9.220*** 
FOROWN 0.123 4.662*** 0.105 3.783*** 0.071 2.687*** 
GOVOWN 0.323 11.459***     
GLC   0.385 7.472***   
INSTOWN     0.232 8.109*** 
CSREXP 0.232 7.957*** 0.276 8.983*** 0.235 7.788*** 
REG 0.365 10.090*** 0.353 9.317*** 0.361 9.626*** 
SIZE 0.188 5.719*** 0.202 5.821*** 0.216 6.370*** 
SHARIAH 0.096 2.344** 0.133 3.136*** 0.101 2.373** 
ROA 0.174 6.090*** 0.194 6.563*** 0.178 6.009*** 
LEV 0.126 4.378*** 0.132 4.436*** 0.103 3.452*** 
IND 0.020 0.502 0.028 0.683 0.026 0.639 
MGRLOWN*REG -0.147 -3.203*** -0.111 -2.309** -0.132 -2.786*** 
FAMOWN*REG 0.110 2.230** 0.075 1.416 0.119 2.336** 
FOROWN*REG -0.021 -0.562 -0.009 -0.229 0.002 0.061 
GOVOWN*REG -0.083 -2.014**     
GLC*REG   -0.066 -0.919   
INSTOWN*REG     -0.016 -0.381 
Adjusted R
2
 0.487 0.446 0.451 
F-Value 57.966*** 49.209*** 50.168*** 
N 900 900 900 
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Table 6.20: Multiple Regression Result (Alternative Measures of Government Ownership-
CSRR Quality) 
 
 
Notes: 
*** Significant at 0.01 level; ** Significant at 0.05 level; * Significant at 0.10 level. 
CSRRQL=CSRR quality, MGRLOWN=Managerial ownership, FAMOWN=Family ownership, 
FORDIR=Foreign director, GOVOWN=Government ownership, GLC=Government-linked firm, 
INSTOWN=Institutional ownership, CSREXP=Board’s CSR experience, REG=CSRR regulation, 
SIZE=Firm size, SHARIAH=Shariah status, ROA=Profitability, IND=Industry, LEV=Leverage. 
 
 
 
Model 4: CSRRQLit  = β0 + β1MGRLOWNit + β2FAMOWNit + β3FOROWNit + β4GOVOWNit + 
β5CSREXPit + β6REGit + β7SIZEit + β8SHARIAHit + β9ROAit + β10INDit + β11LEVit + 
β12MGRLOWN*REGit+ β13FAMOWN*REGit + β14FOROWN*REGit + β15GOVOWN*REGit + εit 
 
Model 6: CSRRQLit  = β0 + β1MGRLOWNit + β2FAMOWNit + β3FOROWNit + β4GLCit + 
β5CSREXPit + β6REGit + β7SIZEit + β8SHARIAHit + β9ROAit + β10INDit + β11LEVit + 
β12MGRLOWN*REGit+ β13FAMOWN*REGit + β14FOROWN*REGit + β15GLC*REGit + εit 
 
Model 8: CSRRQLit  = β0 + β1MGRLOWNit + β2FAMOWNit + β3FOROWNit + β4INSTOWNit + 
β5CSREXPit + β6REGit + β7SIZEit + β8SHARIAHit + β9ROAit + β10INDit + β11LEVit + 
β12MGRLOWN*REGit+ β13FAMOWN*REGit + β14FOROWN*REGit + β15INSTOWN*REGit + εit 
 
 GOVOWN (Model 4) GLC (Model 6) INSTOWN (Model 8) 
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Constant 0.016 0.641 -0.001 -0.043 0.019 0.760 
MGRLOWN -0.026 -0.825 -0.030 -0.907 -0.045 -1.367 
FAMOWN -0.254 -7.188*** -0.240 -6.435*** -0.284 -7.814*** 
FOROWN 0.126 4.697*** 0.113 3.993*** 0.076 2.819*** 
GOVOWN 0.303 10.551***     
GLC   0.376 7.213***   
INSTOWN     0.207 7.111*** 
CSREXP 0.179 6.013*** 0.222 7.121*** 0.182 5.921*** 
REG 0.438 11.847*** 0.425 11.081*** 0.433 11.340*** 
SIZE 0.233 6.942*** 0.244 6.928*** 0.262 7.589*** 
SHARIAH 0.071 1.687* 0.106 2.454*** 0.077 1.771* 
ROA 0.168 5.756*** 0.187 6.237*** 0.173 5.742*** 
LEV 0.095 3.245*** 0.101 3.349*** 0.076 2.490*** 
IND 0.077 1.886* 0.084 1.993** 0.084 1.987** 
MGRLOWN*REG -0.126 -2.693*** -0.091 -1.871* -0.112 -2.316** 
FAMOWN*REG 0.115 2.267** 0.084 1.556 0.121 2.335** 
FOROWN*REG 0.017 0.442 0.030 0.740 0.037 0.978 
GOVOWN*REG -0.068 -1.630*     
GLC*REG   -0.041 -0.569   
INSTOWN*REG     -0.005 -0.130 
Adjusted R
2
 0.459 0.424 0.423 
F-Value 51.835*** 45.179*** 44.930*** 
N 900 900 900 
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Model 7 (for CSRR Quantity) and Model 8 (for CSRR Quality). The specification of 
Model 5 and Model 7 is included in Table 6.19, whereas the specification of Model 6 and 
Model 8 is included in Table 6.20. As presented in Table 6.19 and Table 6.20, a positive 
association is documented between ‘GLC’ and ‘INSTOWN’, and CSRR (p-value<0.01). 
The results indicate that higher levels of CSRR are apparent in government-linked firms 
and firms with higher level of institutional ownership. 
Nevertheless, when CSRR regulation is introduced as a moderator on the association 
between government ownership (represented by GLC and INSTOWN) and CSRR, no 
association is dictated between interaction term of GLC and CSRR regulation 
(GLC*REG) and institutional ownership and CSRR regulation (INSTOWN*REG), 
respectively, on the levels of CSRR.  
In summary, the findings revealed in Model 3 and Model 4 is inconsistent with the one 
reported in Model 5 to Model 8. In Model 3 and Model 4, where government ownership 
is represented by the percentage of shares held by government to total numbers of shares 
issued, firms with higher government ownership tend to disclose lower levels of CSRR, 
following the introduction of CSRR regulation. However, when government ownership is 
represented by the GLC status (see Model 5 and Model 7) and institutional ownership 
(see Model 6 and Model 8), no effect of CSRR regulation found on the levels of CSRR 
disclosed by firms with the GLC’s status and firms with higher percentage of institutional 
ownership, respectively.  
These mixed findings, as shown in Table 6.19 and Table 6.20, suggest that the 
moderating role of CSRR regulation on government ownership-CSRR association is 
dependent upon the measurements used to represent government ownership. Different 
measurements used to represent government ownership lead to different findings 
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revealed on the moderating role of CSRR regulation on the association between 
government ownership and CSRR. This implies the limited robustness of the findings of 
the moderating effects of CSRR regulation on the association between corporate 
ownership structure and CSRR to selected definition of government ownership for 
example, the percentage of shares held by government to total numbers of shares issued. 
While the presence of CSRR regulation has resulted in a decrease in the levels of CSRR 
disclosed by firms with higher level of government ownership (measured by the 
percentage of shares owned by government to total numbers of shares issued), the CSRR 
regulation seems to have no effect on the levels of CSRR disclosed by firms with the 
GLC’s status and firms with higher percentage of institutional ownership, respectively.  
Next, additional analysis is also performed across the different dimensions of CSRR used 
to represent the quantity and quality. There are five dimensions of CSRR used in the 
current study. They are environment, community, workplace, marketplace and others. 
While Table 6.21 presents the regression analysis according to the CSRR dimensions for 
the CSRR quantity, Table 6.22 shows the analysis conducted for CSRR quality.  
Generally, the results presented in Table 6.17 (based on the total of CSRR quantity) are 
somewhat in agreement with the findings dictated in Table 6.21 (according to CSRR 
dimensions). Three out of the four variables used to represent corporate ownership 
structure, namely family ownership, foreign ownership and government ownership, are 
found to be significantly related to all measurements used to represent CSRR quantity 
(measured by total quantity and by different dimensions of CSRR). Boards of directors’ 
CSR experience and CSRR regulation are also significantly related to all measurements 
of CSRR’s quantity. Two of the control variables used in the current study, namely firm 
size and profitability, also documented a significant association with the total quantity of 
CSRR and each dimension of CSRR.  
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Table 6.21: Multiple Regression Results (CSRR Quantity by CSRR Dimensions)  
Notes: 
*** Significant at 0.01 level; ** Significant at 0.05 level; * Significant at 0.10 level. 
CSRRQN=CSRR quantity, MGRLOWN=Managerial ownership, FAMOWN=Family ownership, FORDIR= Foreign director, GOVOWN=Government ownership, 
CSREXP=Board’s CSR experience, REG=CSRR regulation, SIZE=Firm size, SHARIAH=Shariah status, ROA=Profitability, IND=Industry, LEV=Leverage. 
CSRRQNit  = β0 + β1MGRLOWNit + β2FAMOWNit + β3FORDIRit + β4GOVOWNit + β5CSREXPit + β6REGit + β7SIZEit + β8SHARIAHit + β9ROAit + β10INDit + β11LEVit + 
β12MGRLOWN*REGit+ β13FAMOWN*REGit + β14FOROWN*REGit + β15GOVOWN*REGit + εit 
 Environment (EQN) Community (CQN) Workplace (WQN) Marketplace (MQN) Others (OQN) 
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Constant 0.040 1.538 0.036 1.594* 0.039 1.574 0.013 0.509 0.045 1.878* 
MGRLOWN 0.008 0.235 -0.015 -0.498 -0.087 -2.670*** -0.101 -3.015*** 0.032 1.025 
FAMOWN -0.126 -3.389*** -0.303 -9.222*** -0.301 -8.670*** -0.254 -6.813*** -0.191 -5.495*** 
FOROWN 0.127 4.484*** 0.086 3.466*** 0.084 3.079*** 0.121 4.283*** 0.137 5.204*** 
GOVOWN 0.173 5.710*** 0.246 9.213*** 0.319 10.883*** 0.340 11.245*** 0.217 7.672*** 
CSREXP 0.222 7.094*** 0.198 7.177*** 0.167 5.493*** 0.192 6.133*** 0.175 5.973*** 
REG 0.352 9.053*** 0.378 11.014*** 0.280 7.441*** 0.184 4.745*** 0.488 13.433*** 
SIZE 0.185 5.228*** 0.209 6.723*** 0.100 2.916*** 0.132 3.745*** 0.141 4.270*** 
SHARIAH 0.190 4.323*** -0.004 -0.110 0.053 1.234 0.080 1.829* 0.136 3.301*** 
ROA 0.061 1.996** 0.140 5.162*** 0.118 3.977*** 0.182 5.940*** 0.189 6.605*** 
LEV -0.001 -0.035 0.097 3.560*** 0.063 2.098** 0.190 6.177*** 0.144 5.003*** 
IND 0.241 5.594*** -0.127 -3.354*** 0.052 1.251 0.021 0.493 0.032 0.797 
MGRLOWN*REG -0.106 -2.147** -0.151 -3.474*** -0.137 -2.865*** -0.113 -2.282** -0.131 -2.842*** 
FAMOWN*REG 0.035 0.658 0.053 1.119 0.089 1.723* 0.073 1.364 0.059 1.190 
FOROWN*REG 0.022 0.536 -0.015 -0.412 0.002 0.058 0.000 -0.010 0.018 0.483 
GOVOWN*REG -0.037 -0.826 -0.067 -1.707* -0.052 -1.217 -0.016 -0.371 0.003 0.067 
Adjusted R
2
 0.301 0.49 0.382 0.406 0.398 
F-Value 26.867*** 58.570*** 38.096*** 41.939*** 40.674*** 
N 900 900 900 900 900 
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Table 6.22: Multiple Regression Results (CSRR Quality by CSRR Dimensions) 
Notes: 
*** Significant at 0.01 level; ** Significant at 0.05 level; * Significant at 0.10 level. 
CSRRQN=CSRR quantity, MGRLOWN=Managerial ownership, FAMOWN=Family ownership, FORDIR= Foreign director, GOVOWN=Government ownership, 
CSREXP=Board’s CSR experience, REG=CSRR regulation, SIZE=Firm size, SHARIAH=Shariah status, ROA=Profitability, IND=Industry, LEV=Leverage. 
CSRRQLit  = β0 + β1MGRLOWNit + β2FAMOWNit + β3FORDIRit + β4GOVOWNit + β5CSREXPit + β6REGit + β7SIZEit + β8SHARIAHit + β9ROAit + β10INDit + β11LEVit + 
β12MGRLOWN*REGit+ β13FAMOWN*REGit + β14FOROWN*REGit + β15GOVOWN*REGit + εit 
 Environment (EQL) Community (CQL) Workplace (WQL) Marketplace (MQL) Others (OQL) 
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Constant 0.037 1.400 0.032 1.347 0.031 1.193 0.025 0.926 0.038 1.451 
MGRLOWN -0.033 -0.958 0.023 0.747 -0.099 -2.919*** -0.051 -1.452 0.075 2.210** 
FAMOWN -0.069 -1.827* -0.284 -8.322*** -0.258 -6.852*** -0.163 -4.207*** -0.168 -4.474*** 
FOROWN 0.129 4.489*** 0.077 2.989*** 0.098 3.431*** 0.136 4.636*** 0.098 3.436*** 
GOVOWN 0.156 5.046*** 0.235 8.485*** 0.328 10.739*** 0.331 10.552*** 0.156 5.116*** 
CSREXP 0.172 5.381*** 0.165 5.731*** 0.150 4.733*** 0.075 2.319** 0.114 3.603*** 
REG 0.352 8.891*** 0.312 8.751*** 0.276 7.037*** 0.066 1.635* 0.269 6.854*** 
SIZE 0.199 5.544*** 0.265 8.194*** 0.107 3.014*** 0.125 3.412*** 0.167 4.688*** 
SHARIAH 0.131 2.921*** -0.035 -0.857 0.045 1.006 0.087 1.906* 0.083 1.856* 
ROA 0.104 3.335*** 0.121 4.304*** 0.082 2.637*** 0.157 4.923*** 0.206 6.630*** 
LEV 0.009 0.297 0.070 2.475*** 0.024 0.780 0.194 6.053*** 0.135 4.337*** 
IND 0.257 5.872*** -0.119 -3.016*** 0.069 1.584 0.031 0.699 0.047 1.084 
MGRLOWN*REG -0.114 -2.274** -0.126 -2.796*** -0.159 -3.183*** -0.072 -1.397 -0.134 -2.682*** 
FAMOWN*REG 0.063 1.162 0.058 1.191 0.128 2.379** 0.094 1.696* 0.127 2.367** 
FOROWN*REG 0.059 1.440 -0.008 -0.219 0.008 0.191 0.086 2.048** -0.011 -0.279 
GOVOWN*REG -0.013 -0.287 -0.070 -1.721* -0.034 -0.770 0.028 0.613 -0.074 -1.658* 
Adjusted R
2
 0.273 0.448 0.346 0.293 0.243 
F-Value 23.500*** 49.649*** 32.646*** 25.796*** 20.226*** 
N 900 900 900 900 900 
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Several variables examined in the current study report mixed findings across the different 
dimensions of CSRR. For examples, managerial ownership is significantly negatively 
related to the total quantity of CSRR (see Table 6.17, p-value<0.10), workplace 
dimension and marketplace dimension of CSRR (see Table 6.21, p-value<0.01). 
However, no association found between managerial ownership and environment, 
community and others dimension of CSRR. The results indicate that firms with higher 
managerial ownership disclose significantly less workplace and marketplace dimension 
of CSRR. 
Shariah status of a firm is significantly positively related to the total quantity of CSRR 
(see Table 6.17, p-value<0.05), environment (p-value<0.01), marketplace (p-value<0.10) 
and others (p-value<0.01) dimension of CSRR (see Table 6.21). No association dictated 
between Shariah status and community and workplace dimension of CSRR. In summary, 
Shariah-approved firms were seen to disclose greater quantity of environment and others 
dimension of CSRR based on the 1 percent level of significance. Perhaps, the greater 
quantity of environment-related reporting disclosed by the Shariah-approved firms is 
consistent with Kamla et al.’s (2006) argument on the relatedness of Islamic principles 
and the notion of accounting for the environment. A significant positive association is 
dictated between leverage and each dimension of CSRR, with exception of the 
environment dimension of CSRR. Highly-leveraged firms generally disclose a greater 
amount of CSRR, as to attract creditors to provide financial assistance to the firms.  
While industry has no effect on the total quantity of CSRR, it does affect the environment 
and community dimensions of CSRR. There is a significant positive association between 
industry and environment dimension of CSRR. A negative association is dictated 
between industry and community dimension of CSRR. Based on these results, it can be 
seen that firms in high-profile industry disclose significantly more environment-related 
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CSR information, but less community-related CSR information. Perhaps, the greater 
focus placed on the environment aspect of CSRR has made less focus given to the 
community-related CSRR. Being in the high-profile industry, firms are more concerned 
of making sure that their business activities did not harm the environment. This is to 
avoid of being fined by the regulatory authorities or facing litigation risks. 
Evidence from Table 6.17 documents the moderating effect of CSRR regulation on the 
association between managerial ownership, family ownership and government 
ownership, respectively, on the total quantity of CSRR (p-value<0.05). However, these 
associations did not hold for all dimensions of CSRR (see Table 6.21). While the level of 
managerial ownership does not influence the amount of environment-related CSR 
information disclosed by firms, the implementation of CSRR regulation has led to 
significantly lower environment-related CSR information disclosed by firms with higher 
managerial ownership. This finding is also applicable to the community-related and 
others-related CSRR information. In the case of workplace-related and marketplace 
related CSR information, respectively, its significant negative association with 
managerial ownership remained, even in the presence of the CSRR regulation. In other 
word, firms with higher levels of managerial ownership disclosed significantly less 
workplace-related and marketplace-related CSR information in both the voluntary and 
mandatory periods of CSRR. 
The presence of CSRR regulation weakens the negative association between family 
ownership and the quantity of CSRR. However, when the total quantity of CSRR is 
further divided into its dimension, the moderating effect is found to be applicable upon 
the workplace dimension of CSRR. Other dimensions of CSRR did not indicate any 
incremental effect upon the introduction of the CSRR regulation on the association 
between family ownership and CSRR. In contrary to the evidence dictated for family 
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ownership, the presence of CSRR regulation generally weakens the positive association 
between government ownership and the quantity of CSRR. Further division of the 
quantity of CSRR into its dimension indicates the moderating effect of regulation on the 
community dimension of CSRR only. In other words, firms with higher levels of 
government ownership disclose less community-related CSR information during the 
mandatory period of CSRR. 
Generally, findings revealed on the quantity of CSRR are consistent with the findings 
dictated for the quality of CSRR. Therefore, the explanations provided for the quantity of 
CSRR are also applicable to the quality of CSRR, with exception to a few cases of 
moderating effect of CSRR regulation. For example, while the moderating effect of 
CSRR regulation on the association between family ownership and quantity of CSRR is 
applicable only to the workplace dimension of CSRR, it applies to workplace, market 
place and other dimensions of CSRR, in terms of the quality of CSRR. Further division 
of the quality of CSRR into its dimension has witnessed the moderating effect of CSRR 
to be applied to the community and other dimensions of CSRR, rather than community 
only in the case of the quantity of CSRR.  
Overall, the use of alternative measurements to represent government ownership in the 
current study demonstrates the robustness of the finding on the association between 
government ownership and CSRR. Regardless of the different measurements used to 
represent government ownership, for example, the percentage of shares owned by 
government to total numbers of shares issued, status as government-linked firm and 
institutional ownership, there is a positive association revealed between government 
ownership and CSRR. Nevertheless, the robustness of the findings on the moderating 
effect of CSRR regulation on the association between government ownership and CSRR 
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seems to be limited to selected definition of government ownership. In this case, the 
percentage of shares owned by government to total numbers of shares issued.  
Moreover, the division of CSRR into its dimensions also demonstrates several interesting 
findings are not observed from examining the total CSRR; for example, the effect of 
industry and Shariah status of firms on the environment-related information. This has 
signified the importance of examining the CSRR by its dimension, in addition to the total 
CSRR. 
6.6 SUMMARY 
The current study demonstrates an increasing trend of the levels of CSRR disclosed by 
firms in Malaysia over the five-year period from 2005 to 2009. Different types of 
corporate ownership structure seem to have different impact in influencing the levels of 
CSRR disclosed. While government ownership is related positively to CSRR, family 
ownership dictates a negative association with the levels of CSRR disclosed by firms. 
The association between managerial ownership and foreign ownership respectively, and 
the levels of CSRR seems to be inconsistent over the five year period of study.  
Besides corporate ownership structure, the current study investigates the impact of board 
of directors’ CSR experience, which represents an important board characteristic, on the 
levels of CSRR. A positive association is shown between board of directors’ CSR 
experience and the levels of CSRR. Overall, the current study reveals the significance of 
two components of corporate governance; namely, corporate ownership structure and 
board of directors in influencing the levels of CSRR disclosed. 
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In addition, the current study also investigates the moderating effect of CSRR regulation 
on the association between corporate ownership and CSRR. The introduction of CSRR 
regulation has an effect on the association between corporate ownership structure and 
CSRR. Its effect on the association between corporate ownership structure and CSRR 
varies across the different types of corporate ownership structure. This variation denotes 
the levels of effectiveness of regulation in promoting higher levels of CSRR across 
different types of corporate ownership structure.  
Findings of the current study imply the effectiveness of CSRR regulation in promoting 
higher levels of CSRR in firms with greater level of family ownership. Nevertheless, 
CSRR regulation is found to be ineffective in firms with higher levels of managerial and 
government ownership. CSRR regulation has no effect on firms with higher levels of 
foreign ownership. In summary, the current study demonstrates the importance role of 
corporate ownership structure, the board of directors and corporate reporting regulation in 
terms of influencing the levels of corporate reporting, specifically CSRR. 
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CHAPTER 7: DISCUSSIONS  
 
7.1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter provides a discussion of the results revealed from the current study. 
Discussion on the trend of CSRR in Malaysia from 2005 to 2009 is provided in Section 
7.2. Section 7.3 summarises the results of the multiple regression analyses generated 
from the current study. Discussions of the results revealed from the multiple regression 
analyses performed are provided in their respective sections: Section 7.4 elaborates the 
influence of corporate ownership structure on the levels of CSRR disclosed; Section 7.5 
explains the impact of board of directors’ CSR experience on the levels of CSRR 
disclosed; and Section 7.6 enlightens the moderating effect of CSRR regulation on the 
association between corporate ownership structure and CSRR. Finally, Section 7.7 
summarises the discussions of the current study. 
7.2 TREND OF CSRR IN MALAYSIA (2005-2009) 
The longitudinal analysis of CSRR in the current study reveals an increasing trend of the 
quantity and quality of CSRR disclosed by firms in Malaysia over the five-year period 
from 2005 to 2009. In terms of the quantity of CSRR, both the number of reporting firms 
(see Table 6.1) and the number of CSR-related sentences disclosed by firms (see Table 
6.2) demonstrate an upward trend over the period of analysis. The rising trend of the 
quantity of CSRR disclosed by firms might be explained by the introduction of CSRR 
regulation in Malaysia with effect from financial year of 2007, consistent with the 
findings revealed by Larrinaga et al. (2002), Frost (2007), Llena et al. (2007) and Criado-
Jimenez et al. (2008) in Spain and Australia.  
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According to Ioannou and Serafeim (2012), the adoption of the mandatory CSR laws and 
regulation improves the social responsibility of business leaders. This may in turns lead 
to the greater levels of CSRR disclosed by firms. Possibly, the imposition of the 
mandatory CSRR regulation in Malaysia has urged firms to respond actively to CSR- and 
CSRR-related matters, thus in turns lead to the increasing trend of CSRR disclosed by 
firms in the country.  
Larrinaga et al. (2002) found that the number of firms reporting environmental 
information increases subsequent to the introduction of environmental reporting 
standards in Spain. Llena et al. (2007) and Criado-Jimenez et al. (2008) highlighted an 
increase in the quantity of environmental information disclosed by firms following the 
progressive and improved environmental reporting regulation in Spain. Similarly, Frost 
(2007) also dictated an increase in the number of reporting firms and the level of 
information provided on environmental performance in Australia after a regulation on 
environmental reporting was enacted in 1998. 
In Malaysia, CSRR was practiced voluntarily prior to 2007. However, Bursa Malaysia 
had made CSRR mandated upon all public listed firms in Malaysia with effect from 2007 
(Bursa Malaysia, 2007). While evidence from prior related literature have documented an 
increase in environmental information disclosed following the environmental reporting 
regulation imposed in Spain and Australia (see Larrinaga et al., 2002; Frost, 2007; Llena 
et al., 2007; Criado-Jimenez et al., 2008), the current study demonstrates an increase in 
CSR information disclosed by firms subsequent to the introduction of CSRR regulation 
in Malaysia.  
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The increasing trend of CSRR disclosed subsequent to the imposition of CSRR 
regulation may imply the compliance of firms to the regulation imposed. However, there 
has been much variability observed in terms of the CSR information disclosed, consistent 
with the findings dictated by several prior studies (see Tsang, 1998 in Singapore; 
Campbell et al., 2003 in the UK; Saleh et al., 2010 in Malaysia). According to Campbell 
et al. (2003), CSRR disclosed by firms varies substantially between firms and industries, 
and over time. Even in the longitudinal analysis of CSRR of a single firm, for example in 
BHP, Rothmans Ltd, Marks and Spencer Plc and Falconbridge, there is a variation of 
CSRR disclosed over time (Guthrie & Parker, 1989; Buhr, 1998; Campbell et al., 2000; 
Deegan et al., 2002; Tilling & Tilt, 2010; Mia & Mamun, 2011).  
The variation in CSRR disclosed may reflect the changes in CSR focus of the firms over 
a period of time. Specific event that occurs at one specific time, for example; change in 
top management leadership/focus and regulation, and occurrence of social accidents and 
financial crisis; may lead to change in CSR focus of firm from time to time. The variation 
of CSRR disclosed by firms in response to specific events emphasises the use of CSRR 
as a tool for achieving legitimacy and managing the stakeholders. A wide variation in the 
extent to which CSR is practiced is also evident around the world (Baugh et al., 2007) 
and within Asian countries (Chapple & Moon, 2005), which, in turn, leads to the 
variation of CSRR disclosed by firms. 
As shown in the current study, several CSRR items show a reduction in the number of 
reporting firms and the number of CSR-related sentences disclosed by firms in selected 
years. This has been particularly apparent in the later period of the analysis, for example 
in year 2008 and 2009. The fluctuation of the reporting trend of CSRR may reflect the 
variation of CSRR disclosed by firms over the five-year period. 
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Other than the variation of CSRR, the reduction in the number and percentage of firms 
that report at least one sentence on the respective CSRR items and the number of CSR-
related sentences disclosed by firms could also signal the insufficiency and 
ineffectiveness of the current CSRR regulation in promoting greater levels of CSRR. The 
existing regulation of CSRR that is based on the Listing Requirement of Bursa Malaysia 
(Appendix 9C, Part A, Paragraph 29) obligates all public-listed firms to include a 
description of the CSR activities or practices undertaken by the listed firm and its 
subsidiaries or, if there are none, a statement to that effect.  
Nevertheless, the introduction of the mandatory CSRR requirement by the Bursa 
Malaysia in 2007 was not accompanied by proper reporting standards or at least reporting 
guidelines for firms to follow. The lack of details on how to report the CSR information, 
particularly in the annual reports has led to a variety of reporting’s contents and format 
produced by firms. The CSR framework suggested by the Bursa Malaysia in 2006 
appears very basic, thus providing much discretion for firms to report CSR-information 
in their own styles.  
For examples, firms may opt to disclose or not to disclose certain CSR information, to 
disclose more of certain CSR information or disclose less of other CSR information. 
Several firms may provide the description of their CSR activities in one sentence only, 
while others discuss their CSR activities in greater length. Given the vague and general 
nature of the existing CSRR regulation in Malaysia, both cases are seen to be complied 
with the CSRR regulation imposed. Perhaps, detailed reporting guidelines could be 
designed to accompany the mandatory CSRR regulation, either generalised to all 
industries or personalised to cater specific industries. This may facilitate firms to have 
some sort of standardized CSRR that are comparable between firms. A standardised 
 
313 
 
CSRR guideline will enable firms to have better understandings on what to reports and 
allow comparison to be made among reported firms (Lee & Hutchison, 2005).  
Other than that, Criado-Jimenez et al. (2008) and Waagstein (2011) also highlighted the 
need of enforcement mechanisms to accompany the imposition of CSRR regulation, as 
this may boost firms’ urgency to comply with the current CSRR requirement. The greater 
level of compliance to the reporting regulation may in turns translated into a greater 
quantity of CSRR disclosed. Possibly, the existing CSRR regulation can be 
complemented with several enforcement mechanisms such as reporting guidelines, CSRR 
standards, requirement for independent verification or audit, and imposition of penalties 
for non-compliant cases.  
The greater number of reporting firms and sentences that disclose CSR-related 
information, specifically corporate governance (M4) and stakeholder engagement 
(including any communication with shareholders, for example, annual general meetings) 
(M7) information as shown in Table 6.1 and Table 6.2 is expected, in line with the Bursa 
Malaysia Listing Requirement that requires firms to comply with the disclosure 
provisions of the Malaysian Code of Corporate Governance (MCCG) (Shim, 2006). The 
results signify the importance of corporate governance information as part of the CSRR 
as suggested by Kolk and Pinkse (2010).  
Other than corporate governance (M4) and stakeholder engagement (M7), firms were 
seen to place greater emphasis on the workplace dimension of CSRR. The focus on the 
workplace matters is evidenced across the five-year period of analysis, consistent with 
the findings by Gray et al. (1995a), Saleh et al. (2010) and Mahadeo et al. (2011). Gray 
et al. (1995a) revealed that workplace dimension of CSRR dominates both the voluntary 
and mandatory’s areas of CSRR in the UK. At the time of Gray et al.’s (1995a) study, 
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CSRR in the UK was divided into two segments of reporting; namely the mandatory 
segment of CSRR (e.g. employment data, disabled employees, pensions, charity) and the 
voluntary segment of CSRR (e.g. environmental, customer, community and employees). 
Mahadeo et al. (2011) also reported a greater number of firms disclose social-related 
information including workplace related matters, in comparison with the ethics and 
environment dimension of CSRR. Drawing upon a cross-sectional data, Hackston and 
Milne (1996) and Thompson and Zakaria (2004) also observed the dominance of 
workplace dimension of CSRR disclosed by firms in New Zealand and Malaysia, 
respectively. Overall, firms are seen to place greater focus on managing the demand of 
selected stakeholders, namely shareholders and employees, as they believe that these two 
groups of stakeholders are directly impacted the firms’ operations. 
While the increase in the quantity of CSRR over the five-year period has been apparent, 
there is only a slight increase in the quality of CSRR observed over the period of 
analysis. This has been evidenced by the slight increase in the number of firms reporting 
qualitative specific CSR information (see Table 6.5) and quantitative CSR information 
(see Table 6.6), compared with a significant increase in the number of firms reporting 
general qualitative CSR information (see Table 6.4).  
According to Sawani et al. (2010), many firms were reluctant to disclose CSR 
information that is quantitative in nature to avoid criticisms from the minority 
shareholders that focus mainly on profit. The resistance of many firms to disclose the 
quantitative CSRR could also be explained by the firms’ fear of losing their competitive 
advantage. For example, the disclosure of the quantitative CSRR may lead to the use of 
such information by the competitors, who intend to compete between each others, in a 
way to portray good corporate image or reputation.  
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The increasing trend of the quantity of CSRR is expected following the CSRR regulation 
that obligates all public listed firms to disclose their CSR activities in the annual reports. 
Nevertheless, the low quality of CSRR dictated in the current study open up some 
discussions on the effectiveness of the CSRR regulation in improving the quality of 
CSRR in firms. The existing CSRR regulation seems to have minimal impact upon 
improving the quality of CSRR disclosed by firms in Malaysia. Given the absence of a 
detailed CSRR standard or reporting guideline to support the mandatory CSRR regulation 
in Malaysia, firms are seen to report minimum CSR information as to fulfil the minimum 
requirement of the CSRR regulation or disclose CSRR in their own manner, for example, 
report CSR information in qualitative nature rather than quantitative.  
Greater efforts from the regulators are necessary to improve the quality of CSRR in 
Malaysia; for example, through the introduction of specific reporting guidelines, 
standards of CSRR and independent assurance. This is vital as firms with improved 
quality of CSRR may demonstrate a higher level of corporate accountability and 
commitment to both CSR and CSRR, and subsequently become role models for other 
firms to follow suit. The enforcement of the existing regulation is also required to ensure 
the high level of compliance by the firms on the regulation imposed. As documented by 
Criado-Jimenez et al. (2008), there is an improved in the quality of CSRR observed 
among firms, following the progressive and improved CSRR regulation in Spain. While 
independent assurance enhances the quality of voluntary environmental disclosures 
(Moroney et al., 2012), perhaps it may also enhance the quality of mandatory CSRR. 
The continuous efforts to promote CSRR from various parties, for examples, the 
government, public and private firms, NGOs and the society are needed as they may 
bring CSRR practice in Malaysia to a higher level of importance. With the increasing 
emphasis on sustainability reporting in firms, greater commitment of the firms in other 
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aspects of CSRR; for example, in environment and marketplace’s dimension of CSRR is 
expected. The Chairman of the Environmental Quality Council Malaysia urged the 
government to make sustainability reporting compulsory for all Malaysian firms in a way 
to enhance the quality of sustainability reporting in the country. This is vital as to ensure 
the fulfilment of the different stakeholders’ needs and the sustainability of the firms, 
people and planet as a whole. Overall, cooperation between firms and regulators are 
necessary to ensure a successful implementation of the enacted regulations.  
Results from the descriptive statistics of CSRR (see Table 6.7 and Table 6.8) demonstrate 
greater quantity and quality of CSRR disclosed by firms during the mandatory period of 
CSRR (2007-2009) in comparison with the voluntary period of CSRR (2005-2006). 
These findings are expected as more firms disclose CSRR after it is mandated in 2007 
compared to the voluntary period of CSRR (prior to 2007). The results may partly 
indicate the firms’ reaction to the mandatory CSRR regulation. The highest mean 
difference of the CSRR quantity and CSRR quality in 2007 may signify the response of 
firms towards the introduction of the mandatory CSRR requirement that take into effect 
in 2007. Once mandated, the mean difference of the quantity and quality of CSRR 
reduces in 2008 and 2009. Such reduction may indicate the variation of CSRR disclosed 
by firms in the absence of a detailed CSRR guideline or standards for firms to follow, 
along with the CSRR regulation. Furthermore, the lack of appropriate enforcement 
mechanisms to support the existing CSRR regulation (e.g. imposition of penalties and 
fines for non-compliant firms) may also contribute to the reduction in the mean 
difference.  
While most of the dimensions of CSRR (e.g. environment, community, workplace and 
others) reported a highest mean difference in 2007 that is the first year CSRR is made 
mandated, marketplace-related information shows a highest mean difference in 2008. 
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Perhaps, it may indicate partly the effect of the global financial crisis, whereby firms 
attempt to satisfy the information demand of the market players especially the 
shareholders through greater disclosure of the marketplace-related information. During 
the financial crisis, firms need to convince the market players on the firms’ sustainability 
despite facing the crisis. 
The attitude of firms to focus their reports on selected dimensions or items of CSRR may 
explains the use of CSRR as a mechanism for firms to manage selected important groups 
of stakeholders, legitimise their existence and maintain good reputation in society. Firms 
are seen to keep their CSR information disclosed in qualitative nature, in a way to avoid 
criticisms from selected groups of stakeholders (e.g. minority shareholders) and to 
minimise the risk of losing their competitive advantage to their competitors.  
Evidence from the current study also demonstrates firms’ greater emphasis on employees 
and market players rather than community and environment. Employees, which represent 
an important internal stakeholders’ group of firms were given the highest priority in 
firms’ CSR activities. This is consistent with the evidence dictated in a number of CSRR 
research conducted in different countries, whereby human resource or employee-related 
information dominated most of CSRR disclosed in many countries around the world 
(Gray et al., 1995a; Hackston & Milne, 1996; Tsang, 1998; Pratten & Mashat, 2009) 
including Malaysia (Thompson & Zakaria, 2004; Haniffa & Cooke, 2005; Saleh et al., 
2010). Perhaps, this may indicate the importance of employees as corporate stakeholders 
(Puri & Borok, 2002), along with the market players (e.g. shareholders, suppliers and 
customers). These two groups of stakeholders contribute significantly to the success and 
survival of firms. Therefore, they should be given more priority in CSRR, in a way to 
fulfil their information demands about the firms’ activities and performance.  
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7.3 SUMMARY OF MULTIPLE REGRESSION RESULTS 
Table 7.1 summarises the results of the multiple regression analysis performed to test H1 
(the influence of corporate ownership structure on CSRR), H2 (the effect of boards of 
directors’ CSR experience on CSRR) and H3 (the moderating effect of CSRR regulation 
on the association between corporate ownership structure and CSRR) of the current 
study. In general, there is a consistent finding revealed on the significant variables that 
influence the quantity (Model 1 and Model 3) and the quality (Model 2 and Model 4) of 
CSRR. 
Table 7.1: Summary of Multiple Regression Results (Pooled Data–Model 1 to Model 4) 
Hypothesis 
Predicted  
Sign 
Actual  
Sign 
Hypothesis Support 
Strong Moderate Weak None 
MODEL1: CSRRQNit =β0 + β1MGRLOWNit + β2FAMOWNit + β3FOROWNit + β4GOVOWNit 
+ β5CSREXPit + β7SIZEit + β8SHARIAHit + β9ROAit + β10INDit + β11LEVit + εit 
MGRLOWN (H1a) - - 
   
√ 
FAMOWN (H1b) - - √ 
   
FOROWN (H1c) + + √ 
   
GOVOWN (H1d) + + √ 
   
CSREXP (H2) + + √ 
   
MODEL2: CSRRQLit = β0 + β1MGRLOWNit + β2FAMOWNit + β3FOROWNit + 
β4GOVOWNit + β5CSREXPit + β7SIZEit + β8SHARIAHit + β9ROAit + β10INDit + β11LEVit + εit 
MGRLOWN (H1a) - - 
   
√ 
FAMOWN (H1b) - - √ 
   
FOROWN (H1c) + + √ 
   
GOVOWN (H1d) + + √ 
   
CSREXP (H2) + + √ 
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Table 7.1 Summary of Multiple Regression Results (Pooled Data–Model 1 to Model 
4) (Continued) 
Hypothesis 
Predicted  
Sign 
Actual  
Sign 
Hypothesis Support 
Strong Moderate Weak None 
MODEL3: CSRRQNit  = β0 + β1MGRLOWNit + β2FAMOWNit + β3FOROWNit + 
β4GOVOWNit + β5CSREXPit + β6REGit + β7SIZEit + β8SHARIAHit + β9ROAit + β10INDit + 
β11LEVit + β12MGRLOWN*REGit+ β13FAMOWN*REGit + β14FOROWN*REGit + 
β15GOVOWN*REGit + εit 
MGRLOWN - - 
  
√ 
 
FAMOWN - - √ 
   
FOROWN + + √ 
   
GOVOWN + + √ 
   
CSREXP + + √ 
   
REG + + √    
MGRLOWN*REG (H3a) + -    √ 
FAMOWN*REG (H3b) + +  √   
FOROWN*REG (H3c) + -    √ 
GOVOWN*REG (H3d) + -    √ 
MODEL4: CSRRQLit  = β0 + β1MGRLOWNit + β2FAMOWNit + β3FOROWNit + 
β4GOVOWNit + β5CSREXPit + β6REGit + β7SIZEit + β8SHARIAHit + β9ROAit + β10INDit + 
β11LEVit + β12MGRLOWN*REGit+ β13FAMOWN*REGit + β14FOROWN*REGit + 
β15GOVOWN*REGit + εit 
MGRLOWN - - 
   
√ 
FAMOWN - - √ 
   
FOROWN + + √ 
   
GOVOWN + + √ 
   
CSREXP + + √ 
   
REG + + √    
MGRLOWN*REG (H3a) + -    √ 
FAMOWN*REG (H3b) + +  √   
FOROWN*REG (H3c) + -    √ 
GOVOWN*REG (H3d) + -    √ 
 
7.4 CORPORATE OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE AND CSRR 
The current study hypothesises the different influences placed by different types of 
corporate ownership structure on the levels of CSRR disclosed by firms. Based on the 
results presented in Table 7.1, it is observed that three out of four variables used to 
represent ownership structure in a firm revealed significant association with CSRR (p-
value<0.01). They are family ownership (H1b), foreign ownership (H1c) and government 
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ownership (H1d). There is no association found between managerial ownership and 
CSRR (H1a). 
7.4.1 Managerial Ownership 
The current study provides no support for H1a, which hypothesised the negative 
association between managerial ownership and CSRR. The finding suggests that 
managerial ownership does not contribute to the firm’s emphasis on CSR, thus CSRR, 
which is consistent with the selected findings of Johnson and Greening (1999) and Oh et 
al. (2011), who dictated no association between managerial ownership and CSR 
performance in US and Korea, respectively. Possibly, the outcome observed in the 
current study indicates the lack of concern and accountability of the executive directors in 
promoting CSR, as they are more interested in pursuing their self-interest objectives that 
resolve around maximising their own wealth as shareholders (Zahra, 1989).  
In the general context of corporate reporting, this result appears consistent with the 
evidence dictated by Huafang and Jianguo (2007) in China and Donnelly and Mulcahy 
(2008) in Ireland. The result generally implies that firms with higher percentage of shares 
held by executive directors, who are a member of the board of directors of firms, have no 
effect on the levels of CSRR disclosed. This is in contrast to the finding revealed by 
Ghazali (2007), who documented a negative association between managerial ownership 
and CSRR in a sample of public-listed firms in Malaysia.  
Perhaps, the contradictory findings between this study and the one reported by Ghazali 
(2007) could be explained by the different year of data set used in different studies. For 
example, Ghazali (2007) relied solely on a single data set of year 2001, whereas the 
current study covers a longer period from 2005 to 2009. Based on the yearly data of 2008 
and 2009, the current study documents a negative association between managerial 
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ownership and the quantity of CSRR. However, no association was found between the 
two variables for the pooled data and other yearly data (2005-2007). The mixed finding 
observed may signify the existence of other variables, such as specific events or other 
omitted variables that may influence the firms’ decisions on the levels of CSRR 
disclosed. It also emphasises the importance of a longitudinal nature of studies that allow 
the researcher to analyse the consistency of the patterns of a relationship over a period of 
time, before making any conclusion out of the findings revealed. 
7.4.2 Family Ownership 
The significant negative association between family ownership and CSRR indicates that 
firms with a higher percentage of family members on boards of directors disclose 
significantly fewer quantities and quality of CSRR. This provides support for H1b of the 
current study. Perhaps, the fewer CSR concern found in the family firms compared to the 
non-family firms as dictated by Dyer and Whetten (2006) may contribute to the lesser 
amount of CSR information disclosed by the firms in the current study. This finding is 
also consistent with evidence dictated in previous studies relating family ownership to 
corporate voluntary disclosure (e.g. Ho & Wong, 2001; Chau & Gray, 2002; Haniffa & 
Cooke, 2002; Ghazali & Weetman, 2006) and CSR reputation (Othman et al., 2011).  
The lower demand for public disclosure in this type of firms may also contribute to the 
lower disclosure of CSRR in firms with higher percentage of family members on boards. 
As highlighted by Gray (1988), there is little incentive for the family-controlled firms to 
disclose greater quantity of information in excess of mandatory requirement, as the 
demand for public disclosure in these firms is generally low. The appointment of family 
members as the members of the boards of directors has indicated an active involvement 
of the family owners in managing the firms and influencing the boards’ decision on 
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corporate disclosure (Ghazali & Weetman, 2006; Chen et al., 2008). Being owned and 
managed by the same group of people may expose the owners of the firms with greater 
access to the internal information of the firms, thus are less likely to rely on public 
information.  
Evidence on the association between family ownership and corporate disclosure is 
considered important, given the dominance of this type of corporate ownership structure 
in many countries around the world (La Porta et al., 1999), particularly in Asia 
(Claessens et al., 2000; Fan & Wong, 2002; Jaggi et al., 2009). Therefore, the current 
study contributes to the existing literature on corporate disclosure by documenting the 
influence of family ownership on the levels of CSRR disclosed by firms in Malaysia. The 
prevalence of family-owned firms that make up the corporate structure in Malaysia 
(Cheung & Chan, 2004; Jaggi et al., 2009), as well as the continuous development of 
CSRR in the country, drive more research efforts to investigate the way firms with higher 
level of family ownership behave in response to CSRR throughout the voluntary and 
mandatory periods of CSRR. 
7.4.3 Foreign Ownership 
Foreign ownership is significantly positively related to the levels of CSRR disclosed, thus 
provides support for H1c of the current study. This finding generally suggests that firms 
with higher foreign ownership disclose significantly more CSRR, consistent with 
evidence revealed in several prior related studies, for examples, Teoh and Thong (1989) 
and Haniffa and Cooke (2005) in Malaysia, and Oh et al. (2011) in Korea. These studies 
documented higher levels of CSRR or CSR performance in firms with higher levels of 
foreign ownership. Greater disclosure in firms with higher levels of foreign ownership is 
desirable as it may reduce the geographical separation and information asymmetry 
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problems resulted from cross-border ownership (Mangena & Tauringana, 2007; Oh et al., 
2011).  
In addition, the preference of the foreign shareholders to invest in firms, in which they 
are well informed (Mangena and Tauringana (2007), may motivate firms with higher 
level of foreign ownership to provide greater disclosure to their shareholders and other 
stakeholders. In the context of CSRR, the influence of foreign shareholders, especially 
those from Europe and North America, to direct CSR and CSRR practices in firms might 
be more apparent given the greater emphasis of CSR in those countries (Gugler & Shi, 
2009; Oh et al., 2011). 
Despite the positive association between foreign ownership and CSRR based on the 
pooled data, the yearly data of 2005 and 2006 documents no significant association 
between foreign ownership and the quality of CSRR. Perhaps, during these two years 
(2005 and 2006), which denote the voluntary period of CSRR, there was less focus 
placed by the foreign shareholders on the quality aspect of CSRR, rather than the quantity 
of CSRR. Therefore, no association was found between foreign ownership and the 
quality of CSRR during the voluntary period of CSRR. Perhaps, the different findings of 
the association between foreign ownership and CSRR during the voluntary and 
mandatory period of CSRR indicate the effect of CSRR regulation in influencing the 
association between the two variables. 
7.4.4 Government Ownership 
Government ownership is significantly positively related to the levels of CSRR disclosed, 
which provides support for H1d of the current study. The result signifies that firms with 
higher levels of government ownership disclose greater quantity and quality of CSRR. 
This is in agreement with the findings observed by Ghazali (2007) and Amran and Devi 
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(2008). While Ghazali (2007) and Amran and Devi (2008) relied on a single-year data set 
of 2001 and 2003, respectively, the current study employed a five-year data set from 
2005 to 2009 covering both the voluntary and mandatory periods of CSRR. The current 
study reveals that the significant positive influence of government ownership on the 
levels of CSRR remained over the five year period of analysis.  
The higher level of CSRR disclosed by firms with greater level of government 
shareholding is expected as the Malaysian government has continuously promoted CSR 
and urged public-listed firms to become more socially and environmentally responsible. 
With respect to government-linked firms, a specific guideline on CSR that is ‘The Silver 
Book’ has been designed to guide these firms in practising CSR and CSRR, other than 
the mandated CSRR requirement imposed by the Bursa Malaysia. An examination of the 
voluntary CSRR in Malaysian government-linked firms by Rahman et al. (2011) revealed 
that the government-linked firms disclose the bad/negative news in addition to the 
good/positive news. This may imply a better quality of CSRR, measured by the types of 
disclosure as either good or bad news, disclosed by the government-linked firms in 
comparison to other firms, which mostly reported the good/positive news only.  
Rather than merely intending to attain legitimacy, perhaps the CSRR disclosed by the 
government-linked firms may be seen to fulfil the accountability role of reporting. This is 
due to the roles of the government-owned firms to serve the nation, rather than solely 
maximising profit. As highlighted by Eng and Mak (2003), the conflict between the goal 
of firms to maximise profit and to serve the nations may be reduced through greater 
reporting of voluntary information. Certain levels of pressure may be created through 
government ownership for firms to disclose greater levels of information publicly.  
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The greater levels of CSRR disclosed by firms with greater level of government 
ownership could also be seen as to support government’s initiatives in promoting CSR 
and CSRR; for example, the introduction of CSRR regulation by the Bursa Malaysia, as 
well as CSR guideline for government-linked firms that is ‘The Silver Book’. Since they 
are expected to be more involved in CSR-related activities, more CSR-related 
information should be disclosed by these firms.  
Overall, the findings of the current study that demonstrate the influence of shareholders 
in determining the levels of CSRR disclosed by firms are consistent with the outcome 
observed by Patten (1990) and Wilmshurst and Frost (2000). Evidence dictated in the 
current study indicates the different power possesses by different types of shareholders in 
influencing the levels of CSRR disclosed by firms. While greater power possessed by the 
foreign shareholders and government shareholders lead to the greater amount and quality 
of CSRR disclosed by the firms, the greater power of the owner-managers in firms has no 
effect on CSRR. The greater power possessed by the family-owners led to lower levels of 
the CSRR being disclosedby the firms. In the current study, the power possessed by the 
respective shareholders is represented by the percentage of shares held by those 
shareholders. The higher percentage of shares held denotes the greater power possessed 
by the shareholders in influencing firms’ decisions, which supporting the stakeholder 
theory.  
Prior related studies focused merely on the concentrated ownership as the sole variable to 
represent corporate ownership structure. For example, Roberts (1992), Liu and 
Anbumozhi (2009) and Elijido-Ten (2009) found no influence of the concentrated 
ownership on the levels of CSRR disclosed. Brammer and Pavelin (2006) revealed a 
significant positive association between firms with dispersed ownership and the amount 
of environmental reporting in the UK, whereas Huang and Kung (2010) reported a 
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significant negative association between concentrated ownership and environmental 
disclosure in Taiwan. Given the uniqueness of corporate ownership structure in Asian 
countries, particularly in Malaysia that is dominated by family-owned and government-
owned firms (Claessen et al., 2000; Eng & Mak, 2003; Jaggi et al., 2009), the extension 
of corporate ownership structure to include the different types of corporate ownership 
such as managerial ownership, family ownership, foreign ownership and government 
ownership is considered appropriate and relevant. This ensures that the variables used to 
indicate the corporate ownership structure fit the context of the current study. 
7.5 BOARDS OF DIRECTORS’ CSR EXPERIENCE AND CSRR 
The current study documents a significant positive association between boards of 
directors’ CSR experience and the levels of CSRR disclosed by firms. Firms with a 
greater percentage of directors that possess CSR experience tend to disclose higher levels 
of CSRR, measured in terms of its quantity and quality. Generally, the findings revealed 
provide support for H2 of the current study.  
The role of directors with CSR experience in promoting a greater levels of CSRR in firms 
is expected, as experienced directors has been dictated to drive firms’ performance in 
several prior studies; for example, Carpenter et al. (2001), Kroll et al. (2008) and Kor and 
Sundaramurthy (2009). Experienced directors are capable of influencing boards’ 
decisions and providing guidance for strategic decision-making in firms (Westphal & 
Milton, 2000; Carpenter & Westphal, 2001; Mcdonald et al. (2008), including in the 
matters of CSR and CSRR. 
Directors with relevant and appropriate experience are associated with superior corporate 
outcome (Kroll et al., 2008; Mcdonald et al., 2008). As highlighted by Mcdonald et al. 
(2008), experienced directors may develop an extensive knowledge base that signifies a 
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relatively high level of expertise supporting high-quality decision making. This, in turn, 
makes experienced directors become more useful advisers in firms (Kroll et al., 2008). 
They may rely on prior related experiences as guidance in making future related 
decisions (Dearborn & Simon, 1958), including decisions that relate to CSR and CSRR.  
Previous related literature has used several variables to represent directors’ experience; 
for example, multiple directorship (Haniffa & Cooke, 2002; 2005; Gul & Leung, 2004), 
and the age and length of service of directors (Abdelsalam & Street, 2007). The 
association between directors’ experience and corporate disclosure tends to mixed, 
depending upon the variables used to represent directors’ experience.  
In the context of CSRR, the current evidence complements the findings of the existing 
CSRR research that examines the effect of board of directors’ characteristics on CSRR. 
The current study dictates the board of directors’ CSR experience as one of the board’s 
characteristics that may influence the quantity and quality of CSRR disclosed by firms. 
CSR experiences are very much needed in firms’ boards of directors, in order to enhance 
CSR performance and reporting in firms. The appointment of one or more board 
members with prior experience in CSR may enable firms to better manage its CSR 
portfolio (Cramer & Hirschland, 2006; Strandberg, 2007). While the influence of 
directors’ specific experiences on specific firms’ outcome such as firm acquisition and 
growth have been documented in a number of studies (see Mcdonald et al., 2008; Kor & 
Sundaramurthy, 2009), the current study demonstrates the influence of directors’ CSR 
experience on CSRR.  
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Therefore, finding of the current study may shed some light on the association between 
boards of directors with CSR experience and the level of CSRR disclosed by firms. It 
indicates the influence of board of directors’ CSR experience, which represents firms’ 
strategic posture, in shaping the CSRR disclosed by the firms. In other words, firms may 
consider appointing directors with relevant CSR experience, to sit on the boards of 
directors, as one of the strategies to improve CSR performance and reporting disclosed 
by the firms. Examples of directors’ CSR experiences include their involvement in NGO 
activities in preserving the environment and to caring for the community and prior 
experience in managing CSR-related tasks or specific departments related to CSR in 
firms. CSR experience should be included as one of the important criteria in the 
directors’ appointment criteria, as these experienced directors may assist firms in 
promoting CSR and CSRR to a higher degree. Probably, the existing members of the 
board of directors should also be sent for trainings or continuous learning programmes 
that relate to CSR and CSRR, so that they could gain some awareness on the importance 
of social and environmental issues in firms, and knowledge and expertise in 
implementing and reporting CSR activities. 
The current study provides support for Haniffa and Cooke (2005) who dictated a 
significant positive association between chairman with multiple directorships (to 
represent director’s experience) and the extents of CSRR in Malaysia. The findings of the 
current study acknowledge the importance of boards’ CSR experience as one of the 
firms’ strategic posture in promoting CSRR. It adds to the existing CSRR literature, 
which adopted the presence of corporate sponsored philanthropic foundation and 
environmental committee as a variable that represent strategic posture of a firm (Roberts, 
1992; Elijido-Ten, 2009). Overall, the current study demonstrates the importance of 
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directors with CSR experiences in promoting greater levels of CSR practices and 
reporting in firms. 
7.6 CORPORATE OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE AND CSRR: THE EFFECT OF 
CSRR REGULATION 
The results of the current study indicate the importance role of CSRR regulation in 
shaping the development of CSRR, particularly in Malaysia. This is evidenced by the 
greater levels of CSRR disclosed by firms in the presence of the CSRR regulation. 
Generally, the finding supports the results provided in prior studies that examine the 
effect of related regulation on CSRR and CSR reputation. For example, Crawford and 
Williams (2010) suggested that firms operate in a highly-regulated environment in terms 
of CSRR provide higher levels of CSRR. Othman et al. (2011) also dictated a positive 
association between CSRR regulation (measured by the differences in the extent of 
CSRR between the voluntary period of CSRR and the mandatory period of CSRR) and 
CSR reputation index. Frost (2007), Llena et al. (2007) and Criado-Jimenez et al. (2008) 
documented an increasing trend of the volume and the quality of environmental reporting 
disclosed by firms, following the improved environmental reporting regulation imposed 
on firms. 
However, the moderating effect of CSRR regulation on the association between corporate 
ownership structure and the levels of CSRR tends to vary across different types of 
corporate ownership structure. The interaction term of managerial ownership and CSRR 
regulation (MGRLOWN*REG) is significantly negatively related with the levels of 
CSRR disclosed (CSRRQN and CSRRQL), which suggests no support for H3a of the 
current study. The result denotes that firms with higher level of managerial ownership 
disclose significantly less amount and quality of CSRR in presence of CSRR regulation. 
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These findings may imply the ineffectiveness of CSRR regulation in promoting CSRR 
among the firms with a higher level of managerial ownership or owner-managed firms.  
The stronger negative association revealed between managerial ownership and CSRR in 
the presence of CSRR regulation seems to contradict with the evidence dictated by 
Warfield et al. (1995), who demonstrated the lower level of importance of managerial 
ownership in a regulatory regime. Warfield et al. (1995) argued that the presence of 
regulation gives managers less opportunity to pursue non-value maximising action. 
Nevertheless, in the context of CSRR of the current study, the presence of CSRR 
regulation seems to be ineffective in driving the managers to disclose a greater quantity 
and quality of CSRR. Perhaps, this scenario calls for greater enforcement mechanisms to 
be in place for CSRR in Malaysia, so that firms become more motivated to comply with 
the regulation.  
Similarly, the interaction term of government ownership and CSRR regulation 
(GOVOWN*REG) is also significantly negatively related to the levels of CSRR 
disclosed (CSRRQN and CSRRQL), providing no support for H3d of the current study. 
These results indicate a reduction in the levels of CSRR disclosed by firms with higher 
level of government ownership, following the implementation of CSRR regulation. The 
findings may imply the ineffectiveness of the CSRR regulation in promoting higher 
levels of CSRR among the government-owned firms in Malaysia. While the firms are 
expected to disclose more CSRR following the regulation, a reduction in CSRR with the 
introduction of the CSRR regulation is unexpected.  
Perhaps, the lenient CSRR regulation imposed by the Bursa Malaysia has contributed to 
the reduction in the CSRR disclosed by firms with higher government ownership. The 
Bursa Malaysia requires all public-listed firms to include a description of the CSR 
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activities or practices undertaken by the firms and its subsidiaries, and if there is none, a 
statement to that effect. Firms with higher government ownership, which had already 
disclosed greater levels of CSRR during the voluntary period, may think that the high 
levels of CSRR disclosed are not necessary, given the lenient requirement imposed by the 
Bursa Malaysia from 2007 onwards. Possibly, this situation could be improved through 
an implementation of a set of appropriate CSRR guidelines or standards that may serve as 
benchmark for firms to report their CSR information to their stakeholders.  
No association found between the interaction term of foreign ownership and CSRR 
regulation (FOROWN*REG) and the levels of CSRR disclosed (CSRRQN and 
CSRRQL), indicating no support for H3c of the current study. In other words, the 
presence of CSRR regulation does not affect the levels of CSRR disclosed by firms with 
higher level of foreign ownership. Perhaps, firms with higher foreign ownership, 
particularly from the Europe and North America, are influenced by their home country’s 
practice of CSRR, rather than the CSRR regulation imposed by the Malaysia’s stock 
exchange that is Bursa Malaysia. The CSRR practised by firms originating from 
European and North American countries is generally stricter than that adopted by 
developing countries (Gugler & Shi, 2009; Oh et al., 2011), particularly Malaysia. This is 
due to the greater emphasis of CSR placed and stringent regulations imposed in those 
countries (Frost, 2007; Criado-Jimenez et al., 2008; Oh et al., 2011). 
CSRR regulation seems to be ineffective in promoting greater levels of CSRR in firms 
with higher levels of managerial ownership and government ownership. These firms tend 
to disclose less quantity and quality of CSRR during the mandatory CSRR period. Such 
reduction in reporting might be caused by the lack of CSRR standards or at least CSRR 
mandatory reporting guidelines to accompany the mandatory CSRR requirement. This is 
because the mandatory CSRR requirement, which obligates all public-listed firms to 
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disclose CSRR, only requires firms to include a description of the CSR activities or 
practices undertaken by the firms and its subsidiaries or, if there are none, a statement to 
that effect. Such requirement is seen as too general in nature.  
Following this general mandatory requirement, a very general or broad statement of CSR 
activities held by firms is already sufficient for firms to meet the mandatory CSRR 
requirement as outlined by the Bursa Malaysia. Therefore, firms may be less motivated to 
provide greater quantity and quality of CSRR above the levels prescribed by the 
regulators, as it will increase the cost of reporting such information. Nevertheless, they 
may be motivated to disclose more CSRR that is the amount in excess of the required 
disclosure by the regulation, if they intend to exhibit good corporate image or reputation 
to the stakeholders (Hooghiemstra, 2000; Bebbington et al., 2008), or subject to other 
influences; for example, their home country’s practise of CSRR (Gugler & Shi, 2009; Oh 
et al., 2011).  
The greater levels of CSRR observed during the voluntary period may explain the firms’ 
efforts to influence or delay regulation (Adams, 2002). Perhaps, through greater CSRR, 
there is less pressure placed by the government to impose regulation related to CSRR. 
Nevertheless, the introduction of the CSRR requirement that is too general in nature may 
hinder firms to disclose CSRR more than the amount required by the regulation. 
The findings of the current study are consistent with the evidence dictated in a number of 
previous studies that investigated the effect of CSRR-related regulation on the levels of 
CSRR disclosed by firms. For example, in spite of the presence of CSRR-related 
regulation, there are still cases of non-compliant reported in the UK (Adams et al., 1995; 
Day & Woodward, 2004) and Spain (Larrinaga et al., 2002), respectively. 
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In contrast to the findings above, there is a positive association dictated between the 
interaction term of family ownership and CSRR regulation (FAMOWN*REG) and the 
levels of CSRR disclosed (CSRRQN and CSRRQL), which supporting H3b of the 
current study. Firms with higher level of family ownership tend to provide a greater 
amount and quality of CSRR during the mandatory period of CSRR. The result seems to 
indicate the positive effect of CSR regulation on the levels of CSRR disclosed in the 
firms with higher level of family ownership. This is somewhat consistent with the 
findings dictated by Llena et al. (2007) and Criado-Jimenez et al. (2008) in Spain and 
Frost (2007) in Australia.  
These findings generally implied the important role of CSRR regulation in promoting a 
higher level of CSRR in family-owned firms. While firms with higher level of family 
ownership were seen as less motivated to disclose more CSR information during the 
voluntary period of CSRR, they disclose more CSRR following the introduction of CSRR 
regulation in 2007. These firms seem to abide with the new regulation imposed by the 
stock exchange, in line with the arguments by Gray (1988) and Bajo et al. (2009). Gray 
(1988) highlighted a high level of firms’ compliance towards the regulation imposed 
despite the high level of secrecy documented in firms in Malaysia, while Bajo et al. 
(2009) suggested for a high level of regulatory compliance by the family firms. 
Overall, the current study documents the different effect of CSRR regulation across the 
different types of corporate ownership structure. The presence of CSRR regulation is 
seen as effective in firms with higher level of family ownership, as the quantity and 
quality of CSRR improved with the presence of the regulation. However, the 
implementation of CSRR regulation seems to be ineffective in other types of ownership 
structure. This is due to the failure of the regulation to improve the levels of CSRR 
disclosed in firms with higher level of managerial, foreign and government ownership. 
 
334 
 
Perhaps, the nature of the existing CSRR regulation may contribute to such findings. It 
simply requires firms to provide an explanation or statement about any CSR-related 
activities held by the firms in corporate annual reports. The lack of details on how to 
report the CSR-related information, for example, the absence of proper reporting 
guidelines or CSRR standards, has led to the variation of reporting style or format. The 
presence of CSRR regulation does not promote to the greater improvement in the levels 
of CSRR in firms with higher foreign and government ownership. Even without such 
regulation, these firms have already disclosed significant levels of CSRR due to the 
pressures from foreign shareholders and the objective to serve the nation. The current 
CSRR policy also seems to be inadequate to motivate firms with higher level of 
managerial ownership to disclose greater levels of CSRR. As highlighted by Zahra 
(1989), directors with a high level of ownership in firms tend to pursue their self-interest 
objectives more than the interests of other stakeholders. Instead of ensuring that the 
social objectives of the firms are being implemented, the director’s objectives tend to 
resolve around maximising their own wealth as shareholders (Zahra, 1989).  
Findings of the current study demonstrate the application of stakeholder theory as well as 
contingency theory in explaining the levels of CSRR disclosed. While evidence from the 
extant literature relating ownership structure or CSRR regulation to the levels of CSRR 
disclosed focused on the direct effect of the ownership structure or regulation on the 
levels reporting, the current study contributes to the existing body of related works by 
examining the moderating effect of CSRR regulation on the association between 
corporate ownership structure and CSRR. Findings of the current study revealed that 
different types of corporate ownership structure impact the level of CSRR differently in 
presence of the CSRR regulation. Overall, CSRR regulation did offer some effect on the 
association between several types of corporate ownership structure on the levels of CSRR 
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disclosed. The application of the multiple perspective of CSRR that include stakeholder 
and contingency theory has further improved the model of the determinants of CSRR. 
This supports the argument of Parker (2005) on the multiple theorisation of CSRR, 
adding to the lists of CSRR literature that adopt multiple theories (see Ratanajongkol et 
al., 2006; Makela & Nasi, 2010).  
Prior CSRR literature that adopted stakeholder theory used concentrated ownership as the 
only variable to represent shareholders (see Roberts, 1992; Huang & Kung, 2010). 
Likewise, the current study includes the four different types of corporate ownership 
structure in Malaysia that reflect the common corporate ownership in the country. 
Findings of the current study demonstrate the manner in which different types of 
shareholders influenced CSRR in different manner. Board CSR experience has also been 
seen to represent important firms’ strategic posture that help to promote greater levels of 
CSRR disclosed by firms. Prior related literature used several other variables to represent 
firms’ strategic posture, for example the presence of environmental committees, 
philanthropic foundation, and environmental management certification (ISO14001) 
(Roberts, 1992; Elijido-Ten, 2009). 
CSRR was practised voluntarily in Malaysia prior to 2007. The introduction of CSRR 
regulation with effect from 2007 may serve as constraint that affects the levels of CSRR 
disclosed by firms. The findings on the moderating effect of CSRR regulation on the 
association between corporate ownership structure and CSRR dictate the variation of 
CSRR regulation’s impact on CSRR across the different types of corporate ownership 
structure. These findings support the application of contingency theory in explaining the 
levels of CSRR. In contrary to Elsayed and Hoque (2010), who used contingency theory 
to explain voluntary disclosure practice in Egypt, the current study extends the use of the 
contingency theory in explaining the CSRR practice in Malaysia. 
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The current study provides inputs for the regulators to improve the current policy on 
CSRR. For example, the regulatory bodies may need to consider setting up appropriate 
reporting standards on CSR or specifying detailed guidelines on CSRR according to the 
type of firm or industry. The regulators may need to consider the different types of 
corporate ownership structure as one of the important aspect in regulating and enforcing 
CSRR regulation, other than industry. This is because the types of ownership held in 
firms affect the way the firms respond to CSRR, in the presence of the CSRR regulation. 
Perhaps, such consideration may assist the regulators towards enhancing the effectiveness 
of the implementation of the CSRR regulation in Malaysia.      
The regulators may also need to consider imposing stricter CSRR regulation through 
enforcement, for example imposition of penalty or fines for non-compliance case; or 
improvement of the existing regulation, for example through the preparation of CSRR 
guidelines or standards (Criado-Jimenez et al., 2008), or simply abandon the existing 
CSRR regulation as practiced in the UK (Cooper & Owen, 2007). Criado-Jimenez et al. 
(2008), who examined the impact of an improved standard of environmental reporting in 
Spain, revealed a greater quantity and quality of environmental reporting disclosed by 
firms following the regulation. While there has been a lack of compliance reported under 
the preceding environmental reporting standard introduced in 1998 (Larrinaga et al., 
2002), the comprehensive environmental reporting standard that took place in 2002 
resulted in an improved environment of reporting by firms (Criado-Jimenez et al., 2008). 
Contrary to the case of Spain, Cooper and Owen (2007) noted the abolition of the 
proposed mandatory CSRR in the UK, as the reporting, it is argued, did not fulfil the 
stakeholder accountability purpose. Overall, continuous efforts to evaluate the sufficiency 
and relevance of the CSRR regulation are required to ensure the effectiveness of the 
CSRR, particularly in Malaysia. 
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7.7 SUMMARY 
Discussions of the findings and analyses of the current study highlights the different 
influence placed by different types of corporate ownership structure on the levels of 
CSRR disclosed. This finding suggests the influence of shareholders, which are 
represented by the different types of corporate ownership structure, being an important 
stakeholder in firms, in determining the levels of CSRR disclosed by firms. Other than 
the shareholders, board of directors’ CSR experience, which indicates firms’ strategic 
posture, is also found to influence the levels of CSRR disclosed. The influence of other 
important stakeholders represented by the government power (firm size) and creditor 
power (leverage), as well as economic performance (profitability) is also evidenced in the 
current study. In addition, the current study also observes the effect of firms’ 
environment, which is represented by CSRR regulation, in influencing the association 
between corporate ownership structure and CSRR. Overall, the current study suggests the 
application of stakeholder theory, together with the contingency theory, to explain the 
variation of CSRR in Malaysia in both voluntary and mandatory regimes.  
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CHAPTER 8: CONCLUSIONS 
 
8.1 INTRODUCTION 
As the final chapter of this thesis, Chapter eight summarises the results revealed by the 
current study, discusses the contributions and the implications of the study, and 
highlights the limitations of the study, as well as making suggestions for future research 
in this field of study. Specifically, Section 8.2 provides a summary of the key research 
findings of the current study. Next, Section 8.3 explains the contributions and 
implications of the study, both in terms of the theoretical as well as the practical aspects. 
This is followed by Section 8.4, which highlights the limitations of the study; and Section 
8.5, which provides several suggestions for future research. Finally, a summary of the 
chapter is provided in Section 8.6.      
8.2 KEY RESEARCH FINDINGS  
The current study investigates the influence of different types of corporate ownership 
structure on the levels of CSRR disclosed by firms. In addition, it includes an 
examination of the impact of board of directors’ CSR experience on the levels of CSRR 
disclosed. Following the introduction of the mandatory CSRR requirement by the Bursa 
Malaysia upon all public-listed firms in Malaysia with effect from the 2007 financial 
year, the current study also incorporates a test of moderating effect of CSRR regulation 
on the association between corporate ownership structure and the levels of CSRR. 
Based on the descriptive analysis of CSRR performed over the five-year period from 
2005 to 2009, it appears that the levels of CSRR disclosed by firms, measured in terms of 
its quantity and quality of reporting, increased over the five-year period from 2005 to 
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2009. The increasing trend of CSRR observed in the current study coincides with those 
reported by several researchers, such as Gray et al. (1995a), Niskala and Pretes (1995), 
Larrinaga et al. (2002), Criado-Jimenez et al. (2008), Saleh et al. (2010) and Mahadeo et 
al. (2011). The results also demonstrate wide variation of CSRR disclosed occasionally 
by firms, which match closely those obtained by Campbell et al. (2003) and Saleh et al. 
(2010). However, the increasing trend of CSRR reported in the current study seems to 
contradict the findings dictated by several other investigators; for example, Kuasirikun 
and Sherer (2004) and De Villiers and Van Staden (2006). Perhaps, changes in CSRR 
disclosed by firms over time, which indicated through the increasing or decreasing trends 
of reporting, could be explained by a number of reasons, among others the 
implementation of CSRR regulation (Larrinaga et al., 2002; Criado-Jimenez et al., 2008) 
and the occurrence of financial crisis (Kuasirikun & Sherer, 2004). 
In the case of Malaysia, possibly the continuous efforts being undertaken by the 
government to promote CSR and CSRR to a higher degree of importance, as well as the 
global pressure for firms to operate in a responsible way, partly justify the rising of 
CSRR disclosed by firms. For example, the introduction of CSRR regulation by the 
Bursa Malaysia in 2007 may contribute to the increase in the CSRR, particularly between 
2007 and 2009. This has been detailed in Chapter six of this thesis (see Table 6.7 and 
Table 6.8), whereby the highest changes in CSRR disclosed were reported in 2007; that is 
the first year of CSRR regulation in Malaysia. 
Different types of corporate ownership structure seem to influence the levels of CSRR 
disclosed by firms in different manner. While firms with higher levels of foreign 
ownership and government ownership, respectively, tend to disclose a greater amount 
and quality of CSRR, firms with higher level of family ownership disclose significantly 
less CSRR in terms of its quantity and quality of reporting. No association found between 
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managerial ownership and the levels of CSRR disclosed. Findings of the current study 
show the manner in which different variables used to represent shareholder power other 
than concentrated ownership (Huang & Kung, 2010) or dispersed ownership (Brammer 
& Pavelin, 2006) influence the levels of CSRR disclosed.  
Several investigators such as Roberts (1992), Liu and Ambumozhi (2009) and Elijido-
Ten (2009) revealed no association between concentrated ownership and the levels of 
CSRR disclosed by firms in the US, China and Malaysia, respectively. These studies 
relied on a single type of corporate ownership structure, for example concentrated 
ownership or diffused ownership, to represent the shareholder power, which is very broad 
and does not reflect the unique features of corporate ownership structure in a particular 
country. Possibly, for those reasons, the results of the studies showed insignificant 
associations between corporate ownership structure and the levels of CSRR. In contrast, 
the use of different types of corporate ownership structure to represent the shareholders 
power in the current study demonstrated the influence of the different types of corporate 
ownership structure on the levels of CSRR disclosed by firms in Malaysia. The four 
different types of corporate ownership structure used to represent the shareholders power 
in the current study reflect the unique features of corporate ownership structure in 
Malaysia.  
An investigation of the impact of board of directors’ CSR experience on the levels of 
CSRR disclosed also exhibits a significant positive association between the two 
variables. The board of directors’ CSR experience, which represents firms’ strategic 
posture, is found to be an important determinant of the levels of CSRR disclosed by firms 
in Malaysia. While evidence on the influence of directors’ specific experiences, such as 
acquisition experience and international experience on firms’ performance (see Carpenter 
& Westphal, 2001; Kroll et al., 2008; McDonald et al., 2008) and corporate disclosure 
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(see Gul & Leung, 2004; Haniffa & Cooke, 2002; Abdelsalam & Street, 2007) have been 
documented in several related literatures, the current study observes specifically the role 
of directors with CSR experience towards enhancing the levels of CSRR disclosed by 
firms. In general, this finding supports the argument provided by Cramer and Hirschland 
(2006) and Strandberg (2007), which highlighted the needs of boards of directors of firms 
to have knowledge or prior experience related to CSR in understanding CSR issues of 
their firms. The verdict found in the current study is also consistent with the outcome 
revealed in Roberts (1992) and Elijido-Ten (2009), which indicated the significance of 
firms’ strategic posture in determining the levels of CSRR disclosed by firms. 
Finally, the current study dictates that the moderating effect of CSRR regulation on the 
association between corporate ownership structure and the levels of CSRR varies across 
different types of corporate ownership structure. This observation is somewhat consistent 
with the argument provided by Warfield et al. (1995), who documented the influence of 
regulation on the association between managerial ownership and managers’ accounting 
choice. From the current study, it seems that CSRR regulation tends to be effective to 
selected types of corporate ownership structure only that is family ownership, in terms of 
promoting greater quantity and quality of CSRR. Even though firms with higher levels of 
family ownership tend to disclose significantly less CSRR, the presence of CSRR 
regulation has witnessed a positive association between family ownership and the levels 
of CSRR. Other than signifying the effectiveness of the CSRR regulation in promoting 
greater quantity and quality of CSRR in family-owned firms, the findings of the current 
study also support Bajo et al.’s (2009) argument on the high level of regulatory 
compliance by the family firms.  
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Conversely, CSRR regulation tends to be regarded as ineffective in promoting greater 
levels of CSRR in firms with higher level of government ownership. As observed in the 
current study, in spite of the greater quantity and quality of CSRR disclosed by firms 
with higher level of government ownership, the imposition of the CSRR regulation has 
made these firms disclose significantly less quantity and quality of CSRR. Probably, the 
lack of comprehensive CSRR framework as a basis for the existing CSRR regulation in 
Malaysia has discouraged the government-owned firms to disclose more CSRR than what 
is required by the laws. 
Similarly, CSRR regulation is viewed as ineffective in driving CSRR in firms with higher 
levels of managerial ownership. The insignificant negative association between 
managerial ownership and CSRR become significant in the presence of CSRR regulation. 
Nevertheless, CSRR regulation seems to have no effect on the association between 
foreign ownership and the levels of CSRR disclosed. Perhaps, firms with higher levels of 
foreign ownership are more influenced by the practices of CSR of their home country, 
rather than the CSRR regulation imposed by the Bursa Malaysia. 
Overall, findings from the current study contribute to the growing body of literature that 
investigates the link between corporate ownership structure, board of directors’ 
characteristics, corporate reporting regulation and CSRR. These are vital in order to 
ensure the continuous development of corporate governance, CSR and CSRR in 
Malaysia, focusing on their implementation upon public-listed firms.  
8.3 RESEARCH CONTRIBUTIONS AND IMPLICATIONS 
Findings from the current study have several contributions and implications for the 
various stakeholders; for example, shareholders, regulators and the public as a whole. 
Generally, the current study provides incremental contributions on the developments of 
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CSRR, specifically the link between corporate governance and CSRR and the role of 
CSRR regulation in promoting CSRR, particularly from one emerging market’s 
perspective that is Malaysia. Outcomes observed in the current study signify the relative 
importance of the different types of corporate ownership structure in influencing the 
levels of CSRR. The current study also highlights the importance roles of board of 
directors’ CSR experience and CSRR regulation in promoting CSRR in Malaysia.  
From the theoretical perspective, the current study contributes to the application of the 
multiple perspectives or theories in explaining CSRR. As illustrated in Chapter four of 
this thesis (Section 4.2), the current study combines the use of stakeholder theory and 
contingency theory in examining the link between corporate ownership structure, board 
of directors’ characteristics, CSRR regulation and CSRR. Previous studies that employed 
stakeholder theory to explain CSRR limit their definition of shareholder power to one 
specific type of corporate ownership structure, for example concentrated ownership or 
dispersed ownership only (Roberts, 1992; Brammer & Pavelin, 2006; Elijido-Ten, 2009; 
Huang & Kung, 2010).  
Therefore, the current study presents a refined model of Ullmann (1985) of stakeholder 
theory to explain the CSRR disclosed by firms in Malaysia. Instead of using a single type 
of corporate ownership structure to represent the shareholder power, the current study 
includes four different types of corporate ownership structure, representing the common 
types of corporate ownership structure in Malaysia. This reflects the unique corporate 
ownership structure in Asian countries, including Malaysia (Claessen et al., 2000; Fan & 
Wong, 2002; Deesomsak et al., 2004; Tam & Tan, 2007). In addition, the current study 
also suggests for the appointment of board members with CSR experience, which may 
serve as firm’s strategic posture.  
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Moreover, the current study also proposes for the use of contingency theory in examining 
the moderating effect of CSRR regulation on the association between corporate 
ownership structure and CSRR. Being a moderator, CSRR regulation is assumed to 
become among the important determinants of CSRR alongside with the components of 
corporate governance; specifically corporate ownership structure. The current study 
shows the different effect of CSRR regulation in influencing the levels of CSRR 
disclosed by firms across different types of corporate ownership structure.  
Possibly, the observations revealed in the current study serve useful inputs for the 
regulators in their efforts towards improving the current policies on corporate governance 
and CSRR, particularly in the context of one developing country that is Malaysia. For 
instance, the regulators may consider including the appointment of board members with 
CSR experience as one of the criteria for the appointment of members of the board of 
directors of firms, in a way to help firms to improve their CSR practice and reporting.  
The existing CSRR regulation, which was imposed by the Bursa Malaysia in 2007, 
simply requires firms to provide an explanation or statement about any CSR-related 
activities held by the firms in corporate annual reports. The lack of details on how to 
report the CSR-related information, for example, the absence of proper reporting 
guidelines or CSRR standards, has led to the variation of reporting style or format. In the 
efforts of improving the existing CSRR regulation, perhaps, findings of the current study 
may highlight to the regulators on the impact of different types of corporate ownership 
structure, board of directors’ CSR experience and CSRR regulation in determining the 
levels of CSRR disclosed by firms. These findings are beneficial for the regulators to 
evaluate the sufficiency, relevance and effectiveness of the current CSRR regulation. 
They may also serve as benchmarks or references for the regulators to work on a better 
mechanism towards the improvement of CSR and CSRR practices in Malaysia.    
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Results of the current study may also benefit the shareholders or investors of firms, 
especially the ‘ethical’ investors, who are concerned with the social and environmental 
aspects of firms. Being aware of the characteristics of firms that have greater concerns on 
social and environmental matters, the investors may be guided on the types of firms that 
they could invest in; for example, firms with higher level of government ownership. The 
management of firms may also use the results of the current study as guidelines to 
become a social responsible firm; for example, to have a board of directors with CSR 
experience.   
From an academic perspective, the current study may serve as a starting point for 
researchers to investigate on the importance of directors’ CSR experience in enhancing 
the levels of CSRR disclosed by firms. While the results presented in the current study 
are derived solely from the positivist perspective of research, more efforts could be 
undertaken on the interpretive perspective of research, detailing the roles of directors’ 
CSR experience in promoting CSRR in firms. 
8.4 LIMITATIONS OF RESEARCH 
Findings of the current study are subject to several limitations. In terms of sample, the 
current study includes top 300 firms (by market capitalisation) listed on the Main board 
of Bursa Malaysia from 2005 to 2009 only. Therefore, the conclusions derived from the 
current study cannot be generalised to other samples, time periods or countries. This is 
because different results may be revealed when different samples, time periods or 
countries are used in other studies (Hackston & Milne, 1996). Nevertheless, findings of 
the current study may be comparable to other similar studies; for instance, studies 
conducted in other Asian countries that share similar characteristics of corporate 
ownership structure or other countries that implement CSRR regulation. 
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Evidence dictated in preceding studies pointed out the possibilities that the ownership 
structure of a firm may affect the characteristics of the boards of directors of the firm. For 
example, Kang et al. (2007) found that the level of shareholder concentration in a firm 
affect the gender composition of the board of directors of the firm. Nevertheless, the main 
objective of the current study is to examine the association between corporate governance 
and CSRR. Therefore, the current study does not distinguish between corporate 
governance employed by different ownership structure.  
In the current study, the influence of corporate ownership structures and boards of 
directors’ CSR experience on the levels of CSRR is examined in the context of a single 
equation. This is in spite of the possibilities of the specific variables used in the current 
study also depending on the levels of CSRR, which may need to be determined 
endogenously. Rather than drawing a causal relationship between corporate governance’s 
variables and CSRR, the current study offers evidence only of an association between 
corporate ownership structure, boards of directors’ CSR experience and CSRR.  
Despite the shift of CSRR dimensions towards the economic and governance aspects, 
which are related closely to sustainability reporting, the current study focuses solely on 
the social and environmental aspects of CSRR. The reason being that only a few firms in 
Malaysia produce sustainability reporting. Sawani et al. (2010), who investigated the 
sustainability reporting practice by firms that are deemed exhibit ‘best’ reporting practice 
in Malaysia, revealed that only five firms prepared stand-alone reports with only three 
firms having proper sustainability reports. Given the large scale of the current study, it is 
difficult to include the various aspects of CSRR when only a few firms conduct 
sustainability reporting.  
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The current study assumes that CSRR regulation represents an additional variable that 
may affect the levels of CSRR disclosed by firms. Although other specific events, such as 
the global financial crisis in 2008, or other variables may have effect on the levels of 
CSRR disclosed, the current study focuses specifically on the effect of CSRR regulation 
owing to its relevance to the Malaysian context, based on the periods of study chosen.  
8.5 RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
The current study could be extended in the following areas. For example, given the large-
scale nature of the current study covering five-year period of analysis, the current study 
relies on corporate annual reports as the only source of CSRR. Perhaps, a smaller scale 
research could be undertaken to include other reporting media (Jenkins & Yakovleva, 
2006), such as stand-alone reports (Chen & Bouvain, 2009) and/or websites (Adams & 
Frost, 2006), following its increasing importance and relevance in the competitive global 
marketplace. 
Rather than using the ‘percentage of ownership’ to represent the level of specific 
ownership types in firms, future research may employ a specific ‘cut-off’ percentage to 
indicate a specific type of ownership structure (Warfield et al., 1995; Chau & Gray, 
2010); for example, less than 5 percent level of ownership to represent low level of 
ownership, less than 25 percent level of ownership to represent moderate level of 
ownership and more than 25 percent level of ownership to represent high level of 
ownership. As an alternative to the single equation regression analysis performed in the 
current study, future research may consider the use of two-stages least square (2SLS) 
regression model (Gul & Leung, 2004) to address the endogeneity issues associated with 
the relationships examined in the current study. The current study examines the 
association between corporate ownership structure, board of directors’ CSR experience, 
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CSRR regulation and CSRR from a specific country’s perspective; that is, Malaysia. 
Perhaps, the design of the current study could be replicated into other contexts, for 
example other countries, to enable comparisons to be made across different countries. 
8.6 SUMMARY 
The current study investigates the influence of corporate ownership structure and board 
of directors’ CSR experience on the levels of CSRR disclosed by a sample of public-
listed firms in Malaysia. Generally, different effects are observed upon the levels of 
CSRR disclosed across the different types of corporate ownership structure. Board of 
directors’ CSR experience is also found to be an important determinant of the levels of 
CSRR disclosed by firms. In line with the introduction of the mandatory CSRR 
requirement by the Bursa Malaysia upon all public-listed firms in Malaysia with effect 
from the 2007 financial year, the current study also examines the moderating effect of 
CSRR regulation on the association between corporate ownership structure and the levels 
of CSRR. Overall, the investigation of the moderating effect of CSRR regulation 
indicates the level of effectiveness of the current mandatory requirement for enhancing 
the quantity and quality of CSRR disclosed by the public-listed firms in Malaysia. Other 
than providing evidence on the link between corporate governance and CSRR, perhaps 
the current study could offer useful inputs for regulators to evaluate the usefulness and 
effectiveness of the current CSRR regulation imposed in Malaysia. Consequently, this 
may beneficial in the efforts of promoting good CSR and CSRR practices in firms, 
especially public-listed firms in Malaysia. 
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ABSTRACT 
The growing interest in corporate social responsibility reporting (CSRR) research has 
been apparent with most of the research focus on cross sectional analysis and from the 
perspective of developed countries. This study contributes to the extant CSRR literature 
by a longitudinal analysis of the association between ownership structure, board of 
directors, regulation and CSRR from the perspective of a developing country. This study 
investigates the influence of different ownership structure and boards’ corporate social 
responsibility (CSR) experience on the levels of CSRR disclosed in Malaysia. Following 
the introduction of CSRR regulation in Malaysia with effect from year 2007, this study 
also examines the moderating effect of CSRR regulation on the association between 
ownership structure and CSRR. Samples in the study are 300 top firms (by market 
capitalisation) listed on the Bursa Malaysia over a five-year period from 2005 to 2009. 
The examination of the longitudinal data involves voluntary (2005-2006) and mandatory 
(2007-2009) periods of CSRR. Based on content analysis of CSRR in firms’ annual 
reports, this study analyses the trend of CSRR in Malaysia before and after the CSRR 
regulation, reflecting the voluntary and mandatory periods of CSRR. Results from 
multiple regression analyses indicate that different ownership structure has different 
influence over the levels of CSRR disclosed. In addition, the presence of CSRR 
regulation influences the association between ownership structure and CSRR. It is also 
found that boards’ CSR experience and several control variables such as firm size, 
Shariah status of firms, profitability, and leverage show significant effects on CSRR. 
Findings from this study may serve as guidance for authorities in enhancing the existing 
regulation/enforcement on corporate governance and CSRR. The findings could also be 
of guidance for firms and stakeholders on the aspects that may influence firms’ CSRR 
practice. This study indicates the effect of Shariah status of firms in influencing the 
levels of CSRR disclosed. This effect describes some influence of the principles of the 
Islamic teaching (Shariah) in driving CSRR practice. Unlike cross-sectional data, 
longitudinal data employed in this study allow researcher to demonstrate the consistency 
of findings revealed over a specified period. Furthermore, the extant CSRR literature that 
employed stakeholder theory seems to classify shareholders as either concentrated or 
diffused ownership, which is very much relevant to the corporate ownership’s 
characteristics of Western developed countries. Since this study focuses on the 
perspective of a developing country within the Southeast Asian region, the extension of 
the classification of shareholders that includes managerial, family, foreign, and 
government ownership is considered appropriate to reflect the unique corporate 
ownership structure in the country. Overall, this study contributes to the extended 
application of stakeholder theory as well as contingency theory in explaining CSRR in 
the context of an Asian country that possesses different features of corporate ownership 
structure unlike that of the Western developed countries. 
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ABSTRAK 
Perhatian yang kian meningkat dalam penyelidikan pelaporan tanggungjawab sosial 
korporat (PTSK) kini jelas. Kebanyakan penyelidikan ini berfokus pada analisis kerat 
rentas dan daripada perspektif negara membangun. Kajian ini menyumbang dalam 
kajian-kajian terdahulu yang berkaitan dengan PTSK melalui analisis jangka panjang 
terhadap perkaitan antara struktur pemilikan, lembaga pengarah, peraturan and PTSK dari 
perspektif negara membangun. Secara khususnya, kajian ini meneliti pengaruh beberapa 
struktur pemilikan dan pengalaman lembaga pengarah dalam menunaikan tanggungjawab 
sosial korporat (TSK) terhadap tahap-tahap PTSK yang didedahkan. Berikutan 
pengenalan peraturan PTSK di Malaysia mulai tahun 2007, kajian ini turut meneliti kesan 
penyederhanaan yang disebabkan oleh peraturan PTSK tersebut terhadap perkaitan antara 
struktur pemilikan dan PTSK. Sampel dalam kajian ini ialah 300 syarikat terunggul 
(berdasarkan permodalan pasaran) yang tersenarai dalam Bursa Malaysia selama lima 
tahun dari tahun 2005 sehingga tahun 2009. Penelitian terhadap data jangka panjang 
tersebut melibatkan tempoh sukarela (tahun 2005-2006) dan tempoh mandatori (tahun 
2007-2009) PTSK. Berdasarkan analisis kandungan PTSK daripada laporan tahunan 
syarikat, kajian ini menganalisis trend PTSK di Malaysia sebelum dan selepas 
pelaksanaan peraturan PTSK, iaitu semasa tempoh sukarela dan tempoh mandatori, untuk 
melaksanakan PTSK. Dapatan daripada analisis regresi berganda menunjukkan bahawa 
struktur pemilikan berbeza menghasilkan pengaruh yang berbeza terhadap tahap-tahap 
PTSK yang didedahkan. Selanjutnya, dengan adanya peraturan PTSK, ia mempengaruhi 
perkaitan antara struktur pemilikan dan PTSK. Kajian ini juga mendapati bahawa 
pengalaman lembaga pengarah dalam menunaikan TSK dan beberapa pemboleh ubah 
seperti saiz syarikat, status syariah syarikat, keberuntungan, dan keumpilan mempunyai 
kesan yang ketara terhadap PTSK. Dapatan daripada kajian ini boleh dijadikan sebagai 
panduan bagi pihak berkuasa untuk memperbaik peraturan/penguatkuasaan yang sedia 
ada dalam urus tadbir korporat dan PTSK. Dapatan ini juga boleh dijadikan panduan oleh 
syarikat dan pihak-pihak yang berkepentingan tentang aspek-aspek yang boleh 
mempengaruhi amalan PTSK sesebuah syarikat. Kajian ini juga membincangkan kesan 
status syariah syarikat dalam mempengaruhi tahap-tahap PTSK yang didedahkan. Kesan 
tersebut menerangkan sedikit sebanyak pengaruh prinsip-prinsip ajaran Islam (syariah) 
dalam memacu amalan PTSK. Tidak seperti data kerat rentas, data jangka panjang yang 
digunakan dalam kajian ini membolehkan penyelidik menguji ketekalan pada dapatan 
yang diperoleh dalam tempoh tertentu. Lebih lanjut lagi, kajian berkenaan PTSK yang 
sedia ada yang menggunakan teori pihak berkepentingan lebih cenderung untuk 
mengelaskan pihak-pihak berkepentingan sama ada dalam kumpulan pemilikan bertumpu 
ataupun pemilikan berbaur yang lebih cocok dengan ciri-ciri pemilikan korporat di 
negara-negara membangun di Barat. Memandangkan kajian ini berfokus pada perspektif 
negara membangun dalam kalangan negara di rantau Asia Tenggara, pengelasan pihak-
pihak berkepentingan kepada pemilikan pengurusan, pemilikan keluarga, pemilikan 
asing, dan pemilikan kerajaan boleh disifatkan sebagai wajar bagi menunjukkan keunikan 
yang ada pada struktur pemilikan korporat dalam negara membangun. Pada 
keseluruhannya, kajian ini menyumbang dalam memperpanjangkan penggunaan teori 
pihak berkepentingan dan teori luar jangkaan untuk menerangkan PTSK dalam konteks 
sesebuah negara Asia yang mempunyai ciri-ciri struktur pemilikan korporat yang tidak 
sama seperti yang ditunjukkan oleh ciri-ciri struktur pemilikan korporat di negara-negara 
maju di Barat. 
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APPENDIX A: SAMPLE FIRMS USED IN THE CURRENT STUDY 
 
NO. SYMBOL FIRM’S NAME 
1 AEON AEON CO. (M) BHD 
2 AFFIN AFFIN HOLDINGS BHD 
3 AIRASIA AIRASIA BHD 
4 AIRPORT MALAYSIA AIRPORT HOLDINGS BHD 
5 ALLIANZ ALLIANZ MALAYSIA BHD 
6 AMMB AMMB HOLDINGS BHD 
7 AMWAY AMWAY (M) HOLDINGS BHD 
8 ANNJOO ANN JOO RESOURCES BHD 
9 APM APM AUTOMOTIVE HOLDINGS BHD 
10 ASIAFLE ASIA FILE CORPORATION BHD 
11 ASIATIC ASIATIC DEVELOPMENT BERHAD  
(changed to GENTING PLANTATIONS BERHAD) (GENP) 
12 ASTRO ASTRO ALL ASIA NETWORKS PLC   
13 BAT BRITISH AMERICAN TOBACCO (M) BHD 
14 BERNAS PADIBERAS NASIONAL BHD 
15 BIMB BIMB HOLDINGS BHD 
16 BIPORT BINTULU PORT HOLDINGS BHD   
17 BJLAND BERJAYA LAND BHD 
18 BJTOTO BERJAYA SPORTS TOTO BHD 
19 BKAWAN BATU KAWAN BHD 
20 BLDPLNT BLD PLANTATION BHD 
21 BRDB BANDAR RAYA DEVELOPMENTS BHD 
22 BSTEAD BOUSTEAD HOLDINGS BHD 
23 BURSA BURSA MALAYSIA BHD 
24 CARLSBG CARLSBERG BREWERY MALAYSIA BHD 
25 CBIP CB INDUSTRIAL PRODUCT HOLDING BHD 
26 CCM CHEMICAL COMPANY OF MALAYSIA BHD 
27 CHINTEK CHIN TECK PLANTATIONS BHD 
28 CHINWEL CHIN WELL HOLDINGS BHD 
29 CMSB CAHYA MATA SARAWAK BHD 
30 COMMERZ CIMB GROUP HOLDINGS BHD 
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NO. SYMBOL FIRM’S NAME 
31 DAIMAN DAIMAN DEVELOPMENT BHD 
32 DIALOG DIALOG GROUP BHD 
33 DIGI DIGI.COM BHD 
34 DLADY DUTCH LADY MILK INDUSTRIES BHD 
35 DRBHCOM DRB-HICOM BHD 
36 E&O EASTERN & ORIENTAL BHD   
37 EONCAP EON CAPITAL BERHAD   
38 ESSO ESSO MALAYSIA BHD 
39 EVERGRN EVERGREEN FIBREBOARD BHD 
40 F&N FRASER & NEAVE HOLDINGS BHD 
41 FAREAST FAR EAST HOLDINGS BHD 
42 GAMUDA GAMUDA BHD 
43 GENTING GENTING BHD 
44 GNEALY GLENEALY PLANTATIONS (M) BHD 
45 GOLDIS GOLDIS BHD 
46 GUINESS GUINNESS ANCHOR BHD 
47 GUOCO GUOCOLAND (MALAYSIA) BHD 
48 HAPSENG HAP SENG CONSOLIDATED BHD    
49 HDBS HWANG-DBS (M) BHD 
50 HIAPTEK HIAP TECK VENTURE BHD 
51 HLBANK HONG LEONG BANK BHD 
52 HLFG HONG LEONG FINANCIAL GROUP BHD 
53 HLIND HONG LEONG INDUSTRIES BHD 
54 HSL HOCK SENG LEE BHD 
55 HUBLINE HUBLINE BHD 
56 HUMEIND HUME INDUSTRIES (M) BHD 
57 IGB IGB CORPORATION BHD 
58 IJM IJM CORPORATION BHD 
59 IJMPLNT IJM PLANTATIONS BHD 
60 IOICORP IOI CORPORATION BHD 
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NO. SYMBOL FIRM’S NAME 
61 JTIASA JAYA TIASA HOLDINGS BHD 
62 JTINTER JT INTERNATIONAL BHD 
63 KASSETS KRISASSETS HOLDINGS BHD 
64 KENANGA K & N KENANGA HOLDINGS BHD 
65 KFC KFC HOLDINGS (M) BHD 
66 KIANJOO KIAN JOO CAN FACTORY BHD 
67 KLCCP KLCC PROPERTY HOLDINGS BHD 
68 KLK KUALA LUMPUR KEPONG BHD 
69 KMLOONG KIM LOONG RESOURCES BHD 
70 KNM KNM GROUP BHD 
71 KOSSAN KOSSAN RUBBER INDUSTRIES BHD 
72 KPJ KPJ HEALTHCARE BHD 
73 KSENG KECK SENG (M) BHD 
74 KSL KSL HOLDINGS BHD 
75 KULIM KULIM (M) BHD 
76 KURASIA KURNIA ASIA BHD 
77 KWANTAS KWANTAS CORPORATION BHD 
78 LANDMRK LANDMARKS BHD 
79 LINGUI LINGUI DEVELOPMENT BHD 
80 LIONCOR LION CORPORATION BHD 
81 LIONDIV LION DIVERSIFIED HOLDINGS BHD 
82 LIONIND LION INDUSTRIES CORPORATION BHD 
83 LITRAK LINGKARAN TRANS KOTA HOLDINGS BHD 
84 LMCEMNT LAFARGE MALAYAN CEMENT BHD 
85 LPI LPI CAPITAL BHD 
86 MAHSING MAH SING GROUP BHD 
87 MANULFE MANULIFE HOLDINGS BHD 
88 MAS MALAYSIAN AIRLINE SYSTEM BHD 
89 MATRIX MATRIX INTERNATIONAL BERHAD  
(changed to BERJAYA ASSETS BERHAD) (BJASSET) 
90 MAYBANK MALAYAN BANKING BHD 
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NO. SYMBOL FIRM’S NAME 
91 MAYBULK MALAYSIAN BULK CARRIERS BHD 
92 MBMR MBM RESOURCES BHD 
93 MBSB MALAYSIA BUILDING SOCIETY BHD 
94 MEASAT MEASAT GLOBAL BERHAD 
95 MEDIA MEDIA PRIMA BHD 
96 MISC MISC BHD 
97 MKLAND MK LAND HOLDINGS BHD 
98 MMCCORP MMC CORPORATION BHD 
99 MNRB MNRB HOLDINGS BHD 
100 MPHB MULTI-PURPOSE HOLDINGS BHD 
101 MPI MALAYSIAN PACIFIC INDUSTRIES BHD 
102 MRCB MALAYSIAN RESOURCES CORPORATION BHD 
103 MSC MALAYSIA SMELTING CORPORATION BHD 
104 MTD MTD CAPITAL BERHAD 
105 MULPHA MULPHA INTERNATIONAL BHD 
106 NAIM NAIM HOLDINGS BHD 
107 NCB NCB HOLDINGS BHD 
108 NESTLE NESTLE (M) BHD 
109 NPC NPC RESOURCES BHD 
110 NSTP THE NEW STRAITS TIMES PRESS (M) BHD  
111 NTPM NTPM HOLDINGS BHD 
112 ORIENT ORIENTAL HOLDINGS BHD 
113 OSK OSK HOLDINGS BHD 
114 PACMAS PACIFICMAS BHD 
115 PBA PBA HOLDINGS BHD 
116 PBBANK PUBLIC BANK BHD 
117 PELIKAN PELIKAN INT.CORPORATION BHD 
118 PERSTIM PERUSAHAAN SADUR TIMAH M'SIA (PERSTIMA) BHD 
119 PETDAG PETRONAS DAGANGAN BHD 
120 PETGAS PETRONAS GAS BHD 
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NO. SYMBOL FIRM’S NAME 
121 PETRA PETRA PERDANA BERHAD 
122 PHARMA PHARMANIAGA BHD 
123 PLUS PLUS EXPRESSWAYS BERHAD 
124 POS POS MALAYSIA BHD 
125 PPB PPB GROUP BHD 
126 PROTON PROTON HOLDINGS BHD 
127 PRTASCO PROTASCO BHD 
128 PUNCAK PUNCAK NIAGA HOLDINGS BHD 
129 QL QL RESOURCES BHD 
130 QSR QSR BRANDS BHD 
131 RANHILL RANHILL BERHAD 
132 RESORT RESORTS WORLD BERHAD  
(changed to GENTING MALAYSIA BERHAD) (GENM) 
133 RHBCAP RHB CAPITAL BHD 
134 RPB RELIANCE PACIFIC BHD 
135 SCOMI SCOMI GROUP BHD 
136 SCOMIMR SCOMI MARINE BHD   
137 SHANG SHANGRI-LA HOTELS (M) BHD 
138 SHELL SHELL REFINING CO (F.O.M.) BHD 
139 SHL SHL CONSOLIDATED BHD 
140 SIME SIME DARBY BHD 
141 SOP SARAWAK OIL PALMS BHD 
142 SPB SARAWAK PLANTATION BHD 
143 SPSETIA SP SETIA BHD 
144 SSTEEL SOUTHERN STEEL BHD 
145 STAR STAR PUBLICATIONS (M) BHD 
146 SUBUR SUBUR TIASA HOLDINGS BHD 
147 SUNRISE SUNRISE BERHAD 
148 SUPERMX SUPERMAX CORPORATION BHD 
149 SURIA SURIA CAPITAL HOLDINGS BHD 
150 TA TA ENTERPRISE BHD 
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NO. SYMBOL FIRM’S NAME 
151 TAANN TA ANN HOLDINGS BHD 
152 TALIWRK TALIWORKS CORPORATION BHD 
153 TANJONG TANJONG PUBLIC LIMITED COMPANY 
154 TASEK TASEK CORPORATION BHD 
155 TCHONG TAN CHONG MOTOR HOLDINGS BHD 
156 TENAGA TENAGA NASIONAL BHD 
157 TIMECOM TIME DOTCOM BHD 
158 TITAN TITAN CHEMICAL CORPORATION BERHAD 
159 TM TELEKOM MALAYSIA BHD 
160 TOPGLOV TOP GLOVE CORPORATION BHD 
161 TSH TSH RESOURCES BHD 
162 TWS TRADEWINDS (M) BHD 
163 TWSCORP TRADEWINDS CORPORATION BHD 
164 UAC UAC BHD 
165 UCHITEC UCHI TECHNOLOGIES BHD 
166 UMCCA UNITED MALACCA BHD 
167 UMLAND UNITED MALAYAN LAND BHD 
168 UMW UMW HOLDINGS BHD 
169 UNICO UNICO-DESA PLANTATIONS BHD 
170 UNISEM UNISEM (M) BHD 
171 UTDPLT UNITED PLANTATIONS BHD   
172 VS V.S INDUSTRY BHD 
173 WASEONG WAH SEONG CORPORATION BHD 
174 WCT WCT BHD 
175 WTK WTK HOLDINGS BHD 
176 YNHPROP YNH PROPERTY BHD 
177 YTL YTL CORPORATION BHD 
178 YTLCMT YTL CEMENT BHD 
179 YTLLAND YTL LAND & DEVELOPMENT BHD 
180 YTLPOWR YTL POWER INTERNATIONAL BHD 
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APPENDIX B: REPRESENTATION OF SAMPLE 
 
NO CO NAME 
YEAR 
2009 2008 2007 2006 2005 
1 AEON 1,740,960 1,474,200 1,860,300 1,263,600 982,800 
2 AFFIN 3,765,816 2,271,437 3,851,280 2,396,435 1,900,349 
3 AIRASIA 3,805,688 2,053,691 3,793,963 3,552,620 3,723,072 
4 AIRPORT 4,367,000 2,431,000 3,322,000 2,376,000 2,123,000 
5 ALLIANZ 624,709 446,221 807,813 415,166 461,295 
6 AMMB 15,070,924 6,725,735 9,421,455 6,775,188 5,049,365 
7 AMWAY 1,200,015 1,134,261 1,035,630 1,076,726 1,076,726 
8 ANNJOO 1,463,580 616,795 1,395,628 515,738 262,441 
9 APM 536,256 292,320 469,728 461,664 508,032 
10 ASIAFLE 595,470 535,465 646,004 398,639 366,529 
11 ASIATIC 4,729,589 2,678,913 6,530,715 3,210,522 1,602,765 
12 ASTRO 5,802,506 4,274,219 6,769,093 10,719,114 10,115,743 
13 BAT 12,220,684 12,706,085 11,778,113 12,349,173 11,492,583 
14 BERNAS 879,651 564,482 992,547 936,099 630,338 
15 BIMB 1,280,148 779,966 1,203,376 675,558 608,002 
16 BIPORT 2,600,000 2,280,000 2,440,000 1,864,000 1,784,000 
17 BJLAND 5,232,771 3,846,869 7,218,977 608,930 841,356 
18 BJTOTO 5,876,981 6,457,924 6,822,702 6,484,944 6,052,615 
19 BKAWAN 4,481,576 3,444,013 4,969,841 3,205,125 2,199,881 
20 BLDPLNT 318,750 202,300 368,900 221,000 185,300 
21 BRDB 752,699 485,906 1,514,882 657,402 412,067 
22 BSTEAD 3,153,598 2,226,529 4,057,303 1,154,661 1,046,978 
23 BURSA 4,223,914 2,708,186 7,488,170 4,182,448 1,877,683 
24 CARLSBG 1,398,674 1,109,081 1,306,251 1,571,198 1,648,217 
25 CBIP 401,683 233,856 846,009 591,519 185,424 
26 CCM 918,671 886,269 1,155,355 1,288,777 1,023,999 
27 CHINTEK 685,224 525,339 712,633 497,930 460,819 
28 CHINWEL 275,258 185,323 302,512 351,568 228,556 
29 CMSB 487,580 375,568 754,431 480,991 304,737 
30 COMMERZ 45,347,868 20,931,755 37,115,996 24,623,476 15,697,622 
31 DAIMAN 352,084 298,281 417,647 314,216 285,497 
32 DIALOG 1,866,349 1,123,502 2,557,910 1,257,757 591,761 
33 DIGI 17,073,900 16,949,500 18,600,000 11,400,000 5,850,000 
34 DLADY 743,680 576,000 812,800 768,000 400,000 
35 DRBHCOM 1,952,569 1,401,597 1,602,095 1,692,780 1,187,799 
388 
 
 
NO CO NAME 
YEAR 
2009 2008 2007 2006 2005 
36 E&O 782,748 254,558 1,122,089 672,870 223,173 
37 EONCAP 4,741,548 2,218,268 4,575,178 4,575,178 3,500,704 
38 ESSO 696,600 572,400 556,200 807,300 675,000 
39 EVERGRN 718,200 277,020 816,000 585,600 427,200 
40 F&N 3,778,827 3,154,964 2,834,120 2,691,523 2,210,257 
41 FAREAST 885,489 705,375 803,780 598,783 352,551 
42 GAMUDA 5,243,581 3,791,686 9,606,844 3,984,376 2,395,103 
43 GENTING 27,193,568 13,704,081 29,258,091 24,381,190 15,094,168 
44 GNEALY 477,598 334,549 542,201 328,781 223,802 
45 GOLDIS 622,991 388,068 708,101 452,679 401,179 
46 GUINESS 2,099,581 1,525,595 1,676,644 1,842,798 1,721,959 
47 GUOCO 651,426 539,353 2,059,348 735,481 441,289 
48 HAPSENG 1,513,064 1,264,000 1,668,729 1,388,532 1,201,734 
49 HDBS 430,669 279,137 584,769 542,670 322,121 
50 HIAPTEK 468,182 222,632 635,156 461,634 188,255 
51 HLBANK 12,846,270 8,058,546 10,033,680 8,769,594 8,058,546 
52 HLFG 7,853,648 4,190,016 6,316,607 5,161,982 4,079,631 
53 HLIND 1,273,591 1,012,125 1,419,787 1,280,626 675,149 
54 HSL 617,637 268,031 629,114 344,232 310,996 
55 HUBLINE 392,515 249,489 631,520 250,097 265,164 
56 HUMEIND 759,126 600,417 738,092 657,782 764,863 
57 IGB 2,980,592 2,056,608 3,366,776 2,637,044 1,679,637 
58 IJM 5,933,637 2,623,495 7,359,168 3,907,887 2,103,850 
59 IJMPLNT 1,987,330 1,243,684 2,085,953 962,375 557,912 
60 IOICORP 36,499,212 21,896,125 47,008,692 22,817,502 14,196,667 
61 JTIASA 737,399 1,660,512 4,368,437 3,160,344 2,528,275 
62 JTINTER 1,273,673 528,328 1,067,958 1,022,753 655,466 
63 KASSETS 1,111,685 1,161,213 962,447 1,067,060 1,061,830 
64 KENANGA 391,526 860,580 1,024,558 826,256 908,882 
65 KFC 1,467,233 250,821 571,995 458,820 281,409 
66 KIANJOO 519,676 1,477,146 1,268,958 1,070,683 812,926 
67 KLCCP 3,213,216 519,676 755,085 538,338 547,884 
68 KLK 17,613,827 2,615,408 3,269,260 2,652,771 1,933,534 
69 KMLOONG 638,536 9,500,792 18,574,582 9,618,968 5,985,135 
70 KNM 3,083,365 453,379 679,324 280,747 187,950 
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NO CO NAME 
YEAR 
2009 2008 2007 2006 2005 
71 KOSSAN 868,078 1,603,168 8,058,688 2,268,485 535,610 
72 KPJ 1,373,940 447,628 623,481 748,177 311,741 
73 KSENG 941,434 534,126 718,796 407,997 303,585 
74 KSL 422,983 700,040 1,177,999 815,909 518,995 
75 KULIM 2,405,957 211,491 518,953 489,033 425,246 
76 KURASIA 1,042,500 1,412,714 2,357,690 1,433,325 649,494 
77 KWANTAS 564,136 495,000 1,432,500 1,680,000 1,845,000 
78 LANDMRK 596,046 532,968 1,343,679 714,558 587,285 
79 LINGUI 659,630 418,194 1,432,433 898,876 477,746 
80 LIONCOR 473,582 395,778 1,088,390 1,292,876 626,649 
81 LIONDIV 309,634 221,126 778,965 623,172 398,005 
82 LIONIND 977,083 258,028 1,415,469 4,397,554 1,400,264 
83 LITRAK 1,392,148 481,221 1,533,894 718,016 352,014 
84 LMCEMNT 5,310,597 904,872 1,908,268 1,460,928 1,367,922 
85 LPI 1,900,505 3,347,800 4,970,719 3,908,599 1,782,636 
86 MAHSING 1,275,072 1,310,932 1,678,548 1,297,060 1,146,861 
87 MANULFE 667,821 1,002,953 1,192,976 510,869 213,343 
88 MAS 4,545,332 420,930 647,584 467,475 464,418 
89 MATRIX 478,608 5,113,266 8,154,440 5,865,181 3,559,213 
90 MAYBANK 48,554,962 367,304 588,283 393,697 285,091 
91 MAYBULK 3,220,000 24,893,850 44,822,123 45,352,676 41,972,318 
92 MBMR 626,968 2,390,000 4,460,000 2,048,000 1,680,000 
93 MBSB 707,173 551,926 774,476 698,912 638,633 
94 MEASAT 717,477 570,640 462,150 402,050 216,228 
95 MEDIA 1,426,822 467,920 662,886 1,017,726 647,289 
96 MISC 31,350,707 947,730 2,366,411 1,900,751 1,019,679 
97 MKLAND 458,759 31,637,134 36,435,711 32,846,078 36,956,487 
98 MMCCORP 7,399,492 193,162 736,247 838,838 615,550 
99 MNRB 658,385 3,166,861 14,159,522 6,151,018 3,029,833 
100 MPHB 2,015,390 613,640 1,032,330 905,372 802,944 
101 MPI 1,122,882 1,039,421 2,214,638 1,259,104 734,477 
102 MRCB 1,243,446 1,227,824 1,951,925 2,224,775 2,088,350 
103 MSC 278,250 639,814 2,314,220 798,913 414,820 
104 MTD 809,400 225,000 600,000 558,750 450,000 
105 MULPHA 547,750 540,000 1,050,000 653,345 529,202 
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NO CO NAME 
YEAR 
2009 2008 2007 2006 2005 
106 NAIM 735,000 508,263 1,957,756 1,731,861 836,648 
107 NCB 1,462,486 360,000 1,180,000 780,000 745,000 
108 NESTLE 7,761,950 1,095,689 1,429,568 1,170,929 1,170,929 
109 NPC 238,800 6,331,500 6,155,625 5,815,600 5,698,350 
110 NSTP 384,493 211,797 432,283 503,969 532,208 
111 NTPM 628,992 299,520 293,280 230,880 193,440 
112 ORIENT 2,946,900 2,553,980 3,412,200 2,305,820 2,109,360 
113 OSK 1,151,994 666,338 1,559,233 1,237,103 597,169 
114 PACMAS 666,875 437,743 584,798 834,448 1,051,610 
115 PBA 284,893 284,837 397,446 404,013 496,650 
116 PBBANK 39,868,379 31,151,586 38,806,805 26,940,778 22,230,012 
117 PELIKAN 473,573 415,234 1,371,203 770,892 333,443 
118 PERSTIM 311,817 204,568 299,900 258,192 222,443 
119 PETDAG 8,643,050 7,152,869 8,593,377 4,947,401 3,934,078 
120 PETGAS 19,530,084 19,391,573 21,172,431 17,709,651 18,402,207 
121 PETRA 431,520 372,000 1,461,240 746,856 450,549 
122 PHARMA 471,772 376,562 344,421 436,410 530,482 
123 PLUS 16,300,000 14,900,000 16,400,000 14,050,000 15,300,000 
124 POS 1,192,198 1,084,793 1,309,641 2,589,087 2,069,607 
125 PPB 18,920,578 11,025,149 13,040,499 6,460,974 4,931,680 
126 PROTON 2,147,423 994,076 2,021,104 3,624,806 3,597,345 
127 PRTASCO 273,000 177,000 294,000 264,000 219,000 
128 PUNCAK 1,245,763 1,085,417 2,055,714 1,805,705 1,153,318 
129 QL 1,280,400 775,500 827,200 624,800 500,000 
130 QSR 947,933 695,911 785,507 820,570 765,723 
131 RANHILL 498,716 438,990 1,475,244 752,554 465,867 
132 RESORT 16,592,453 13,338,063 22,619,658 15,973,836 12,229,015 
133 RHBCAP 11,413,416 8,398,551 12,597,827 6,236,283 4,029,879 
134 RPB 343,421 412,105 446,447 248,980 187,164 
135 SCOMI 473,358 342,316 1,417,374 1,015,404 991,987 
136 SCOMIMR 340,849 230,898 703,689 557,087 584,973 
137 SHANG 805,200 726,000 1,113,200 946,000 550,000 
138 SHELL 3,156,000 2,430,000 3,390,000 3,180,000 2,925,000 
139 SHL 268,757 363,186 460,035 215,490 288,127 
140 SIME 53,904,891 31,249,212 71,509,598 17,912,438 14,854,243 
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NO CO NAME 
YEAR 
2009 2008 2007 2006 2005 
141 SOP 1,212,699 833,447 878,894 424,508 222,226 
142 SPB 1,123,627 927,765 1,195,786 927,765 848,733 
143 SPSETIA 3,985,879 3,151,765 5,024,361 3,419,454 2,142,777 
144 SSTEEL 830,446 553,631 727,690 529,170 296,984 
145 STAR 2,348,632 2,392,946 2,540,659 2,245,233 2,705,240 
146 SUBUR 418,000 355,300 716,000 968,000 540,000 
147 SUNRISE 1,020,504 707,922 1,433,848 894,870 494,544 
148 SUPERMX 1,266,141 212,216 577,890 473,107 400,455 
149 SURIA 405,159 236,579 963,315 263,495 283,328 
150 TA 1,206,896 906,402 1,826,523 1,056,137 803,727 
151 TAANN 1,032,376 772,672 1,502,418 2,038,996 958,696 
152 TALIWRK 625,313 734,351 897,198 631,009 464,987 
153 TANJONG 6,790,833 5,363,307 7,460,239 5,806,888 5,847,214 
154 TASEK 721,138 690,278 728,643 555,006 395,105 
155 TCHONG 2,096,640 779,520 1,397,760 840,000 907,200 
156 TENAGA 36,464,993 27,091,546 41,594,001 46,704,817 32,011,587 
157 TIMECOM 974,348 620,040 1,910,735 1,872,774 1,164,157 
158 TITAN 2,138,294 1,314,525 2,348,618 2,453,780 2,506,361 
159 TM 10,946,850 11,018,398 38,525,868 33,121,870 32,386,900 
160 TOPGLOV 3,077,142 1,053,727 1,953,585 2,650,909 1,299,241 
161 TSH 815,047 558,350 1,329,336 571,605 488,954 
162 TWS 818,259 889,411 1,615,764 806,400 741,176 
163 TWSCORP 658,089 353,930 1,548,431 482,850 370,704 
164 UAC 259,684 191,229 319,954 295,587 354,355 
165 UCHITEC 502,821 345,071 1,001,455 1,166,695 1,117,082 
166 UMCCA 1,082,760 770,529 1,078,740 608,383 544,060 
167 UMLAND 335,970 241,705 553,378 281,139 220,729 
168 UMW 7,107,661 5,624,539 8,387,978 3,928,461 2,991,080 
169 UNICO 706,560 534,336 989,184 507,840 388,608 
170 UNISEM 850,481 330,009 777,879 737,427 621,227 
171 UTDPLT 2,838,951 2,143,783 2,643,305 2,029,309 1,467,347 
172 VS 230,019 217,440 572,173 274,585 188,328 
173 WASEONG 1,613,837 653,715 1,691,189 842,543 747,713 
174 WCT 2,022,030 1,172,678 2,729,855 888,676 482,615 
175 WTK 468,674 317,560 1,073,133 1,245,386 563,701 
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NO CO NAME 
YEAR 
2009 2008 2007 2006 2005 
176 YNHPROP 616,945 449,104 1,067,088 732,801 427,741 
177 YTL 13,866,731 11,692,071 13,103,712 10,778,200 8,370,562 
178 YTLCMT 2,104,613 1,152,631 2,451,694 1,960,711 1,125,754 
179 YTLLAND 911,861 378,648 616,615 282,760 227,314 
180 YTLPOWR 15,134,946 11,106,033 14,465,606 10,925,700 11,494,365 
Total market 
capitalisation  
of the sample firms 
(1)   782,796,326    544,295,455       894,324,499    641,249,974    513,978,862  
Total market 
capitalisation of all 
firms listed on the 
Main Board (2)   974,136,594    633,521,897    1,048,950,411    803,373,973    659,848,595  
Representation of 
Sample (1:2)              80.36               85.92                  85.26               79.82               77.89  
Number of 
companies  
in Main Board 849 634 636 649 646 
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APPENDIX C: DESCRIPTION OF CSRR CHECKLIST USED IN THE 
CURRENT STUDY 
No 
CSR dimensions 
and its components 
Code 
Description of CSR 
components 
Description of CSR 
sub-components 
 ENVIRONMENT    
1 Pollution control/ 
abatement  
 
 
E1 To control / reduce / 
eliminate pollutions, such 
as noise, air and water 
pollutions. For example, 
the discharge of 
pollutants such as 
effluent (chemical waste) 
may cause land and 
water contamination 
while emissions (harmful 
gases such as greenhouse 
gas and carbon dioxide) 
may contribute to the 
climate change / global 
warming problems. 
 
 
Environmental 
management system 
(EMS) in place; the use 
of green products (e.g. 
CFC-free gas, 
biodegradable / 
environmental-friendly 
products); proper waste 
disposal process; 
research and 
development (R&D) for 
pollution control / 
abatement; zero burning 
policy; statement 
indicating that firm’s 
operations are non-
polluting or that they are 
in compliance with 
regulations and relevant 
Acts (e.g. Environmental 
Quality Act, 1974); 
statement indicating that 
pollution from operation 
has been / will be 
reduced. 
2 Environmental 
conservation and 
repairs 
 
  
E2 To protect plants and 
animals (e.g. endangered 
wildlife), natural areas 
(e.g. habitats, land, 
water, reservoirs, natural 
wonders), and interesting 
/ important structures / 
buildings (e.g. historical 
structure) from damaging 
effects of human activity, 
and repairs to 
environmental damages.  
 
To restore historical 
buildings / structures; 
design buildings / 
facilities harmonious 
with the environment 
through increasing 
landscaping and green 
space, and adopting 
green technology / 
building); conserve 
biodiversity of 
ecosystem through 
conservation and 
rehabilitation projects; 
repairs to environmental 
damages that include 
land reclamation, 
reforestation, beach 
clean-up, soil 
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No 
CSR dimensions 
and its components 
Code 
Description of CSR 
components 
Description of CSR 
sub-components 
conservation, erosion 
control; contributions in 
terms of cash or art / 
sculptures to beautify the 
environment. 
3 Energy conservation  
 
 
E3 Conservation and 
efficient use of energy, 
reduction in energy 
consumption.  
 
 
  
 
Types and total energy 
usage / saving in firm; 
energy conservation; 
development (research) / 
use of alternative / 
renewable / energy (e.g. 
solar power, biogas, 
biodiesel) / technology 
(e.g. conversion of 
recycled waste into 
energy, Life Cycle 
Analysis (LCA); voicing 
firm’s concern about 
energy shortage; firm’s 
policy on energy. 
4 Resource 
conservation and 
waste management  
 
 
E4 Conservation and 
efficient use of resources 
/ materials through 
reduction, recycling and 
reuse of resources and 
waste. 
 
Water consumption 
(total usage / saving of 
water) and efforts to 
reduce water 
consumption; types and 
total usage / saving of 
other resources / 
materials used by firm; 
use of recycled (e.g. 
recycling glass, metals, 
oil, water, papers, waste) 
/ treated (e.g. treated 
water, waste) resources / 
materials.  
5 ISO 14001 / 14004 
(Environmental 
Management 
System) certification  
E5 Certification granted on 
firm's environmental 
management system. 
Certification of ISO 
14001 / 14004. 
6 Environmental 
awards  
E6 Awards received in 
relation to environmental 
commitments undertaken 
by firm.  
Best practice in 
environmental reporting 
/ energy conservation 
programme.  
7 Other commitments 
towards 
environmental 
protection / 
sustainability. 
 
E7 Other commitments to 
protect / sustain the 
environment, which 
includes educating the 
community on 
environmental issues, 
supporting public or 
private actions / events 
Organise / participate / 
sponsor for 
environmental 
educational / awareness 
programmes; research / 
studies of general 
environmental issues; 
sustainability-related 
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CSR dimensions 
and its components 
Code 
Description of CSR 
components 
Description of CSR 
sub-components 
 relating to environmental 
protection. 
information. 
 COMMUNITY    
1 Education  
 
 
C1 Provision of education / 
any educational-related 
activities, practical 
training, scholarship and 
sponsorship for 
educational-related 
activities to the 
community. 
Organise tuitions, 
motivational talks and 
seminars; sponsor for, 
upgrading library, 
motivational talks and 
seminars. 
2 Charity  
 
 
C2 Aid to improve the lives 
of underprivileged. 
 
Charitable donations / 
‘sadaqah’ (in cash / in-
kinds) and activities for 
the elderly, disabled, 
orphanage, disaster’s 
victims, single-parents, 
indigenous groups; 
amount and recipients of 
such donations; details 
information on charity 
activities done.  
3 Art, culture and 
heritage  
 
 
C3 Organise / support for 
art, cultural and heritage-
related activities. 
 
Related shows and 
exhibitions; participation 
/ contribution (cash / in-
kinds) in related 
activities. 
4 Equality in 
community 
 
 
C4 To promote equality in 
the community, for 
examples, in terms of 
rights and opportunities, 
learn to respect each 
other, equal opportunity 
for women, the disabled 
and minority / indigenous 
groups. 
Scholarship / research 
grant for women 
scientists; campaign to 
stop violence against 
women; making building 
and public facilities 
barrier-free for the 
disabled (e.g. special 
parking place, restroom, 
walking areas). 
5 Youth development 
and graduate 
employment 
programme  
C5 To enhance knowledge 
and skill of youth and 
groom them to become 
valuable human capital 
assets.  
Management trainee 
programme, trainings for 
youth. 
6 Employees 
participation in 
community service  
C6 Employees’ involvement 
in community-related 
activities.  
Employees’ participation 
in community activities 
such as fund raising and 
blood donation events. 
7 Community health 
and safety 
C7 Promoting for 
community’s health and 
Organise / support for 
public health and safety 
projects such as 
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and its components 
Code 
Description of CSR 
components 
Description of CSR 
sub-components 
safety.  
 
awareness talks and 
exhibitions on general 
health / specific diseases 
/ road safety; medical 
check-up provision; 
sports / recreational 
activities; aiding medical 
research. 
8 Community and 
infrastructure 
support 
 
 
C8 Provision of basic 
amenities, employment 
opportunities, and other 
facilities for 
community’s benefit. 
Provision of training / 
consultation to educate 
the community; 
employment for local 
workforce / basic 
amenities (e.g. road, 
school, community hall, 
playground, place of 
worship) and other 
facilities (e.g. relocation 
of squatters’ community) 
for the benefit of the 
community. 
9 Community awards 
 
C9 Awards / recognitions 
received in relation to 
community initiatives / 
achievements. 
Best practice in 
community reporting. 
10 Community 
engagement 
C10 To understand and 
address community’s 
concerns, needs and 
wants, in a way to 
improve firm’s decision-
making and 
accountability towards 
CSR.   
Channels to voice out 
community’s concerns / 
grievances / complaints 
(e.g. special dedicated 
website / unit); 
community engagement 
through dialogues / 
partnership with firm. 
11 Support for national 
pride / government 
sponsored 
campaigns  
 
C11 Participate in 
government social 
campaigns / collaborate 
with government’s 
ministries / agencies in 
social-related projects. 
School adoption 
programme; training for 
unemployed graduates. 
 WORKPLACE    
1 Employee health and 
safety (H&S)  
 
 
W1 To promote employees’ 
health and safety at 
workplace. 
 
  
 
Management of 
pollutants / irritants / 
hazards at workplace; 
H&S policy / 
management system; 
H&S research / 
education / training; 
conducive working 
environment; zero 
accident / statistics on 
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No 
CSR dimensions 
and its components 
Code 
Description of CSR 
components 
Description of CSR 
sub-components 
accidents happened at 
workplace / toxic hazard 
released; compliance on 
H&S standards & 
regulation; provision of 
low cost healthcare for 
employees. 
2 Human capital 
development  
 
 
W2 Education, training and 
career development 
programme to enhance 
employees’ knowledge, 
skills and opportunities 
to reach their full 
potential.  
 
In-house / outside 
trainings / seminars; 
scholarships for 
continuing education; 
establishment of training 
centres; nature of / cost 
associated with 
trainings; number of 
employees attended the 
trainings / seminars; 
clear career development 
programmes; 
opportunity for 
employees to reach their 
full potential. 
3 Workplace diversity 
and equal 
opportunity  
 
 
W3 Employees’ composition 
and workplace diversity 
programmes / policies / 
practices. 
 
Employees’ 
classification (e.g. by 
gender, ethnics, 
qualifications); policies / 
guidelines on 
employees’ rights (e.g. 
value and respect each 
other); provide equal 
opportunity / non-
discrimination to all 
employees, regardless of 
gender, ethnics, 
disability, etc. 
4 Employee 
appreciation  
 
 
W4 Rewards and recognition 
given as a token of 
appreciation on 
employees’ excellent job 
performance and loyalty. 
Statements showing 
gratitude and thanking 
employees; excellent 
performance’s awards / 
rewards; information on 
the existence of or 
amount and value of 
shares offered to 
employees under a share 
purchase scheme or 
pension programme; 
share option scheme / 
any other profit sharing 
schemes. 
5 OHSAS 18001 W5 Certification granted on Certification of OHSAS 
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Description of CSR 
sub-components 
(Occupational 
Health and Safety 
Management 
Systems) 
certification  
firm's H&S management 
system. 
 
18001. 
6 Employee relation / 
engagement 
 
 
W6 To improve / maintain 
good employer-employee 
relationship, which may 
in turns, improve job 
satisfaction and 
employee motivation. 
 
Employee dialogues; 
satisfaction surveys; 
channels for employees’ 
concerns / grievances / 
complaints; information 
on employees’ turnover, 
firm’s stability / 
restructuring (which 
requires employees’ 
relocation / retraining)/ 
future prospects of firm 
(e.g. clear missions and 
visions); employee 
participation in firm’s 
strategy formulation. 
7 Workplace awards  W7 Awards received in 
recognition of firm’s 
excellence in workplace 
practice. 
Best employer’s award; 
safety award; best 
practice in workplace 
reporting. 
8 Employee 
remuneration, 
benefit and 
assistance  
 
 
W8 Remuneration, assistance 
and benefits provided by 
firm to its employee.  
 
Competitive pays; 
emergency fund to help 
employees who are in 
need; assistance / 
guidance / counseling for 
employees on any 
personal / work related 
problem; personal health 
insurance / medical care 
for employees and / or 
their families, housing / 
car / computer loan). 
9 Work-life balance  
 
 
W9 To enable employees to 
have a balance between 
their work and life.  
 
To facilitate employees 
with family’s 
commitments (e.g. 
provision of childcare 
centre, maternity / 
paternity leave, flexible 
working arrangement / 
teleworking, family 
day); to promote 
employees’ wellbeing 
(e.g. gym, sports / 
recreational / wellness 
programmes, medical 
check-up, talks and 
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No 
CSR dimensions 
and its components 
Code 
Description of CSR 
components 
Description of CSR 
sub-components 
seminar on health and 
wellness). 
10 Industrial relations W10 Relationship between 
firm and industry (trade 
unions). 
Firm’s relationship / 
engagement with trade 
unions; any strikes, 
industrial actions / 
activities and resultant 
losses in term of time 
and productivity; 
information on how 
industrial action was 
reduced / negotiated. 
 MARKETPLACE    
1 Product 
development  
 
 
M1 Developments of green 
products / packaging. 
 
 
Development of 
environmental friendly 
products / packaging 
(e.g. biodegradable 
products / packaging; 
reusable packaging); 
information on research 
and development (R&D) 
involved in product 
development (e.g. 
amount of money spent, 
R&D’s benefits); use of 
green technology in 
product development; 
controversial-free 
products (free from any 
controversial / 
uncertainty / ‘al-gharar’ 
issues, e.g. listed in 
Shariah-approved 
shares; contracts, 
transactions and dealings 
are performed in 
adherence to the Islamic 
principles such as 
avoidance of interest / 
‘riba’, unfair trading, 
hoarding, fraud, breach 
of contract). 
2 Product / service 
quality  
 
 
M2 Certification / awards 
received on firm’s 
products / services.  
 
Certifications such as 
MS ISO 15189, ISO / 
IEC 17025 (quality for 
lab testing), GMS, ISO 
9001 (Quality 
Management System); 
certified by RSPO, 
MSQH; Halal 
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No 
CSR dimensions 
and its components 
Code 
Description of CSR 
components 
Description of CSR 
sub-components 
certification on products 
(e.g. MS1480 HACCP, 
MS1500 Halal). 
3 Product / service 
safety  
 
 
M3 Concern about customer 
health and safety  
 
Policy preserving 
customer health and 
safety; compliance with 
local, national or 
international regulations; 
compliance with code of 
marketing practices; 
safety research 
conducted on firm’s 
products; safety 
standards met / improved 
sanitary procedures 
applied in the 
manufacturing process. 
4 Corporate 
governance  
 
 
M4 Commitment to the 
highest standards of 
integrity, openness and 
accountability. 
Compliance with best 
practice / relevant law 
and regulation; 
demonstrating ethical 
behaviour; adopting the 
ethics charter; 
establishing ethics 
committee; received 
corporate governance 
award. 
5 Supplier relation / 
engagement 
 
M5 To promote transparent 
and ethical procurement 
whilst ensuring 
suppliers’ quality and 
satisfaction.  
 
 
Trainings provided by 
firm to suppliers; 
communication / 
discussion / dialogue 
with suppliers on the 
conditions imposed on 
them (e.g. need to be 
socially responsible); 
nature  and location of 
outsourced operations; 
performance of firm in 
honouring contracts with 
suppliers (e.g. meeting 
payment schedules, 
surveys to measure 
suppliers’ satisfaction, 
drivers behind the choice 
of suppliers). 
6 Customer relation / 
satisfaction 
 
M6 To achieve customer 
satisfaction / maintain 
good firm-customer 
relationship. 
Providing timely / 
prompt delivery of 
product / service (e.g. 
timely completion of 
houses for firms in 
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components 
Description of CSR 
sub-components 
 properties industry); 
friendly facilities to 
customers; measuring 
customer satisfaction 
(e.g. survey / 
consultation); customer 
service (e.g. address 
customers’ complaints 
on products / services, 
after sales service); 
analyse customer / 
consumer interest (e.g.  
consumer needs / 
concerns, marketing 
practice); consumer 
education; product 
knowledge. 
7 Stakeholder 
engagement 
M7 Dialogue / partnership 
with stakeholders (other 
than community / 
employees / suppliers / 
customers), for 
examples, non-
government 
organizations (NGOs) / 
special-interest groups 
(e.g. environmentalists) / 
investors, with the aim of 
improving firm’s 
decision-making and 
accountability towards 
CSR.  
Provide channels for 
stakeholders’ concern / 
grievances / complaints 
(e.g. special dedicated 
website / unit / investor 
relation); engage with 
stakeholders through 
dialogues (e.g. to 
understand / address 
their concerns, needs, 
and wants). 
 
 
8 Other stakeholders’ 
matters  
 
 
M8 Other matters relate to 
the stakeholders. 
 
 
Provide new knowledge 
/ awareness programme 
to the stakeholders; 
communicating firm’s 
policy on stakeholders 
(e.g. fairness / equality 
in stakeholders’ 
transaction). 
9 Marketplace awards M9 Awards / recognition 
received in relation to 
marketplace practices. 
Certification / 
recognition granted from 
external assurance 
report; best practice in 
marketplace reporting. 
 OTHERS     
1 CSR reporting 
standard / quality  
O1 Initiatives undertaken to 
produce a high quality of 
CSR reporting; 
recognition received in 
Compliance with the 
Global Reporting 
Initiative (GRI) 
Reporting Standard / 
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sub-components 
relation to CSR 
reporting. 
 
Quality; awards received 
in recognition of best 
practice in firm's overall 
CSR reporting (e.g. 
ACCA Malaysia 
Sustainability Reporting 
Awards (ACCA 
MaSRA), formerly 
known as ACCA 
Malaysia Environmental 
and Social Reporting 
Awards (ACCA 
MESRA); National 
Annual Corporate 
Report Awards 
(NACRA). 
2 CSR committee  
 
 
O2 Establishment of a 
department / committee / 
management structure 
within the firm in 
relation to CSR.  
 
Health and safety review 
department / committee; 
CSR committee; 
Environmental 
committee; the inclusion 
of CSR as a senior 
management’s and board 
level’s agenda. 
3 Other commitment 
statements to CSR. 
 
 
O3 CSR development plans / 
policy / strategy / 
performance / reporting 
media. 
 
CSR (e.g. environmental 
/ social) policy / 
guidelines / strategy and 
its alignment to business 
strategy (e.g. firm’s 
mission and vision 
related to CSR); 
acknowledgement of 
success / failure in 
achieving                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                         
targets; social and 
environmental audit; 
being a member of  
Roundtable on 
Sustainable Palm Oil 
(RSPO) / Institute of 
Corporate Responsibility 
Malaysia (ICRM); 
value-added statement. 
 
403 
 
APPENDIX D: RESEARCH INSTRUMENT (CODING SHEET) OF THE 
CURRENT STUDY 
 
CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY (CSR) REPORTING CHECKLIST 
Company’s Name:  
Year of Reporting:  
Location of Reporting in Annual Report:  
 
No CSRR CODE Quality 
Score* 
Quantity** 
 
Remarks 
0 1 2 3 
ENVIRONMENT 
1 Pollution control / abatement E1       
2 Environmental conservation and repairs E2       
3 Energy conservation  E3       
4 Resource conservation and waste management  E4       
5 ISO 14001 / 14004 (Environmental 
Management System) certification  
E5       
6 Environmental awards  E6       
7 Other commitments towards environmental 
protection / sustainability 
E7       
 Total Environment / 21        
COMMUNITY 
1 Education  C1       
2 Charity  C2       
3 Art, culture and heritage  C3       
4 Equality in community C4       
5 Youth development and graduate employment 
programme  
C5       
6 Employees participation in community service  C6       
7 Community health and safety C7       
8 Community and infrastructure support C8       
9 Community awards  C9       
10 Community engagement C10       
11 Support for national pride / government 
sponsored campaigns  
C11       
 Total Community / 33        
WORKPLACE 
1 Employee health and safety (H&S)  W1       
2 Human capital development  W2       
3 Workplace diversity and equal opportunity  W3       
4 Employee appreciation  W4       
5 OHSAS 18001 (Occupational Health and 
Safety Management Systems) certification  
W5       
6 Employee relation / engagement W6       
7 Workplace awards  W7       
8 Employee remuneration, benefit and 
assistance  
W8       
9 Work-life balance  W9       
10 Industrial relations W10       
 Total Workplace / 30        
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MARKETPLACE 
1 Product development  M1       
2 Product / service quality  M2       
3 Product / service safety M3       
4 Corporate governance  M4       
5 Supplier relation / engagement M5       
6 Customer relation / satisfaction M6       
7 Stakeholder engagement  M7       
8 Other stakeholders’ matters  M8       
9 Marketplace awards M9       
 Total Marketplace / 27        
REPUTATION / OTHERS  
1 CSR reporting standard / quality  O1       
2 CSR committee  O2       
3 Other commitment statements to CSR O3       
 Total Reputation / Others / 9        
TOTAL CSRR / 120 
 
* Using the weightage procedure, the value of each item disclosed is measured by assigning a value of 3 (if 
there is quantitative disclosure – highest weightage); 2 (if there is qualitative specific information); and 1 
(if there is general qualitative disclosure – lowest weightage). If there is no disclosure made, a value of ‘0’ 
is assigned. 
 
** Number of sentences. 
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APPENDIX E: OUTPUTS FROM FREELON (2010) RECAL AND HAYES AND 
KRIPPENDORFF (2007) SPSS MACRO 
 
1)  Output from Freelon (2010) ReCal 
 
 
FILENAME  liability test input.csv       
filesize  2000 bytes       
n columns 2       
n variables 1       
n coders 
per var 
2       
          
  Percent 
Agreement 
Scott's 
Pi 
Cohen's 
Kappa 
Krippendorff's 
Alpha 
N 
Agreements 
N 
Disagreements 
N Cases N 
Decisions 
Variable 1  
(cols 1 & 2) 
96 0.8725
91177 
0.87291
5012 
0.872750438 384 16 400 800 
          
* * *         
 
 
2) Output from Hayes and Krippendorff (2007) SPSS macro 
 
 
Run MATRIX procedure: 
 
Krippendorff's Alpha Reliability Estimate 
 
 
             Alpha    LL95%CI    UL95%CI      Units   Observrs      
Pairs 
Nominal      .8728      .7455      .9682   400.0000     2.0000   
400.0000 
 
Probability (q) of failure to achieve an alpha of at least alphamin: 
   alphamin          q 
      .9000      .5728 
      .8000      .1086 
      .7000      .0076 
      .6700      .0018 
      .6000      .0002 
      .5000      .0000 
 
Number of bootstrap samples: 
  5000 
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Judges used in these computations: 
 Obsv1    Obsv2 
 
==================================================== 
 
Observed Coincidence Matrix 
    628.00     16.00 
     16.00    140.00 
 
Expected Coincidence Matrix 
    518.26    125.74 
    125.74     30.26 
 
Delta Matrix 
       .00      1.00 
      1.00       .00 
 
Rows and columns correspond to following unit values 
       .00      1.00 
 
Examine output for SPSS errors and do not interpret if any are found 
 
------ END MATRIX ----- 
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